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The mission of the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) is "to create sustainable 
increases in the productivity of irrigated agriculture within the overall context of water basins and 
the analysis of water resource systems as a whole". In pursuit of this mission, IIMI has worked in 
Nepal and with Nepal Government agencies and with Nepal non-governmental organizations 
since 1986. Much of IIMI's work in Nepal has focused on studies of farmer managed irrigation 
systems. These studies have awakened us to the importance of issues concerned with waterrights 
in Nepal because of  their effects on the productivity of irrigation systems. IIMl's Nepal studies 
have also stimulated us to consider such issues elsewhere in the world. 
Therefore IIMI was very pleased to be given a Ford Foundation grant for a study of water rights 
in Nepal. One of  the activities under this grant was to collaborate in a workshop with other Ford 
Foundation grantees working on related topics. The  proceedings of this workshoparedocumented 
in this volume. 
We believe that the issues discussed here are fundamental not only to make irrigation systems 
perform well, but also to improving lives of rural peoples. Irrigation is the single largest user of 
freshwater resources:  about 80% of the worlds consumption of  freshwater is for irrigation. 
However, irrigation systems and water sources developed for irrigation are increasingly being 
used  to serve other purposes as well, including drinking water supply and  domestic water. 
Assurances of rights to water for these uses as well as irrigation is critical to the livelihoods and 
welfare of  rural peoples around the world. 
Icommend the authorsofthe paper sin  this volume for bringing togetherafascinatingandvaluable 
discussion of a variety of issues related to water rights in Nepal and India. I hope that the readers 
vii will be able to make use of the information and insights in this volume to clarify and strengthen 
the water rights so necessary for effective and equitable use of the worldis limited freshwater 
resources. 
IIMI wishes to thank the paper presenters, chairpersons, discussants and other participants of the 
workshop which was jointly organized by IIMI, FREEDEAL, the Department of Agrarian Law 
(Wageningen Agriculture University) andthe  Sanders Institute (Erasmus University, Rotterdam). 
The support extended by the Study Advisory Group, the Study Working Group, the National 
Planning Commission and the Department of Irrigation, Government of Nepal, is gratefully 
acknowledged. Funding for organizing the workshop was provided  by  the Ford Foundation. 
Finally,  IIMI wishes to thank the editors and contributors of this volume. 
Jeffrey Brewer 
IIMI Representative for South Asia. 
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Vlll Speech by the Chief Guest, Mr. R. L. Kayastha, 
Joint-Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources 
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the organizers of this workshop for giving 
me the opportunity to inaugurate this workshop on there “Water Rights, Conflict and Policy”. The 
three main features of water resources in Nepal are abundance, scarcity, and competition. Nepal 
is rich in water, and the resources have to be harnessed sustainably for the development of our 
society. Whilewatermaybeabundant,thereisscarcityatcertain  timesinmany pansofthecountry 
to meet irrigation and domestic needs. Further competition is on  the rise within and between 
different sectors, such as irrigation, hydro-electricity, and drinking water. As we continue in our 
efforts to harness and manage water, we have to follow an optimum approach to utilize the 
available resources. More specifically, we have to answer questions, such as, how do we make 
efficient, productive, and equitable use of water and  how do we allocate water to different users 
within and between different sectors ? 
The Water Resources Act of 1992provides one framework for utilization and allocation of water. 
Accordingto theAct, theownershipofall waterwithin theKingdomofNepalisvestedin  thestate. 
Right to use water is obtained either through license or is granted free for certain uses. The Act 
has laid down proiority for use, the first of which is drinking water and domestic use, followed by 
irrigation, fisheries, hydro-electricity, etc. The Act provides broad guidelines on how water is to 
be utilized. However, there are specific cases where the laws and local water rights have to be 
reconciled. 
Itistimetostrikeabalancebetween,ontheonehand,theprincipleofeminentdomain,forthegood 
of general public, the rights of  existing right-holders, and on  the other, decentralization  and 
centralization, with the objective of ensuring social justice. Decentralization will mean not only 
transferring power and financial autonomy to the local bodies, but also respecting local practices 
and customs. It is in this context that the question of development of infrastructure for delivery of 
services has to be considered. In the development and management of water resources, therefore, 
issues of water rights and participation of all stakeholden in planning and allocation becomes and 
ix important element. The first challenge is to bring the stakeholders within the planning framework 
and, subsequently, to set out appropriate institutional mechanisms for the management of water 
resources. Sustainable management of water would also depend upon our success to address the 
issue of local water rights and organizations. 
The development and management of water  have conventionally emphasized the technical, 
economic, and to some  extent, the organizational and institutional aspects of project formulation 
and execution. The issue of water right is important, not just for the reasons of social justice, its 
neglect may lead to conflicts, which, in turn, may result in unjust or inefficient use of water or 
delays in our efforts to manage the water for our common good. 
Water rights study has to be included asmandatory aspect of  feasibility studies of water resource 
projects and of water management. The papers to be presented in this conference, the discussions 
thatfollow,asalsothepanelsession,Iamsure  wouldprovideinsightsofwaterrightsissues,  which 
will be of great help in our efforts to chart out the course for sustainable water management. I 
believe that  the suggestions concerning water rights will  positively  contribute  towards this 
endeavor and I wish the participants a productive discussion. 
Before 1  close may remarks, I declare this workshop to be opened. 
Thank you 
X Address by Dr. Ujjwal Pradhan, 
. 
I 
Program Officer, Ford Foundation 
Respected Chairperson, Chief Guest Mr. Kayastha, Distinguished Participants, 
I am  very happy to be back once again with you, my colleagues and friends, to be discussing a 
topic lose to my own personal work. 
The  Ford Foundation has been engaged for more than four decades in addressing the social needs 
and development challenges of India and her neighbors. The New Delhi office program activities 
have now begun to  cluster around three common sets of concerns. These include rural community 
resource management, women’s status and well being, and and diversity and pluralism. 
The Rural Poverty and Resources program in the New Delhi office concentrates on evolving more 
equitable,  productive, and sustainable management institutions and practices for forests and 
irrigation. With a rural population in India and Nepal of over 700 million, competition for these 
resources  is intense. The future of  South Asia’s  embattled  natural  resources depends on  a 
combination of more equitable and defensible rights for rural people, improved technologies and 
skills, and policies and procedures that encourage rural people to invest in their land, water and 
forests.  Serving the  needs of  vulnerable  groups, such  as women  in  forest communities of 
downstream water users, are special challenges that add to the complexities of  managing scarce 
natural resources. 
The New Delhi  office seeks to address these issues by  facilitating  government-community 
partnerships.  Current programs in joint forest management and water resources management 
experiment with new relationships between the government, which usually has formal mandate, 
staff  and budget  to  control  the resource,  and  the  community  of  users,  who  usually  have 
considerable local knowledge, skills and resources. Foundation grants help evolve participatory 
mechanism of planning and investment in the resource, new sharing frameworks between local 
communities and the State, and greater community empowerment over key resources. 
Irrigated land produces two-thirds of India’s food production, and its careful management is vital 
for sustaining  both foodsecurity and rural livelihoods. Since the mid-l980s, Foundation programs 
xi have concentrated on the development and management of small-scale irrigation systems, such 
as ground water and hill irrigation. Cumulatively, small-scale systems serve more than half of all 
irrigatedlandinIndiaandNepa1.  Theyreachresource-poor farmersnothenefitingfrom enormous 
state investments in large facilities. Their decentralized nature lends themselves to local manage- 
ment and potentially  high  productivity.  And, significant participatory  experiments  by  both 
government and non-government actors in small systems provide a strong platform on which 10 
build larger and more systematic programs. 
During the last five years, Foundation programs have been concentrated mostly in Nepal and the 
Indian states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, which together have a population of over 100 million 
people. These regions were chosen because of their combination of viable local management 
patterns,range of government experimentation. and strong non-government actors involved in the 
water  sector.  But  small  systems  also face  a  variety  of  threats  such as  siltation  and poor 
maintenance. The financial resources to maintain even small systems cannot always be met from 
within the community, and supra-local institutions are often needed to help manage water over 
longer distances. 
The Foundation  seeks to support the emergence of water management systems that are more 
equitable, productive and sustainable, Past experience in small-scale irrigation suggests that to 
achieve this goal it is essential to enable rural communities to assume more decision-making and 
implementing authority over watcr systems, and to effect a shift in the government’s role at the 
local level from prime mover toenahler and arbiter ofinter-group interests. Making this transition 
requires forging  new  financial  and institutional  partnerships  between  government agencies 
responsible for  irrigation and thecommunities that depend on it. These new relationships can lead 
to improved government investment procedures and support services and, greater efficacy of 
management by the community. Developing viable models of these relationships is the short-term 
goal of the water resources management  program of the Foundation. 
While projects that foster better operational partnerships for water management are critical at the 
fieldlevel.equally important is the institutional framework that governs basic access to water. The 
water rights framework in India and Nepal suffer from a variety of anachronisms, imprecisions 
and lacunae. Surface water is regulated by colonial laws that assumed all-encompassing State 
control.Groundwater,ontheotherhand.  isaprivatebutindefensibleproperty. Legally, those wilh 
capital and technology can drill a new or deeper well, causing a neighbor’s to go  dry. This often 
results in transferring water to the richer, or from drinking purposes to irrigation. Other conflicts 
are also increasingly common. Newer upstream systems sometimes  take water from downstream 
users; municipalities  appropriate water  from  irrigators without compensation;  industry takes 
water from both rural and urban users; and water polluters in effect steal water from everyone. 
Rural people cannot be expected to invest their scarce rcsources in improving local water systems 
if they cannot he assured that their access to water is secure. 
Signs of growing competition for water are becoming evident. In the mid-hills region of Nepal 
where the rural population is densest and landholding the smallest, new or expanded irrigation 
systems are being built by farmers or the government. During the critical post-monsoon period, 
these new entrants often divert water that customarily flowed to older systems. Irrigation systems 
that were formerly spearate are now sometimes combined through government funded programs, 
xii or existing  systems are  overlain  by  new  structures. creating  new  tensions  and managerial 
problems. In addition, water customarily used for irrigation is being appropriated hy the growing 
urban areas of the Kathmandu Valley and other parts of  Nepal. 
What these changes have in common is that they all potentially challenge the adequacy of the 
existing water rights framework in Nepal. Much of the potential tensions lies in the dual nature 
of the country’s water rights that encompass both customary rights systems and kmxil statutory 
rights frameworks. Nepal’s long and rich tradition of water use has engendered the development 
of complex bundles of customary water rights in many parts of the country. These locally crafted 
rights systems are often finely tuned to local conditions. flexible according to need and water 
availability,  dynamic  over time,  reasonably  equitable in  water  distribution  and  attuned  to 
processes as well as outcomes. They are also largely invisible to the State. The nature and functions 
of indigenous water rights traditions for the most pad may be unappreciated  by government 
planners and officials. the locus srundi of customary water rights in Court is ambiguous, and the 
variability of local traditions is bewildering to a state that seeks uniformity for administratives 
case. 
For its part, the State has been gradually codifying formal, statutory water rights. In 1992, a new 
national Wafer Resources Act was passed by Parliament vesting ownership of all the country’s 
water resources in the Slate. The Act establishes a hierarchy of needs for watcr utilization and sets 
uptheStateas the liccnsorofwateruse.  The Water Resources Rcgulationsof 1993 devolves power 
to the district level to recognize and license users and resolve water disputes. 
How customary water rights will mesh with strengthened and more pervasive statutory water 
rights codes in Nepal is a current question. Occasionally, elements of customary law have found 
their way into statutory law, such as in the Muluki Ain, the National Code of Nepal, which was 
promulgated in  1854. However, unless special efforts are made to identify and strengthen the 
positive  elements of customary  law,  uniform  statutory  water  law  tends  to  gradually  take 
precedence over customary law. This trend can he seen in the transformation of laws governing 
the ucequius of Northern New Mexico. sub&  of Bnli, ghuls of Himachal and  kirlos of Nepal. 
One of the first steps in raising the visibility of customary water rights has simply been to prepare 
inventories ofexisting waterusers. When traditional irrigation systems gounrecorded by the State, 
thcir  water  rights  are especially  vulnerahle.  Recording  the canals  initiates  the  process  of 
legitimizing their claim to water in the eyes of the Slate. The  Foundation has in the past supported 
efforts to  develop inventory methods for indigenous irrigation systems in Indonesia and Nepal. In 
the case of Nepal, the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat has expanded the effort beyond 
the Foundation-funded pilot phase into a broad irrigation census of almost all 75 districts in the 
country. 
While the irrigation census is one important piece in the water rights picture, in its current Corm  f 
it cannot accurately represent either the details or the dynamism ofcuslomary water rights. The 
inventory is a useful, hut static snapshot of the existence of water using groups. How groups relate 
to one another, what different kinds of customary water rights exist, how indigenous groups deal 
with scarcity and resolve conflict, how they distribute responsib  es  attached to the water rights 
andhowcustomaryrightsmayormaynotmeshwithstatutory  waterrightsall fall outside thescope 
L 
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Xlll of an inventory. Moreover, what kind of local water rights and water rights institutions are needed 
to balance both local and supra-local interests is a question that demands different methods than 
the inventory has to offer. Nepal is at a stage where its water rights structures are still flexible. 
Indepth analysis of these types of questions can held planners protect earlier users of water while 
still taking a proactive role in developing the country’s water wealth. 
Thus, the Foundation has supported various institutions like CEL, IIMI, IIDS. IAAS, DECAP and 
WAU to undertake activities that address issues related to community irrigation parterships and 
water rights. 
xiv Introduction 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 
Rajendra Pradhan, and H. L  J. Spiertz 
LAW, WATER RIGHTS, CONFLICT, AND POLICY 
World wide, water has become a subject of great contention. Struggles over, or against, water are 
no longer exclusively the domain of arid, semi-arid or flood prone areas. They are found in 
virtually all parts of the world in some way or another, either because there is scarcity or floods. 
or because of pollution, or for several reasons at once. Water is also more and more becoming 
subject to intersectoral contention: industries, urban households, and agriculture all demand more 
water than is available. Technological solutions have been offered, ranging from more intensive 
use and re-use, to infrastructure for water transfer over ever farther distances and water extraction 
from ever deeper layers of the sub-soil. Each solution solves some problems, but often creates as 
many  new  ones  at the  same time.  India,  with  its  large  (semi-)arid  areas, its huge  urban 
agglomerations and their growing needs for industrial water use, for along  time has been suffering 
greatly from water shortage and water pollution, and the problems are only becoming graver. In 
Nepal, which has vast water reserves in the Himalayas, water scarcity and pollution also have 
become  a serious problem,  especially  in  the  Kathmandu valley and in  other more densely 
populated areas with intensive agriculture. 
The problems  are not new and much has been written on the technological and management 
aspects of water  scarcity, and much policy  has been developed to address these problems. 
However, the legal issues involved and the wider social contexts in which these issues play a role 
regulated by legislation and other forms of government regulation. These legal rules legitimate 
control over water resources, technological artefacts for the storage or transportation of water, 
over the intersectoral distribution of water and over the actual use and exploitation of  water 
resources. Struggles over water therefore often take the form of conflicts over the applicable legal 
rules. They are conducted and decided in terms of law. The administrative and court system then 
9  have remained underexposed. Allocation control and actual access to water are to a large extent is to guarantee that such struggles are not determined through negotiations or fights that depend 
on the economic, political or even physical power of the contending parties, but according to the 
law which is  presumed to embody the general will  and the common interest of  the people. 
However, laws and regulations made by governments are only one part of the motivations for 
human behaviour. In many cases there are also other (legal) rulcs, such as customary rules and 
regulations and rules deriving from religion, that bcar on the control and use of water. Various 
contributions to this volume testify to the continued existence and practical relevance of this kind 
ofrules.  Thecontrihutions  alsoshow thatsuch ‘customary law’ need not consist of time-honoured 
rules to which all rural people feel a strong emotional and cultural attachment. ‘Customary’  rules 
may be adapted to modem circumstances and in this process have incorporatcd elements of other 
legal regulations, forming amixture which the von Benda-Beckmanns & Spiertz call ‘local law’ 
in their contribution. ‘Customary’ rules or ‘local law’ do exist and exert their influence in many 
ways. Law makers, NGO activists and researchers ignore them at their own risk - and at the peril 
of those who suffer from this neglect. As experiences in Nepal and India (and in many other 
countries) show, if one intends to control or change water management practices it is simply not 
sufficient to make a new law and expect people to behave accordingly. One of the reasons appears 
to be that what was called local customs and local traditions arc more persistent than law makers 
hoped for. However, precisely how complex and tenacious these nonnative systems are, and 
which role they actually play is not sufficiently clear. Similar remarks can be made for disputing 
over watcr and processes of conflict management. As can be inferred from several papers in this 
volume, courts in Nepal and India handle numerous disputes over water, but their case load seems 
to form only a tiny fraction of the vast amount of disputes and conflicts over water taking place. 
The majority  of such disputes seems to be decided in  quite different processes of  conflict 
management by a large variety of institutions, ranging from village councils to the highest levels 
of  political and administrative organs of the state. Very little is known about the decision making 
processes. and consequently, which law, or which mixture of legal rules and principles really are 
used  in these processes. Moreover, the research raises the question of what should he seen as 
disputes over water rights, and what not. As the contributions of Veera Kaul Sinah & Rharnth 
Jairaj and Bishal Khanal show, disputes in which rights to water play an important role, the so- 
called ‘water related cases’, can be framed in quite different ways: as a straightforward dispute 
over rights to water, as a dispute over land, over inhcritance, or as a civil case, a criminal case, a 
constitutional or human rights case. Whether one likes it or not, the non-official (legal) rules and 
procedures are factors which have to be taken into account. As it is, these factors are increasingly 
taken into account by the government administration and policy makers as well as by NGOs that 
strive for a more equitable, sustainable and efficient use of water. 
It is these experiences, and the insight that research was needed into the legal issues involved in 
water conflicts. that form the background and motivation for the research projects taken up by the 
International  Irrigation Management Institute in Nepal (IIMI-Nepal), the Legal research and 
Development Forum (FREEDEAL) at Kathmandu and the Institute of Agricultural and Animal 
Science at Rampur (IAAS) and some othcr institutions, with the active intellectual and financial 
supportoftheFordFoundation. These groups initiatcd researchprogrammes tolook into problems 
ofwaterrights, waterdisputesandconflict management. InIndiaresearchonwaterrights wasalso 
initiated. among others by the Centre for Environmental Law (CEL) and by the Devclopment 
Centre on Alternative Policies (DCAP). It is these same insights and experiences which led to the 
Workshop on Water Rights, Conflict and Policy which was held in Kathmandu in from January 
2 22 to 24,1996 and was jointly organized by IIMI-Nepal, FREEDEAL, Wageningen Agricultural 
University  (Department of  Agrarian Law) and Erasmus University  (Sanders Institute). This 
workshop brought together researchers, NGO and INGO activists, consultants and Nepalese 
government officials from the National Planning Commission, the Water and Energy Commission 
Secretariat, and especially The Department of Irrigation, in an endeavour to improve communi- 
cation between them, exchange knowledge  and jointly discuss water related  problems. The 
participants of this meeting discussed the research contributions from these research groups, the 
implications of this research for a better understanding of major problems in water management, 
and for new policies dealing with water rights and management. 
The papers presented at the workshop and the discussions which ensued are a rich combination 
of new insights from the field, new knowledge about how irrigation actually functions, how water 
is allocated, what conflicts flare up and how they are managed, how people use the law, how courts 
and administrative institutions decide in water related disputes, and how water legislation actually 
functionsintherura1areas.Theyprovidenewinfonnation  which is veryrelevant forpolicy makers 
and action  oriented research  groups,  since it contributes  to  the insights  upon  which policy 
objectives can be based and new legal and organisational guidelines to change water management 
to the better can be framed. At the same time, they highlight certain dilemmas with which policy 
makers and action oriented research groups are confronted. 
The question of policy implications of the studies presented, which was pointed out  in the keynote 
addresses by both the Chief Guest and the representative of the Ford Foundation, also surfaced as 
one of the major concerns and dilemmas addressed by the participants in the panel discussions. 
One of the key policy issues raised at the workshop was the question: Who should control water 
resources? The state or local communities? And further: How to develop and manage water 
resources and provide infrastructures for delivery of services to the consumers which take into 
account beneficial use and interests of the wider public on  the one hand and the rights of the 
existing users on the other? What are the implications of state intervention in water management 
(rehabilitation/expansion,  changes in management organisation) for the development of water 
resources and water rights of stakeholders? Should the existing (state) laws be changed to ensure 
better development and use ofwaterresources. and fora better ‘distributivejustice’.  Is  it possible, 
or even desirable, to prevent conflicts over water rights? Moreover, should that be achieved by 
better laws or better management? 
In the workshop papers, which are in this book presented to a wider public, not all the above issues 
are  extensively discussed. But, whether being discussed in these papers or not, they were identified 
as important issues for future research agendas. It is unfortunate that for various reasons four 
papers from India, oneeach by hof.  Chhatrapati Singh,  M.S. Vani, Rucbi Pant andNiumaiLiangsi 
(see Programme Scheduel in Annexure I), could not he included in this volume. The papers in this 
bookare for amajorpart ‘working papers’, interim reports ofon-going research, presented toshare 
information and get suggestions. More ‘theoretical’ versions of  these papers, with additional 
information, will be published elsewhere. 
Althoughthe issues discussed in the various contributions overlap to some extent, they have in this 
bookbeen divided into two major sections. In the first section the papers have been placed that can 
be seen  as mainly  aiming at an  introductory,  or a more general  discussion  of  water  laws, 
1 
3 constitutional law, court cases and procedures. The second section contains a number of papers 
which report and reflect on field work carried out in hill and lowland irrigation systems in Nepal, 
and will introduce some basic concepts and methodological issues, which from a legal anthropo- 
logical perspective, are (should be.)  involved in research on water rights and policy recommenda- 
tions. 
In the rest of this Introduction, we will first discuss the introductory and general papers, followed 
by the papers based on fieldwork on  farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS) and intersectoral 
water allocation. We will then discuss some  ofthe questions and concerns which most ofthe  papers 
in this volume have in common, and finally we will present an account of the issues and policy 
recommendations which came out of the discussions. 
INTRODUCTORY AND GENERAL PAPERS 
Three papers deal with the legal system concerning water rights and water related court cases at 
the national level in Nepal. Shantam Khadka sets the present legal structure of water rights in the 
Kingdom of Nepal in a brief historical perspective and presents the main substantive law and 
procedures concerning the various aspects of water rights, the centre piece of which is the Water 
Resources Act of 1992  (2049). This Act vests all surface and underground water in the Kingdom 
of Nepal, and regulates the priorities in the use of water, as well as various types of procedures in 
case of  conflicts at the village level. The author raises some constitutional questions about the 
relationship between private property, community rights and the right of the state. The Water 
Resources Act is added as an annex to this volume. Ramchandra Bhatrarai provides the reader 
who is not well versed in the Nepalese legal system with a brief outline of the court system of 
Nepal, with a summary of the  jurisdiction and case  load of courts at different levels. Bishal Khanal 
broadens the legal framework by presenting a brief survey on the cases  related to water, dealt with 
by the Supreme Court between 1980 and 1990. 
India has a much longer history of court involvement in cases of water conflicts than Nepal. Veera 
Kaul Singh & Bharath Jairaj give a comprehensive overview of this history. Analyzing the case 
load of the High Court and Supreme Court in the period between 19M) till 1995, they show that 
in the first period water problems were addressed by means of criminal procedures, while later on 
there was a shift towards tort law. Recently, there has been another shift: now constitutional law 
is being employed. At the same time, the formulation of claims in water conflicts has undergone 
a shift from riparian rights, to easement rights and recently to natural rights and fundamental rights. 
With the recent judicial activism, Veera Kaul Singh & Bharath Jairaj speculate on the emerging 
concept of Indian Environmental Justice vis-i-vis water law. 
Aspart ofacase  study on waterrights and policy in New Delhi, with its tremendous water shortage, 
unequal distribution and pollution, Bharath Jairaj provides in this volume an analysis of the 
attempts that government agencies in various Indian states have made to regulate and curtail 
groundwater extraction. While the regulations may be quite diverse, they all share the common 
feature that they are based on the right of a landowncr to extract the water under hisher land. The 
author suggests that the inequality which is inherent to this legal fundament, is usually neglected 
4 and deserves a fundamental discussion. On the basis of a discussion of the strong and weak points 
of various legal regimes, Bharalh Jairaj points to a fundamental weakness in the Constitution, 
which assigns the right to regulate water to the State instead of the Federal Government. He 
suggests that groundwater regulations should rather be designed on the basis of  aquifers than on 
the current political and linguistic boundaries between the Indian states. 
Focusing again on water rights in Nepal, Gahendra La[  Mallu & Shantarn Khadka report on the 
survey they made on conflict resolution practices in 40 fanners managed irrigation systems in 
seven districts which represent the most intensively irrigated regions, the inner valley and the mid 
hill regions in Nepal. One of the aims of their research project was to go beyond the common type 
of legal research that concentrates on legislation and case law. The authors look into the history 
of canal building - including expansion -,  land- and waterownership, rules of  operation  and 
maintenance, the role and functioning of water users associations. Most importantly, they make 
an inventory ofthekindsofproblems andconflicts thatariseandofmodes ofconflictmanagement. 
They sketch a wide range of institutions, both of the state administration at various levels and 
courts, as well as non-state institutions and informal leaders that deal in  various  ways with 
conflicts. The overview is a valuable addition to the in-depth studies presented in this volume. At 
the same time it is a starting point for further research on the theme of conflict management. 
PAPERS ON CASE STUDIES OF STATE INTERVENTION 
AND ON METHODS 
Four papers discuss how state intervention in irrigation systems in Nepal affects the water rights 
situation. Three of these papers result from the IIMI-FREEDEAL research project and deal with 
hill imgation, while the fourth is a case study by  IAAS in the Chitwan valley in the Terai. The 
studies show that the basic problems in these different ecological areas are quite similar. 
Rajendra Pradhan. Azharul Haq & Ujjwal Pradhan stress the opportunities for contesting and 
changing property rights and obligation structures, created by external intervention of the state or 
donor agencies when they enlarge or rehabilitate existing irrigation systems. Successful use of 
these opportunities depends to a large extent on locally existing power relationships between the 
stakeholders; on connections in the state administration or in political parties; on caste relation- 
ships; on  the position  of  fields  within  the command  area. It  also  depends on  the level  of 
organization and of knowledge of the state legal system, both on the side of farmers and irrigation 
department representatives. The authors raise the question to what extent these new systems create 
or increase equity of  water allocation and  actual distribution and show how donors or state 
agencies try to influence  the local power-relationships by introducing conditionalities, so that the 
poorer,  low caste people  are included  in the new  system. They  are not  always successful. 
Intervention and its conditionalities  are often subject to negotiations and disputes, leading to 
adjustments in the water rights situation, which may be, but not always are, more equitable than 
before. 
Durga K.C. & Rajendra Pradhan discuss some important mechanisms of conflict prevention in 
situationsof water scarcity in systems in which both fanners themselves and the govemmentrnake 
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J improvements on the irrigation systems. Fanners are in general aware of the existing rules and 
regulations, but that does not prevent some from violating them, or exclusively interpreting them 
to their own advantage. The authors provide a history of water management and control of 
distribution and allocation regulations. They show that the level of organization and the presence 
of a special officers, such as  the Pani Thakedar (water contractors) have a preventive effect. They 
also stress that the physical infrastructures themselves are a way to actualize and protect rights, 
because they determine the reach of the command area, and are more or less conducive to fixing 
water shares. Changes in the infrastructure are therefore extremely sensitive issues, because they 
concern questions of who will be included in or excluded from access to water, what the water 
shares will be and how well water division and allocation can be controlled. 
Focusing on water conflicts and conflict resolution, Mahesh & Rajendra  Pradhan offer the 
proposition that conflict can be a means to acquire water rights, which they demonstrate with case 
histories  of disputes.  Conflicts are used  to express dominance.  but  destruction  of  physical 
infrastructure may be a 'weapon of the weak" (Scott) as it is employed by poor, low caste people 
who face exclusion from water allocation. During the panchayat period these conflicts were seen 
as public order problems and obstruction. They were therefore not tolerated by  the state, in 
particular if the projects were foreign funded. The paper thus raises the important issue of the - 
mostly unintended -political role of foreign donors in such projects. 
Shukla  et ul. approach  similar questions from a slightly different angle. They focus on the 
dynamics of processes  in which property rights are created, regulated and used, and on  the 
mechanisms of what they call arbitration. They show how irrigation management is based on 
agreements, resulting from negotiation among those affected by  the system,  in which both 
collective and individual claims are (re)defined. The authors stress the importance of including 
ecological factors in the analysis of water regulation and water rights and emphasize that conflicts 
are both man-made and influenced by ecological forces. Depending on the flow regimes, different 
sets of rules are being worked out. The case material of this study is situated in the Terai, aregion 
with a strong feudal tradition, that has experienced great movements of migrants from the hills, 
which has led to new constellations of water relationships, rights and obligations. Groups of 
newcomers, often wealthier and better educated, try to negotiate better rights and do not shy away 
from open conflict if they want to re-open negotiations. Kin relationships among the old ruling 
families, and between users in different systems, as well as the infrastructure itself have created 
complex linkages among the systems, with much tension and open conflict among the farmers 
drawing water from these systems. 
While most studies presented in this volume deal primarily or exclusively with irrigation, Ajuya 
Dixit's account concerns inter-sectoral conflicts over water, as they have developed most acutely 
in the Upper Bagmati Basin. The paper addresses the changes that new lifestyles, urbanization and 
industrialization have brought in relation to water allocation. He describes the changes from a 
situation in which water was used for agriculture. drinking water and household purposes in arural 
setting,  to  a complex  and  highly  explosive  situation  of  sharp  competition  between  urban 
households, industry,energy producers and theneedsfor agricultureand  households in rural areas. 
Water for urban centres is drawn from increasingly greater areas and over ever greater distances, 
thus  expanding  the area affected by  water competition. The author describes  the complex 
institutional setting that has been put in place to deal with these conflicts and the concomitant 
6 expanding legal framework the state has developed. However, this institutional setting is highly 
fragmented, often hardly accessible, so that many consider it inadequate. Many conflicting parties 
go to other institutions that are willing to deal with their conflicts, such as local NGOs. The result 
is a paradox: a sharp increase in state legislation and state institutions, yet at the same time more 
rather than less conflict management by  non-state institutions. Some of these draw on existing 
modes of conflict management, others are new. Dixit also finds contradictions within the national 
legal policy itself, notably between the Water Resources Act, according to  which day to day 
irrigation activities may not be affected by state legislation, and public investmentpolicies, which 
erode customary laws and norms regarding water management. He further points to some of the 
tensions between customary law, religious law concerning rituals and state law, and calls for a 
serious evaluation of the appropriateness of the Water Resources Act. 
The paper by  Franz and Keebet von Benda-Becknrann and Joep Spiertz, finally, undertakes to 
place some of the main issues of the study of water rights and policy which are touched upon in 
the other papers, in a legal anthropological perspective. They argue that the above mentioned 
research programmes have two things in common: 1) the wish to look into the actual practices of 
the various nonnative orders that appear to apply, and 2) the wish to improve the water rights 
situation of water users, especially of the poorer and less influential persons, while taking the 
existing legal constellation into account. The authors stress that such action oriented research is 
not unproblematic. In their view all the research reports presented at the workshop demonstrate 
how difficult it is to capture local law and the existing rights structure. Many of the norms are not 
precise; they are principles rather than rules, subject to recurring negotiation. Often they are not 
easily distinguishable from state law, or even from the ‘official’ repertoires of  religious law or 
customary law. They may be formulated more clearly only in cases of dispute. The authors set out 
to develop a set of basic assumptions as analytical tools for studying the complexities of water 
rights in a pluralistic normative and institutional environment like the one found in Nepal. In view 
of the fact that, as the research reports show, the water rights situation may be extremely complex, 
with prior rights, lesser, rights, secondary rights and people with no legitimate claims whatsoever, 
it becomes understandable (according to the vonBenda-Beckmnnns & Spienz)  that donor  agencies 
only rarely manage to improve the position of the weak effectively. There is a real danger that the 
wish to improve unjust situations tends to be so strong. that it interferes with the requirements of 
depth of a study that is needed for a proper analysis of the situation. Too often the analysis is based 
on a too cursory and shallow knowledge and understanding of the situation that is  felt to he unjust. 
And researchers, who feel the hot breath of policy makers in their neck, may feel pressed to jump 
tooreadily to conclusions. They may fear that their research may remain unused, as so much other 
research  has remained  unused.  In addition, as many researchers  will  have experienced,  the 
relationship between the outcome of research and policy implications that might be drawn, is 
mostly not straightforward at all. But even if this were so, if policies would become based on in 
depth study and proper analysis of the existing water rights situation in the villages and irrigation 
schemes, there remains the question of what is meant by the intention ‘to take the existing legal 
constellation into account’. It is argued that two separate issues are involved, namely 1) having 
a thorough understanding of an existing constellation, including the various normative orders that 
arevalidinaparticulararea; and2)  acknowledgingexistingrights  asdeserving furtherrecognition 
in a newly developed normative framework. These two meanings of “taking into account” are 
often not distinguished, and this may be to the detriment of both analysis and policy making. 
3 COMMON PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS IN THE PAPERS 
Besides a multitude of different water and water rights related situations and issues, the case 







Physical structures, such as intakes, diversion weirs, canals, as well as the physical 
conditions  of  water flows  (floods, dependable  or irregular  supply) have direct legal 
implications. They determine the command area and division of water. Some infrastruc- 
tures are less easily manipulable and therefore more conducive to conflict prevention than 
others.Thelegalimplicationsareoften  not the same in thestatelegal systemand in thelocal 
legal system (Shukla et al.; Durga & R.Pradhan; Dixit; M.& R.Pradhan; Pradban, Haq & 
Pradhan). 
Waterrights are highly dynamic and require recurring negotiations, duetothe geophysical 
conditions that cause frequent destruction of irrigation infrastructure, and due to enlarge- 
ments of systems initiated by users or external agencies (Shukla et al.).  Much negotiating 
takes place within village settings, but sometimes people go to administrative offices or to 
courts. ‘Forum shopping’ (F.von Benda-Beckmann, K.von Benda-Beckmann &  .J. Spiertz), 
the selection  of  that  institution that might  offer the best  protection,  is a commonly 
employed strategy to improve one’s negotiating position. Power relationships  among 
stakeholders  are an important factor in such negotiations, with different persons or groups 
having  different  interests.  different  objectives, and often different  interpretations  of 
existing rights and obligations. 
Customary rules and regulations are not always and in every respect equitable. Notably 
caste and class differences are reflected in water rights. Migrants and other newcomers 
have to breakinto theexisting waterrelationships(Durga&R.Pradhan;R.Pradhan.A.Haq 
& U.Pradhan; Shukla et al.). Legislation and other state regulation intended to change 
customary regulations are often resisted successfully by wealthy and powerful local elites, 
who fear to lose some of their influence. 
Interventions by state agencies or other development institutions usually imply more 
complex forms of water rights and water management structures. (Dixit, Jairaj); there also 
is a great range of institutions, both state and non-state, that deal with water conflicts, and 
there seems to be a tendency to try out the non-state forms of conflict resolution before 
turning to state institutions. On the other hand, as some of the papers show, courts are not 
always an instance of last resort (Shukla et al.. Dixit; Durga & R.Pradhan). Often court 
decisions appear to become just another asset in  ongoing struggles and  negotiations 
involving water rights and many other local interests as well. 
State intervention (expansion, rehabilitation) creates new institutions, as well as new 
sets of regulations for access, distribution, and management, and new ‘normative idioms’ 
(von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckrnann & Spiertz). These may provide poorer 
sections of the populations with arguments to obtain access to water that they previously 
8 had none, but the new arguments provided by the new idioms and the new institutional 
arrangements are not always readily accepted by the local elites. As most papers show, it 
may often be necessary to bring ensuing disputes before the courts (Durga & RRadhan). 
However, little is known about whether or not court decisions are actually carried out. 
6.  State legislationisoften internally inconsistent (Dixit; Jairaj). Moreover, state institutions 
may have different interpretations of state legislation, while sometimes officers lack a 
thorough knowledge of the relevant legislation (Pradhan, Haq & Pradhan). On the other 
hand, government institutions often operate in isolation from each other. One agency may 
totally ignore customary law and norms, while others may try to accommodate them. And 
in some  agencies there is hardly any knowledge about local notms, while others have some 
or even a good understanding of them. 
I.  One of the most difficult questions, and at the same time the question that research will 
never he able to answer, is which position and whoserights deserve to be supported. “These 
cases raise the question of equity, but how are we going to address this difficult question? 
[...I Are we to ignore customary laws and local rights and go strictly by statutory laws? Or 
are we to uphold customary laws and local rights, even if the existing rights holders 
monopolize all or most of the water? How do we strike a balance between respecting the 
rights of existing rights holders and the claims of those who are excluded? And who is to 
decide these issues?’’  (See Pradhan, Haq & Pradhan in this volume.) This is a purely 
political question. 
8.  As all case studies in this volume show. replacement of one set of regulations by another 
set does not work as simple as is often assumed. One cannot simply do  away with existing 
rules by just declaring them to be no longer valid. On the other hand, simply giving 
recognition to the existing rules and practices is equally hazardous. If the papers in this 
volume show anything, it is the importance of looking at the power constellations in which 
irrigation projects are being carried out. They show thedifficulties which the weakeractors 
have in actualizing their rights. If they have rights in the old system, they are now forced 
lo  share them with stronger newcomers, but if they had no rights in the old system, they are 
confronted with strong resistance against their inclusion included in the new system. 
9.  Anotherimportantfacetofthestudiescollected  in this volumeis thatthey show how each 
newregulation tendstoaddtothecomplexity,even  whereitismeant tocreatea ‘cleanlegal 
slate’. There are basically two related reasons for that. One is that important economic, 
social and political positionsare atstake. People donot easily surrender theirrights to their 
resources, or share them with others if that affects their income, their political or their social 
position: To have rights to water means to have wealth and power. And to he poor often 
means to have no access to water. The second reason is that water rights are not isolated 
from rights to other resources and from other social relationships, to be changed at wish. 
They are embedded in complex sets of  other economic, social and political rights and 
obligations. Changes in water rights may have far-reaching consequences in other legal 
domains as well. 
9 10.  Similar problems arise when water is disputed. While a legal problem of ‘water rights’ 
may be isolated from its social, economic and political context, the actual conflict cannot. 
The social, political and economic relationships that exist between the contendingparties, 
and between the patties and the decision making agency, are bound to influence the nature 
of the process, the decisions taken, as well as the implementation of such decisions. 
However this may be, depending on where one’s loyalties lie and what kind of society one 
envisages, the answer to the above questions may differ. But however one decides these 
questions, it will not say anything about the ways in which policy objectives might he 
realized. One of the lessons we can draw from the case studies in this volume is, that 
ignoring existing rights will not help improve the situation of someone who is excluded 
from rights to water. 
ISSUES RAISED DURING THE DISCUSSIONS 
The  aforementioned  common  problems  and  concerns also  form  the  background  of  many 
discussions at the workshop. The discussions were lively and very useful because a plurality of 
views and approaches wereexpressed. The  participants from different disciplines and occupations 
and withdifferent interests and aims struggled to understand each other’s terms and point of view. 
The patticipants felt that at the end of the three day workshop, if nothing else, they had learnt to 
listen and understand (to some degree) each other’s perspective, and all came to understand that 
water right issues are more complex than they had imagined. Many of the participants felt that 
water right issues should be studied before irrigation or other water projects are implemented. 
Many alsofeltthatframing waterrightsandirrigation management problems asaquestion oflocal 
versus statecontrol was too simplistic. However, althoughallparticipantsfeltthatthekey  question 
was how to develop water resources in an efficient, productive, sustainable, and equitable way, 
in discussing how to pursue these often conuadictory aims, priorities and approaches remained a 
matter of (stimulating) debate throughout the workshop. Some of the main topics of debate 
centered around such questions as: 
Should control of water resources be exclusively the domain of the state. and should the wider 
public interest receive priority over customary and local interests? 
Should the question of public versus private interests not be seen in the first place in the light of 
support for the rights of the vulnerable sections of society (women, low castes, poorer sections of 
the population)? 
Should the rights of the existing rights holders and customary law be protected, especially in 
relation to the rights or control assumed by the state and state law? As was pointed out, besides 
expressing the values and interests of the rural population, customary laws can be oppressive and 
unjust as well. 
The question  whether  conflict  is positive or harmful. For  many  of  the policy  makers  and 
implementers, conflict was harmful as it led to delays, disorder and bad social relations. Others 
argued that conflicts can also play a positive role because disputing is one way of changing the 
existing structure of rights and social relations. 
10 When the discussions, finally, embarked on the topic of the recommendations that should ensue 
from this workshop,  it was  interesting again to notice how wide an array of concerns and 
approaches, and how broad a variety of professional involvement in the issues of water rights, 
water conflict and policy had been brought together in the workshop: Policy makers  wanting 
recommendations which  would  help  them  formulate  better policies;  implementers wanting 
recommendations which they could use to better implement projects; activists wanting recom- 
mendations which they could use to help local communities, especially the vulnerable sections; 
and some researchers cautioning against making too hasty recommendations  on the basis of 
insufficient data and an inadequate understanding of the concepts and issues. There was a general 
consensus, however, on the point that some major topics and issues had not been discussed in the 





Almost all the papers, especially on Nepal, discussed farmer managed irrigation systems. 
Further research is  required on water rights issues in agency or  jointly managed irrigation 
systems. Similarly, water rights issues in processes of ‘turning over’ irrigation systems to 
the user groups need to be studied. 
Only one paper discussed water rights issues relating to groundwater (in India). This issue 
needs further research for Nepal, especially in the light of the new Agriculture Perspective 
Plan which recommends massive expansion of the use of groundwater for irrigation in the 
plains. 
Land rights and water rights are intimately linked. The papers presented at the workshop 
did not discuss this issue which should be studied in future research. 
There is a need for multidisciplinary approach to studying water rights. It is not sufficient 
to study only legal and institutional aspects of water management and use;  ‘hardware’ 
aspect such as the physical structures (canals, tubewells, diversion weirs) as well as water 
discharge during different seasons, water use patterns, etc. also need to be studied to 
understand water rights. In order to gain a full understanding of the historical development 
of water management systems, their present functioning and future development, both 
kinds of study have to be integrated. 
11 Water Use and Water Rights in Nepal: Legal 
Perspective’ 
Shantam S.  Khadka.’ 
“The  naturalnessofnatural rightsioaccessanduseofwaterasa  resourcerests 
on a belief ihat, all  people, because they are people, whatever be their moral, 
legal, social or civil status, have a naiural right io water since water as a 
resource isanotherwayofdescribingthe  righttolife. ”( UpendraBaxi, inSingh 
1991:ll  I) 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper  attempts to analyze  the existing  Nepalese  legal framework  in  relation to water 
management and water rights. Further it deals with the acceptable extent of customary water use 
rights of the Nepalese people and resolution of  water related disputes by  mediation under the 
existing legal  framework.  This paper  also gives  a  brief  introduction  to the  status of water 
management and history of legal development in relation to irrigation management in Nepal. 
Nepal is divided into three distinct geographical sectors; the northern most portion of the country 
is mountainous area, the middle consists of hills and valleys the southern part is plain land, known 
asTerai.Theycover 17%,68 %and lS%ofthecountry,respectively.About 18percentofthe total 
land area (2323 thousand ha in 1991-92) has been brought under cultivation, of which 53% lies 
in the Terai. 
Nepal is endowed with abundance of water resources and the total surface run off of the rivers is 
estimated to he around 20 m.ha. The abundance of water resources of Nepal has yet to be utilized 
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1 and exploited to its considerable extent. For example,  in  1992-93, out of 2323 thousand ha. of 
arablelandonly 882thousand ha(37.96%) was irrigated; 250MW3 ofelectmicity was generated, 
and a  total of 140560 thousand liters of drinking water was provided daily  to 1109 thousand 
people ‘.  In the irrigation sector, the contribution of Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems is 72% 
of the total irrigated area as  compared to Agency Managed Irrigation System’s 28 percent.’ 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN NEPAL 
For about 500 years in the early Nepalese history Nepal was ruled by Gopal (cowherds) and Aahir 
(buffaloherds) dynasties hut no information is available about their legal systems. Then after, 
Nepal, as many small principalities, was ruled by  Kirat, Lichbavi and Malla dynasties.  The 
duration of regimes of the concerned dynasty especially of Kirat and Lichhavi period is confusing 
to some extent because different historians have mentioned different dates.  Prithivi Narayan 
Shah, king of Gorkha, took the painstaking task of unifying the country. Thus since 18th century 
the unified Nepal is being ruled by the Shah Dynasty. 
The first single codifed law, valid for the whole of Nepal was promulgated in 1854, and is known 
as the Mu&  Ain (National Code). This Code existed for over a hundred years as  the sole codified 
law to dispense justice in the country. Before the promulgation of the Muluki Ain 1854 and after 
its promulgation in the matters not dealt in the code, the task of dispensing  justice was done as  per 
the provisions made in different religious scriptures. 
The historical development of legal system in general and water related laws in specific in Nepal 
aresketchedinTableI(See also Annex1 forthechronologyofthe waterrelatedlaws andpolicies). 
Very little information regarding  water management and water rights of the people is available 
while studying the past legal history of  this country. The provisions of  Muluki Ain,  1854 as 
mentioned in the chart still exist under the New Muluki Ain of 1963 which is a signal of the legal 
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'alka  Smriti  and  othei 
:ligious  scriptures 
As  above 
A5  above 
is  above  +  Nationa. 
:ode of 1854 
7  Substantive  Law 
'40  specific provision  regarding 
water management found to date 
lharmashastra 
4nnual  repair  of  canal  by  its 
isers made mandatory and non. 
mmpliance was punishable. 
%very  one had right to use watei 
rrespective  of  their  caste  on 
urn by  turn basis, 
' First  come  first  service  in 
drinking water & irrigation. 
' Petty  cases  relating  tc 
drinking water and irrigatior 
was not heard by  state agenc) 
or royal courts (Rules 6 & f 
of  Ram Shah) 
' The  person  who  cut  tree! 
around  drinking  water  tap! 
was filed Rs.  5 (Rule 14) 
Makers of  the canal had first 
priority  to  use the  water but 
traditional  water  sharing 
pattern was upheld. 
9  Irrigation from top to  bottom 
was recognized. 
*  Canals could  not  allowed  to 
be  constructed  upstream  of 
existing  canals  if  that 
lessened  water  supply to the Table  1  (contd.) 
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Water  related  conflicts  a, 
well as other issues 
*  Panchali was village ]eve 
assembly  of  five adults 
like a trial  court, all case: 
within  their jurisdiction. 
*  Drang  was province  leve 
or appeal  level  court anc 
Adhikarn  was  central 
level. 
*  Birtawala had authority  to 
hear  local  level  watel 
related  cases within  theii 
Bitra land area. 
’ All  village level  disnutes 
inchdingwater relateb.  ~ 
’  All  appointed  by  king, 
princes  or  ministers  to 
hear petty cases including 
water  related  issues  of 
their respective areas. 
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Remarks 
* Birtawalas were person! 
who  receive< 
landgrants,  usually  ta, 
free, from the state. 
*  In  1626 AD.  Jitamitri 
Malla  of  Bhaktapul 
issued a royal  order to 
levy  for  the  use  of 
canal water. 
*  Water  related  disputes 
were not considered  as 
important  disputes  of 
the society. 
lurisdiction  of  state 
lgencies  and  their 
iuthorities overlapped, 
16 CURRENT WATER RELATED LAWS AND POLICIES 
The human body consists of about 70% (in terms of weight) of water thus human life is not 
possible without water. Therefore, “WaterRight”in it’s broadconnotationmay be termed as “right 
to life”. However, water right does not only entail water right for consumption but also the right 
to use and discharge it. Further in many  occasions water right also entails protection from 
destruction and pollution of water sources and related construction works. 
Keeping in mind the general meaning of water rights mentioned above, all the current Nepalese 
laws, related to water, may be broadly grouped into the following categories: 




Drinking Water:  Nepal Water Supply Corporation Act. 1992. 
Domestic Needs: National Code 1963 (Muluki Ah,) 
Irrigatiqn: National Code 1963 (ChapterofLandCultivation:  “JaggaAbad Gmeko” 
Mahal) 










Industrial hoduction: Industrial Enterprises Act, 1992 
Hydro-power 
Electricity Act, 1992 
Electricity Rules 1988 
Fixation of Electricity Tariffs Rules, 1993 
Transportation 
Vehicle and Transportation Management Act, 1992 
Fishing. 
Aquatic Animals Rotection Act, 1960. 
Forest Act, 1992. 
Recreation: Trekking and River Rafting Regulation, 1984. 
3.  Discharge Related Laws 
Sewage into surface water and sewage into aquifer 
(i) 
(ii)  National Code, 1963 
Solid Waste Management and Resource Mobilization Act,  1987 
4.  Protection Related Laws 
(i)  Decentralization Act, 1982 
(ii)  Decentralization (Working Arrangement) Rules, 1982 
17 (iii) 
(iv) 
(v)  Municipality Act, 1991 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii)  Local Administration Act, 1971 
(ix) 
Essential Commodities protection Act, 1955 
Village Development Committee Act, 1991 
District Development Committee Act, 1991 
Soil Conservation and Watershed Management Act, 1982 and its Regulation 
Some Public Offences and Punishment Act, 1970 
5.  Umbrella Laws 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii)  Water Resources Rules, 1993. 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 
Water Resources Act, (WRA) 1992. 
Theclassificationsmadeabovearenothardandfast  becauseonelaw or actoftenleads withmany 
aspects. And water related laws are not confined to the provisions of one or two laws but scattered 
in different laws. We have included policies in the classification of laws because though policies 
may not have a direct bearing on aperson’s waterrights, they nevertheless may affect waterrights 
by affecting laws or implementation of laws. 
Due to lack of space, this paper has not discussed all the water related laws but only with the 
following issues/topies and referred to the related laws wherever felt necessary. Thechoronological 
development of the water related laws and policies have been presented in Annex I. 
Ownership Versus  Management of Water Resources 
As per the provision of  Water Resources Act, 1992 (WRA 1992) the ownership of the water 
resources of surface,  underground or in whatsoever form, available in the Kingdom of Nepal, is 
vested in the kingdom of Nepal. [Sec. 2 (a) and Sec. 31 
This provision rejects the existence of any individual or community ownership right over any of 
the water resources available within the kingdom of Nepal irrespective of its origin, place, mode 
of use. nature of water resources and management system. This provision rules that any water 
resources  originated  on  private  land should be considered as state owned, and negates  the 
constitutionally awarded property right (to use it as he/she pleases) of the Nepalese citizen. 
Theremay beseriousquestionsraisedinthisregard  suchas: Will individualsorcommunities (who 
have been managing their water resources since time immemorial) keep “loving” the water 
resources as they used to when they know that the water resources no more belongs to them ?Will 
they not take it as state’s intervention in their local matters ? Can the government manage and 
maintain the water resources for beneficial uses, for which the WR Act has come into existence, 
with its limited number of administrators and experts in this field ? 
While talking about nationalization of natural resources one may remember the Private Forest 
Nationalization Act 1957. This Act was brought into existence in the name of “better preservation 
18 of the forest resources” but afterwards it was realized that the government, keeping the local 
communities out of the management system, can not effectively manage and protect the natural 
resources with its limited number of officials and the experts. Will the same story be repeated?. 
Access to Water is a Natural Right 
Considering the constitutional provisions, two provisions relating to fundamental rights, namely 
a) right to equality [Art. 11 (4)] and right to property (Art.  17) are found related in this regard. 
According to Article 1 1  (4), no person shall be discriminated against as untouchable and bedenied 
access to any public place or be deprived of the use of public utilities. Contravention of this law 
is punishable. According to Article 17, all citizens have right to property and private property can 
not be confiscated without paying due compensation. These constitutional provisions entail that 
every Nepali citizen has natural right of access to water of all public utilities without any kind of 
discrimination and the water source limited to a private land be considerd as the owner’s private 
property so far the use of water is mingled with the use of the land. 
Every Citizen Has Right to Sue with Regards to Public Water 
Among other related provisions of the present constitution (under Art. 126) the ratification of, 
accession to, acceptance of or approval of a treaty or agreement including about natural resources 
and the distribution of their uses are subject to be done in the parliament. On the other hand, if any 
agreement or treaty is of an ordinary nature which does not affect the nation extensively, seriously, 
or in the long term, the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of, or approval of the same, may 
be done at the meeting of House of Representatives by a simple majority of the members present. 
Otherwiseitmay bedoneonly by amajority oftwo-thirdsofthemembenpresentatajointsitting 
of both the Houses of  the parliament. 
Article 126 is vague in terms of spirit as well as letter and has provided grounds for debates and 
controversies. It is very difficult to define whether a treaty concerning water resources is of an 
ordinary nature or whether it affects the nation extensively, seriously or in long term. The criteria 
and mechanism to determine the nature of a treaty have not been fixed so far, either in the laws 
or in legal practices. Therefore, certain issues  sharing of  water resources  in the “Tanakpur 
Barrage” case, in which the Supreme Court has made it clear that the deal of His Majesty’s 
Government (HMG) with India during the visit of  the former Prime Minister, Mr. Girija Prasad 
Koirala, on Dec. 1991, was not merely an understanding, but atreaty, are stillunder consideration 
by the parliament.  However, in the said case the Supreme Court has clearly established the 
precedent that water is one of the natural resources and matter of concern for common people so 
every citizen has a right to sue against anyone and a right lo get information about the acts of the 
government in this regard. 
It may be recommended that the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 should contain clear cut criteria or 
establish specific mechanisms to determine the nature and extent of a treaty concerning natural 
resources, particularly water resources and sharing of their benefits. 
19 Right to Utilize Water Resources 
Although all water vests in the Kingdom of Nepal, i.e., that the state is the owner of  all water 
resources in whatever form, all Nepalese citizens have the right to utilize water. Water may be 
utilized for some purposes without acquiring licence from the concerned state agency, while for 
other purposes licences are required. The WRA has defined when and for which purposes licences 
are required and when they are not required, as described below. 
Water Uses for Which it is Not Necessary to Obtain Licence 
As per the WRA everyone is entitled to utilize water resources (without obtaining a license) for 






For one’s own drinking and other domestic use on an individual or collective basis; 
For the irrigation of one’s own land on an individual or collective basis; 
For the purpose of running a water-mill or water grinders as cottage industry: 
For the use of a boat on a personal basis for local transportation; 
For the use, as prescribed under Water Resources Rules, of the water resources confined 
to a plot of land by the owner of such land. 
Although licence is not required for the use of water for the purposes mentioned above, the users 
are not free to use water as they wish. They must make beneficial use of water without causing 
damage to others (see Sec.4, subsections (2) and (3) of the WFL4). 
Water Ues For Which License is Required 
Since the ownership of all the water resources available within the national boundary vest in the 
Kingdom ofNepal, no person is entitled to utilize the water resources, except as mentioned above, 
without obtaining a licence from the concerned authority under the WRA (Sec. 3 and 4). For the 
porpose of  awarding license for survey and utilization of water resources, Rule 8 of  the Water 
Resources Rules, 1993 has made a provision for one “District Water Resources Committee”  in 
each district,  under the  chairmanship of  Chief District Officer (CDO), and comprising the 
following members: representative from district level Agriculture Development Office, Forest 
Office,  Drinking Water Office, Irrigation Office, Electricity Project Ofiice of  HMG,  office 
relating to utilization of  water resources, District Development Committee (DDC)  and Local 
Development Officer (LDO). It is noted that the members, except the representative from DDC, 
all are bureaucrats. 
Persons willing to make use of water resources for collective benefits or on an institutional basis 
can form a water users association and register it with the concerned District Water Resources 
Committee (Sec.8). [The registered water users association becomes an autonomous corporate 
body]. Even a person willing to survey water resources for possible project implementation needs 
to obtain a license and apply to the concerned authority as prescribed under the said Act. The 
license obtained under this Act can he sold or transferred otherwise to others. The licensee may 
collect fees from the users for the use of services generated out of the water resources and services 
20 may be stopped on default of payment. A person or a corporate body, who is utilizing water 
resources prior to the commencement of WRA, is also required to apply to the concernedauthority 
as prescribed under the act witbin one year of commencement of the Act. 
The licensee is liable under the WRA to pay a charge or annual fee for utilizing water resources 
to HMG [(Sec. 8 (5)].  HMG may prescribe the necessary quality standard of water resources for 
various uses and that should be maintained (Sec. 18 WRA). Similarly HMG may prescribe the 
tolerance limit for water resources and may prohibit water resources pollution by any means (Sec. 
19 WRA).. 
The license relating to the survey of water resources and its utilization for the generation of hydro- 
electricity is not governed by the WRA provisions as mentioned above but other matters relating 
to the water use is governed by the provisions of the Act (Sec. 9). 
The license of such a licensee can be cancelled if he or she performs acts contrary to the WRA or 
Rules framed under it, or  does not  comply with  the order given by  the prescribed  officer 
prescribing necessary improvements thereon. 
While providing license for utilizing water resources following priority order, shall, in general, be 
followed: 
(i) 
(ii)  Irrigation 
(iii) 
(iv)  Hydro-electricity. 
(v) 
(vi)  Navigation 
(vii)  Recreational uses 
(viii)  Other uses. 
Hydro-Power 
All forms of water use and license awarding process has to be guided by the Water Resources Act 
and rules fromed thereunder except the use and licence awarding process for hydro-power. Thus 
the legal provisions regarding awarding license for hydro-power needs to be dealt seperately. No 
person or institution is authorized to generation, transmission and distribution of electricity unless 
permission or licence is obtained under the Electricity Act, 1992. However, it is not required to 
take permission to generate and distribute electricity up to  1 MW  by  a citizen or national 
institution, who only needs to inform the concerned authority about the project (Sec.  3). 
The person or institution willing to survey or generate hydro-electricity needs to file application 
to the concerned authority forthe  purpose of obtaining alicense asprescribed under theElectricity 
Act and the concerned authority will provide the required license following the due process as 
prescribedunderthelaws. Thelicensee with prior approval oftheconcernedauthoritycan transfer 
his right by any way to others (Sec.  4). The duration of license of survey for hydro-power will be 
maximum 5 years and maximum 50 years for generation, transmission anddistribution unless that 
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Drinking water and domestic uses 
Agricultural uses, such as animal husbandry 
Cottage industry, industrial enterprises and mining is renewed. The land and installation related to electricity generation, transmission and distribu- 
tionlinesestahlishedby foreign nationalsorcorporatebody in which they havefinancedmore than 
50%  of the total investment shall be under the ownership of HMG after expiry of the license (Sec. 
5 and 10). The licensee is authorized to collect fees from the hydro-power users and terminate the 
service if the fee is not paid (Sec. 16.17 and 19). He/she needs to run the project without polluting 
the environment (Sec. 24) and such license can be cancelled if the lincensee acts in contravention 
to the Act and Rules framed thereunder and order given by the concerning authority (Secretary of 
the Ministry of Water Resources) in this regard. 
The Electricity Act, 1992,  has been promulgated with the objective to attract national and foreign 
private sector entrepreneurs to invest in the development of hydro-power and utilize the available 
water resources. Therefore, the Act has made provisions for many concessions and facilities to 
such investors. 
But within the new legal framework, license to the private sector has yet to be issued. The private 
sector feels that until the Nepal Electricity Authority itself is privatized andor greater opportuni- 
ties are provided, the prospect ofprivate sector participation in medium and small projects (1 MW 




The uncertainties involved in the development of hydro-power projects due to a lack of 
hydro-meteorological data. 
Uncertainty over the continuous flow of the benefits and guarantee of being paid in the 
future. 
Uncertainty over tariffs which would be fixed by a proposed public tariff commission and 
further negotiation with Nepal Electricity Authority. 
The legal situation of  water rights regarding other uses such as agriculture, cottage industry, 
transportation, recreation, etc. are not dealt with separately in detail in the existing Nepalese laws. 
However, for the use of water for such a purpose a license is required. 
Water Rights to a Water  SourceWhich Originates in and Confiied to a Private Land 
The owner of the land on which the water resources is confined (to hisher  land) may use the same 
without obtaining a license but subject to the provisions made under the Rules framed under the 
WRA (Sec. 4 (2) (e) of the WRA). But, surprisingly the Rules are silent on this issue; thereby it 
leaves room for confusion regarding the use of  such water resources to both. users and law 
implementors. 
All the water resources as per the provisions of the WRA is owned by the fingdom of  Nepal 
whether it is originated or existed on private or public land and the provisions regarding to legal 
restrictions on its use may be considered ascontrary to theconstitutional provision of the property 
right, (See Secs. 2,4  (2) (e) of WRA and Art. 17 of the Constitution) because the use of water is 
attached with the use of land. 
Similar arguments can be put forward regarding to the Aquatic Animals Protection Act, 1960, 
which statesfhat thetermwater includeslake, waterreserve, waterfall,  stream,river, watercourse, 
22 pond, canal, etc. and their sources; and defining the term aquatic animal it states that the term 
includes all animals which livein water.TheActhasmadeaprovisionthattheowneroftheprivate 
watermay use the water tokill orcatchaquaticanimalsanyway helikesexceptby usingpoisonous 
substances and without aquatic animals in other water. [See. Sec. 2 (a) and (b) and Sec. 31  The 
term “private water” has been defined as the lake, pond, watershed, or water reserve on a land of 
which the owner is paying land revenue of the land to HMG. (Sec. 2 (gha) of the Aquatic Animals 
Protection Act, 19601. Thus the concept of private water and its use to the extent accepted by the 
Aquatic Animals Protection Act has not been confirmed hy WRA. Further the WRA has made 
room to frame rules impossingsomerestrictions on the use ofprivate waterwhichmay contravene 
the provisions made under the Acquatic Animals Protection Act. 
Irrigation and Customary Water Use Rights Vis-a-vis the Existing Legal 
Provisions 
Asmentionedahove,MufukiAinistheoldestcodifiedlawofNepal.  In 1950,  there wasasuccessful 
popular political movement against the then Rana rulers and the social, political, and economic 
situation ofthe country was changed hut the same law remained in existence till 1963. It was only 
in 1963 that the old Muluki Ain was revised thoroughly as per social and political changes and a 
new, reviseJ Muliki Ain promulgated 
The Muluki Ain devotes one out of its 44 chapters,  known as Jugga  Aubud Gurneko (Land 
Cu1tivation)to  basic legal provisionsregarding irrigation. Underthesaidchapterif someonewants 
to make a new irrigation canal above the existing canal helshe can make the new one only if that 
does not lessen the quantity of water to those plots of land which are being irrigated through the 
old one (Sec.  I). 
Similarly, for the purpose of cultivating land, an irrigation canal can be made through anyone’s 
private land, whether fallow or cultivated, and water can be channelized; no one should prohibit 
such an act. A landlord, on whose land the irrigation canal is made, unless hidher land is revenue 
exempted fallow land, should be given the price of the land or substitute land as a compensation 
for thelossofhis/herland.Therevenueofthecultivatedland,  on which theinigationcanal ismade 
to cultivate a fallow land, should he exempted if the revenue of such newly cultivated land comes 
around double of the cultivated land used for making the canal (Sec.  3). 
Likewise, land, on  which a water resource or hank of a pond exists, should not he cultivated 
(Sec.4). The person who cultivates  such a land is liable to be  fined five times the revenue in 
addition to the revenue of the land and such land should he left fallow again (Sec.12). 
The Muluki Ain contains several provisions that recognizes existing social norms, values and 
practices. But the Ain is also confusing to many people. In the first place, the original Muluki Ain 
was drafted over one hundred years ago. The language is very difficult to understand. It contains 
many Urdu and Persian words which has madeit very difficult for the common people to read and 
understand, Secondly, it contains some provisions that may lead to contradictions. For example, 
the upper riparian have prior right of  water use to irrigate their land. On the other hand the 
traditional water distribution system is also recognized. What happens if the upper riparian turn 
. 
23 their bari (unleveled cultivated land which can be used to grow other crops than rice) into  khet(rice 
fields) lessening thequantity ofwater to thelower riparian7Itisdifficulttoanswcrsuchaquestion 
under the provisions of this Ain. 
Third, the fineofup  toRs. 50foraperson whocompclssomeonetoleave  hisherlanduncultivated 
is very nominal and therefore not a good protection against infringement of rights. 
Fourth, being a general law of the nation specific laws, such as the WRA, prevail over it. This legal 
provision often leads to confusion, even among lawyers.  Thus the Muluki Ain has recognized the 
prior appropriation and customary water use right, but the WRA of  1992 does not explicitly 
recognize customary water use rights. For example, in many parts of the country water users 
associations, who in general are not registered as institutions, have constructed irrigation canals 
and are charging fees from the beneficiaries: such water users c.ommittee andcustomary practices 
oflevyingwaterfeesisnotlegallyvalidunlessanduntil  they obtainalicenseunderthe WRA [Sec. 
(031. 
Likewise the WRA has broadly “nationalized” all water resources within the kingdom ofNepal. 
It  also has fixed priority order for the use of  the water sources and drinking purpose is on the top 
of the priority list. In such a situation, if someone or a group, without obtaining a license, has 
constructed an irrigation canal using the water from long past but sonieone comes to claim the 
same water for drinking purpose then what kind of right will prevail over there? The right of the 
person who constructed the canal as customary water use right under Muluki Ain?  Or the right 
of a person who would like to use the water source for the drinking purpose? This question may 
beansweredbyalegalexpertsayingthatWRAisapplicableinthiscasebecauseMulukiAin,  being 
agenerallaw,cannotprevailoverthespecific  law. But, willit bejustified,that someonegets water 
use right under Muluki Ain since time immemorial but loses the same right under WRA ? 
Here the question arises what is customary water use rights? The meaning of the term customary 
water use rights hasnotbeendefinedin any OftheNepaleselaws. Thusit is upto thecourts  todefine 
this termanddeterminehow may year  sofusedoes  it  take forapractice to beconsidered customary 
use. The  number of years may differ from one court to another unless and until the Supreme  Court 
ascertains the number of years in this regard. 
Nevertheless, the WRA has not completely rejected the customary water use right because some 
provisions of the Act have made room to recognize such rights. For example; 
i. 
ii. 
Using  water for ccrtain purposcs such as drinking,  domestic,  irrigation  purposes on 
individual or collective basis does not require obtaining a license  [Sec. 41. 
On receipt of an application for survey and utilization of water resources from an individual 
or a corporate body the concerning authority or officer is required to make necessary 
enquiries before issuance of the license [Sec.B (2) and (4)]. 
If adispute arises while utilizing water resources, the prescribed committee shall decide as 
to whether or not or in what manner such use could be made. Such decision must be made 
on the basis of priority order of water use, the beneficial use, i.e. rational uses of the water 
resources within the available means and resources and use of the water resources without 
iii.  ‘ 
24 causing damage to others [Sec. (2)a and 4(3)] or misuse of water resources and also other 
necessary enquiries. [Sec.  7(2) and Sec.101. 
All these three provisions give room to the implementors to consider the customary water use 
rights of the local people and respect them before they take a decision within their respective 
jurisdiction. But two things have tobeconsidered. First, these provisions do not makeit mandatory 
forthelawimplementors  torespectthecustomary wateruseright. Second, to follow theintentions 
of the legislature [which are not directly mentioned] by the law implementors not only require 
knowledge of the law but also proper understanding of such legal provisions. These two things 
have made it doubtful that the law implementors would respect customary water use rights of the 
people or at least it can be concluded that it depends upon the bureaucrats which may vary from 
place to place. 
RESOLUTION  OF  WATER  RELATED  CASES  BY 
MEDIATION 
The Village Panchayat Act 2018 (1961) gave judicial power to the village Panchayats (village 
councils). The  judicial power of the village Panchayats included power to hear cases relating to 
encroachment of water outlet, embankment of water resources and irrigation water, etc. (Sec. 41). 
The village Panchayats were authorized to exercise the powers like a court while hearing cases. 
The village Panchayats were required to form a three member judicial committee headed by the 
villagechairmanorvice-chairman and two othermembers, i.e., the wardmembers fromthe wards 
ofthedisputingparties, butmaintainingsomeofthebasicjudicialprinciples,e.g., arelativeofthe 
the disputing parties could not be member of  the judicial committee. The appeal against the 
decisions of the village Panchayat Judicial Committee was heard by the concerned District Court. 
After the successful popular movement of 1990 the place of the Village Panchayat Act has been 
taken by the Village Development Committee (VDC) ,  as per the VDC Act of 1992. 
However, the  judicial power given to the Village Panchayats is not given to Village Development 
Committees undertheVDC Actof 1992. Thejudicial power given tolocal villagepanchayats was 
directly or indirectly justified in many ways. It was argued that local disputes would be solved 
locally without going out of the village and entering into a complex judicial process thus saving 
time and money of the disputing parties. It  was also considered to help the social development 
process of the local communities. But surprisingly neither had the Village Panchayat Act, 1961 
given any justification for giving such judicial power to Village Panchyats, nor did the Village 
Development Committee Act mention why such a judicial power is not given to the VDCs. 
Under Secection 44 of the Village Development Committee Act, 1992,  the Village Development 
Committees are authorized lo  mediate in minor cases relating to encroachment of (water) outlets, 
use of bathing platforms in a water source and protection of public properties (those kinds of 
property whicharenotownedby individualpersons) andwaterreservoirs(dams),imgationcanals 
or distribution of water. Under Sec. 45 of  this Act the VDCs should summon both the parties and 
try to bring about a compromise after due discussions. If an agreement can not be reached then the 
parties shouldbetoldby theVDCthatthey may take their case to theconcemed court of law within 
. 
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25 three months  from the date  of registration of the first petition in the VDC. If agreement is reached 
the VDC is authorized to take fees from the parties as per the rate prescribed under the existing 
laws. 
These provisions show that there are some basic differences between the judicial power of the 




The  village Panchayat had given authority to hear and decide on cases  prescribed under the 
VP Act and the appeal was heard by the district court, including the authority to bring 
agreement between the disputing parties; hut the VDC Act has not given power to decide 
over such cases, hut just to try to bring about an agreement between the disputing parties. 
The VDC Act has much more clearly mentioned that VDC should hear complaints about 
distribution of water and try to bring an agreement between disputing parties which was not 
clear under VP. Act. (Sec. 44 of VP Act and Sec. 44 of VDC Act.) 
The VP. Act had authorized Village Panchayats to bring compromise (agreement) between 
disputing parties even in those cases which were not under theirjurisdiction (as mentioned 
under Sec. 44).  But,such a power is not given to VDCs under the VDC Act. 
Thus we can notice that there are substantive as well as procedural differencesbetween the VP  Act 
and the VDC Act regarding to the judicial power of the concerned  local bodies. The village 
Panchayats under the VP Act, 1961 were given much wider judicial power and power to bring 
compromise between the disputing parties than the power given to VDCs under the VDC Act of 
1992.  Why has such changes been brought? Is it  the consequence of feed back from the concerned 
local bodies or agencies or is it because of the change in the political system? Perhaps the second 
one prevailed because such a change is not based on any study or study report. However, the report 
of the Royal Judicial Improvement Committee of 1983  mentioned, "though it is noticed that many 
people were not interested to comment on the effectiveness of the judicial power given to the 
Village Panchayats as per being for short expansion of  time. However, in the opinion of  the 
majority of the people it was appropriate to award such a judicial power to Village Panchayats. 
Further, evaluation of the benefits and experience of exercise of such a power is  needed to wait 
up to a proper expansion of time." (p. 159) 
The study of the Royal  Judicial  Improvement Commission  1983 reflects  that  on  the spot 
observation revealed that many VP officials were ncither aware of, nor exercised, their judicial 
powers.  These  officials,  in  accordance with  their historical  tradition,  effected  compromise 
between disputingparties even on suchcases which were not under theirjurisdiction under the VP 
Act. Theyalso brokered compromise between disputing parties without preparing any document. 
Further, the same legal provision was used differently by different VP officials. At the same time, 
the Commission report also commented that this practice has helped the villagers find apractical 
solution of their disputes and only a negligible number of cases went to the courts (p. 160). 
It may be argued that assigning too many judicial tasks to the village units might slow down local 
level developmental works. Nevertheless, termination of such a judicial power of village units in 
26 the absence of a proper study into the question whether such a provision is justified in accordance 
with tradition,  geographical  situation, social and economic condition  of the citizen, and the 
concept of decentralization, may be called a “blunt step”, and, accordingly, the impact of this is 
another issue for research. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Water rights are available to the people in Nepal by the following four ways: 
I. 
2. 
Natural rights for which license is not required. but only for limited purposes; 
Rights acquired by licensing. Such rights are limited to the purpose for which the license 
isawarded. However, by acquiring thelicense, thelicenseegetsright overtheuseofwater 
as property, which he can sell (license) to others, collect fees from the users of the water 
or product thereof, and terminate the service upon non-payment of the charge/fee. 
Riparian rights have been recognized, under which the upper riparian has prior right to 
irrigate his land in comparison to the lower riparian. 
Customary use right and prior appropriation rights have also been recognized in two 
senses. First no other irrigation canal can be constructed above the existing one if water 
supply to the existing canal is decreased. Second, the water share of aperson who has becn 




All these rights can be adversely affected by  governemnt inverventions. The government may 
acquire a water source to develop  it as long as this does not cause substantial adverse effect to the 
existing users and benefits a larger population than the existing beneficiaries. Thus none of these 
water rights can prohibit the government to acquire or develop water resources and construction 
works. However, the government is liable to pay compensation for acquiring construction works 
in accordance with the law but the compensation does not include payment for the loss of possible  .  income by selling the water services. 
The elected VDC members are unaware of their judicial power due to their socio-economic and 
educational background. If power is given to the local bodies, we naturally expect them to utilizc 
the power in a proper way. To help them carry out their responsibilities successfully, they have 
to be trained, provided with the necessary physical facilities, experts, and copies of laws. They 
havetobeprivided withguidelinesandorientation  whichshould bemonitored andevaluatedfrom 
,  time to time. Unfortunately these have not been provided to them. 
We should make very  simple and  cost effective proccdures  which  should be  followed and 
flexibility should be adopted in the laws. 
27 The spirit of WRA is to make legal arrangements for beneficial use of water resources and keep 
them free from environmental and other hazardous effects. The WRA must be regarded as legal 
provisions in the interest of the people but. if the spirit of the law is not properly understood by 
its implementors, then it can be used to terminate peoples’ customary water use rights as well. The 








It has been internationally accepted that natural resources can be managed best if the 
indigenousmanagement systemsand thecustomaryrightsofthepeople are accepted and 
protected under the formal laws of the country. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
WRA should clearly mention that the customary water use rights of the people are given 
legal recognition and the term “customary water use rights” be defined in accordance 
with international practices. 
All the members in the District Water Resources Committee, except the representative 
from DDC, are bureaucrats. It is widely accepted that the elected representatives and 
representatives fromtheconcernedsectorshouldalso  be includedin thedecisionmaking 
process  for the purpose of involving people in the governance of the country. It is, 
therefore, recommended that the District Water Resources Committee should include 
one representative from the concerned VDC or municipality and one also from the water 
users association as prescribed by the DDC. 
It is recommended to provide one legal expert in all District Administration Offices and 
give them necessary orientation and guidelines regarding implementation of the con- 
cerned laws, otherwise such law implementors even may not know that there exists alaw 
called Water Resources Act ! 
The background mentioned above clearly shows that there is little input of  the govern- 
ment in the efforts of the people in managing water resources. JAW  always affects, one 
way or the other, their management systems but the laws are never brought into public 
discussions  before  their adoption. Therefore, it  is recommended  that the laws and 
amendments thereon which affect the people at large must be brought into public 
discussion before they are passed by  the parliament. And for the effective implementa- 
tion of the laws people should be made aware of their water rights and necessary steps 
should be taken in this regard. 
The WRA has made provision for registering water users associations under it. However, 
they are registered under the Society Registration Act, which may not be enough to 
provide proof of the rights of the concerned people to the use of certain water resources. 
So, necessary instructions should be given to all the District Administration Offices in 
this regard. 
Necessary amendments should be made in the laws so  as to avoid overlapping and 
contradictory law. 
Legal provisions should be made to establish coordination so as to avert duplication in 









5  DlOlIIMl Nepal 1995: 53 
6  Sharma 1975: 62-112. 
7 
This is the revised version of the paper presented at the  workshop on ‘‘Water Rights, Conflict,  and 
Policy” held in Kathmandu, Jan. 22-24, 1996. 
The author is associated with FREEDEAL. 
It is expected that major river systems of Nepal bear a potential  of about 83000 MW of electricity 
of which 42000-45000 MW is economically and technically feasible for commercial exploitation. 
Center Bureau of  Statistics 1994 47, 83 and 94. 
Some writers have translated “  Jagga Aabad  Garneko Mahal” as “Land Reclamation” 
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29 ANNEX I 
Chronology of  of Water Related Laws and Policies in Nepal 











1854 AD (1990 B.S.): Promulgation of the MulukiAin (National Code). One section of the 
National Code deals with rules concerning irrigation in general and construction of canals 
and priority of: water distribution in particular. 
1952 AD (2009 B.S.): Amendments made to the Muluki Ain to provide further legal rules 
with regard to canal construction and protection of fishery resources. 
1955 (2012 B.S.):  Enactment  of  the Essential  Commodities Protection Act, 2012  to 
regularize water resources as an essential commodity. 
1961 (2017 B.S.): Aquatic Animals Conservation Act, 2017 was enacted and introduced 
with a view to conserve fisheries and other aquatic animals. 
1963 (2018 B.S.): Promulgation of the Irrigafion Act, 2018 to provide legal provisions 
concerning water  use,  construction and  maintenance of  canals, distribution  of  water, 
collection of water charges, sewerage etc. 
1963 (2018 B.S.): Enactment of the Electricity Motor or Power Transfer Act, 2018 to 
provide legal provision concerning the transfer of private ownership of electricity. 
1963 (2019 B.S.):  Enactment of  the Nepal Electricity Corporation Act, 2019 for the 
establishment of the Nepal Electricity Corporation, as a corporate body for production and 
distribution of electricity. 
1964 (2020 B.S.):  Introduction of  the Nepal  Electricity  Acf, 2020  to  provide  legal 
provisions  concerning  policy  to be  developed  by  the  Government  on  hydro-power, 
distribution of licences, fixation of power tariffs, etc. 
1964 (2019 B.S.): Enactment of the Village  PanchayatAct, 2019 to empower the Village 
Panchayats in the field of irrigation, water supply and fisheries. 
30 10.  1964 (2019 B.S.): Enactment of the Town PanchayatAcr, 2019 to provide legal provisions 
for management and utilization of streams, wel1.s ponds and other water resources within 















1964 (2019 B.S.):  Introduction of the District Panchayat Act,  2019  to provide legal 
provisions concerning water rights to he applied within the territory of  the concerned 
district. 
1964 (2020 B.S.): Enactment of  the  new  Muluki Ain;  the existing Muluki Ain  (with 
amendments) is repealed. 
1964 (2020 B.S.): Commencement of the new Muluki Ain 
1967 (2025 B.S.): Introduction of thehigarion, Electricity andRelared WarerResources 
Act, 2024 to provide legal provisions related with irrigation, production of  electricity and 
other matters concerning water resources. 
1968 (2026 B.S.):  Commencement of  the  Irrigation,  Electricity and  Related  Water 
Resources Act, 2024. 
I974 (20328,s.): Introduction of the Canal Operation Regularion to govern water use for 
irrigation. 
1982 (2039 B.S.):  Introduction of  the Soil and Watershed Conservation Act, 2039  to 
protect soil and watershed. 
1984 (2041 B.S.): Enactment of the Nepal Electricity Authority Act, 2041 to merge two 
institutions existing at that time, namely, Electricity Department and the Nepal Electricity 
Corporation. 
1984 (2042 B.S.):  Commencement of the Electricity Authority Act, 2041 
1982 (2039 B.S.): Enactment of the Decentralization Act, 2039. 
1984 (2041 B.S.):  Implementation of the Decentralization Act, 2041. 
1988 (2045 B.S.): Adoption of a new working policy on irrigation development by HMG. 
1988 (2045 B.S.): Enactment of  Irrigation Regulation, 2045 to provide legal provisions 
for formation of water users’ groups, water distribution, realization of water charges, etc. 
1989 (2046 B.S.):  Enactment of  the Nepal Water Supply  Corporation Act, 2045 to 
constitute a public utility company to supply clean water in various regions of  Nepal. 
31 25. 
26. 
1989 (2045 B.S.):  Commencement of the Nepal Water Supply Corporation Act. 2046. 
1990 (2046 B.S.): Publication of lthe ist of water resources and irrigation systems or 















1990 (2047 B.S.):  Drafting and promulgation of the Constitution  ofthe Kingdom ofNepal, 
2047 , The Constitution provides some leading provisions on water resources and their 
utilization. 
1990 (2047 B.S.): Infroduction of the Villuge  Development Committee  Act, 204710 replace 
the  Village Panchayat Act, 2019. 
1990 (2047 B.S.):  The Municipality Act, 2047 was introduced and the existing Town 
Panchayat Act, 2019. 
1990 (2047 B.S.):  The District Development Committee Act, 2047 replaced the District 
Panchayat Act, 2019. 
1992 (2048 B.S.) The Village Development Comminee Act, 2048 replaced the Village 
Development Committee Act, 2047. 
1992 (2048 B.S.): The Municipality Act, 2048 replaced the Municipality Act, 2047 
1992 (2048 B.S): The District Development Committee Act, 2048 replaced the District 
Development Act, 2047. 
1992 (2049 B.S.):  Hydro-power Development Policy, 2049 was adopted to invite private 
sector investors in the hydro-power development areas. 
1992 (2049 B.S.): Adoption of the Irrigation Policy, 2049 to clarify the government’s 
policy in this field. 
1992 (2048 B.S): Enactment of the Water Resources Act, 2049 as an umbrella Act on 
management of water resources. 
1992 (2049 B.S.): Enactment  of  the Electricity Act, 2049 to provide legal provisions 
concerning production and distribution of electricity, issuing of licences, incentives to be 
given to the private sector entrepreneurs, etc. 
1993 (2050 B.S.):  Commencement of the Water Resources Act, 2049. 
1993 (2050 B.S.): Commencement of the Electricity Act, 2049 
1993 (2050 B.S.): Introduction of the Water Resources Regulation, 2OSO  to provide for 
the procedures of the Water Resources Act, 2049. 
32 41.  1993 (2050 B.S.): Introduction of  the  Electricity  Regulation, 2050  to  carry  out  the 
objectives of the Electricity Act, 2049. 
1993 (2050 B.S.):  Electricity Turiffs Foreign Regularion, 2050 framed and introduced to 
provide a mechanism for fixation of  electricity tariff. 
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33 The Court System in Nepal' 
Ramchandra Bhattarai2 
INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this paper is to give a general introductory information on the Nepale$e court 
system. It highlights the changes in the tiers and jurisdiction of courts, basic court procedures and 
time limit as well as work load of the courts. 
\\  HISTORY  OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND  TIERS  OF 
COURTS 
The history of  the judicial system in Nepal can he divided into three periods:  1) before the 
unification of Nepal (pre- 1768 A.D.), 2) post-unification and the Rana period (1768 to 195  1). and 
3) modern period (1951 to the present). In each period the tiers or levels of courts (court of first 
instance, appeal and apex courts) have undergone changes. These changes  are described helow 
and the Nepalese  court structure over the past fifty years are presented in Table I. helow.  \ 
of  Nepal 
documented ruling dynasty in Nepal. During their reign 
and introducedjudicial system based on Hindu scriptures 
A.D.) instituted  separate central courts for civil and 
and  Itachapali,  respectively.  Justice  was delivered 
inistered according to the Mundhum (religious hookofthe Kirat~)~.  The Lichhavi 
es (customs and practices)5. King Jayasthiti Malla. one of  the rulers during 





Tier of  Court of First  Appellate 
Courts  Instance  court/s 
Four  AminUAdalat  a. Appeal Adda 
b. Bharadari Adalat 








Three  Amini/Adalat  Appeal Adalat  Supreme Court 
Four  Ilaka Adalat  a. District Court,  Supreme Court 
b.  Uchha Adalat 
Three  District Courl  Zonal Court  Supreme Court 
Pradhan 
Nayalaya 
1974-  1990 
1990 to date. 
Four  District Court  a. Zonal Court,  Supreme Court 
b. Regional Court 
Three  District Court  Court of Appeal  Supreme Court 
36 was in the hill districts.  Both Amini and Adalat are now known and function as district courts. 
There were two levels of Appellate Courts, known as Appeal Ad&  and Ehurudari Adulur, The 
Pradhan Nyayalaya was the apex court9. But in 1945  A.D., the Bhuruduri Adalut  was repealed 
and only three tiers of courts were retained.  \ 
\ 
Modern Period 
(i)  1951-1961 A. D:  The Ranaregime was overthrown in 1951 and a democratic govern- 
ment was installed. The Interim Government Act, 1951 A.D. for the first time recognised the 
judiciary as an independent institutionlo. The judiciary comprised of three tiers, i. e., the Amini 
or Adalat as court of first instance, the Appeal Adalat as the appellate court and the F'radhan 
Nyayalaya-(Supreme Court) at the apexll. The Radhan Nyalaya Act was enacted in 1952 A.D.. 
under which the Pradhan-Nyayalaya had jurisdiction  to hear appeal and all five types of writ 
petitions, i. e., the writ of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorarylz. 
In 1959  A. D. the Judicial Administration Act again changed the name and tier of the courts. Ilaka 
Adalat was established as the trial court, District Court as first appellate court, Uchha Adalat as 
the secondappellatecourtandtheSupremeCourtastheapexcourt~~.  (Duringthisperiod, theterm 
'Ilaka'  covered  areas, smaller or larger than the present district and the term 'district'  covered 
an area whihc was larger than the present district, known as zillaJ. 
(ii)  1961-1990A.  D.: In 1961 A.D. the Judicial Administration Act repealed the provision 
of Uchha Adalat which left only three tiers of courts. Under this Act the District Court was the 
Courtoffirstinstance,theZonalCourt  wasanappellatecourtand the Supremecourtwasthe  court 
of final appeall4. In 1974 the Judicial Administration Act, 1974 was enacted. One more tier, i. e., 
the Regional Court (second appellate court) was added in the court system. After this enactment 
there were two tiers for appeal according to the disputed matter or level of crime. Though some 
amendments were made in the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in 1986, the tier of the courts 
remained the same15. 
(iii)  1990tothePresent:  After the popularmovement of 1990  A.D., anew  constitution,. the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990  was promulgated. In the new constitution, provision 
was made only for three tiers of courts, namely,  the District Court as the court of first instance, 
the Court of Appeal as the appellate court and the Supreme Court at the apex16. Thus at present 
there are 75 District Courts, one for each district, and 14  Courts of Appeal, one for each zone, and 
the Supreme Court. 
Presently Nepal is divided  into five development regions,  14 zones and 75 districts. Village 
Development Committee (VDC)/Municipality is  the lowest local level administrative unit in each 





There has notbeen any study as to why the tiers of courts have been changed so often. However, 
during each change, the government officials had given similar reason why the tiers had to be 
altered to save time and cost of the disputing parties. Further research is required to determine 
whether three or four tier system is more efficient and saves money and time. 
31 JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 
Jurisdiction of Courts Prior to the Constitution of 1990 
Prior to the Constitution of  1990. the District Court was the Court of  First instance. It also had 
appellate jurisdiction in cases decided by the Village Judicial Committee (VJC), which was part 
of  the Village Panchayat and was in existence from 1980 to 1989. The first appeal against the 
decisionoftheDistrictCourtwastakenasarightofthedisputingparty.Duringtheperiodof  1974- 
1986, cases were divided into two groups according to the value of disputed matter or the level 
of crime (possible year of imprisonment or penalty). Appeal on low valued (i. e., less than NRs. 
5000) disputed matter or cases incurring punishment of less than 5 years of imprisonment were 
filedin theZonalCourtandcasesotherthanthese  werefiledin theRegionalCourt. Incases where 
there was error of law or error of the case law then there was also a provision of leave petition for 
appeal. The Judicial Administration Act was amended after 1986 and some changes were made 
in the jurisdiction of the Zonal and Regional Courts. After this amendment, the Zonal Court was 
taken as the first Appellate Court while the Regional Court was made the second appellate court. 
First appeal was taken as a matter of right of the party. There was a provision for second appeal 
but only  when  the decisions of two tiers of courts differed. 
Under the fourth amendment of the Judicial Administration Act 1986, the appeal against the 
decision of either the district or the zonal level quasi-judicial bodies could be filed in the Zonal 
Court. Second appeal was also allowed to the regional court in case of difference in decision of 
the first appellate court to the initial decision. 
The ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was almost the same in the previous constitution 
also. But the jurisdiction related to declare any law ultravires (law or act madeldone going beyond 
constitutional provisions) was not directly stated in the previous constitution and there was no 
clear provision to revise its own judgement.There was a provision to issue order by the King to 
revise the judgement of the Supreme Court. The King was the last resort of judiciary. 
The village judicial committee (VJC) was introduced in 1980. The original jurisdiction for the 
settlement of  other disputes in addition to canal water was provided to the VIC by  a notice 
published in the Nepal Gazette (in September 1980) as stipulated in the Village Panchayat Act. 
Thevillagejudicial committee would be formedby theconcemedvillagePanchayat.There would 
be three members in the committee. The chairman of the committee would be chief or vice-chief 
of the Village Panchayat. There was also a provision for District Judicial Council (DJC) and the 
appeal against the decision of VJC could be filed in DJC. The provision of appeal in the DJC 
against the decision of the VJC changed in 1986  and appeal against the decision of  the VJC could  , . -,-, 
be filedin theDistrictCourtsince 1986.  TheseprovisionsoftheVJCremainedin  effect up t+l$89. 
The VJC was required to  follow the same procedure as a court of law. As discussed ia.  Khanal 
(this volume) 15  cases have been filedin the Supreme Court against the decisions ofVJC and DJC. 
In 1992 the new Village Development Committee (VDC) Act was adopted. The Act provides the 
VDC the power only to mediate all disputes, except criminal cases,  arising within the village. 
38 Jurisdiction Since 1991 
District courts 
The District Courts have exclusive  jurisdiction as the court of first instance over all types of cases 
exceptas otherwiseprovidedby  thelawls. Forexample, somecaseshaveto  be firstregistered with 
with Land Revenue Office and the disputants can take the case to Appellate Court only to appeal. 
Courts of Appeal 
Courts of Appeal are at the second level of the court hierarchy. They have jurisdiction to hear 
appeals against the decisions of the District Courts and to ratify referencesmade to them by such 
courts or against the order of the judicial or quasi judicial bodies within  their jurisdictionl9. 
Thecourts  ofAppeal havealso been grantedextraordinary  jurisdiction to issue orders in the form 
of writ of habeas corpus, mandamus and injunctionzo. In addition to this jurisdiction the Courts 
of Appeal have original jurisdiction over the cases prescribed by the law and over the cases 
ordered by the Supreme Courtzl.  \. 
Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has Ordinary as well as Extraordinary jurisdiction 
Ordinary Jurisdiction 
(i)  The Supreme Court  has appellate  jurisdiction in cases which are decided by 
the Courts of Appeal within their original jurisdiction, cases decided by the 
Districtcourts  withmore than ten year's imprisonment andcases where there 
are basic differences in decision of Appellate Courts to the decision of  the 
District Courts or other quasi judicial bodiesZ2. In addition  to this, the 
Supreme Court may ratify references made by the lower courtsz3. 
(ii)  The Supreme Court may review its own judgments or final ordersZ4. The 
SupremeCourtmay provide opinion on any complicatedlegalquestion to His 
Majesty25. 
Extraordinary Jurisdiction 
(i)  Any Nepali citizen may file a petition in the Supreme Court to have any law 
or any part thereof declared void on the ground of inconsistency with the 
constitution because it imposes an  unreasonable restriction on the enjoyment 
of the fundamental rights conferred by  the constitution or on other grounds 
and extraordinary power shall rest with the Supreme Court to  declare that law 
as voideitherabinitioorfrom  thedateofitsdecisionifitappearsthat thelaw 
in question is inconsistent with the constitution26. 
.,+" 
.,. 
39 (ii)  The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of  the fundamental rights 
conferred by the constitution, for the enforcement of any other legal right for 
which no other remedy has been provided or for which the remedy even 
though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or for the settlement 
of any constitutional or legal question involved in any dispute of  public 
interest or concern, have the extraordinary power to issue necessary and 
appropriate orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute. The Supreme 
Court may issue appropriate orders and writs including the writs of  habeas 
corpus, mandamus, certiorary, prohibition and quo  warrant^.^^ 
Public Interest Litigation 
If there is a public interest or concern by its subject or nature, any person may file a case with the 
permission of the concerned court.The application seeking permission should also be filed along 
withthepetition.28Thushefore 1990theprovision  ofpublic interestlitigation was only in national 
code (Muluk Ain )and it was conditional i.e. it was necessary to get permission from concerned 
court before filing the petition(Mu1uki Ain Nineth Amendment). After the Constitution of 1990 
such provision was  stipulated in the constitution without any condition. 
BASIC PROCEDURES 
Basic court procedures are different in criminal and civil cases. The major differences are in the 
matter of filing a case, process of  summons, execution  of judgements,  etc. Details  of  the 
procedures are discussed under the following headings:. 
Civil Cases 
In civil cases when a person comes to the court to file the claim, defence statement or appeal, he 
shudd go to the RegistradShrestedar of the court. After due examination of the document the 
RegistmdShrestedardecides to register thedocumentifall basic proceduresare fulfilledor hemay 
reject to register the document stating the reason on the hack of the document29. 
After the tiling of a case by a plaintiff. the first action to be taken by the court is the delivery of 
the summons (Italayanama) to the defendant ordering hider  to present hisher defence within 
the time prescribed by law (35  days in general). A copy of the petition /claim should also be sent 
along with the summons30. 
After the submission of defence statement the court provides the same date for app-uance in the 
court to both the parties. When both the parties appear in the court on the same day, tht .  wrt  will 
fix a hearing date. In the first hearing, the court may order to submit necessary documents 8.2 
necessary witnesses stated in their claim and defence statement, and on the spot mapping in the 
presence of both parties and other villagers (if necessary)3'. 
40 Only after the execution of these orders the next hearing date will be fixed. In the hearing, a party 
may represent himself or he may present his lawyer to represent his case. The court should give 
a  reasoned judgement.  All  the  facts,  claim,  counter claim,  pleadings  of  lawyers,reason  of 
acceptance or rejection of the claim, defence statement as well as lawyers’ pleadings should also 
be clearly stated in the decision of the court3*. After hearing both the parties, the court gives its 
decision. One level appeal is amatter of right to the party. 
After the final decision, again the decided case returns to the concerned District Court (court of 
first instance) for its execution and record.The concerned party should apply in the related District 
Court for the execution of the judgement within the time prescribed by law (in general within two 
years of the final decision). 
Criminal Cases 
Criminal cases (where one of the parties is the state) start after the registration of First Information 
Report (FIR) in a police office and that can be tiled by any person. The police investigate the case 
and forward it to the District Public Prosecutor’s  Office with their opinion ahout the claim. The 
Public Prosecutor decides and prepares the claim and forwards the same to the District Court. The 
courtrecordsthestatementoftheaccused.  Afteranalyzingtheclaim, defence, statement and other 
documents submitted hy the claimant, the court makes first order whether the accused person 
should he kept into judicial custody or released in hail depending upon the possible punishment 
on the claim and whether the accused person is seen to be culprit on the grounds of proof available 
at that time33. 
The  court also issues order to present the witness(es) and other necessary documents to both 
parties. After examining the witnesses and documents the court fixes the hearing date again. 
During the hearing, the Public Prosecutor represents from the claimant’s side and the accused 
person may appoint his lawyer for his defen~e3~.  If the accused person is poor and unable to 
appoint a lawyer, then a lawyer will he appointed by the court to defend him. If the person who 
filed the FIR wants to be represented by a lawyer he may also appoint  his lawyds. 
Time Limit for the Delivery of Judgement 
There is also a legal provision of time limit to decide the cases. In case of the District Court, the 
judgment should he delivered within six months after the submission of defence statement or 
completion of time limit to submit defence statement35. But in case of appeal it should he decided 
within three months after the receipt of the case file decided by  the lower  But very few 
cases are decided by the courts within the prescribed time limit. One of the studies conducted by 
FREEDEAL3’  shows that in the District Court it took one to two years to decide a case in the 
selected districts in 199338. But in case of the Courts of Appeal it varried from 7 months to 31 
months during the same year in the selected courts39. The  Supreme Court  took more time to 
dispose acase  than thelower courts. In 1993,  on an average it took 16 months todecide writ petition 
cases and 3  1 months for other types of cases40. This may be either due to heavy work load of the 
SupremeCourtorduetomoretimetakenbythelayersormay  beduetomoretimerequiredtostudy 
the case. 
,’ 
41 Types  of  Cases  Supreme  Court 
Land  70  I(1. 69)  I  369  I(6.17) 
Transactions  20  I(0. 48)  I63  I  (I. 05) 
1991192  I  1992193 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Family Dispute  I525  I(12. 69)  I1052  I(17. 59)  I1638  I(8. 51)  I2547  I(10. 50)  I  14498  I(16. 07)  16088  I(14. 26) 
Forgery  and1  25  I(0. 61)  I33  I(0. 56)  I  1046  I(5. 43)  11361  I(5. 62)  I6842  I(7. 58)  I 12343  I(10. 94) 
Courts  of  Appeal  District  Courts 
1991192  I 1992193  1991192  I  1992193 
5530  1 (28. 69)  I6662  I(27. 46)  19603  (21. 72)  121896  I(19. 41) 
1637  I(8. 49)  I  1965  I(8. 10)  10920  I  (12. 09)  19888  I(8. 77) 
Sub-Total 
Injunction4’ 
certiorari46  2442  (59. 02)  3397  (56. 80) 
Sub-total  2715  (65.  63)  3594  (60.  1) 
Total  4137  (100)  5980  (100) 



















Source: Annual Reports of the Supreme Court 19916’2 and 19926’3 WORKLOAD OF COURTS BY TYPE OF CASES 
This heading  discusses mainly type of cases under different levels of courts and their percentage 
to the total cases during 1991/92 and 1992/93. 
Table 2 shows that in the District and the Appellate Courts, the highest percentage of cases was 
about land disputes followed by family disputes: while in the Supreme Court the number of writ 
petitions was very high in comparision to the appeal cases. Writ petitions were almost two thirds 
of the total cases registered in the Supreme Court. Among the cases registered in the Supreme 
Court more than 50 percent were writs of Certiorary (59.02% in 1991/92 and 56.8Win 1992/93). 
The percentage of cases filed in the Courts of Appeal against the decisions of the District Courts 
was 21.33% and 21.5% in 1991/92 and 1992/93 respectively  whereas in the Supreme Court it 
was almost five percent in both the years. If we exclude the Writ petitions from the Courts of 
AppealandSupremeCourtthepercentagecomesdownto21.8%(1991/92)and 18.86%(1992/ 
93) in case of the Courts of Appeal and nearly two percent in case of the Supreme Court. The 
percentage of the cases registered in the Supreme Court against the decisions of  the Courts of 
Appeal was 21.46% and 24.65% in 1991/92 and 1992/93 respectively. If we compare only the 
cases filed under the headings of appeal and ratification then the percentage of cases registered in 
the Supreme Court to that of the Courts of Appeal comes to 7.67 and 10.63 percent for the year 
1991/92 and 1992/93 respectively. The classification of cases as published by the court does not 
reflect the cases relating to water management and water rights which may be a cumbersome task 
to study such cases. The workload of the Supreme Court seems to be very high. Cases per judge 
is about 295 in 1991/92 and 427 in 1992/93. It is even worse since a minimum of two judges are 
required to decide  cases and sometimes three, five or more depending upon the gravity of the 
cases. This may be one of the reasons why more time is taken to dispose of  cases in the Supreme 
Court than in lower level courts. 
CONCLUSION 
During the last 50 years there have been many changes in the court structure of the country. Why 
has there been such frequent changes?Nosystematicstudy has beendonein this regard. However, 
whenever the tiers of courts were changed the authorities had given the explanation that the tiers 
were changed so as to save time and money of the disputing parties. Whether the three tier system 
or four tier system is more efficient to save time and money is a matter of further research in this 
area. When the three tier of courts was changed to four tier, it was assumed that the burden of the 
Supreme Court would be reduced. But this did not happen because every litigant wants to go upto 
the Supreme Court to satisfy himself. 
In the process of changes and development, the present Constitution, the Constitution of  the 
Kingdom of Nepal 1990, has brought some changes to the existing court structure. Some of them 
are as follows: 
43 a.  The four tier system of courts has been changed into a three tier system which has helped 
save time and money of  the disputing parties. 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been expanded to include the review of its own 
judgements under conditions stipulated under the existing laws. It was the prerogative of 
the King to issue an order to the SupremeCourt  in this  regard under theconstitution of 1962. 
Similarly, there are also provisions of  public interest litigation in  the National  Code 
(Muluki Ain 9th. amendment 1986)  as  well as in the Constitution of 1990; before that such 
provisions were not made in the Nepalese laws. 
b. 
c. 
Thecomparisionofthe workloadofthecourts  fortbelasttwo  years showsthat less than 22percent 
of the total decided cases were filed in the appellate  courts. Though, according to the existing law, 
one level appeal is a matter of right for disputing parties. It indicates that nearly 80 percent of the 
disputing parties are either satisfied with the decision of the concerned courts or unable to file 
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Constitution 1990, Art. 88 (4) 
hid Art.88 (5) 





















Ibid Art. 88(2). 
Sec. I0 of  Courr Procedure, National Code (Muluki  Ah). 9rh. Amendmenr 1986 
District Courr Rules 1995, Sec. 7(Ka). 
lbid Sec. 22. 
Disrrict Courr Rules 2052, Sec. 24 and Sec. 184(Ka)  of Court Procedure of theNational Code. 
Disrricr Court Rules 1995,Sec.  47 and Sec. 185 of Coun Procedure of the National Code. 
Sec. 11  8 of Court Procedure of National Code. 
Ibid Sec. 185. 
Sec. 14 of Court Procedure. National Code. 
Ibid Sec. 198. 
FREEDEAL, 1995. 
bid  P. 35. 
Ibid p. 40. 
lbid p. 53. 
‘Habeas Corpus’ =the writ, meaning “you have the body to testify”. This writ is used to bring  a 
prisoner detained in a jail or prison to give evidence before the court [Black’s  Low Dicrionary] 
‘Mandamus’= ‘we command’. This is the name of a writ (formerly a high prerogative writ) which 
issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to a private or municipal corporation, 
any of its officers, or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or to an inferior courl, 
commanding the performance of a particular act therein specified,  and belonging to his or their 
public, official, or ministerial duty. or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or 
privileges of which he has been illegally deprived. 
“Prohibition” is that process by  which  a superior court prevents an inferior COUR  or tribunal 
possessing  judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters over which 
it has cognizance or usurping matters not within its jurisdiction to hear or determine. 
“Quo-Warranto”=  A common law writ designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally 
entitled to do so. 
“Injunction”= A court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding 
some one to undo some wrong or injury 
“Certiorari”=Certiorari is a prerogative writ of superior court to call for the records of an inferior 
court or a body acting in judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. [Saha. I9941311 
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46 Analysis of Supreme Court Cases and Decisions 
Related to Water Rights in Nepal’ 
Bishal Khanal and Santosh K.C2 
INTRODUCTION 
Water is one of Nepal’s most important natural resources and is available in almost all parts of the 
country. However, the availability of water varies according to season and location.  In the past 
the demand for water was low as the population was low and the people were unware about the 
multiple uses and benefits of  water. Water was used for drinking, washing and irrigation. And 
since water was sufficient for these uses, there were hardly any disputes relating to consumption, 
distribution and other uses of water. Consequently,  water related disputes were not regarded as 
significant and the state did not concern itself much witn such disputes. 
With the growth of the population and the development of the idea of multiple uses and benefits 
of water as well as the growth in demand, especially for irrigation, issues and disputes relating to 
water were raised from time to time in different parts of the country.  The state then began to 
institute conflict resolution processes through preventive as well as judicial methods. As part of 
preventive method, the state appointed officials, many of who were revenue collectors, to look 
after water management (allocation, distribution, maintenance, etc.). These officials were known 
as Dhalpas, Birtawalas,  Mukhiyas, Jimidars,  and so on . The state delegated power to these 
officials to hear and resolve conflicts within their (territorial) juridictions. Normally the Royal 
Court was not entitled to hear water related disputes. The legacy of King Ram Shaha’s edict that 
the ‘conflict  raised due to the sharing of drinking water and canal water sho  ld not be heard by 
important cases relating canal water (forwarded by the local level authorities and advisers) had 
been resolved by  the Prime Minister’s court in the late Rana regime. 
3 
the  rnyal  court’ played dominant role until the modern history  of Nepa  I!  However, some 
41 
3012 6 With the beginning of democratic exercise since 1951 the courts in Nepal were kept separate from 
executive and other form of influences. At first, thelnterim GovernmentofNepalActof  1951 and 
the Pradhan Nyayalaya Act (Apex Court Act) of  1953 constituted a separate appeal court. The 
process of  separating subordinate courts was underway till the promulgation of the Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Nepal 1958 (and legislation relating to administration ofjustice thereunder). 
As a result, judicial responsibility vests upon the judiciary as constituted by  some enactments. 
Hence disputes which need judicial settlement could be filed in the court of law. However due to 
various reasons people use non-formal adjudication (not the judicial process) in large number of 
cases. The Supreme Court (known as F’radham Nayayalaya  from 1951 to 1956) was the apex in 
the judicial hierarchy. 
As per the Nepalese legal system there was and is little scope for filing water rights related cases 
in the SupremeCourtbecause waterrightsrelatedcasesas  well asother cases were (are)first heard 
by the concerned local bodies (village level units) or District Courts or quasi-judicial bodies. And 
appeal against the decisions of these bodies are/were heard by the concerned District Panchayat 
(now knownas District DeveopmentCommittee [DDC]), District CourtorAppellate level couTts. 
The Nepalese legal system has adopted “one step appeal” system which allows little room for 
water related cases to reach to the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court can hear water 
related cases in two ways. First, it can hear such cases under the provision of spscial leave for 
appeal, is., with the prior approval of the Supreme Court an appeal against the decision of 
appellate courts can be filed in the Supreme Court. Second, under writ jurisdiction, if the citizens’ 
fundamental rights are infringed  and there does not exist proper  and efficient legal remedy 
established under theexisting laws, the Supremecourt can hear writ petitions even related to water 
rights. 
This paper presents apreliminary analysis of cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1980 
and 1990. The study team first went through all the cases, published and unpublished, for which 
the Supreme Court had given its judgements during the period mentioned above. The study team 
faced great difficulty in locating cases related to water rights because water rights is not category 
used to classify cases either in Nepal Kanoon Patrika(NepalLawReporter),  the  journal published 
by the Supreme Court,  or  in the court register.  We were able to locate 9 1 cases which were 
somehow related to water rights issues and which were published in the above mentioned journal. 
In this paper we discuss these cases briefly under different headings. In the following section we 
will briefly discuss the classification of water related cases used in this paper, the title (category) 
under which the cases were registered, the origin of the dispute, the dispute resolution processes 
followedbeforethecases were filedin thesupreme Court and thecomposition (castelethnic group 
as well as  individuals/ institutions) of  the claimants and defendants. We will then briefly discuss 
21  cases which we believe are directly related to waterrights and in the last section we present our 
conclusion. 
48 SUPREME COURT CASES ON  DISPUTES  RELATED TO 
WATER RIGHTS 
Classification  of  Water  Rights Case 
From the view point of the subject matter of the cases filed and the verdict of the Supreme Court, 
cases have been classified into three categories (a) Directly related, (b) Indirectly related, and (c) 
Partially related cases. Directly related cases (23% of the total cases) include cases in which the 
petitions were put forth with claims or defenses relating to water rights and the Court’s decisions 
also were limited to water rights issues Indirectly related cases (55%) consist of  cases which 
originated from of water rights issues or were somehow related to use or disposal of water but 
neither did the disputing parties ask the court to decide on water rights issue nor did the court do 
so; and also, those cases in which the disputingparties raised issues relating to waterrights hut the 
court did not speak on that issue or decided the cases on  “procedural” and other ‘technical’ 
grounds. Partially relatedcases (22%)  include those cases whichare notrelated to waterrights but 
were partially related to water resources or some how linked with water resources. 
Registered Title and Origin of Supreme Court Cases 
The analysis of Supreme Court cases (excluding partially related cases) shows that the majority 
of water related cases (more than 63 %) were registered  as Writ of  Certiorari.. The other major 
headingsunderwhich thecaseshavebeenregisteredareCana1  Water(S.6%),  LandEncroachment 
(5.6 %),  Injunction (4.2 %), and Murder (8.5 %).gee  Table-I). 
Table I :  Supreme Court Cases by Registered Title 
REGISTERED TITLED 
10.  MURDWAmM 
49 The study of  the Supreme Court cases from the view point of origin of the cases reveals that about 
halfofthecasesregistered(49,3%)arerelatedtocanal  water,followedbypond(21.1  %) anddrain 
(1  5.5%) (See Table  II). Among the canal related cases, the majority of  the cases were related to 
sharing of canal water and construction of newlor branch canals in the system, which comprises 
43% and29%  ofthecases,respectively.  Theothermajorcausesofconflicts  were damageofcanals 
and diversion of canals. Similarly in pond related cases, the notable issues of  conflicts are 
encroachment of ponds and transfer of rights, which comprise 33% and 47% of the pond related 
cases respectively. Drain related cases are urban phenomena which occurr from the problem of 
drain access, construction andencroachment of drain, roof water, etc. In  addition, easement rights 
issue (drinking water for domestic animals) has also been found as one of the important causes of 
conflicts. Two other  interesting causes of  conflicts are convrsion of bari  (upland, usually 
unirrigated fields) to Met (Paddy fields), and sharing tap water. 
Conflict Resolution Procedures Followed Before Registering  Cases at the 
Supreme Court 
Various formal and informal dispute resolution processes are generally followed before cases are 
registeredintheSupremeCourt.Outofthetotal91  casesregisteredintheSupremeCourt,25cases 
wereregistereddirectly in theSupremeCourtand66cases  afterpassingdifferent stagesofconflict 
resolution processes. Village Judicial Council (VJC), District Judicial Council (DJC) and juasi- 
judicial bodies are the prominent agencies which generally first attempt to resolve water related 
conflicts at the local level. The cases which they were not able to resolve and were taken to the 
Supreme Court constitute about 44  per cent of the total water rights related cases in the Supreme 
court. 
Claimants and Defendants 
Individuals, Groups and Institutions 
The analysis of claimants and defendants of the Supreme Court cases reveals that the majority of 
cases were filed by individuals (82 %), whereas the majority of the defendants were institutions 
(54  96). The cases filed by group of individuals or by institutions are very limited. They comprise 
of  12% and 7%  of  the total claimants respectively. Similarly, individual and group defendants 
comprises of  26 %and 21 %of the total defendants respectively. 
Various institutions haveheeninvolvedinmediatingorhearing  cases related to waterrights. And, 
asmentionedabove,themajority  ofthecasesfiledin theSupremeCourt wereagainstthedecisions 
oftheseinstitutions. Of the49cases wherethedefendants wereinstitutions, tencases (20percent) 
were against District Judicial Councils (DJC). Theother institutions which were defendants in the 
Supreme Court cases were Land Revenue Office (LRO), Town Panchayat (TP), His Majesty's 
Government (HMG), Village Judicial Council (VJC), and Chief District Officer (CDO).(See 
Table III). 
50 Table II: Supreme Court Cases by Origin and Cause of Conflicts 
Canal Consbuction 
Canal Damage 
Canal Water Sharing 
Canal Diversion 







Pond Right of  Ownership 
Pond Transfer of Right 
Breach of  Contract 
Change Bari to Paddy field 
Easement Right 
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Public Well Encroachment 
Ratification of Treaty on Rive 
Tap Water flow Sharing 
TOTAL:  I  21  I  50  I  71 
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49  100.09c 
lOO.O%l 
1  Chief District Office (CDO) 
2  District Judicial Council (DJC) 
3  Land Revenue Office  (LRO) 
4  Town Panchayat (TP) 
5  His Majesty's Government (HMG) 
6  Villaae Judicial Council (VJC) 
7  Others 
-  Village Panchayat (VP) 
-  District Court (DC) 
-  School 
-  Poweroffice 
-  Land Reform Office (LRFO) 
-  District Panchayat (DP) 
-  Regional Court 
-  Zonal Coun 
TOTAL 
I 
I/  4 






5  10.2% 
4  9  19.4% 
EthnicityKastes of Claimants and Defendants 
Analysis of  the ethnicity\ castes of claimants and defendants shows  that more than SO percent of 
claimants and 44 percent of defendants were of Brahman and Chhetris, followed by the Newars 
who comprises 20 percent of claimants and 24 percent of the defendants. The reason why most 
of the claimants and defendants are Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars is that they more aware of 
their water rights then  other communities becausc they  are more privileged  and have more 
exposure to the administrative and judicial areas than the other communities. 
SUMMARY OF THE DIRECTLY RELATED CASES 
A total of 21 cases fall under this category which are described briefly below under different sub- 
headings. It will he noted that the decisions of the Supreme Court are not always directly related 
52 to water rights issues (which they were at the lower courts\ institutions). Many of  the cases are 
about the jurisdiction of  local bodies or lower courts to hear cases or make decisions: other cases 
are about (court) procedural issues: and a few cases are about property relations (ownership and 
use rights). In all these cases, the disputes were originally about water (pond, lake, canal, drainage 
and roof water) which were later transformed to other issues (juridiction, etc.) by  the time they 
reached the Supreme Court. As a result, the Supreme Court has made very few decisions directly 
on water rights issues, at least during the period in review (1980 to 1990). 
Fishery Development in a Sacred Pond Does not Infringe Right to Religion 
A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court against the decision of  Jhapa District Panchayat 
claiming that the use of the sacred lake known as Birat Pokhari for fishery and demolition of the 
temple locatedinthemiddleofthelake violated the fundamentalrighttoreligion ofthepetitioners. 
The petitioners urged the court to revoke the decision. The respondent, Jhapa District Panchayat, 
contended that under the prevailing law, all ponds and lakes located in the district and not owned 
by any individual are its property. It therefore has the authority to use them as it wished. The 
respondent requested the court for the dismissal of  the claim on the above mentioned ground. 
TheSupremeCourt, initsdecision. stated that therighttoreligion ofthe peopleshouldbeprotected 
but fishery development in a sacred lake does not infringe on the right to religions 
Jurisdiction of  Local Bodies 
(i)  A writ petition was filed on the ground that the respondents encroached on their land of 
easement through which  water flowed and converted it into a farm land. Prior to filing the writ 
petition in the Supreme Court, the Village Judicial Committee (VJC) had ruled the action of the 
respondents unlawful. Thereafter, an appeal was filed with the District Judicial Committee (DJC) 
which refused to hear the appeal on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction as the issue in dispute also 
involved entitlement of landedproperty. The respondents approached the Supreme Court urging 
for the dismissal of the DJC’s decision. The DJC denied the allegations stating that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
The Supreme Court however, held that DJC is the authorized body to hear appeals against the 
decisions of the VJC and quashed the DJC’s decision6 
(ii)  In another case, a claim was filed with the VJC for the damage done to a canal and the VJC 
held the defendant’s action unlawful. The defendant filed a writ petition with the Supreme Court 
claiming that the VJC lacked the jurisdiction to hear cases relating to public canal and water. The 
VJC,init’scounterclaim, contended thatit haddecidedthecaseinaccordance with theprovisions 
of  the prevailing law. 
The Supreme Court held that the VJC is the competent authority to hear cases relating to public 
canal and water, appeals against which lie with theconcernedDJC under Section41 oftheVillage 
Panchayat Act 1961. The petition was dismissed? 
53 (iii) A dispute arosein Dangdistrict because acanal was constructedupstreamof anexisting canal 
which disturbed the users of the old canal made for the use of  farmers in a different Village 
Panchayat. A case was filed with Tari VJC but the Tari VJC forwarded the case to Tulsipur VJC. 
The latter VJC held that water should be provided to the Tulsipur Village Panchayat. An appeal 
against the decision was filed with the DJC which disagreed with the appellant’s contention. 
Hence a petition for special leave for appeal was filed with the Supreme Court and the division 
bench, allowing the leave for petition, revoked the decision of  the DJC. 
Following the decision of the division bench, a writ was filed on the ground that it was an  age-old 
canal. The respondent urged for the dismissal of the decision of the division bench. The Supreme 
Court held that since the source of  water is located in Tulsipur Village Panchayat, it has the 
jurisdiction to hear the case and the decision rendered by the Tulsipur VJC was held valid8 
(iv)  In another case, the issue in dispute was the diversion of canal water. A case was filed with 
the VJC which granted the plaintiff the right to use the canal water. An appeal was filed with the 
DJC which restricted the use of the canal water. Hence, a writ petition was filed in the Supreme 
Court to dismiss the decision on the ground that the DJC’s power to hear an appeal on such a case 
had already been transferred to the District Court. The DJC contended that its decision was made 
in accordance with the prevailing law of the country. 
The Supreme Court held that the decision of the DJC restricting the use of the canal water was 
unlawful on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case? 
(v)  However, in another case of  similar nature relating to  sharing of  canal water the court 
disagreed on the point that DJC had no power to hear an appeal. It was ruled that the DJC is 
empowered to bear an appeal under Section 13 of  the Administration of Justice (Reforms) Act, 
1974. ‘0 
(vi)  In another case, dispute arose because of the construction of a new canal, tapping water from 
a stream which was already used by the petitioner. The new canal reduced the quantity of water 
flowing to  the petitioner’s land. The case was initially filed with the VJC which restricted 
construction of the new canal. An appeal was filed with the Gorkha District Court urging for the 
dismissal of thedecision by the VJC. The District Court did not entertain thepetioner’s claim. He 
then filed an appeal in the Regional Court, Pokhara, requesting that the District Court’s order be 
dismissed. The Regional Court did not entertain the issue. Finally, a writ petition was filed in the 
Supreme Court urging the court to quash the order of the Regional Court. The respondent refuted 
the charge, arguing that the VJC had decided the case under it’s statutory authority. 
TheSupremeCourtheldthat anappeal againsttheVJC’sdecisionmayonly  be filed withtheDJC. 
The District Court and the Regional Court have no authority to hear such an appeal, and if heard, 
itisunlawfu1.Thecourtquashedtheordersgiven  by theDistrictandRegionalcourtsontheground 
that they had no jurisdiction to hear the case relating to sharing of canal water! I 
(vii)  A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court against Nepalgunj Municipality for refusing 
to grant permission to build a house on the ground that the construction site encroached a drain. 
The petitioner claimed that the municipality had no authority to resolve disputes relating to right 
54 and entitlement of property. The respondent contended that no one should be allowed to construct 
a house by encroaching a public drain so permission was not granted in accordance with the 
Municipality Act 1962 and Rules framed thereunder. 
The court, differing with the respondent’s contention, held that the municipality did not have the 
power to resolve disputes relating to rights and entitlement of property and such cases should be 
resolved by the concernedcourt. 12 
Power of  Local Bodies to Open a Drainage 
(i) Awritpetition was filedon thegroundthatKathmanduMunicipality haddecidedtoshed waste 
water in  a drain  constructed through the petitioner’s land. The petitioner claimed  that the 
Municipality had no legal authority to decide issues relating to landedproperty. The Municipality 
contended thatissues relating todrainshouldberesolved bytheMunicipalityandithadperfomed 
its task in accordance with the law. 
The Supreme Court held that the Municipality is empowered to resolve disputes relating to 
drainageandas theMunicipality,in thepresent case, haddecided onlyon theissueofthedrainage, 
the action of the municipality was valid!3 
(ii)  Similar issues were raised when the respondent of  a case started to construct a drain through 
thepetitioner’sprivateland  to which thelatterobjected. The respondent filed acomplaint with the 
CDO Office, Lalitpur which asked the petitioner to allow the construction work to continue. 
Hence, the petitioner, requesting the dismissal of  the order,  filed a writ petition stating that the 
CDO had no authority to decide such issues. The respondents contended that the dispute was not 
over the construction of a new drain but over the maintenance of the existing one. 
TheSupremeCourt heldthattheCDOhadnojudicial authority todecide casesrelating todrainage 
but only the Municipality could. The court held the action of the CDO unlawf~l!~ 
Consultation with the Disputing Parties is Compulsory 
(i)  A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court on the ground that the defendant had diverted 
a canal to his land which made the petitioner’s land dry. The case was at first filed with the local 
VJC but the VIC did not agree with the claim. An appeal against the decision was filed with the 
DJC whichquashed theearlier decision andestablishedthepetitioner’s  claim. Thedefendant filed 
a writ in the Supreme Court contending that the DJC did not allow him the opportunity of 
explanation which was in violation of  the principle of  natural justice. The respondent contended 
that the decision made by the DJC under a statutory authority should be held valid. 
The Supreme Court held that opportunity should be given to the disputing parties to present and 
defend their cases failure of  which means the violation of  the principles of natural justice under 
Section 202 of the chapter on Court Procedures ofMuluki Ain (Nationalcode). Hence thedecision 
of  the DJC was held ~nlawful.’~ 
(ii) WhanapondownedbyaVillagePanchayat (VP) was handcdovertoascbml,somemembers 
55 of the Village Panchayat challanged the transfer of ownership. The pond was returned to the VP 
hut the Zonal Commissioner issued an order stating that the action of returning the pond was 
unlawful. The chairman of the Village Panchayats then filed writ petition in the Supreme Court 
urging for the invalidation of the Zonal Commissioner’s order. The respondent contended that it 
was done to maintain security and also to make the school economically sustainable. 
The Supreme Court held that the Zonal Commissioner had no judicial authority to quash the 
Village Panchayat’s action without giving an opportunity for explanation hence it was declared 
as unlawful.16 
Restriction on the Imposition of  Levies by Local Bodies 
An injunction writ petition was filed with the Koshi  Zonal Court on the ground that the plaintiff 
had been asked by the District Panchayat to pay levies fur the extraction of sand and stones from 
the Koshi river. The Zonal Court held that since the work was done under a bilateral !agreement 
between Nepal and India, the District Panchayat had no authority to charge a levy. The chairman 
of District Panchayat filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against the decision. The respondent 
claimed that he did not have to pay any local levy or charge because he was supplying the stones 
and sand under an agreement reached between the two governments. 
The Supreme Court held that the respondent is simply acontractor authorized to carry stones from 
the Koshi,  the main patties being the Government of India and Nepal. Therefore, the District 
Panchayat cannot levy tax or fees under the District Panchayat Act!’ 
Individuals Cannot Prohibit Access to Public Drain Located in Private Land 
A writ petition was tiled on the ground that Kathmandu Municipality had not given permission 
to build a houseon the ground that the proposed building site will encroach on a public drain. The 
person concerned disagreed with the Municipality’s decision and filed a writ petition stating that 
the municipality did not have the authority to deny him the permission because the drain was 
constructed in his private land.  The Municipality contended that the no individual can claim 
ownershipof thedrain because itisapublicproperty madefurpublic use. Therefore, thepetitioner 
should not be allowed to make a house on the drain site. 
The Supreme Court held that although the drain was located in the petitioner’s private property 
he cannot claim personal right over it and must give access to the public. Hencc, the petition was 
dismissed.’* 
Right to Shed Roof  Water in  Other’s Private Land Does  not  Create 
Ownership Right in the Land 
On the northern side of  a person’s  house There is three feet of  open IandA case was filed on the 
ground that on the northern side of the plaintiff’s house there was three feet open land where the 
roof water usually fell. On the hasis mentioned the house owner encroached the land and claimed 
as his own. 
56 The defendant contended that the plaintiff could not claim ownership on the land on the ground 
that the roof water from his house fell on the disputed land. The defendant claimed himself as  the 
owner of the land. 
The Supreme Court held that the legal right of the plaintiff could not be created only on the ground 
that roof water from his house fell on the disputed land!g 
Ponds and Lakes Located Within the Territory of  Local Bodies which Are 
not Owned by Anyone Are the Property of  the Respective Local Body 
(i)  A writ petition was filed against a Municipality which claimed that the pond adjoining the 
petitioner’s house wasits property. Thepetitionerclaimedthathe shouldberegardedastheowner 
of the pond because he had been paying land tax for it. The Municipality contended that as  per the 
Mucipality Act, 1962, it is the owner of the pond and urged the court to dismiss the writ petition. 
The Supreme Court, upholding the claim of the Municipality, ruled that the pond in dispute is the 
property of  the municipality because ownership right of  the pond was not claimed hy anyone?o 
(ii)  In another case, an injunction petition was filed on the ground that a pond constructed for 
religious purposes by the ancestors of the petitioner was claimed by  the Village Panchayat as  it’s 
property as per theprovisionsof theVillagePanchayat Act. The defendant refuted the petitioner’s 
claim and contended that the disputed pond was the Village Panchayat’s property. 
The Narayani Zonal Court dismissed the petition stating that an order for injunction could not he 
issued if it raised right and entitlement issues. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Zonal Court’s decision which ruled that the Village Panchayat had 
noauthoritytoclaimownershiprightovertheprivatepondonly  onaground thatit is locatedwithin 
the territory of the Village Panchayat?’ 
(iii)  A dispute arose when a lake, owned by Ram Janaki temple, was given to the plaintiff for use 
and exploitation of  its products under an agreement reached between the plaintiff and the Ram 
Janaki Temple Management Committee. The  Village Panchayat then  claimed the pond as its 
property and restrained the plaintiff from using it. The plaintiff filed a petition for injunction on 
the ground that the Village Panchayat violated his civil rights. The defendant denied the charge 
and urged for the dismissal of the claim because the Village Panchayat Act clearly stated that 
Village Panchayats own ponds and lakes located within their territory. 
The court held that the Village Panchayat can not interfere in the property of  the temple because 
the pond has been its property since time immemorial. The court further statied that apart from 
having sacred and religious values, it was the property of the temple on the hasis of  custom and 
tradition. Therefore, the V P could not claim ownership of  such properties falling within its 
jurisdiction merely on the basis of existing general legal provisions? 
57 Customary Use of  Water Sources Can Create Perpetual Use Rights 
(i)  A dispute arose when the petitioner constructed a boundary wall preventing access to others 
to the well in her land. The action resulted in shortage of drinking water for the people of  that 
locality. On receiving a complaint, Kathmandu Municipality pulled down the newly constructed 
wall and made the well accessible to the local people. A writ petition was filed with the Supreme 
Coun against the Municipality’s action. The respondent, the Municipality, contended that it had 
pulled down the wall to make drinking water available to people of that locality. 
The Supreme Court held the action of the municipality unlawful but ruled that the local people 
should be given access to the well because they had been dependent on it for a long time. The 
Supreme Court through this decision upheld use rights based on customary water use. Its decision 
allowed for the use of water  located in someone’s private property on the ground that they were 
long-term users.23 
(ii)  In adispute over landencroachment, acase was filed claiming that the defendant encroached 
upon the land and a pond located on the disputed land. The defendant denied the charge. 
The Supreme Court held that the encroachment of the land by the defendant is unlawful hut, at the 
same time, it  allowed both the parties to use the water in the pond as per their convenience because 
they had been jointly using it for a longtime. The Supreme Court upheld this principle onthe  basis 
of customary right to use of water by both the partiesZ4 
(iii)  A petitioner tiled a case in the Pyuthan District Court requesting that a) the defendant pay 
him compensation for damages to the wooden pipes he had installed to supply water to his canal 
and h) to establish his rights to use the canal water. The defendant denied the allegations. 
The Pyuthan District Court ordered  the defendant to pay compensation for the damage of the 
pipes. The Mid Western Regional Court held that if the new canal has disturbed the old one, no 
claim should be entertained. The Supreme Court held that all the fanners have equal right to use 
the disputed canal water. They can use the water as done traditionally and customarily,  i.e., 
following the turn by turn rule which they themselves had made. They may face lcgal ohlitations 
if they violate this rule and deny some farmers access to water? 
CONCLUSION 
Laws relating to water resources  in Nepal have a long history. However,  due to sufficient 
availability and lack of multiple use of water, disputes relating to water resources had not been 
thought as aseriousproblemin theeyeofthe state. Besides, thedisputesrelating to water resources 
require quick disposal and, on the spot, if possible. Since long past most of the disputes relating 
water resources in Nepal have been resolved by  the local officials and influencial persons likc 
Thakali, Birtawala Kipatia Subbas, Jamindar, Chaudhari etc. In many occasions the state had 
delegatedit’spowerofresolvingdisputeds  to thosepersonalities whoplayedaroleinmaintaining 
58 harmonious relations between the government and local people. With the hegining of democratic 
exercise in 1951 this method of settlement of disputes was gradually abandoned. However, even 
after 1951, the state left tHese disputes to he resolved by  local influential persons and to some 
committees at the village level. As a result, the chances to file cases in the state courts became 
minimal. However, from 1959 to 1981 the District (trial) Courts had the jurisdiction to hear water 
related disputes. In 1981 this jurisdiction was again transferred to approximately 4000 Village 
Panchayat Judicial Committes (VJC) and appellate jurisdiction was given to 75 District Judicial 
Committee(DJC).Hence, thescope forfilingcasesin thecourtsingeneralandtheSupremeCourt 
in particular become very limited. 
The Supreme Court, therefore, has heard very few cases directly related with water rights issues. 
The percentage of cases relating to customary rights issues, especially, water rights related 
conflicts,  is nominal in the Supreme Court in comparison to district and appellate courts. 
From the review of  these cases it is clear that the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
customary water use rights of the users, even going against the concept of  private property and 
control over its use by the owner. The decisions of the Supreme Court also reveal that the members 
of local bodies (VDC, DDC, etc.) are  confused about the jurisdiction of the local bodies. This fact 
clearly indicates the need for legal orientation programs for the district and village level quasi- 
judicials regarding excercise of their legal mandate and the basic judicial principles. 
The water resources situated within the territory of a local body and not owned by any individual 
or institution and not  used by  the government is legally presumed to be the property of  the 
concerned local body. The concerned local body  is legally authorized to utilize such water 
resources and levy use-charge from its beneficiaries. The local body may even hand over such 
resources to others by concluding an agreement and levying some fees for their use. But HMG, 
by an agreement, may provide the right to use such resources to a foreign country or its citizens 
even without consulting the local body. Such an act of the government can suspend or terminate 
the legally awarded power of the concerned local body which may have financial implications for 
it. 
If the decision of the Supreme Court regarding roof water falling on another person’s private land 
is  followed toits hasiclegal provision then we findanuniquelegal  provision in this regard. Section 
1 of the chapter on House Construction in the Muluki Ain (  National Code) states that a house can 
be constructed in such a way that the roof water can fall on another person’s  private land. The 
owner of the land cannot prohibit such an act but if  he  constructs a house on such a land then he 
can cut the overlapping part of  the neighbour’s house. This legal provision restricts ownership 
rights of the land owner. However, the Supreme Court, further explaining this legal provision, 
states that the customary practice to let the roof water fall on other’s land cannot create ownership 
right of the house owner from whose house the roof water falls. 
On the whole, the Supreme Court has been more realistic than legalisting in resolving disputes. 
In some cases the court has held that though the lakes and ponds of within the territory of any 
Village Panchayat belong to the that VP  hut it cannot intervene if they are used,  occupied orbnd 
owned by religious endowment for sacred or development purposes. The court has held that 
59 encroachment of any individual’s land for the construction of public canal to  benefit  the wider 
public is not unlawful. Similarly, in the case of construction of winter canal  through a person’s 
land the court compelled the land owner to give access to the canal every winter on the ground that 
this facility had been secured for a long time. 
Likewisqin someinstancesthecourthasignoredtheright  toproperty ofthedefendantandupheld 
the customay rights to the people by  supporting the decision to provide access to a drain in the 
respondent’s land. Moreover, in other cases, the court held that the land owner should not deny 
access to drinking water from the well in his land. 
However, in a few cases the Supreme Court has taken an escapist stance by not giving clear cut 
verdicts. In many cases it has refused to hear cases on the basis ofjurisdictional error. The coitrts 
took this stance because  during the earlier (Panchayat) regime, the courts had to face many 
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61 Judicial Trends in Water Law 
A Case Study’ 
Veera Kaul Singh and Bharath Jairaf 
INTRODUCTION 
Water is being  used and abused indiscriminately in India. Conflicts and disputes, therefore, 
continue to arise over issues of water sharing, water allocation, liability, sanctions, usages, water 
markets and water pricing. Disputes are resolved either in  the formal or the informal sectors. At 
the informal, local level, there are the Panchayats and the Naya Panchayats which help in solving 
some of the water related disputes. Other disputes are brought to the courts. 
This paper presents an analysis of the water related cases brought to the High Courts and the 
Supreme Courts between 1887 AD and 1966  AD. The  earliest case dealt by the court was that of 
Emperor Vs.  Halodhur Piroe and the last case included in our study is that of Indian Enviro-legal 
Council Vs.  UOI, which was decided in April 1996. Water related cases spanning over a century 
have been  collected, documented  and analysed  to understand  and get a better  and holistic 
perspective on the existing and emerging water related issues and trends. 
The role of the  judiciary in the laying down of rules in the adjudication of these cases is vital for 
a holistic understanding of the entire problem and for tracing the evolution of the concept of 
development of water rights vis-a-vis different laws. As we trace the history of water law cases, 
we can clearly discern how, on the one hand, the judgements delivered by the courts have altered 
the ambit of the law and how, on the other hand, changes in the laws have affected the  judgements 
in cases relating to water. The cases also reveal how rights vis-a-vis water law have emerged, 
enlarged and are still growing strong; how Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has been used to widen 
the ambit of the court as well as law so that all citizens and individuals whether they are affected or not can move the court and get grievances redressed. Our analysis revealed that the earlier 
judgements were based solely on the facts of the case and that only recently have the  judges looked 
into the larger issues of equity, economics of source and environment.  Further, environmental 
concerns and issues have emerged strongly in the 80s of this century. During decade there were 
some important development which led to significant changes in the way water rights cases were 
filed and decisions delivered.  Some very important cases were decided, public interest litigation 
(PIL) as a source and means of getting environmental rights justified  as well as pro-active stand 
of the judiciary (judiciary activism) emerged, the concept of locus standi was liberalized and the 
scope of environmental rights and justice emerged. 
In this paper we will first discuss cases which were filed andjudgements delivered under Criminal 
Law, followed by cases filed under law of Torts, and Administrative Law. We will then discuss 
the developments in water related laws, followed by development in Constitutional Law and of 
water rights. The major category of laws which are revelant for the cases reviewed are Criminal 
Law (especially Indian Penal Code, 1860,  the Criminal Procedure Code, 1878  and the Criminal 
ProcedureCode, 1972),  thelaw ofTorts, ConstitutionalLaw (especiallyArticles21,32,226,297), 
Easements Act, 1882,  and laws specific to water  (such as the North Indian Canal and Drainage 
Act, 1873,  theFerries Act, 1897,and  the Water Act, 1974). In somecases, theexistinglaws were 
re-interpreted or interpreted differently by the courts, leading to development of law in favour of 
the public and better environment. These cases deal mainly with the responsibilities of the state 
and municipal bodies in providing services, such as potable drinking water, and environmental 
issues. 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Criminal Law 
Until the Water Act was enacted in 1974,  disputes relating to water, including pollution, were 
booked under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860  and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1878 
(and later the amended  Act, i.e., the Criminal Procedure Code, 1972 ). The British had enacted 
the IPC 1860  and the CrPC 1878 for better administration of their colony and to help them (the 
British) to better exploit the natural resources of India. These laws were applicable uniformally 
all over the country. The types of cases that were booked under these laws related to public 
nuisance, mischief, theft,  and so on. 
The law relating to “mischief‘ in the IPC has been used in litigation related to drainage. In the case 
of Alum Srinivaulu Vs.  Somiah Cbetfy,  1967, the accused blocked the drain and obstructed the 
flow of sewage from the complainant’s house. The Hon’ble Court held that a drain was ‘property’ 
and that the act of blocking it amounted to “causing achange ... so as to destroy its utility...”, thus 
amounting to “mischieP‘ under Section 425  of the IPC. 
Almost all the cases discussed in the category of surface water /tanks relate to the actus reus 
involvedin forcibly openingcanals, erectingdams, andcuttingbundsorchannels. Theissuesdealt 
with in this category are  mostly rights basedissues like riparianrights, natural rights and easements 
64 rights whicharediscussed tounderstandandascertain theextent andthenatureofthedispute.The 
cases are generally filed under Section 430 of the IPC, i.e .,”...  mischief by doing any act which 
causes...a diminution of the supply of water ...” . 
Issues concerning encroachments on navigable rivers are tiled under Section 290, of the IPC. In 
the case of  King Emperor Vs.  Fateh Din,  1909, the court held that encroachment on a tidal 
navigable river did not  amount to a public nuisance so as to attract Section 290. In the IPC. the 
need to produce evidence to show that such an encroachment satisfied the ingredients of “public 
nuisance” as enumerated in Section 268 of the IPC was stressed. In an equally striking case of 
Emperor Vs. Muhadeo Prusnd, 1923, it was held that running water which was not reduced into 
possession could not form the subject matter of theft. In these cases the courts lay stress on the 
proof of the actual diminutiuon of water supply. In addition, since these are criminal law cases, 
the “intention” of the offender has also to he proved. This has made litigation rather technical and, 
in many cases, rather cumbersome. 
In other instances, the courts have directed the patties to approach alternative forums and statutes 
for effective redressal of their disputes, therein conceding the inadequacy of criminal law to deal 
with issues of this nature. For example, in the case of Ashutosh Vs. Emperor, 1930, where a canal 
distributary was forceably opened, the learned Judge stated that the section applicable to the case 
in question was Section 70  of the Northern India Canal And Drainage Act, 1873 and not the IPC 
provisions. In another case ((Emperor Vs.  Halodhur Piroe), the court ohserved that disputes 
concerning the right to use water should be rightly placed before a Civil Court and  not before a 
Criminal Court.. 
There are also some cases dealing with irrigation matters and criminal law. The earliest of these 
cases is the case of  King-Emperor Vs. Fateh Din,  1909, in which the respondents were charged 
under Section 430, IPC as they had prevented others from imgation to the extent to which they 
were entitled. The Court held that the condition precedent to conviction under Section 430 is that 
mischief (as under Section 425 of the IPC) must he done. Any act resulting in the diminishing of 
the value of the property needs to  be proved. 
Water can also be the subject matter of theft or mischief. In the earlier mentioned case of Emperor 
Vs.  Muhudeo Prasud, 1923, the court ruled that in India, as in England, water, when conveyed in 
pipes and thereby reduced into possession, can he the subject of theft. Similarly, in the case of 
Ashutosh Chose Vs. Emperor, 1930,  the Calcutta High Court held that before a person can be 
convicted under Section 430 of the IPC for interfering with water supply ,  the intention to inflict 
loss must be proved 
The penal consequences of fishing were initially rather ambigous. In the earlier discussed case of 
Emperor Vs.  Halodhur Piroe,  the accused was let off even though he voluntarily corrupted a river 
by strewing branches for fishing, because Section 227 talked only about  ‘public springs and 
reservoirs ‘  and not  ‘rivers ‘. But this was altered by subsequent cases and the position is rather 
clear now.  Fish in open and unenclosed  waters are farae nafurae. They are not capable of 
possession and hence cannot form the subject matter of theft. Even in private waters, if the fish 
are able to move in and out, fishing does not amount  to theft. But where the sluice of a private 
enclosed tank is closed and the fish are unable to escape, then they are capable of being objects 
of theft. 
65 Despite aspecial legislation which deals with water pollution most of the litigations has been filed 
eitherunder thegeneralcriminallaw  orunderArticle32and226oftheConstitutionofIndia.  Many 
cases havekenfiledunderSection 133  ofthePC,  whichdeals with“publicnuisance”.Theissues 
inthesecasesdealtessentially  withthequestion: “whatamounts to apublicnuisance?“In Venkata 
Reddy Vs.  State, 1953, the Madras High Court ruled that raising the level of a bund ,  thus making 
it prone to mosquito breeding, would constitute the offence. On the other hand, in Emperor Vs. 
Halodhur Piroe, the court held that corrupting a river by  strewing branches for the purpose of 
fishing did not constitute the offence. However, the most striking of these decisions was given in 
Emperor Vs.  Namn Rnma 1904,  where the court stated that strewing plants in a continuous stream 
with a view to extract fibre amounted to “fouling of water”, as envisaged under Section 290 of the 
IPC. 
The question of environment was not totally ignored in the earlier court decisions. A landmark 
judgement was given by the Court in 1926  in the Desi Sugar  Mills Vs.  Tupsi Kahar case in which 
the question that came up for decision was whether Section 133  (I) of the CrPC was applicable 
to a case dealing with pollution of a river by effluents from a factory. It was held that the section 
was applicable to cases where rivers were polluted. The Court looked into the larger question of 
environment and said that everyone must recognize that it is of utmost importance to keep the 
sources of public water supply pure and free fiom pollution by industrial factories. 
Law of Torts 
The British introduced the law of Torts and the defence of sovereign immunity. The law of Torts 
based on various principles that had been formulated by the British Courts was transplanted to the 
Indian legal system. These principles were applied to conflicts on  issues of  negligence and 
nuisance. The law of torts is based on the principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy. 
Thus, the principles of strict liability as evolved in the famous Rylands Vs.  Ffercher case and the 
defences available came to be applied to the Indian situation. 
Theearliest application oftheRyfands Vs.  Fletcherrule in India was madein thecaseofSecrerary 
ofState Vs.  Rumrahal Ram,  1925 . This was a case dealing with negligence in torts, and the 
concepts of duty and liability of the government vis-a-vis the irrigation canals. The Court held that 
the defendent had a duty of care to protect others from damage caused by the overflow of water 
from the canal. Because the duty was not fulfilled or no adequate precautions were undertaken, 
the defendent was liable for the damage caused and the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. 
The growth of the law of Torts as another important judicial trend can be discerned from the 
various cases that we have collected, documentad and analysed. After the famous Rylands Vs. 
Flercher case, some defences became available vis-a-vis liability. One defence among them was 
‘Act of God’. In the case of Puroshathama Rajaliar Vs.  Kannaya, 1928  the court defined  ‘Act of 
God ‘  as the occurence of an act, exceeding the ordinary contemplation, and one which no 
reasonable man would anticipate. The main issue in contemplation was whether the breach of a 
river bank and consequent floods diminished the petitioners crop and whether this amounted to 
an ‘Act of God ‘  or not. The court held that an extraordinary flood is one which no reasonable man 
would anticipate, hence it is an  ‘Act of God ‘. 
66 A question that came up for decision in the M & S  M Railway Co. Vs. Maharaja OjPithapuram, 
1937 case was whether a railway company official was justified in cutting open a dam in order to 
protect arailway bridge from being washed away by floods, when this act resulted in the flooding 
and damaging of the plaintiffs land. Does the fact that the act took place on the petitioner’s own 
land and that it was done with a good motive make a difference in this claim for damages?  The 
Hon’ble Court held that a riparian owner who commits an act in order to save his property from 
being flooded and this act diverts the flood to, and damages, a neighbour’s land, will be liable for 
the damage. The fact that he had a good motive and that the act was carried on his own land does 
not change the liability. Since the railway official changed the flood channel, thus damaging the 
plaintiff sland,  therailwaycompany is liablefordamages.Therule  that theHon’bleCourtapplied 
in this decision was that a riparian owner may make defences against flood anywhere on his land 
provided he does not interfere with a recognised flood channel which results in damaging a 
neighbour’s property. 
On  issues pertaining to the burden of proof in water supply cases, the courts seem to agree that 
the plaintiff that alleges negligence on the part of the Municipality has to prove the negligence. 
In Rai.ldns Tapandas Vs.  Sukkur Municipality. 1940, and in Parfab Dialdas  Vs. Hyderabad 
Municipality, 1932 the Court held that there could not be a presumption that the leakage was due 
to the negligence of the respective defendant; the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that their 
buildings were damaged by leakage from a Municipal pipe. However, earlier, in another case 
(Kasia Pillai Vs. G.K.  Pillai, 1929)  the Court ruled that it is the duty of the government to take 
all necessary precautionary steps to prevent overflowing of an irrigation canal and it shall be liable 
to compensate, if someone’s property  is damaged. 
An important rule was applied and upheld by  the Madras High Court in the case of Shnmugavel 
Goundan Vs.  Venkitaswami Asari, 1936, where the court held that storing of water for agricultural 
purposes is a natural and lawful use and is not actionable for damages unless negligence is proved. 
This rule was deemed necessary in order to protect customary usages of water.  In another case, 
the Court stated that the owner of the upper lands or the upper riparians can discharge the surplus 
of naturally brought water from his land on to the lower lands, provided thee is no damage. 
In N.ArIvudaiNambi Vs.  StateojTamilNadu,thecourtheldthatincaseofdive~ionofwaterfrom 
ariver by forming a channel manually, the landlords had the right to take water from lands situated 
on the banks of the river, provided  there is no complaint by the lower riparian owners that their 
share of water was affected by this act. 
In another case (Sarju Prasad Vs. Mahadeo Prasad, 1932).  the question that came up before the 
court was whether a compensation suit was maintainable in case of deficiency of water resulting 
from the reduction of the dimension of  a sluice. The court held that if the reduction of the size of 
the sluice results in the decrease of the water supply to which the plaintiff is entitled, then the mere 
fact of the sluice being part of the canal works cannot be relied on as  justification for interference 
with the plaintiff‘s rights. The court reversed the decree of the lower court and sent it back for re- 
admission and to determine whether the plaintiff‘s have, inter-aha ,  an easement to receive water 
in excess of the quantity which they receive through the reduced sluice, and whether they have 
suffered any damage. 
67 There are other cases dealing with surface water which have been filed under the law of Torts - 
under negligence and nuisance. In the case of Stare of Gujarnt VS.  Patel Mohanbhai Mnthurbhai, 
1974, of nuisance,  the defendants had dug a trench on their own land in which rain water had 
accumulated. The water then precolated to, and damaged, the foundation of the plaintiffs house. 
The  Court refused to apply the distinction between natural and unnatural use of land as laid down 
in the Rylands Vs. Fletcher case and instead applied the doctrine of  sic utere tuo ut alienurn non 
laedas, i.e., that where the defendant was negligent and could have prevented the damage from 
being caused, he would be liable for all such damages caused to the plaintiff. In a similar case the 
government was held liable for the construction of a canal  which resulted in the percolation of 
water in the respondent’s  well, thereby submerging his water pump and ultimately drying his 
crops. 
Development of Administration LawDuty of Municipality and Municipal 
Corporations 
On analysing water related cases we see another important aspect of  the development of law, 
namely, the development of the duties and liabilities of the administration and the municipal 
corporations and the use of  other laws in addition to Criminal Law and the law of Torts for the 
settlement of disputes. This has assumed great importance because of the alarming growth of 
urbanisation which has resulted in problems relating to sanitation and drainage. The Courts have 
been approached very often to compel municipal authorities to provide adequate sanitation. This 
is normally done by filing a writ of mandamus against the appropriate authority’ 
In the case of Kali Krishana Narnin Vs. Municipal Board, 1943, Lucknow, the Court ruled that 
the Municipal Board had the duty to get drains periodically checked by competent persons so as 
to ensure that  they remain in a proper working condition. In this case, the Board was held liable 
because the appelant’s house collapsed due to its negligencc in carrying out its duty of getting the 
drains checked. But in some other cases, especially before Independence (i.e., before 1947), the 
Municipalities have been given the benefit of doubt. In Partab Dinldas Vs. Hyderabad Munici- 
pality, 1932, a pipe maintained by the defendents leaked and the water damaged to the appellant’s 
building. In this case, the Court ruled that the burden of proof of the negligence of  the defendent 
wason theplaintiff-failingwhichtheaction wouldfail. Astatutory body is notliablefordamages 
unless the power conferred upon it is negligently exercised. In the Lahore Municipality case (pre- 
Independence), titled Syed Muuafar Hussain Vs.  Administration ofLahore Municipnlify, 1942, 
the court was of the view that the drainage arrangements should he rearranged only if the system 
was found to be dangerous to public health or interfered with the ordinary comforts of individuals 
This would, however ,  depend on the facts and circumstances of a case. 
In Kushi Nath Vs.  MunicipalBoard, Agra, 1939, the plaintiff broughta suit against the Municipal 
Board of Agra for damage caused due to the non-supply of  water to the second storey of the 
plaintiffs house. He  prayed foramandatory  injunction to theBoard. to supply water to himduring 
pmcribed hours. The Allahabad High Court, while dismissing a second appeal, ruled that in the 
circumstances, the court will not grant the injunction because it is incapable of enforcing it. 
Cases relating to the various aspects of water supply, rural as well as urban, have decreased in the 
post- Independence period, i.e., after 1941. The underlying basis that the courts have worked on 
68 is that  the  Municipal Authorities  and  other local bodies  are under  an  obligation  to  make 
arrangements for water supply. 
The Courts, on more than one occasion,  have had to deal with the plea of the state, that there is 
a paucity of funds. But repeatedly the courts have held, as for example, in Janki Nuthubhui Vs. 
Sardar Nagar Municipulify, 1986,  and also in the famous Ratlam Municipality case, that this 
excuse will not attract the sympathy of the court. In the case of Ratlam Municipal Corporation Vs. 
Vardichund, 1980, local residents filed a criminal  case under Section  133 of the  Criminal 
hocedureCode, 1973 against theMunicipality. On appeal, theSupremeCourtcamedownharsbly 
on the Municipality and directed it to “clean up “ the area. This has come to be considered a 
landmark case, for this very reason. Subsequent to this famous, landmark case, the other public 
interest litigation cases which are of great importance are the M. C. Mehru case and the Gunga 
Pollutioncasein whichtbeMunicipalities weredirected toperform theirstatutoryduty ofensuring 
that sewage from the towns would not be emptied into the Ganga without first treating it. 
The cases discussed above show that the judiciary has exhibited dynamism in evolving new ways 
ofdispensation tocombat theever increasing problemofdrainage and sanitation. Thesecases also 
establish the fact that statutory bodies oradministration cannottake thedefence ofpaucity offunds 
or staff to forgo their primary duties . 
Statutes on Water Law 
The British enacted and applied their own laws in India without bothering about the prevailing and 
existing local dispute resolution mechanisms. As aresult ofthese new enactments the local forums 
had to take a back seat since these laws were applicable all over the country. The Northern India 
Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878, and the Fisheries Act, 1897 
were enacted  by  the British.  The other Acts were enacted  by  the Indian Government after 
Independence. We will briefly review the major laws relating to water. with reference to their 
application in court cases. 
(0 
The Northern India Canal And Drainage Act, 1873 deals extensively with irrigation matters. In 
the case of Cajjan Singh Vs.  State of  Punjab, 1967, the superintending Engineer sought to alter 
a water course that he himself bad approved earlier. The court held this review to be invalid. The 
Rule thatthecourt applied wasthat noonecanreview  hisownordersuomoru Thepowerofreview 
is over a decision of a subordinate authority. 
(ii) 
To ferry is to convey passengers and goods, essentially by boat, across water. This makes the ferry 
a property and capable of being possessed. This point was discussed in a criminal case (Dhanujoy 
Dhra  Vs. Provot Chundru Biswas, 1934)  where the accused had forcibly occupied a feny. It was 
held to be an act of trespass, thus reiterating that a feny was a “property” . 
The Northern India Canal And Drainage Act,  1873 
The Northern India Ferries Act, 1878 
69 In India, the principal statute dealing with the ferries is the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878. This 
statutedraws  adistinction between public ferries and private ferries, and differentprovisions apply 
to each. 
The right to a feny franchise has always been granted by the presumed owner of water resources: 
thestate.Initially,thisrightwasdeterminedsolely by theevidenceof adirectgrantby thecrown. 
Even prescription did not constitute a valid franchise. But this has long been subject to change and 
the position now is that a valid license has to be obtained in order to ply a ferry in a river. 
The law relating  to ferries is therefore quite settled. The rights to a ferry can be exercised 
irrespective of any rights  in land. This right is wholly unconnected  with  the ownership or 
occupation of land and it is not necessary that a feny owner should have any property in the soil 
of the river over which he has a right of ferry. Even though it seems an exercise in administrative 
law, ferries continue to be an integral part of  the law relating to water. 
(iii)  The Fisheries Ad,  I897 
The right to fish in tidal navigable waters was earlier determined by the proof of a grant by the 
crown  or by  prescription,  failing  which the right  was deemed to be non-existant.  And  the 
prescriptive right to catch fish stood proved merely by the fact that the defendants did not deny 
such an act. But if the river changed its course, the status of this “right to fish“ was unclear. In the 
case of Ishwar Chandra Das Vs. Upendra Nath Ghosh it was held that the right would cease since 
the property now became the property of the adjacent owner. However, in a subsequent case, 
Srinath Roy Vs. Dinabandhu Sen, the privy council ruled that the grantee of such a right could 
follow the shifting river for the enjoyment of his right so long as the waters of the river system are 
within the upstream and dowmstream limits of his grant. 
Before the Indian Constitution came into force, the right of fishing in temtorial waters was vested 
in the local zamindar. Article 297 changed this position. It vested “all land, minerals and other 
things of value underlying the ocean within territorial waters, ...” in the Union (i.e., the Indian 
State). However, even before it came into force  the courts had anticipated this transfer of right to 
the state. 
In an important case,  AMSSVM and Co Vs. State, the court held that “Whatever theory might 
ultimately find acceptance with the family of nations as to the true basis of the right which a state 
possesses over territotial waters, there cannot be any doubt that with reference to the rights of 
fishery, the marginal belt must be regarded as part of the territory of the littoral state.” 
Under the Fisheries Act,  1897, the Government could settle the fishery rights in favour of a 
particular cooperative society for a fixed period and this period  could be further extended. In 
instances where the Government chooses to cancel this extension, it has to hear the party - 
irrespective of whether the party has complied with the directions of the extension or not. The 
principals of natural justice and all necessary procedures have to be adhered to mandatorily. 
The courts have not normally concerned themselves with the socio --economic aspects of the 
fishermen and have confined themselves to technical determination of the cases. But there has 
been a gradual and welcome change.  In State of  Kerala Vs. Joseph Anthony, the Supreme Court 
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traditional local fishermen. Similarly, the court ruled that a Government circular that sought to 
eliminate middlemen and settled fishery rights directly with genuine co-operative societies and 
local fishermen did not amount to ‘’ creating a monopoly”.  It was ,  on the contrary ,  attempting 
to involve the fishermen directly. 
(iv) 
The Parliament  recognizing  the importance of water free from pollution enacted the  Water 
(Prevention and Control) of Pollution Act in 1974 (Water Act, 1974). This Act was enacted to 
ensure the wholesomeness of water and to ensure that with industrialization and growth of cities 
domestic and industrial effluents and waste waters  are not throwm into the streams and rivers 
without being treated first. For these purposes the act also envisages the creation of a Central 
Pollution Control Board and the State Pollution Control Boards in the States. 
Although the main legislation dealing with water pollution is the Water Act, 1974, most of the 
litigations  have been  filed under the general criminal  law or under Articles  32 and 226  of 
Constitution of India. In the period between 1980 to 1990, there has been a massive increase in 
pollution related litigations. In fact, just from 1990 to 1993, upto thirteen judgements have been 
delivered by different courts on this issue. 
And a number of prosecutions against polluting industries have been launched under Section 33 
of the Water Act. In the Pondicherry Paper Mills case, the Madras High Court ruled that the 
remedy under Section 33 was independant of the rights of the Pollution Control Board. 
Regarding the nature of evidence in water pollution cases, the Delhi High Court stated in the M/ 
SDelhi Eonling Co. Put. Ltd. Vs. CPCB, 1986  that samples not taken in strict compliance with 
Section21 oftheActareinadmissib1easevidence.Thecourtmadeitclearthat  the sampleofwater 
must be lifted from stream or well only in accordance with the provision of the Water Act. Such 
technical requirements of the court  only obstruct and dilute the essence of the Act, which is to 
prevent water pollution. Taking note of this, the Supreme Court, in the cases of Satish Sabharwal 
Vs,  State of  Maharashtra, 1986, UP PCB Vs. M/s Modi Distillery and Mahmud Ali Vs.  State, 
repeatedly ruled that technical obstacles in the interpretation of the environmental law will not be 
allowed to come in the way of prevention of water pollution .  But implementation of this rule to 
its full potential has yet to be done. 
Anaddedfeatureofthepresent waterpollutionproblemis theutterdisregardshown by thecentral 
and State Pollution Control Boards (PCB’s) in launching prosecutions against polluters. In the 
Francis Barreto case of  1983 this lackadaisical approach of the Central PCB was highlighted. 
Again ,  in Rajiu Ranjan Singh Vs.  State of  Bihar, the Patna High Court hauled up the Central PCB 
for its absolute inaction  and for dereliction  of  duties. In  another case,  Travancore Cochin 
Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Kerala PCB, the Kerala High Court criticised the Central and State PCBs for 
issuing conflicting orders. 
The constituitionality of  Sections 19 and 24 of the Water Act have been challenged  before the 
Rajasthan and Gujarat High Courts in M/s Agganval Textiles Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1981 and 
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Water ( Prevention and Conrrol)  of  Pollution Act, 1974 M/s Abhilash Textiles Vs. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, respectively. However, both courts 
upheld the validity of the provisions, stating that the power granted by these provisions was not 
unbridled and did not violate Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 
In most cases, the response of the courts has been to provide injunctive reliefs. In addition, the 
courts have also repeatedly asked and ordered the polluters to conform to the requirements of the 
law, failing which they would fact strict, deterrent actions. 
Regarding liability for pollution caused by  erring industries, the courts have normally ruled in 
favour of individual liability. In K.K.Nandi Vs. ArnifabhBannerjee, 1983 the CalcuttaHigh Court 
categorically stated that liability is to be fixed on every person who is in charge of,  and was 
responsible for, the conduct of business of the company. Similar ratios were laid down in M/s 
Trans Asia Carpets Ltd. Vs. Stare of  U.P..  1992  and J.S.Huja  Vs. Sate. 
The law relating  to  water  pollution has normally failed to take into account the nature  and 
uniqueness of the water as a resource. But over the last decade, the courts have begun addressing 
larger questions of the environment and, as a result, the right to potable water was recognised, for 
example, by the Kerala High Court in F.K.Hussain Vs. Union of  India, 1990. 
(v) 
The Haryana Government formulatcd a  ‘rice shoot ‘  policy which sanctioned various new rice 
shoots. This was challenged by the petitioners in the case of Darayo Singh Vs. State, 1992, unaer 
Section 17 of the HaryanaCanal and Drainage Act under which a new outlet can only be provided 
by preparing a draft scheme and in this case no such draft had been made . 
The issue which the court looked into was whether the procedure under Section 17 and 18 of the 
act has been followed in the formulation of this policy.  Can the procedural requirements be 
dispensed with? The court held that  ‘rice shoot ‘  does not come within the definition of  “outlet 
“  as per the Act, hence the policy was valid. The court also looked into the purpose of the policy 
which was framed in the interest of the nation so that more rice was grown in areas more suitable 
for rice cultivation. The court also laid down guidelines for the sanctioning of  ‘rice shoots’ to be 
implemented by the competent authority. 
(vi) 
After the implementation of  the Water Cess Act,  1977 many industries have challenged  the 
imposition of  the cess. These challenges required the courts to go into various issues, namely, 
interpretation of the Act, nature of industry, nature of end product, and so on. 
What is a water cess?  The Patna High Court in the famous TISCO case titled, TISCO Vs. Sfate 
of  Bihar, 1991,  held that a cess imposed under the Water Cess Act is by  way of compulsory 
exaction of money by a public authority for a public purpose. Tha court further stated that a cess 
is to be imposed for the purpose of treating the effluent of the factory and other sewage so that the 
common public may  not  have to  use contaminated  water  or polluted  water.  The issue of 
interpreting the Water Cess Act also came up before the Kerala High Court in the Kerala SPCB 
The Haryana Canal and Drainage Act  ~  1974 
Water Cess ( Prevention and Control J of  Pollution Act, I977 
72 Vs. Gwalior Rayon SilkManujacturing (Weaving)  Co.,  1986, case. The Hon’ble Court stated that 
rules that sought to ensure regulation of the release of effluents into rivers are in  the interest of the 
public and are therefore valid. In addition they stated that mere installation of a treatment plant 
doesnotentitleonetoarebate. Inotherwordsthecourtruled  that theCess Act shouldbeconstrued 
liberally. However the Supreme Court, in theA.P. Rayons Lid. case, ruled otherwise. Viewing the 
statute as a fiscal one, tha court held that it must be construed strictly. This was reiterated by the 
Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board Vs. Cess Appelate Committee, 1991. 
Regarding the imposition of ces,  it is quite settled that this would depend on the nature of the 
industry. In Tata Engineering and Locomofive Company Ltd. Vs.  State, the Patna High Court 
stated that while identifying the nature of an industry, the totality of its activities and its domonant 
primary  purpose should be the guiding factor and not the mere presence of some incidental 
processes. This test of  “dominant purpose’’ is now the test that is followed to ascertain whether 
the industry attracts the provisions of the Water Cess Act. 
Constitutional Development 
The Constitution guarentees to all citizens the right to life and enjoins upon the state to safeguard 
the environment for the citizens. It imposes a duty on the state to protect the environment The 
citizens have the right to a clean environment under the directive principles of the State Policy 
which, however, are not enforceable. The ambit of Article 21 has been increasing as judicial 
activism bas been taking root as has been proved in various cases. 
Most of the constitutional litigations have been converted to PIL in order to bring about social 
justice within the reach of the common man. PIL and judicial activism go hand in hand because 
PIL itself is the result of judicial activism.  Judicial Activism is the term  used for the un- 
conventional role played by  thc court when it gives value judgement and grants relief to the 
aggrieved person or persons according to its moral and social sense of justice in a situation where 
statutory law is silent or even contrary. 
The courts recently discussed a very vital issue -whether the larger question of the maintenance 
of health falls within the purview of Article 21 of the Constituition.  After a long debate, finally 
in the recent judgement given by Chief Justice Ahmadi and Justice K. Ramaswamy and M.M. 
Punchi, dated February 1995,  the right to health has been included in Article 2 1. Even though this 
case essentially deals with labour law.  the ratio of  this case has unlimited potential in the law 
relating to drainage and sanitation. 
Article 21 of the Constitution guarentees to all persons the right to life and personal liberty. The 
scope of this Article has been widening through various judgements in cases such as the Attakoya 
Thangal case, the CERS case, and the  Subhas Kumars case. The Andhra F’radesh High Court in 
its judgement gave a new “jurisprudential approach “to  the question of environmental pollution. 
It observed that “The enjoyment of life and its entitlement and fulfilment guareoteed by Article 
21 of the Constitution embraces the protection and preservation of nature’s gifts without which 
life cannot be enjoyed  ...  The slow poisoning by polluted atmosphere caused by  environmental 
pollution and spoilation  should be regarded  as amounting  to violation  of  Article 21 of  the 
13 Constituition “.  In the Subshas Kumar case the Supreme Court declared ,  “the right to life in 
Article 21  includes theright ofenjoymentofpollution free water and air for fullenjoymentof life”. 
Two other important judgements  reported  in  1990 arc the cases of  Attakoya  Thangal  and 
F.K.Hussain  which dealt with the groundwater usage as water supply to the citizens being a 
fundamental right of the citizens. Short supply of potable water in the Laksadweep Islands had led 
to large scale withdrawal of water which had resulted in salination of water and had upset the fresh 
water equilibrium. The court held that the right to potable, sweet drinking water is an attribute of 
therighttolifeandtheadminislrationcannotbeallowed  to withdraw groundwater on alargescale. 
This will upset the fresh water equilibrium. The court also held that there should be a proper 
scheme evolved by the administration and reiterated that  withdrawl of water at all levels should 
bc effectively monitered.  The Hon’ble court applied the rule that the right to life  envisaged in 
Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to potable water. The administration cannot be 
pcrmitted to make inroads into this fundamental right. Similarly,  in the case of Attakoya Thangal, 
every citizen’s right to sweet drinking water was held to be a fundamental right and an extension 
of right to live which thereby included the right to sweet drinking water. 
Thus overtheyears the scopeandambit ofArticle21 oftheconstitution whichguarentees theright 
to life to all persons has included the right to sweet drinking potable water as a fundamental right. 
Right to health, and right to water free from industrial pollution has also been included in this 
fundamental right. 
The  Supreme Court in a recent case has held that the preservation of the environment and keeping 
thc ecological balance unaffected is a task which not only the Government but also every citizen 
must undertake. It is a social obligation and every Indian citizen is to be reminded that it is his 
fundamental duty as enshrined in Article 51 A (g) of the Constitution. 
DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS 
Various aspects and issues of rights such as  riparian rights, easement rights,  property rights, 
natural rights, prescriptive rights, fundamental rights have evolved, emerged and developed from 
the water law cases. The Easements Act, 1882 has been applied in many cases dealing with water 
law in order to come up with rights of  individuals, riparian owners, etc. The various rights dealt 
in the cases also asccrtain the extent and nature of the dispute. In most cases the larger questions 
of the socio- economic status of the parties, equity and environment have not been considered. 
There are cases that do not pcrtain to water law directly and yet have been discussed as water law 
cases. This is because thc facts show that indirectly, the cases are due to the operation of certain 
inhercnt notionsof wateruseandmanagement. Incertain instances, we findriotsandevenmurder 
caused due to animosity generated by diversion of water. These cases are of utmost significance 
sincc thcy reflect the socio-economic status of water in the society. 
14 Having regard to the use of water by riparian owners, the law states that the upper riparian owner 
could direct the water by any method provided that he did not materially injure the right of the 
lower riparian  owner. The rights of  the riparians  are discussed  here seperately because the 
development of these rights is an important aspect of the development of water rights. These 
observations are based on the cases discussed earlier in the paper. These rights are based on the 
observation of the courts, the judgements given by the court, the priniples that court took into 
account while arriving at decisions, and so on. 
The rights of the riparian owner were given paramount importance and it was held that a riparian 
ownermay takeprecautionsagainstfloodanywhereonhislandprovidedhedoesnot  interfere with 
a recognized flood channel thereby damaging a neighbour’s property. 
The scope of the right of the riparians were further expanded when it was held by  the Hon’ble 
courts thatanaturalrightvestedintheownerofahigherland  todrainexcess watertoalowerland. 
However, in cases where there is adrain orachannel that seperates the two fields, this natural right 
will not arise. On thc other hand,  it was held that this right of the upper land owner to drain excess 
water by artificial means did not amount to  “normal use of land” and the owner of such land was 
liable in damages to the owner of the lower land. 
The irrigation cases deal with:  (I) the right of the Government to regulate the collection, retention 
anddistribution ofwaterforirrigation, (ii) thecontraveningrightsoftheriparian  owners, and (iii) 
the duty of the government to compensate, in the event of damage. 
The earliest reported case (under the category of irrigation), Fischer Vs. Secretary ofstate,  was 
filed under the provisions of  the Easements Act, 1882. This is an important case because it 
discussedtherightsoftheGovernmentovernatura1  sourcesofwaterasagainst thoseoftheriparian 
owners. The court ruled that the Government had the power to regulate, in public interest, the 
collection, retention and distribution of water of rivers and streams flowing in natural channels or 
in manually constructed works, provided that they do not thereby inflict sensible  injury on any 
other riparian owners and diminish the supply that they have traditionally  utilised. 
In the case of Gangaram Vs. Secretary of  State, the question that came up before the court was 
whether a compensation suit was maintainable in case of deficiency of water resulting from the 
reductiuon of the dimension of the sluice. Thc court  hcld that if the reduction of  the size of the 
sluice results in the decrease of the water supply to which the plaintiff is entitled ,  then the mere 
fact of the sluice being part of the canal works cannot be relied on as justification for interference 
with the plaintiffs rights. The  court reversed the decree of the lower court and sent it back for re- 
admission and to determine whether the plaintiffs have, intcr-alia, an easement to receive water 
in excess of the quantity which they receive through the rcduccd sluicc, and whcthcr they have 
suffered any damage. 
In  the case of M and S.M.  Railway Company Vs.  Maharaja of  Pithapuram (1937),  discussed 
earlier,  the Hon’ble Court held that a riparian owner, who commits an act in order to save his 
property from being flooded and this in effect diverts the flood to a neighbour’s land and damagcs 
such land, he will be liable for the damage. The fact that he had a good motive and that the act was 
carried on his own land docs not change the liability. Since the railway official changed the flood 
75 channel which damaged the plaintiffs land, the railway company is liable for damages. The rule 
that the Hon'ble court applied while coming to this decision was that a riparian owner may make 
defences against flood anywhere on his land provided he does not interfere with a recognised flood 
channel, which results in damaging a neighbour's property 
In one case the court established that the owner of  upper lands can discharge the surplus of 
naturally brought water from his land on to the lower lands, provided no damage is caused . 
The court upheld in a case that diversion of flow of water from a river by  forming a channel 
manually, the landlords had the right to take water for lands situated on the banks of the river, 
provided that there is no complaint by the lower riparian owners that their share of water was 
effected by this act. 
CONCLUSION 
The present paper has tried to analyse cases  relating to water law and come up with ajudicial trend 
which reflects the role of the judiciary, the scope of judicial activism, the growing concern of the 
citizens, the development of PIL, the development of various laws, the growth of  fundamental 
right, andso on.Thetrendthatemergesfromthisstudy  isthatcases inthebeginingofthiscentury 
were mainly dealihg with criminal law and related to issues of theft, mischief and nuisance. Over 
time law developed and the concepts widened. We see the scope of law of Torts widening, though 
most of the torts cases were confined to certain specialised categories of  water like irrigation and 
pollution. The trend also sees the development of riparian rights and principles. With the increase 
in  urbanisation  and  industrialisation  the problems  relating  to  sanitation  and drainage  also 
increased. This also led to the development of municipal and administrative law and the attendant 
duties and liabilities of the Municipal Corporations. Increased levels of pollution of the rivers and 
streams led to the enactment of water specific legislations to ensure water as a source for drinking 
water, for supporting fish life, for use in irrigation and to ensure water free from pollution. 
TheambitofConstituitionallaw  \yidenedinthe80'sasaIsothescopeofArticle21  toincluderight 
to potable drinking water, right to environment and health, and right to water free from pollution. 
There was another development more or less concurrent to this constituitional development and 
that was the growth of public intertest litigation filed by concerned citizen groups to redress their 
grievances whetherof water pollution or improper sanitation and drainage. With thegrowth ofthe 
concept of PIL,  water pollution cases came to be filed under the larger ambit of Articles 32  and 
226 of the Constitution. Most of the constitutional litigations have been converted to PIL in order 
to bring about social justice within the reach of common man. 
The courts have over the years held that it is the duty of Municipal Corporations to properly 
maintain sanitation and drainage and that paucity of funds and staff is no defence. This trend was 
started in thejudgement of the SupremeCourtinRatlam Municipal Corporation case  and was later 
reiterated in the Ganga Pollution case, wherein the court laid down that sanitation and drainage 
wa3tobemaintainedbytheMunicipalCorporationsand  thatuntreatedsewageandeffluentscould 
76 not be thrown into the riveruntreated. Thus, the underlying basis that the courts have worked upon 
is that  the Municipal  Authoirities and other local  bodies are under an  obligation  to make 
arrangements for water supply and drainage. The two cases mentioned above are landmark cases 
and marked the development of laws and the positive attitude of the  judiciary and the activist role 
that it played 
An analytical overview shows the general disconcern of the judges to go into issues involving 
social justice barring a few exceptions. They have, on the contrary, stuck by the letter of the law 
and have sparingly, if at all, applied the principals of judicial activism. But thesupreme Court 
seems to be taking the lead in moving away from this practice. In two instances, they set up expert 
committees to  go  into technical questions, which they thought themselves unqualified tocomment 
upon. This step, though small, shows the  judiciary’s willingness to enlarge its own  jurisdiction in 
order to deal with the socio economic realities of the society. 
The modern judiciary cannot afford to hide behind notions of legal justice and plead incapacity 
when social justice issues are addressed to it. This challenge is an important one, notjust because 
judgesoweadutytodojustice withaview tocreatingandmouldingajustsociety, butalso because 
a modem judiciaq can  no longer  obtain social and political  legitimacy  without  making a 
substantial contribution to issues of social justice. 
This paper thus attempts to analyse the cases relating to water filed in the High Courts and the 
Supreme Court since 1900 and present the judicial trende based on the that analysis. However, 
there are some  shortcomings in the present study as  we have been unable to collect and document 
unreported  cases. Secondly, in  our classification  and categorisation  of  water law cases, hill 
irrigation has not been included but this was due to the lack of any case on this topic. The cases 
that we have collected and analysed have not helped us in discerning a trend of customary water 
practises. Further, not many cases are reported on big dams. We have not analysed the Narmada 
Dam issue because it is sub-judice. The Tehri Dam case showed the lack of judicial activism in 
a different light. The court while dismissing the writ petition held that in view of the material on 
the record the court did not find any good reason to issue a direction restraining the respondents 
from proceeding ahead with the implementation of the project. 
Thus water law has developed from criminal to torts to Constituition as also specific water related 
statutes besides the growth of administrative law.  Judicial activism has been very much the 
hallmark of a number of cases and and the concept of rights has changed from mere  ilparian rights 
to easement rights, natural rights and fundamental rights. However, the courts have not normally 
concerned themselves with socio-economic aspects but have confined themselves to technical 
determination of the cases. Nevertheless, there is a gradual but  welcome change as enumerated 
in some of the cases discussed in the paper. This  judicial activism is perhaps the begining of what 




This is arevisedversion of the paper presentedat the workshoponWaterRights,CoflictandPolicy, 
Kathmandu, January 22-24. 
Both of the authors are lawyers and work in the Center of Environmental Law, attached to the 
World Wild1 Life Fund-India. 
A writ of mandamus may be defined as a command issued from the High Court or the Supreme 
Court. directed against the state or the authority mentioned in Article 32 as well as under Article 
226 of the Constitution requiring the perfaormance of a particular duty therein specified, which 
duty results from the official  duty or by operation of law. In other words. prerogative writ of 
mandamus is imposed for securing judicial enforcement of  public duties, performance of which 
has been wrongfullyrefused. Mandamusisapubliclaw remedy and willnot,  therefore. beavailable 
in respect of  duties of private nature. 
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80 Delhi’s Groundwater: Rights and Policy’ 
Bharath Jairaj2 
INTRODUCTION 
Demands on water resources in India, and particularly in Delhi, are increasing and the distribution 
of available supplies has long stopped satisfying the demand. Thesedemands have had substantial 
costs. Groundwater resources have been exhibiting definite signs of overutilisation. The existing 
legal framework is inadequate to solve this. In fact, it often encourages the indiscriminate use and 
exploitation of groundwater. 
Attempts have been made, both at the Centre and at the State levels, at resolving this problem. 
However, they have not met with the expected or desired success. 
This paper seeks to describe the water situation existing in Delhi and it highlights the inequities 
of the system. It also seeks to lay out the legal scenario in terms of rights and policies, and briefly 
elucidate the various legislative attempts made. 
THE WATER SITUATION IN DELHI 
The natural resources in Delhi, especially water, have been vulnerable to exploitation because it 
has remained a capital through centuries. Modern developing trends have attracted people to settle 
here:  for jobs,opportunities.  and urban life. The increase in population,  “development”  and 
industrialisation has had a consqquent effect on water resources. The old wells have coughed dry, 
and the river Yamuna forcibly diverted from its original course. After Independence the focus has 
remained on surface water. From 1941 to 1991,  Delhi’s population has increased by over 3.8%  per 
year causing a drain on all natural resources, especially the water resources. 
In the existing situation, the scenario is one of acute crisis. Water resources are being depleted and 
what is available is most often contaminated  with pollutants. In  such a situation, we have a 
81 responsibility to protect the quality of water and question the existing legal and administrative 
regimes; and to evolve a system wherein water is used and conserved sustainably. 
Supply and Demand of Water 
The Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Disposal Undertaking (DWSSDU) estimates that of the 
575 MGD supply in Delhi today, 210 MGD  is from the river Yamuna, 200 MGD  is from the river 
Beas, 100  MGD  is from the river Ganga and the remaining 65 MGD  is from government tubewells 
and the Ranney wells. They concede that to meet the drinking as well as other requirements it is 
necessary to produce about 700 MGD of potable water. 
The consumption profile of water in Delhi, as illustrated by Tables I and 11,  shows that absolute 
reliance on surface water supplies alone has never been  adequate. The growth process and 
expansion of economic activities made it imperative to find and make use of a supplement source 
of water supply. The obvious choice was and is groundwater. 
Table I: Demand and Supply of Water in Delhi (MLD) 
Demand 
Supply 
22131  2840  5121 
1 I50  2347  4189* 









Table 11:  Total and Per Capacity Water Supply 
Population  Average Supply  Per Capital availabilit) 
(Million)  (MLD)  (Litresmay) 
4.1  785  190 
6.2  1 I50  185 
8.8  2160  245 
9104  2143  231 
10.00  2347  235 
10.5  2860  272 
12.8  3520  215 
Source: DWSSDU, 1994  * Projected Values 
82 The  Significance of  Groundwater 
Groundwater has always been in use. In fact, it accounts for about 50% of the total irrigated area 
and 80% of drinking and domestic requirements in India .  Groundwater is easily accessible. It is 
“attached” to the land in many respects and its supply is normally controlled by  the private 
individual herself. All that it requires is a Water Extraction Mechanism (WEM) ,  for example, a 
dugwell or more likely a motor-operated tubewell, and a minimum maintenance cost. 
Legally. there is an inherent “right” one has over the groundwater as it lies directly helow one’s 
land.Whilethegenerallaw  seemstostatethatall waterandrights thereinvest withtheState(Enlry 
17, List 11, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India), groundwater is one area that has always 
remainedinthe “privatedomain”. Groundwaterrights belong to theland owner sinceit formspart 
of the dominant heritage, and land ownership is governed by  the tenancy laws of the State. A 
person with a dominant heritage who transfers her land also transfers the water under it. The 
relevant provisions of the law on this point are reproduced in Annexure I. 
The Problems with  Groundwater 
The 1989 Report of the Central Gro~ndwaterBoard(CGWB)~reveals  that since their 1984 study, 
the water table  in  all parts of  Delhi  has gone down  substantially, indicating thereby  that 
groundwater recharge is much less than its withdrawl from the acquifers. The nationwide drought 
of 1987 is aclear indication that the sustainable limit of groundwater exploitation is very low. The 
groundwater situation has turned acute since the percentage of rainwater falling directly (verti- 
cally) is minimal and most of it is lost through run-off and evaporation and does not go down to 
the recharge zone depth. It was suggested that private individuals should stop willful exploitation 
6  of groundwater and regulate or atleast register private tube wells  . 
In a more recent state of  the environment report of Delhi, it is stated that “the water table of Delhi, 
ingeneral, is low. Though much of the water is brackish, about 237 million cubic metres is 
withdrawn  annually ...( as reported  by  the  Central  Ground Water  B0ard)”’l. In  addition, 
Mr.V.M.Sikka, scientist, CGWB, notes “rapid urbanisation of Delhi has (had an) adverse impact 
on the groundwater resources of  the State where (the) water table has declined in most parts by 
2 metres to 8 metres during the last decade”*. 
The management of Delhi’s water is rather unique. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), 
the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) and the Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) all have 
their respective areas of water supply. Of the total of  1484.46 sq.km that make up Delhi. 1399.26 
sq.km is under the MCD, 42.40 sq.km under the NDMC and 42.80 sq.km. under the DCB. Apart 
from  the overlap of jurisdictions,  the price for water  supplied by  these agencies Delhi  is 
particularly low. The level of subsidy is extremely high. The cost of production of  1 kilolitre of 
potable water is Rs.2.13 and the domestic tariff is Rs.0.35 till 20 kilolitres and Rs.0.7  above 20 
kilolitres ( lus a surcharge of 30%). In other words, the level of subsidy is as high as 79%  for the 
lower slab . 
Almost half of the consumption is not metered. Charges for unmetered consumption are either 





83 the question of equity: because only landowners can ‘own’ groundwater, landless individuals and 
slum-dwellers are left out. 
Had there been an equitable and sustainable use of  groundwater, perhaps there would have been 
no problem. Now, to resolve the water scarcity problem, the Delhi State Government seeks to 
depend on water from mega-hydroelectric dams to be constructed in the Himalayas. This is both 
ecologically and seismologically undesirable. 
CEL, WWF-India’s Research on the Problems of Delhi’s Groundwater 
The special status of groundwater has always ensured that it is kept away from the regulatory 
clutches of the State. In fact, there has hardly been any research on groundwater. This, inferaria, 
prompted CEL, WWF-India to collect information pertaining to Delhi’s water, and in specific the 
groundwater. The methodology used in obtaining the information was essentially through a 
questionnaire. 
For the purpose of data collection, Delhi was divided into five sections: north, south, east, west 
and central. A cross section of the residents were interviewed based on their socio-economic 
status. While the final analysis of the information is yet to be done, the data collected suggests that 
gross inequities in the distribution of water exists. In order to highlight the inequity, the residents 
havebeenclassifiedon the basisoftheir socio-economic statusas: (a) lowerclass; (b)middleclass; 
(c) elite; (d) VIP areas; and (e) hotels. 
TheNDMChas adoptedthefigureof225litrespercapitaperdayasthecity’s  water load”.  While 
most residents of the lower socio-economic groups face water crises throughout the year, they turn 
acute in the summer months (April, May, June and July). On an average they get as low as 15 litres 
per capita per day and very often have no dependable water supply. Many have resorted to 
groundwaterextraction, hutusually do not useitforcooking, drinkingorbathingpurposes, as they 
find its quality very poor. However. very often, they do not have a choice. 
The 50-odd embassies and other VIP areas require about 45 kilo litres per day12 and in the event 
of a water shortage, private and government agencies rush in tankers with capacities between 450 
litres and 15,000 litres for price ranges between Rs. 400 and Rs. 2Mx)  respectively. 
Overandabove the watersuppliedtothem by the agencies,thefive-starluxury  hotelsinDelhi used 
to rely on groundwater. They have since stopped making use of this source as it was found to be 
of  sub-standard quality. They now largely resort to buying water from private tanker agencies. 
Even this water is treated, in order to conform to international standards, before the foreign 
clientele uses it. On an average they require 20 tankers of 12 kilolitres capacity per month in the 
non-summer months and at least 10 more during the summer months. 
Gross inequities are the rule, which is rather shameful for the capital of the world’s largest 
democracy. 
84 The problems therefore are: 
(i)  There is an inadequacy in the supply of water in Delhi. In order to satisfy their wants and 
needs, private individuals and agencies are resorting to extraction of groundwater. 
There is no legal regime within which this extraction takes place. As a result, there are no 
limits or safeguards to the groundwater extraction. Since this right is available only to the 
landed, there are serious equity and equality questions that arise. The additional costs of 
the WEM and maintenance contribute to this inequality. 
The administrative practices of the various Government agencies in the supply of water, 
in terms of their respective scopes and jurisdictions, have added to the confusion. 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Confronted with similar situations, the Central Government and the various State Governments 
responded with Bills and Acts hoping that these would solve the problems. 
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Entry 17, List I1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of  India, 1950  makes it clear that the 
state governments have the legislative competence to legislate on “water, that is to say, water 
supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankment, water storage and water power subject 
to the provisions of Entry 56 of List I”. Entry 56 of  List I deals with inter-state rivers and river 
valleys. 
Groundwater is not mentioned in this Schedule. Nevertheless, the major initiatives have been at 
the national level. The National Water Policy of  1987 was formulated which recognises the 
importance of prudent groundwater resource management and conservation as well as equitable 
distribution on the basis of common policies and strategies. Another initiative was the setting up 
of the national level Central Ground Water Board (CGWB) to conduct necessary surveys and 
investigations. 
The Groundwater (Control and Regulation) Act, 1970 
This Model Bill was prepared by the Central Government to be adopted by any State Government 
to regulate and control the development of groundwater and the matters connected therewith, as 
the title suggests. 
The Bill comprises a total of 23 sections. The salient features of this Bill are as follows: 
(i)  Section 3 prescribestheformatfortheformationofaStateGroundwaterAuthority  which 
is to be established by the State Government. This Groundwater Authority is to consist 
of a Chairman and several other representatives concerned with the development of 
groundwater to be appointed by the State Government, as specified in the Section. 
85 The State Government is empowered to regulate the  extraction or  use or both of 
groundwater in any area if it is in the interest of the public. 
Itismandatoryforanyperson  toapplyforapermitorlicencetosinkawellinthenotified 
asea for any other purpose other than domestic use. 
This Bill has grantdsanctioned the State Groundwater Authority with certain powers: 
a.  The power to grant or cancel the permit/licence. 
b.  The power togrant the certificate of Regisuation to existing users otgroundwater in 
the notified areas and the power to alter, amend or vary the terms of the permit. 
c.  The  power to enter any property with a right to search, inspect, investigate or seize 
any mechanical equipment utilized for illegal sinking, if it has reason to believe that 
an offence under this Act has been or is being committed. 
d.  The prosecution of an offence under this  Act can only be instituted with the written 
consent of  the Groundwater Authority. 
The offences under this Bill are to be tried as  under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. 
Section 19 specifies the penalties for the commission of an offence under this Bill: 
a.  For the first offence: fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. 
b.  For second and subsequent offences: imprisonment for a term  extending to  six 
months and/or  with a fine upto one thousand rupees. 
This Bill imposes a  bar on the civil courts to  try  any matter on which  the State 
Government or the Groundwater Authority has been empowered to act. 
The Bombay Irrigation (Gujrat Amendment) Act,  1976 
The Amendment made to the Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879 as applicable to the State of Gujarat 
came into force only in 1988. It sought to regulate the conmetion of any tubewell, artesian well 
or borewell, exceeding forty five metros in depth.  The land owner was required to apply for a 
licence in order to extract groundwater from lower depths. 
The authority under this statute was the Regional Canal Officer. to whom the application for 
license was to be submitted. The RCO was vested with the sole power of granting or denying a 
license. 
The  penal consequences for violations of the Act included the closinglsealing of the well, and/or 
imprisonment which may extend to six months and/or fine which may extend to five hundred 
rupees. 
86 The Karnataka Groundwater (Regulation and Control) Bill, 1985 
ThisBill draws bothletterandspiritfromthe 197OModelBill.  However,itdeparts fiomtheModel 
Bill in that Section 2(1) of the Karnataka Bill defines “domestic use” of groundwater as follows: 
“use  of groundwater inreasonable quantityfordrinking, cooking, wasbing,livestockprvation 
and contrary requirements by an individual or a group of individuals depending on one or more 
sources for abstraction of groundwater but shall exclude all wells which are used primarily for 
irrigation”. In addition, it categorically states “all the groundwater that exists below the surface 
of the ground at any one location or centerminous locations shall be the property of the State and 
belong to the State” [S. 3(1)]. 
Violations by individuals will result in a tine of a maximum of one thousand rupees for first 
offenders and upto two thousand rupees and/or imprisonment for one year for second and 
subsequent offenders. Violations by  companies will result in the prosecution of the person in 
charge of, and responsible for, the affairs of the company. 
The  Maharashtra  Groundwater  (Regulation  for  Drinking  Water 
Purposes)  Act,  1993 
This Act was enacted to regulate the exploitation of groundwater for the protection of  public 
drinking water sources, thereby reiterating the fundamental premise of the 1987 National Water 
Policy.  It prohibits the sinking of any well within five hundred metres of a public drinking water 
source. In  addition, it prohibits the sinking of a well within the ma  of “an  over-exploited 
watershed” [S.7( l)]. The appropriate Authority is the body vested with the powers in this regard. 
The Act also provides for the Authority to prohibit extraction of water from an existing well for 
certain periods in a year based on the quantum and pattern of rainfall. 
The penal provisions  for violation of  the Act include the closing/sealing of  the well  and 
disconnecting power supply. 
Control and Regulation of  Groundwater Exploitation in Pondicherry and 
Karaikal, 1988 
This notification was issued by  the Lt. Governor, Pondicherry. in order to protect the rapidly 
declining water tables in the Union Temtory. It prohibits the construction of a tubewell, the grant 
of new power connections for energising any tubewell. and the setting up of industries requiring 
more than 1O.ooO litres of potable water, within six kilometres of the coastline. 
Tubewells outside the six kilometres limit can be constructed only with the clearance of the State 
Groundwater Unit and even then at a minimum of 150 to 200 metres apart from each other. 
87 The Madhya Pradesh Peya Jal Parirakshan Adhiniyam, 1986 
This legislation came into force on  9th January, 1987. The salient features of the Act are: 
(i)  This Act is to provide for the preservation of water and for the regulation of digging of 
tubewells in order to maintain the water supply to the public for domestic purposes. 
As in the Karnataka Groundwater Bill, this Act also defines “domestic purposes”. 
The Collector has the power and authority under this Act to grant or refuse permission 
for the digging of a tubewell. 
The punitivemeasures providedunderthis Actareimprisonment extendible totwo years 




The Tamil Nadu Groundwater (Control and Regulation) Bill, 1977 
This Bill regulates andcontrols the development of groundwater in the whole of the State of Tamil 
Nadu. It is a verbatim replication of the Groundwater Model Bill of  1970 with certain specific 
differences: 
(i)  Before making any alteration, amendment or variation in the terms of the permit and the 
Certificate of Registration, the Groundwater Authority has to ensure that: 
a.  The standing crops in the area are not damaged; and 
b.  The existing interests of the industries using the groundwater also are not affected. 
(ii)  ThisBillhasanoverridingeffectoverall theotherexisting  Actsincaseofinconsistency. 
Model Bill to Regulate and Control the Development of Groundwater, 1992 
Based on the comments received from different State Governments, the Central Government 
revised the Groundwater Model Bill of  1970. This Bill is now being re-circulated as the Model 
Bill of 1992. The salient additions are: 
(i)  It  exempts  “small  fanners’’ and  “marginal  fanners”  from  obtaining  a  permit  for 
extraction of groundwater. 
A limit of six months has been laid down for obtaining the licence.  (ii) 
(iii)  ItallowstheGroundwaterAuthoritytocancelapermitorlicenceifitfeels  thatasituation 
has arisen warranting such an action. 
88 ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The Central and State responses to the groundwater problem have created a new situation. The 
general law seemed to have clearly laid down the absolute right of the private individual over the 
water beneath her land. Now, the new Bills and legislations are based on the right of the State to 
regulate the private individual right. 
While the Model Bill of 1970  and the revised Model Bill of 1992 remain “models”, almost all the 
legislations draw inspiration from these Bills in both letter and spirit. The underlying basis of the 
Bills and Acts is that the State has granted itself the right to regulate and control the development 
of  groundwater. The adoption of criminal  procedure  and prosecution  for violations of  the 
provisions of the BilUAct only emphasises the seriousness of  the intentions of the State. 
The  Bombay Irrigation Act, 1879  as  amended in the State of Gujarat in I976 came into force only 
in 1988. It is based purely on the depth of the digging of the WEM. The drawbacks with this Act 
is that it is restricted in its application to a few districts in Gujarat. In addition, all supervision was 
to be done by the Regional Canal Officer (RCO). This was found to he highly  impracticable as 
the RCO could not monitor the WEM’s and their depths in all the districts mentioned. Further, it 
13  was felt that the punishments did not deter the commission of the offences under the Act  . 
The Karnataka and the Tamil Nadu Bills are almost replicas of the Model bill of  1970. The 
Karnataka Bill defines “domestic use” and excludes it from the license requirement. The Tamil 
Nadu Bill departs from the Model Bill in allowing for industrial interests to be protected during 
the determination of altering or amending the terms of the license or permit. 
The Madhya Pradesh Act grants the power to grant permits and licenses to the Collector. As  in the 
Karnataka  Bill,  this  Act  also defines  and  excludes  “domestic purpose”  from  the  license 
requirement. The notification issued by the Lt.Governor of Pondicherry is based on the need to 
protect  fresh  water  supplies from contamination by  the sea water. The notification  was an 
immediate reaction to the depleting water tables in the Union territory and preceeded legislative 
discussions on this topic. 
The Maharashtra Act of  1993 is probably the most comprehensive  of  the legislative attempts 
made. While it concentrates on drinking water - the focus of the National Water Policy of 1987, 
it bases its approach on the distance and spacing between the new well and another public water 
supply. In addition, it allows the Appropriate Authority to prohibit (a) the sinking of a well within 
an  area of “over-exploited watershed“  as determined  by  the Appropriate  Authority and; (b) 
extraction of water from an existing well for certain water-shortage periods (summer months). 
Further, it allows the Appropriate Authority to shut off electricity supply to contravenors of the 
Act. 
On thc whole, thelegislativeattempts have heenunsatisfactory. They havemerely tried to regulate 
the extraction of groundwater. The Bills and Acts have not taken into account the variances in 
socio-economic status and remain ambiguous on the extent of  the water rights, if any. Even the 
implementation of  these laws leave much to be desired and so they have not achieved even the 
meagre objectives they were set out to achieve. Given this fact and the uniqueness of Delhi’s water 
situation, attempting to apply any of these laws to Delhi will prove infructuous. 
89 CONCLUSION 
Groundwater was not specifically mentioned in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the 
Constitution of India. This could be because the framers,  in their infinite wisdom, did not envisage 
a water crisis as we are faced with today. On the other hand, it could be because they felt that 
groundwater was too “private” to be given to the regulatory State. 
The fact remains that we are faced with a water crisis. And the attempts made by the Union and 
the State agencies have only tried to regulate extraction. The direction of all government action 
has been at augmenting supply, never at demand management. None of the Bills or Acts have 
sought to deal  with  the  inequity  and  inequality  inherent  in  the  very  conceptualisation  of 
groundwater - it being only available to the landed. Can a legislation that fails to take into account 
social and economic realities ever achieve its objectives ? 
The enormous subsidy afforded to Delhi, by virtue of it being the capital, is really not required. 
Even the preliminary data collected by CEL. WWF-India suggests that the residents of Delhi are 
ready to pay more for their water provided there is an improvement in water quality and quantity. 
The leaka  es, even (hose admitted by the NDMC amount to a phenomenal  25.30% of the water 
supplied  . The agencies blame this on the inadequacy of revenue from faulty water meters and 
the low rates for water. Can not the money spent on providing the subsidy be spent on reducing 
leakages, improving the water pipe connections, installing efficient  water meters and other 
infrastructural arrangements? 
The gross inequities can not be emphasized enough. The MCD, NDMC and DCB send kilolitres 
of treated water to industries for their use. What equitable use can this treated potable drinking 
water be put to in a complex industrial process, when millions of  poverty stricken families have 
no access to any kind of water? 
For an efficient regulatory regime, perhaps we require ecological and more specifically acquifer- 
based divisions of the State. The question of rights - those of the landed and those of the landless 
needs  to  be addressed within  this framework. All  attempts  that  ignore  this reality  remain 
inadequate. And perhaps, we need to look at water and water management more holistically: 
understanding surface water, groundwater and rain water as a common pool of resource, giving 
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91 ANNEXURE-I 
LAW RELATING TO GROUNDWATER 
1. 
(a) 
Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 
[Tlthe expression “land” includes benefits to arise out of the land and things attached to the 
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth;. . . 
Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: 
[Alttached to the earth” means- 
(a)  x x x; 
(h)  x x x; 
(c) 
2. 
attached to what is so imbedded for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to 
which it is so attached; 
3.  Section 17 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882: Easements acquired under section 15 are 
said to he acquired by prescription, and are calledprescriptive  rights. None of the following 
rights can be so acquired:- 
(a)  x xx; 
(b)  x xx: 
(c)  x x x; 
(d) 
(Thereby clarifying that groundwater is linked to the dominat heritage) 
a right to underground water not passing in a defined channel. 
92 Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems in Nepal: 
Some Issues and Trends’ 
Gehendra L. Malla  and  Shantam S. Khadka2 
INTRODUCTION 
Nepal is a poor country but ia  rich in water resources. Unfortunately the utilization of water 
resources is extremely limited. Nepal is an agrarian country but it has been able to imgate  merely 
38% of its total cultivable land. Given the limited capacity of  both the private and  the public 
sectors to take new initiatives and the scarcity of resources, and despite the efforts being made to 
develop waterresources, one can rightly assume that it will be difficult to narrow the gap between 
the growing demand and available supply of water, especially for imgation.  Due to the gap 
between growing demand and the available supply,  disputes are inevitable over  water rights, 
especially over the use of water for irrigation and other domestic purposes. As such, it has been 
deemed necessary to make an initial study of the issues and problems relating to the overall 
development of  irrigation systems in Nepal. 
This paper reports the findings of the survey on the water rights situation of the Nepalese farmers 
and the nature of conflicts over the use of water as well as the prevailing conflict resolution 
practices. The study team surveyed 40 fanner managed imgation systems in  seven districts and 
and also visited  judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in these districts. The basic objectives of the 
survey were to obtain ageneral impression about the legal status of imgation management systems 
and the prevailing practices regarding conflict resolution as well as  possible future research issues 
in this regard. The study team attempted to get general information of  the 40 irrigation systems 
without going into much detail. Some of the important questions addressed in the field were as 
follows: Have these imgationsystemsacquiredlegal status? Are the wateruse rights ofthepeople 
curtailed or disturbed during expansion  of  the  irrigation  systems? Do  the  irrigation  canal 
construction initiators get priority in the water use as per the existing legal provision? What is the 
process of acquiring land for canal construction? What are the problems of the fanners in the 
operation and maintenance of the irrigation systems ? 
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w  ao\x.g GENERAL INFORMATION  OF  THE  IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
STUDIED 
With the aforesaid objective the study team  conducted a general survey of 40 im+ation systems 
of 7 districts representing both the inner valley and mid hill districts of Nepal  .  They are:  1. 
Gorkha, 2. Parbat, 3. Palpa, 4. Dang, 5.  Chitwan, 6. Tanahun and 7. Sindupalchowk. (See Annex- 
1 for the list of names of all irrigation systems studied). A check list of topics and questions was 
used to conduct the survey. 
Hitory of the Settlements 
To begin with the overall analysis of the irrigation system, it is worth looking at the history of 
settlements of the areas undertaken for study. The settlements in the study areas are either old, new 
or mixed (settlement comprising of old and new settlers). For this reason, the settlements as a 
whole are classified into three different categories: (a) Old settlements, (b) New settlements and 




Old Settlements: This category includes those areas where settlers began to live for at last 
100 years or more. The settlers of 23  (58%) irrigation systems fall under this category. 
New Settlements: In this category the settlements are occupied by  new  settlers. This 
category includes settlements where the settlers started living than a hundred years ago. 
A total of 10 (  25%) settlements are in this category, one of which, Dhanmashe Kumaltari 
in Gorkha District,  is just over 8 years old. 
Mixed Settlements: This category of  settlement consists of both old and new settlers. 
Altogether there are 7 (17%) settlements in  this category. In 6 settlements under this 
category Tharus are the traditional settlers whereas the new settlers belong to different 
ethnic communities. In the seventh  settlement,  people from different communities are 
living together who represent themselves as both old and new settlers. 
Religious Composition 
The overwhelming majority of the population (97.5%) in these settlements are Hindus, the others 
are Buddhists and Muslims. An isolated case of a settlement with Hindus and Buddhists living 
together in the Arjung Khola Irrigation Project area in Dang District is also recorded 
Political Organization 
For administrative purposes Nepal is divided into five development regions, 75 districts, 36 
Municipalities  and  3995 Village  Development  Committees. All  local  bodies,  viz., District 
Development  Committees  (DDC) and Municipalities  or  Village Development Committees 
(VDCs) have their own elected bodies to carry out day to day work and developmental activities. 
The  DDCs are sub-divided into sub-districts known as iluka, which vary in number between 9 to 
17, depending on the area and population size. Similarly, Municipalities are divided into nine or 
94 more wards whereas the VDCs are divided into nine wards. The wards are headed by elected 
representatives. 
These local bodies have the legal mandate to initiate water related projects, utilize and protect 
water resources and dispense justice to the extent permitted under the existing laws. However, in 
practice, the majority of the irrigation projects are constructed and managed by the beneficiaries 
themselves without, or with minimum support and intervention of, the concerned local level 
bodies. The canals are in general extended beyond one ward or  VDC. 
Land Cultivators and Landowners 
In all the systems surveyed, land is cultivated both by the landowners as well as by tenants. Land 
cultivated by the owners themselves vary from system to system: between 4% to 100% of the land 
indifferent systems.Morethan50W ofthelandarecultivated by theownersin31 systems.Tenants 
cultivate less land than owners in most systems. There are three types of tenancy: 
(i) Tenants do  the farming and take most of the harvest. This system of land tenure is practiced 
in 21 systems and between 10  to 30% of the cultivated land is fanned in this manner. 
(ii) Tenants do all the fanning but share the produce equally with the owners of the land. This type 
of land tenure covers between 20 to 50% of all cultivated land in 28 systems. 
(iii) Tenants do  the farming and share the produce with the landowner, based on agreement. This 
system was recorded in only 2 systems: in one 5% of the cultivated land was cultivated according 
to this land tenure system and in another less than one hectare. 
MostofthelandareownedbythehighcasteBrahmansandChheuis,Theyownonanaverage43% 
and 3 1 % respectively  of the land in the' irrigation systems studied. Brahmans are the major 
landowners in 21 systems and Chhetris in 8 systems. Tharus own about 30% of the land in the 
systems they are predominant whereas Newars own 13% and the low caste Damais. Kamis and 
Sarkis jointly own 12 % of the land. In other words, the highest and the lowest castes own most 
and least portion of land. 
Ownership of Land on Which There is a Source of Water 
Land on which there is a source of water may belong to (be owned by) the government, the public 
or private individuals, depending upon the nature of the water source. The term 'public'  has been 
used to refer to  land owned by  local bodies. It is to be noted that none of the sectors may 
monopolize the use of water resources only on the basis of ownership of the land. There are 
altogether 21 irrigation  systems (67%) which have exploited  water  sources  originating  on 
government lands. The origin of the source of water of one system, the Arjung Khola Irrigation 
Project in Dang District, is ajungle, a government property. The sources of water of other systems 
originate simultaneously in both  public (of VDCs) and private lands. One of the systems in this 
category is Anjana canal in Chitwan District which was initially owned by the Government but 
was later handed over to private owners. 
95 Land Acquisition Methods 
Canals  pass through government, public or private land.  Land on which the canal is to be 
cosntructed has to be acquired by the canal users either by paying compensation or by agreement 
without paying compensation.Compensation  isusually notpaid for government orpuhlic land and 
for the land of those who benefit from the canal. In the irrigation systems studied,  lands for 
constructing canals were acquired by adopting a few hut effective methods. Only two cases were 
detected in whichcompensation was paid in the form of cash or land fortbe  acquisition of the land. 
In the first case, the construction of  Gangate Irrigation canal in Gorkha District was initiated in 
1959 by  local fanners, under the leadership of  Mr. Ghanshyam Aryal and his brothers. The 
problem faced in this project was that there was a small plot of land (about 684 Sq. ft.) owned by 
Mr.  Abdul Miya near the source of water and unfortunately the canal had to occupy all of his land 
but he would not benefit from the project. The local fanners decided to raise a fund from the 
beneficiaries of the project to purchase a plot of land (10952 sq. ft.) for Mr. Miya which could be 
irrigated by the canal. This plan was accepted by Mr. Miya and canal construction was completed 
as per the agreement.  However, some fanners gave their land without taking any compensation 
on the ground that they were to benefit from the project. 
In another case, namely, the Chauwa Khola Irrigation System, the original canal was constructed 
by local the Tharu community in 1839 and it was improved and enlarged in 1993  with partial loan 
assistance from the World Bank and the Agriculture Development Bank, Nepal. The Village 
Development Committee decided to provide compensation to the land owners whose land had 
been acquired by the project but did not benefit from it. The total amount of compensation was 
about two hundred thousand  rupees. 
Compensation has not been paid in any form in 29 (94%) of the systems because the affected 
parties also benefitted from the irrigation canals constructed on their land. The affected parties of 
lOsystemsoutofthe29 were alsoconvinced by theadviceandsuggestionsreceived from thelocal 
leaders. 
Similarly, extension of canals were done by acquiring lands of the users. Compensation was not 
necessary in such cases because they benefitted from the extended command area. It was observed 
that in 25 systems the required lands have been acquired from the users  without paying any 
compensation. It is interesting to note that in 5 out of the above mentioned 25 systems lands were 
acquired by mutual understanding from individual or families whodid not benefit by the extension 
of the canals. In another 10 systems land was acquired from the public or government agency. 
Thereis an isolatedcaseofcompensation being paid to 15 affected families. The Kumroj Paschim 
Third Irrigation  Project, Chitwan District,  paid a sum of  a little over Rs. eight million  as 
compensation  to the concerned landowners. The amount of compensation indicates that the 
construction of the project must have been initiated (and financed) by the government. 
96 HISTORY OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
The Water Sources of  the Systems 
The sources of water for most of the irrigation systems (93 %) are streams. Only 5 % (2 out of 40 
systems) tap rivers (Narayani in Chitwan District and Rapti in Dang District).  And one system, 
Anjana canal in Chitwan District, depends on a  water fall and a lake. 
When Were They Built ? 
Of the 40 irrigation systems surveyed,  17 systems (43%) were constructed between 100 to 450 
yearsagoand22systems(55%)  wereconstructedwithin thepast 100years.  TheRaj KuloinPalpa 
District was constructed by King Mani Mukund Sen, about four centuries ago. King Mukund Sen 
was the king of a petty kigdom ruled by the Sen dynasty. One system, the Narayani Irrigation 
System in Chitwan District, constructed by the government, could not be completed. The system 
operates only in some part of the command area. 
Who Initiated Construction of the Canals ? 
From the very beginning, local landlords have initiated the construction of canals; but other 
farmers and institutions have also contributed. Individuals who had ‘good influence’, i.e., who 
wererespectedin theircommunities, initiatedconstruction  workof 18 systems. In somecases they 
were local leaders and in two instances (both in Palpa District) it was King Mani Mukunda Sen 
and Shree 3 Maharaja Juddha Shamsher (i.e. the Rana Prime Minister then) who were involved 
in initiating construction of the canals. Local farmers (the users) initiated construction of 1  1  canals 
(31%).  Althoughsome influential individuals floated theinitial ideaof construction ofcanals, the 
ordinary farmers initiated the actual construction work.. They were the major contributors for the 
construction works. 
Governmental or non-governmental agencies initiated construction of canals where the necessity 
for such a construction was realized by either the government or the local fanners but the latter 
lacked the required resources. The survey reveals that some  governmental and non-governmental 
organizations are involved in  the construction of several irrigation projects. Such construction 
works were carried  in 7 systems (19% ). Governmental and non-governmental organizations 
undertaking construction of such canals are: the Department of Irrigation, the Department of Soil 
Conservation and Meteorology, Small Irrigation Project, Agriculture Development Bank, District 
Development Committees, Village Development Committees, Ward Committees, and projects 
such as Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC). 
Sources of Expenditure 
The leading persons (local elites) in all the systems have mobilized various resources for the 
construction of thei respective canals. Such resources include individual contributions, HMG’s 
grant, DDC and VDC development fonds, loans (even from international agencies like the ADB 
and World Bank), Food-for-Work Program, people’s participation in the form of cash and labor, 
97 etc. However, it needs to be noted that  the contribution of the users in terms of cash is not as 
important as their participation for the sustainability of the system. 
Loans were sometimes taken by farmers from the Agriculture Development Bank (ADBN) for 
the construction or rehabiliatiod enlargement of irrigation systems with the intention of repaying 
the  amount through the increased grain production. Large loans taken from international agencies 
such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are to be repaid by the government per 
the agreement. Seven irrigation systems had to take loan from the Agriculture Development Bank. 
In most cases, the fanners took loan to fulfil their financial commitment  (i.e.. from 5% to 10% 
of the total budget) in the projects in which substantial portion of the cost for the construction of 
irrigation systems was either donated or given as loan by HMG, the World Bank, SINKALAMA 
Project, ILC project, etc. for the construction of the irrigation projects. Loans were taken for the 
construction of four irrigation systems, forthe  rehabilitation and improvement of two systems and 
for the construction as well as repair of one system. 
Thefarmershavetomortgage theirland tothebank when they loan from it. Usually, theconcerned 
water users association decide bow much individual farmers have to contribuate to repay the loan 
and this is normally based on the size of the land to be irrigated. If the loan is not repaid as per the 
agreement withthe bank,itcanauctionofftbemortgagedlandstorecovertheloan.  Ofthesystems 
studied, notice for the auction of mortgaged lands has been served to the farmers of  only one 
system. When questioned about this issue, the farmers informed the study team that they were 
unabletorepay theloanbecause agricultureproduction  was not sufficientto savemaney  and they 
lacked  alternative source of income. 
This may lead one to wonder how a bank, established for the welfare of the farmers and to increase 
their standard of living, can render the farmers “landless.” There  may be other issues to be 
examined in this regard such as the problems faced by the fanners and the bank in this direction. 
Why are the farmers unable to repay the loan ?What could be other alternatives if loans are not 
repaid ? What are the ultimate result the in majority of cases ? 
In twenty-three out of the twenty-four systems for which data is available. the hasis of resource 
contribution  for construction of canals is either size of  landholding  or the  number of  user 
households. The users with larger landholding contribute more than those with smaller lands. In 
somecases all households contribute equally irrespective of the size of land they own. The Sishne 
Dovan Irrigation Project in PalpaDistrict is an isolated case of “will and financial capacity” of the 
donors as a basis for contribution of resources. This means that affluent households as asked to 
contribute more than others, irrespective of the size of their lands. 
Expansion of the System 
Ithasbecomenecessarytoexpandirrigationsystemstomeettheincreaseindemandforimgation.. 
For this reason, the irrigation capacity and command areas of 30 systems (about 83% )have been 
increased. Although all the demand for irrigation cannot be met. the enlargement of these systems 
means that they are capable to benefiting new irrigators to some extent. However,  the irrigation 
capacity and command areas of about 17% of  the systems could be increased. 
98 The expansion of the systems were mainly done through the decisions and understanding of the 
Water Users’ Associations (WAS)  and the Department of Irrigation (DOI). The WAS  normally 
call a meeting of the users and the issues are decided by the users present. The  number of the 
decisions taken by both the actors are almost similar, i.e.,  14 and 13 respectively. Whereas, the 
decision regarding expansion of the irrigation facilities of the remaining 3 systems were taken by 
their respective water user’s committees. 
In 27 of the irrigation systems not a single existing beneficiary household has been left out from 
the extended command areas. In three systems existing user households have been left out of the 
expanded command area. 
LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION 
Organizatioflater Users Associations 
Registration of WUA 
The data of the survey indicates that 38 WUAs have been formed by the respective users. Among 
them only 21 WUAs (a little over 55%) have registered their organizations with the concerned 
governmental agency, i.e.. the CDO office. The WUAs have to submit their constitution while 
filing application for registration. The informally formed or unregistered WUAs are not consid- 
ered as legal entities and have to face many legal complications such as they are not entitled to 
receive loans, they can not operate bank account in their own names, etc. 
Formation Process 
The records of the survey provides information of the formation process of only 36 systems. The 
formation processs of committees and associations of water users includes consent, nomination 
and election. In 26 systems committee members were selected by common consent of the users. 
In four systems both nomination and election are used to select their committee members. This has 
happened in systems where nomination alone was not effective and some of the candidates had 
to he selected by means of elections  There are two more systems which use both consent and 
election as the basis for the formation of their organizations. One of the systems has adopted 
election as  the process of forming the main body and consent as the basis for the formation of sub- 
committee established for the operation of branch units. In the other system election is used to 
select members of its executive body. 
Basis of Membership of the Executive Committees 
The systems have  several criterias  for providing  membership  to  the executive committees 
(management committees) of the WUAs. The foremost criteria to be a member of the executive 
committeeofWUAis  tobeauserofthe system. But thiscriterion hasnotbeenmandatorily applied 
in all the 33 systems which responded to this question. It seems that much attention has been paid, 
while selecting the committee officials, to geographical representation and to personalities who 
99 are active, trustworthy and have leadership quality; and also those who can spare time to work for 
the committee. The responses received reveal that they tried to select their members, as far as 
possible with all the qualities mentioned above. For some systems only one quality was enough 
while selecting the  committee members. 
Tenure of Officials 
The tenure of the officials of the WUAs is between one to three years. The tenure in most of the 
systems is two years. The Kalapani Praganda Kulo in Dang District has a unspecified period of 
tenure, hut the project may if it feels necessary restructure the committee and may make required 
changes among the officials  especially during the month of Magh (15 Jan. to 14 Feb.). 
Fund and it’s Operation 
The funds of WUAs aregenerated throughcash and labor contribution, grain donation, water fees, 
fines, etc. Only 15 WUAs generate funds from these sources but they have very little cash funds, 
which range between Rs. 200 to Rs. 35,000. Only a few systems have been able to save money. 
The maximum amount saved hy the WAS  was by the Katuwa Khola Irrigation Project in Dang 
District which, after accounting all the expenses incurred, saved only Rs. five to six thousand. In 
one-fourth of the total systems studied, resources are raised whenever it is felt necessary (and not 
regularly as in other systems). The farmers currently contribute both cash and labor as required 
for their systems. 
The funds of the WUAs are operated by officials who vary from one system to another. The 
chairmen of 10 WUAs operated the funds of their associations. Amongst them, in some cases, the 
secretaries and, in others, treasurers co-operate with the chairmen in the operation of the funds. 
The treasurers operate the funds of their WUAs solely by themselves in six systems and the 
treasurers in three. In two WUAs the watchmen have been made responsible for the operation of 
the funds. 
In two cases, the operation of the WUA funds have been entrusted to the VDC chairman and an 
individual of the respective communities. In  the Dhanmashe Kumaltari Irrigation System in 
Gorkha District, the Village Development Committee chairman and a villager, who possess the 
largest area of land in the system, operate the WUA fund. The users of the Pakariya Irrigation 
Project in Dang District have selected an individual, Mr. Durga Bahadur K.C., as their leader and 
also entrusted him with the responsibility of operating the fund. 
Bank accounts have been opened by 13 WUAs (out of 32 systems) to operate their funds whereas 
others have yet go do so, for unknown reasons. The users of Shirkatty Kulo, Dang District, 
revealed that they had not opened a hank account as they were lending money to local individuals 
levying interest which in turn helped them make extra money for the system. 
ThesurveydidnotdiscoveranyfinancialirregularitiesinthefundsoftheWUAs.  However,it was 
noticed that the account keeping system practiced is not very “scientific”. The reason being that 
the local people lack proper knowledge about  keeping accounts ‘scientifically’. 
100 Decision Making Process 
The meetings of the executive body of WUAs are held in different months in different systems as 
perthe willand necessityfeltby therespective WUAs.TheSishnedovan1rrigation  Project in Palpa 
District seems to be the only WUA which holds its meeting every month. In fourteen WAS 
meetings of the executive committee are held twice a year, especially during the months of Jestha 
and Magh (mid-May to mid-June and midJanuary to mid-February), i.e., right before plantation 
seasons of  summer and winter crops. Meetings are held annually in five systems and in the 
remaining systems they are held whenever necessary. In general the meetings are called during 
Jestha, Kartik and Magh (between mid-May to mid-June; mid-October to mid-November; and 
mid-January to mid-February). Meetings are necessary during these months because  the canals 
have to be cleaned and arrangements made for water distribution in preparation for irrigation of 
the monsoon and winter crops. 
The meetings of WUAs are generally held in public meeting areas such as  open fields, VDC 
buildings, schools, etc. However, there are four WUAs which hold meetings in the courtyards of 
some individuals. The meetings of the Budhi Kulo in Gorkha District, are held near the source of 
water because thecommitteemembers makeon the spot inspectionand moniterthesituation from 
time to time. 
All the WUAs have made it mandatory for all the committee members to attend the meetings. 
Those who are absent from meetings are liable to be punished. In some associations, membership 
may be revoked if a person does not attend three consequetive committee meetings, while in two 
WUAs, committeemembers arenot punishedfornot attendingmeetings. Thestudy team recorded 
one instance of a committee member being tined Rs. 50 for being absent from a meeting. 
In 28 WUAs decisions are made jointly by the committee officials and the ordinary members of 
the associations during meetings. The procedure usually followed is that the committee members 
firsst extensively discuss the agenda and then all the members  unanimously pass the resolutions. 
However, in two WUAs, decisions are passed during meetings by majority  vote and not by 
unanimous consent ofall  present. In themajority oftheirrigation systems (36),  the WUAmeetings 
are attended by both the committee members as well as ordinary members and although all the 
present may not vote, they do sign the minutes of the meetings. This allows for transparency  as 
well  broad  participation in the decision-making process. 
Relation with Local Bodies 
Of the irrigation systems studied, 27 WUAs stated that their relations with their respective local 
bodies, namely, VDCs and DDCs was good and only one recorded dissatisfaction with the role 
of their local bodies, but thereason thereof is not known. And nine WUAs have not involved the 
local bodies in their activities. 
101 Functioning of the Systems 
Operation and Maintenance 
In most of the irrigation systems surveyed, maintenance and operational works such as cleaning, 
repairing, acquisition and delivery of water, etc., are carried out as per traditional practices or the 
needs of the area. Maintenance and operation activities may be carried out by the users themselves 
or by operators employed by the users. However, an operator is basically a watchman called by 
different names in different localilics and irrigation systems, such as Pale, Katkandar, Chaukidar, 
Dhalpa, Sardaruwa, Thekedar, Sipahi, Peon, etc.  The responsibilities of  the operators (watch- 
men), whatever they may be called, are to guard and operate the canal and look after the smooth 
distribution  of  water for irrigation purpose. Watchmen have been  appointed, usually  by  the 
chairmenof theWUAs, in4574 oftheirrigationsystemsonanannual basiswhileinafewsystems, 
they are appointed only for the monsoon season, when the demand for water as well as conflicts 
increase. A few WUAs do not plan to employ watchmen while  they will be appointed in other 
systems when they (the irrigations systems currently ‘managed’ by the government) are handed 
over (turned over) to the users’s associations by the government. 
The  users of the canals have to contribute labor, cash or kind (grains, construction materials, etc.) 
for the operation and  maintenance of their irrigation  systems.  In  31 systems, the users are 
compelled to contribute resources on a regular basis for repair and maintenance. Amongst them, 
the chairmen of 23 WUAs (74%) call the farmers to work to repair and mainten their canals. In 
some of  the cases the chairmen direct the contractors/watchmen  to  call the users  for their 
participation in the maintenance works. The survey also recorded three systems where mainte- 
nance work is done on the basis of information given by individuals01 theusers. In two systems 
the users are called by the Sardaruwas (the watchmen) to contribute their labour for maintenance 
works. 
Emergency maintenance work  had been carried out in 36 (90%) of the 40 systems; the other 
systems did not require emergency maintenance work because the.y were newly built. 
Water Distribution 
Altogether 33 systems were recorded to have given some sort of priority to the process of water 
distribution.Amongstthemalmostallthesystems  havegivenpriorityfortheirrigationofdifferent 
kinds of crops. However, the Chepetar Irrigation Project in Gorkha District has given water use 
priority to brick making for the construction of  the house of  a user.  Similarly, the Kharkhola 
Khahare and Armadi and Pahare Khanda Irrigation Projects in Gorkha and Parbat districts have 
given priority to drinking and irrigation purposes respectively. 
In general, turn by turn methodofwater distribution is practiced. Altogether 36irrigation systems 
(90%) follow this method, of  which  34 systems have adopted the head-to-tail end or vise versa 
method of water distribution. The widespread use of this method  shows that  most associations 
use  systematic method of water distribution for irrigation. 
The timing of  water distribution  for irrigation is an important factor especially  during the 
plantation period. However, water cannot be delivered to the fields as demanded because of the 
102 high demand and the limitcd capacity of the systems. The users of 20 systems (50%)  are satisfied 
the timing of water  delivery  10  their  fields whereas  the  users of  17 systems expressed 
dissatisfaction for not receiving watcr at an appropriate time.  In some systems, for example, the 
AnjanaIrrigation System in Chitwan District, water is inadequate  for the extended command area 
especially during the wintcr period.. This sort of problems is faced especially by the tailend users 
due to  insufficient flow of water in die canal. 
The role of water distributor is perlonned by  different individuals in different systems. In  13 
systems thechainnen of water user scorninittee are responsible fortakingdecisions ondistribution 
of water to the users whereas this task is perrornied by the users themselves in nine systems. This 
task is arried out  by  watchmen in eight systems and by committee members  themselves in  six 
systems. For Khageri Irrigation Project in Cliitwan District, it was observed that the officials of 
the project and the committee jointly play the role of water distributor but, in case of extreme dry 
season ,theelderlypersonsofthc  Katuwal family are alsocngaged in 1hedistributionofwater.The 
Shirkatty Kulo in Dan$ District presents an isolated case of a Sardaruwa (watchman) being fully 
in charge of decision making regarding watcr dislrihution. 
In most systems the water distributors are responsible only for distribution of water whereas in 
other systems additional duties have been entrusted to them. However, additional responsibilities 
relating to water distribution depends on the position occupied by the water distributor. Such 
additional responsibilities are necessary in 24 systems for the smooth and effective operation of 
the irrigation systems. The water distributors are required to undertake activities as suggested by 
their respective committees. Some of the important additional duLies entrusted are as follows: 
To collect fines; 
To work as directed by  the committee or project chief; 
To report to the committee on the status of  the canal; 
To arrange for the outlet of the canal; 
To supply water to all the users within the command area on turn by turn basis by giving 
priority to those plots where seeds are drying for lack of  water; 
To mobilize resources and labor for the operation, repair and maintenance of the canal; 
To implement the rules regarding the operation and maintenance of the systems; 






During the process of water distribution the water distributor has to face varied problems and the 
systems under survey were no exception. The problems  noted are more or less the same as 
mentioned below, under the sub- heading of “operational problems”. 
103 PROBLEMS, CONFLICTS, DISPUTES 
Operational Problems 
It is rare to find irrigation systems without any operational problems. The survey also reveals that 
the majority of the systems are plagued with operational problems. In many cases the problems 
have disrupted the smooth functioning of the systems. The following are the common problems 
prevalent in the systems studied: 
(i)  Lack of  leadership and passiveness of  water users' associations have led to problems of 
regular operation of  the canals and  mobilization of resources, especially cash; 
Lack of definite rules for the operation of  the canals;  (ii) 
(iii)  Problems of water stealing; 
(iv) 
(v) 
Controversy over labour contribution and sharing of water between old and new users; 
The conversion of  bari or bkit (unirrigated, upland) to kket (irrigated land) by head and 
middle users decreases water flow to tail end users; 
The volume of water in the canals are reduced during the dry season due to the fact that the 
canals are not lined/ cemented; 
(vii)  Government projects are handed over to the users even before they are completed; 
(viii)  The watchman appointed by the government has no contact with the users, leading to lack 
of coordination; 




During the survey, water related disputes were recorded in 37 ofthe 40irrigation systems studied. 
The average number of disputes annually per system was five (190 cases of disputes  in  37 
systems). The number of  disputes varies from system to system: 2 conflicts each in 2 systems. 4 
in 20 systems, 6  in 8 systems, 7  in 4 systems and 10 in 3 systems. Suprisingly no conflicts were 
recorded in three systems. 
Reasons for Disputes 
Thedataofthesurvey on thegeneralreasonsforthedisputesover  waterrelatedissues areavailable 
for only 33 systems. The reasons for the disputes between the users are very similar. Most of the 
disputes (67% ) occurred  when farmers diverted water to their fields out of turn,  that is over 
deviation from the water schedule as arranged by the Water Users Associations.  Disputes also 
occur over sharing of inadequate supply of water, (21% of the cases), especially during the dry 
season (mid-February to min-June). Only 12% of the disputes were over the sources of water of 
the irrigation systems. 
104 Nature of  Conflicts 
The users of the irrigation systems express their conflicts over water issues in several ways, such 
as by merely voicing dissatisfaction, quarelling, physical altercation, and filing cases in local 
administration offices or the court. During the survey, 35  cases of the following nature were 
recorded which we have classified in three separate categories, namely, (i) conflicts which were 
limited to verbal quarelling only and which did not escalate  (71%); (ii)  conflitcts which were 
limited toexpression ofdissatisfaction because the pmies, for whateverreason, were not willing 
to or unable to quarell(6%);  and (iii) conflicts which weretaken to the local administration offices 
or court ( 23%). 
Inter-system Disputes  and Their Reasons 
The fieldsurveyrecordednotonly intra-system but also inter-systemconflicts.  Ofthe4Oirrigation 
systems studied, 15 have conflict with outsiders, of which 14 systems have conflict with users of 
other irrigation systems and one with a water mill and another irrigation system. Thus in almost 
all cases conflict is with users of other systems which undoubtedly indicates the lack of proper 
policyandlawson thesharing ofwateramongusersofdifferent irrigationsystems havingthesame 
water source. 
The reason for four conflicts are similar: disputes over rights to water sources. The reasons for the 
other  11 inter-systems conflicts are divergent. They are: 
(i) 
(ii)  Damaging of canals. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Construction of  new canals in  an old system. 
Diversion of water for drinking purposes 
Disputes  over water allocation between old and new irrigation systems, from the same 
source. 
Insufficient water during winter season. 
Insufficiency of water due to extension of command area. 
(v) 
(vi) 
Six irrigation systems brought their inter system conflicts to formal judicial and quasi judicial 
bodies. Whereas other nine systems tried to resolve their conflicts themselves regarding use and 
sharing of the water source through mediation but all of them proved to be temporary and the 
conflict arose time and again. These conflicts are still on going. 
Resolution of Disputes 
(1) 
Several actors are  involved in resolvingconflicts in the systems studied. Conflicts were resolved 
in 64  (89%)  of the cases by the concerned WUAs with assistance from ward committees, VDCs 
and local elites. This is because they are more accessible to the users in many respects than other 
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Where do the disputing parties go atfirst and who settles the disputes  ? agencies such as judicial and quasi-judicial bodies in the district headquarters. Local elites have 
very often been sought for the purpose of dispute resolution. Of these 64 disputecases,  thehighest 
numberofcases (66%)  wereresolved by thehelp,oflocalelites.  From thisfact,itmay besubmitted 
that the users have more faith in the local elites than other agencies in this regard. The role of VDCs 
in assisting the WUA in resolving disputes figured in 17 (26%)  cases whereas ward committees 
were involved in helping resolve only 5 (8%) of the cases. A note worthy fact is that  not even a 
single case has been handled by  the Water Resource  Committee  formed under the  Water 
Resources Act in each district of Nepal. This may be because the local farmers are not aware of 
the existence of such acommittee  in their district headquarter. The  local District Adiministration 
Offices (CDO) resolved 3 (4%) of  the cases and the district courts 8  (11%) cases. The low 
percentage of cases filed with and resolved by  the CDO office or the court reflects the fact that 
the users do  not want to  get involved in cumbersome legal suits which for them is troublesome and 
an unnecessary waste of time and money. 
(ii) 
During the survey,  the fieldworkers were able to record only 29 decisions, which were made by 
WUAs, local people, VDCs and district courts. The decisions of  16  cases (55%) were already 
implemented and the rest of the decisions (45%) were in the process of  implementation. The 
records do  not indicate the non-execution of any decision which proves that the disputing parties 
more or less respect, and to a large extent, accept the dispute resolsution decisions made locally. 
While assessing the implementation of the decisions on the basis of who made the decisions, 10 
decisions of WUAs were already implemented whereas 12 were in  the process of implementation. 
Three decisions  taken  by  the WUAs  with  the  help of  the  local  people  had  already  been 
implemented and two were in the process of implementation. One decision each of a VDC and a 
districtcourtwerealsoalready implemented.This in totality reflects that many water relatedcases 
are beingresolved by WUAsandtheimplementation of theirdecisionsisalso very high. However, 
the role of the local people, who have no authority to hear water related cases but nevertheless do 
so, is vital in resolving disputes. They resolve disputes by themselves or help  WUAs or VDCs in 
this process. 
(iii) 
On the issue of whether  writ petitions or appeals were filed against the decisions of the WUAs, 
only 37 responses were recorded during the survey.  In only four (1 1%) of the cases have the 
parties, unhappy or dissatisfied with the decisions made by  the WUAs or  those who felt their 
interests were affected or injustice had been done to them, filed petition in the concerned district 
courts. In most of the cases ( 89%)  the parties accepted the decisions as an effective mechanism 
for the resolution of such disputes. It is submitted that the users tend to accept the decisions of the 
respective WUAs as final  and they do not try to follow the cumbersome legal procedures for the 
settlement of their disputes. 
Whether the decisions were implemented or not 
Acceptance of the decisions and writ and appeals 
I06 CONLCUSION 
The charm and dynamism of successfully running irrigation systems depend on many factors, all 
of which are found  in Nepalese  farmer managed  irrigation systems. To cite a few  factors: 
inexpensive rehabilitation and expansion projects; accommodation of new users by  extending 
command areas while not excluding old users; equal respect and equal treatment to all the users; 
priority in water distribution according to need, i.e., need of crops and not of persons; better 
understanding among the users; voluntary and active participation of the users in the management 
as well as maintenance of their systems; involvement of users in the decision making process, i.e.. 
decision making  is not monopolized by the users’ committee: capabilities to use the available 
resources properly; and their capability to resolve  conflicts in their systems, etc. Another  vital 
dimension is flexibility in running irrigation systems. For example, watchmen are entrusted with 
judicial authority, an user who is not a WUA committee member can operate the bank account of 
the association, etc.  The issues mentioned above may seem to be problematic in some instances 
but they are not so critical as to cease the operation of the whole system. 
A substantial number of irrigation systems (45% )were initiated by individuals which in turn has 
resulted in the emergence of informal leadership and has contributed a lot in the establishment of 
irrigation systems. Though the people who initiated and completed the consturction of canals can 
legally claim prior water use rights, the fieldstaff did not discover such practices which means that 
everyone is treated on equal footing within the system. 
The farmers in all the systems, except two, made available land for the construction of canals 
without  any compensation or creating any dispute or legal complication. This fact has certainly 
made the projects less expensive and viable as well as less problematic. 
In general people try  to evade conflicts by being absent from the spot where the other party is 
reacting in anger. If  conflicts arise, they are usually solved locally throughmediation process. The 
majority of the cases which were filed with  judicial or quasi-judicial bodies were registered 
without first trying to resolve them through locally available process of mediation. The number 
of such cases may he decreased if the people are made aware of the advantages and disadvantages 
of  both methods of conflict resolution. 
Disputes between different irrigation systems and competitive users such as water mill or other 
industries or drinking water projects are on the increase due to limited water supply and high 
demand, in specific areas, andalso theever growing population pressure. In suchasituation, there 
is an urgent need to protect waterrights of the people through legal mechanisms and to make the 
users aware of their (legal) waterrights and the measures to be followed toprotect their rights. The 
level of legal awareness of the local farmers is very poor. In many instances, others have exploited 
their poor legal awareness to adversely affect them but they lack the knowledge to deal with such 
situations. Theusers ofirrigation systemsexperienceotherprobems andconflicts  due to their lack 
of  scientific  account  keeping,  knowledge  about  registration  of  their  association, and  good 
management practices. It is therefore recommended that programmes be launched to make the 
farmers aware of their legal rights, teach them the process of registering their association and how 
to effectively mange it. Conducting seminars, workshop, training sessions, legal counselling and 
1  07 publishing bulletins in simple Nepali are some of the means of making the fanners aware of their 





This  is a revised version of  the paper presented at the workshop on Water Rights, Conflict 
and Policy. Kathmandu, January 22-24, 1996. 
Both authors are associated with FREEDEAL. 
Due to various reasons, date for all the 40 irrigation systems were not available for all the 
topics. The number of  systems for which data were available vary from topic to topic.  Hence 
while presenting data in different places, the precentages have been calculated on the basis of 
the number of systems for which data were available for that specific topic. ANNEX-1 
LIST  OF  THE  IRRIGATION  SYSTEMS STUDIED ANNEX  1 (Contd.) Law, Rights and Equity: Implications of State 
Intervention in Farmer Managed Irrigation 
Systems’ 
Rajendra Pradhan, K. Azharul Haq, Ujiwal Pradhan’ 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past  two decades the state has intervened heavily, directly or indirectly, in fanner 
managed irrigation systems (FMIS)  to increase agriculture production by expanding irrigated 
agriculture’.  Along with these interventions many studies have been conducted and workshops 
held to seek ways to reduce the cost of rehabilitation, expansion and maintenance of FMIS. For 
example, since  1986, IIMn Nepal,  which  has  worked closely  with the  Water and  Energy 
Commission Secretariat (WECS) and the Department of Imgation, has published at least four 
books based on  workshops or seminars on public interventions in FMIS ‘.  These studies have 
shown that fanner participation in rehabilitation and improved water management capabilities of 
the water users are two ways of achieving these objectives. 
Inmany waysresearchontheconsequencesofinterventionsdonot  seem tohaveprogressedmuch, 
at least concerning water rights issues, since the first conference on public intervention in farmer 
managed irrigation systems held in 1986 in Kathmandu’.  Coward and Levine (1987) suggested 
in their keynote paper in that conference that the issue of water rights was very important in public 
intervention.  They  argued  that  state intervention often leads to “eroding or eradicating the 
legitimate rights of existing water users” (ibid.:  19) but secure water rights are important for 
incentives to  individuals and groups to develop and maintain their systems. They suggest that the 
State can play an important role in allocating and enforcing water rights. In the Nepalese context, 
Coward and Levine mentioned Martin’s (1986) and U. F’radhan’s (1984) studies. Martin showed 
that secure water rights are important for successful operation and continuity  of  FMIS and 
U. Pradhan demonstrated (1984)  that one of the (unintended) consequences of state intervention 
111 in FMIS is to “disrupt the security of water rights held by traditional users” (Coward and Levine 
1987:19). Someofthe  participant  softheconference  werealsoconcerned with waterrights issues, 
especially of local waterrights. One ofthe  questions raiscdduring thediscussion in that workshop 
was,  “As government authority penetrates  more into rural  areas, what happens when  local 
customary water rights conflict with national laws?” (Martin and Yoder 1987:vi). 
The issues raised in the conference have not been pursued seriously in Nepal, even by IIMI. In the 
workshops, seminars and publications  which followed,  most  of the papers discussed either 
implications of state interventions for the cost of system rehabilitation, increase in command area 
and agriculture production and productivity, or management issues such as farmer participation, 
strengthening local farmers capability to maintain and operate their systems
6. Issues concerning 
law, water rights and equity were rarely addressed’. 
It is of course perfectly reasonable to have other concerns than water rights. Howcver, the neglect 
of this issue in intervention and research may lead, among other things, to disinclination by  the 
existing irrigators to continue developing and maintaining their imgation systems, to the targeted 
beneficiaries of system expansion projects not having access to irrigation, or to conflicts between 
farmers of the same or different irrigation systems. As the studies in this volume show, in some 
cases, the enlarged irrigation system benefits new users at the cost of existing users who had 
invested in creating and maintaining the system. In other cases. the targeted beneficiaries receive 
less water than proposed ordo  notreceiveany waterat all. Further, theconstruction ofapcrmanent 
headwork to replace the temporary brushwood structure of one system benefits the users of that 
system but reduces water supply to downstream irrigation systems. All these raise questions 
concerning rights, law and equity. 
In this paper we discuss how state interventions in FMIS affect cxisting water rights relationships 
between stakeholders (old as well as new rights holders and non-rights holders)  and how such 
interventions, often legitimized by state law, frequently question local law as well as notions of 
rights and equity based on  or  justified by such law8. Three case studies of  state interventions to 
rehabilitate and enlargc existing MIS  will be discussed. It will be argued that state intervention 
often provide opportunitics for some stakeholders  to contest  and  possibly  change property 
relations  and rights (as well as obligations),  and the basis  of  these relations  and rights,  by 
negotiation, disputing, or resorting to administratieve and political connections. Social relations, 
especially power relations,  the resources they are able to employ, the type of involvement of the 
state (or donor agencies), organizational skills and location of  land in the command area all 
determine how property relations and water rights are restructured. Law, whether state or local, 
is but one of the resources used to legitimize their claims (cf. R. Pradhan and U. Pradhan 1996). 
The paper will also raise the question of how equity is to be defined and who is to define what is 
equitable. 
STATE  INTERVENTION  AND  DISPUTES  IN  FARMER 
MANAGED IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 
We will now present case studies of disputes between farmers over water rights issues in sevcral 
farmer managed irrigation systems which were initially constructed by the users of the canals and 
112 later rehabilitated and enlarged with grants from the state. All of these are small, hill irrigation 
systems, serviee command areas ranging from 16.5 ha to 51.9 ha and benefit  between 64  to 110 
households. The volume of water in these streams, fed by springs, increases during monsoon and 
decreases considerably during the pre-monsoon months. 
Thecroppingpatternin allthesesystemsaresimilar, andvary according toseason andtype ofland. 
During monsoon, rice is grown in kher (low land, irrigated rice fields) and maize (one in one case 
millet) in badpukho fields (upland fields): this is followed by wheat (and in one case mustard) 
in khet and mustard in bari fields; finally during the dry, pre-monsoon season, early rice or maize 
are cultivated in khet and ban' fields are either left fallow or maize or ghaiya dhan (a paddy crop 
which is broadcast and not transplanted and which does not require irrigation) are cultivated. 
In all these systems more land could be irrigated and bari land converted to khet if the existing 
rights holders agreed to allocate water to these fields or practiced a different system of water 
distribution. The existing rights holders, however, were (and are) extremely reluctant to enlarge 
theareaofirrigated fields (whetherkkerorbari), except when they themselves benefit and because 
they are usually local elites, they are able to effectively control water use. The farmers who did 
not have access or rights to water waited for the right opportunity to stake claims to rights or 
somehow acquire water. The intervention by  the state, directly or indirectly, as well as active 
leadership provided by a few local leaders initiated the process of staking claims to water rights 
from sources (irrigation system or stream) they were previously denied. 
The three case studies describe the consequences of state intervention for existing irrigators and 
newcomers within irrigation systems: in one case (Aarubote Kulo), the targeted beneficiaries did 
not receive irrigation water while another case (Jaisi Kulo), state intervention helped the targeted 
beneficiaries  actualise  their water rights. These case studies complement  the  case study  of 
Satrasaya Phant described elsewhere in this volume (Durga K.C. and R. Pradhan) The third case 
study describes the consequences of intervention for irrigators of other irrigation systems tapping 
waier from the same source (Tallo Chapleti). State intervention and active leadership helped one 
system acquire water at the cost of another system. This case study complements the case study 
of Telia  Kulo. described  elsewhere in  this  volume  (M. Pradhan  and  R.  Pradhan),  where 
intervention by the state helped downstream canal farmers protect their water rights. 
These case studies also illustrate the importance social relations, especially power relations. 
between stakeholders in acquiring acquiring, rearranging and protecting water rights. 
Aarubote Kulo in Sindhupalchowk 
Aarubote  Kulo  is  located  in  Sikharpur  VDC  of  Sindhupalchowk  District  and  is  the  most 
downstream of the three irrigation systems which tap water from Sahara Khola. a spring fed 
stream. The canal was first constructed in 1977 by three farmers using their own resources. A Few 
years laterotherfarmers,  including  Majhis (fishermen/ fenymen), contributed labour toextend the 
canal. The canal irrigated about 1.7 ha of kker during monsoon and benefited 12 households. 
The  irrigation system was rehabilitated and enlarged between 1986 and 1987 with grants by the 
SINKALAMA project totalling Rs. 500,000. The the beneficiary households contributed a total 
113 of Rs. 200,000  worth of labour and Rs. 25,642 cash as security deposit, two conditions laid down 
by the project. The canal is now 3 !an long, irrigates 9.33 ha of khet during monsoon and 16.55 
ha of khet and bari during winter, and benefits (or was targetted to benefit) 74 households. 
One of the main objectives of the extension project was to provide irrigation facilities to the fields 
in Ambole  gaon (also known as Majhi gaon), a hamlet settled by  Majhis (low caste fishermen/ 
ferrymen), at the tail end of the present day command area. The 28 Majhi households of Aarubote 
gaon also contributed labour and cash for the canal rehabilitation and enlargement project and the 
canal was extended upto their hamlet. However, as in many canal extension projects, the main 
beneficiaries are head and middle sector fanners. Many of them were able to take advantage of 
the improved water supply to convert their buri (upland fields) to kher. Many Majhis too converted 
theirburito khet with the expectation that they would receive irrigation for the monsoon rice crop. 
However, five Majhis households have reconverted andother  households areplannig toreconvert 
theirnewkhettobaribecausethey  havenotbeenable toacquire waterfortheirmonsoonricecrop. 
Thoughthey areahle toacquire water forthe winter crops they donotreceive sufficient watereven 
for crops such as maize which require less water than rice because the upcanal farmers use up all 
the water or frequently divert water to their fields out of turn. Or they receive water only after 
fanners at the headreach have finished irrigating their fields but by then the  seeding time is almost 
over. 
Thetailendfannerscouldhaveirrigatedtheirfields  had thereken  aneffective watermanagement 
organization and officials such as water moniters and had the farmers who diverted water out of 
turn been penalized (cf. Durga K.C.  and Pradhan, this volume). But the users of Aarubte Kulo 
do not havesuch an organizationorofficial and theupcanal farmers are notpenalizedfordiverting 
water out of turn.  The upcanal fanners, or rather the leading families, are not keen to form a water 
users’ asswiation or have a formal canal management committee and water guards, all of which 
exist in M4h  Kulo, a few hundred meters above Aurobote Kulo, because they benefit from a lack 
of such organization. All the decisions regarding water management activities are taken by a few 
leading families. 
The upcanal fanners claim that they allocate water to the tad end sector and that had they really 
wanted, they could irrigate their fields but they (the Majhis) are not interested in irrigation or 
agriculture. They further claim that the Majhis are lazy or scared to convea their fields to khet 
because of the danger of landslides and that they are more interested in fishing which they find 
more lucrative than fanning. The Majhis claim that they are keen to cultivate their fields and grow 
rice but even if they are allocated water, they are unable to acquire water for monsoon irrigation. 
Two local rules make it possible, at least theoretically, for the tail end farmers to irrigate their 
fields. First, the Majhis are allowed to irrigate their fields at night. Second, whoever reaches the 
intake first has priority in delivering water to his field. However, it is usually the case that the 
upcanal fanners are present at the intake as early as 2 a.m. so that in effect the Majhis hardly ever 
get the opportunity to irrigate their fields. And even if they manage to get their first, the upcanal 
fanners divert water to their fields out of turn. 
In 1993, as in other years, the Majhis were unable to irrigate their monsoon maize crop but that 
year, unlike earlier, they organized themselves and threatened the upcanal fanners with khukuris 
114 (Nepalese knife). This threat persuaded the upcanal fanners to allot water to the Majhis for two 
days during the monsoon season. However, the following year the upcanal fanners  again deprived 
the Majhis of their water rights. The Majhis retaliated by not contributing labour for maintenance 
of the system, which they had done regularly earlier. The next year, as  a result of further threat and 
negotiation, theMajhis were allowed to irrigate their winter crops in time and undisturbed but they 
are yet to acquire water to irrigate their monsoon rice crops. 
State intervention changedexistingproperty relations and structureofrights. The upcanal farmers, 
the old rights holders in the canal, accept, at least in principle, that the tail end fanners have rights 
to water from the canal. The Majhis have rights to water from the canal because they contributed 
labour for its rehabilitation and extension and also because the project was sanctioned, and grants 
given, primarily to irrigate their fields. The upcanal fanners, however, grant them junior rights, 
reserving for themselves senior rights to water from the canal. Their claim to senior rights is 
supported by two rules, both of which are in accordance with state (National Code) as well as  local 
law. First, as the original investors in the canal (by contributing labour for construction  and 
maintenance), they have senior rights. As in many communities. in this locality too, newcomers 
have junior rights to the existing rights holders. Second, upcanal fanners have priority over 
downcanal farmers in water acquisition. 
Thequestion is how much watercan theupcanal fanners, the old rights holders, use?TheNational 
Code states that the prior appropriators (the old investors) and the upcanal irrigators can use as 
much water as they require to irrigate their fields and that existing irrigated fields, wherever they 
are located,  should not  be deprived  of  irrigation. Local  rule  also  assigns priority  in water 
distribution to existing rights holders and upcanal fields. This may mean that the newcomers, 
particularly if their fields are located at the tailend of the command area, may receive very little 
or no irrigation water, as long as the upcanal fanners do not waste water. 
However, and this is an important point, local rules, in this case, water distribution rules, are 
subject to negotiation between the rights holders. And the outcome of the negotiation (agreement 
or  lack of agreement, disputes, etc.) is influenced a great deal by social relations, especially power 
relations, between the stakeholders. In this case, the tailenders, because of their location and weak 
social position, wereat first unable to irrigate their fieldseven thoughthey hadrights to water from 
the canal. Later, they were able to irrigate their fields for limited time and that too only for some 
crops (not the important rice crop) only because they threatened physical violence and refused to 
contribute labour to repair the system. 
Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Kulo in Tanahu 
The village known as Yampa Phant lies on a hill slope. The upper part of the village is called Jaisi 
Phant and the lower section Baraha Phant. Jaisi Phant is irrigated by Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Phant 
by Baraha Kulo. It is not known for certain when these irrigation systems were constructed and 
which system is older but both systems tap water from Sano Andhi Khola, a tributary of Andhi 
Khola. The intake points of Baraha and Jaisi canals were located less than 100  meters apart so that 
increased water supply toonecanal was reducedif theothertookmore than the shareagreedupon. 
The fanners of these two irrigation systems had negotiated and renegotiated water allocation from 
the stream and finally agreed to share water equally even though Baraha Kulo irrigates eight times 
115 more land than Jaisi Kulo. One of the main reasons for the equal allotment of water is that the 
fanners of Jaisi Kulo had an advantage over the fanners of Baraha Kulo because their canal is 
upstream to  the latter canal. (See Map I). According to local law, upstream systems, especially if 
they are constructed earlier than downstream ones, can divert as much water as they want. The 
users of Baraha Kulo were not really satisfied with this agreement and continued to demand more 
share of water. The disputes between the users of the two systems are still continuing. 
In  1988 and  1989 the  Yampalis received two  grants of  Rs. 8.85.576.00 and  Rs. 6,00,000 
respectively from the Hill Food  Irrigation Development Project (HFDIP) to rehabilitate and 
combine the two imgation systems. The two systems were to have a single diversion structure in 
Andhi Khola and water was to be diverted to Baraha Kulo from a gate regulator in Jaisi Kulo. The 
tail end of Jaisi Kulo was to be enlarged to irrigate pakho land. The fanners had to contribute 25 
% of the total cost, 20 % as labour and 5% cash as security deposit. 
Before the implementation of this project, the total cultivated area in Jaisi Phant was 22.15 ha of 
which only 1.60 ha was irrigated by Jaisi Kulo. In Baraha Phant, of the total cultivated area was 
14.35 ha, 11.85 ha was irrigated by Baraha Kulo. Baraha Phant had 2.5 ha of pakho (unirrigated 
fields) and Jaisi Phant had 20.55 ha of unirrigated fields. At present, after the rehabilitation and 
extension as well as fusion of the two irrigation systems, Jaisi and Baraha Kulo service about 37 
ha of fields and benefit 65 households. All the cultivated fields, including the formerly pakho 
fields, are irrigated. 
Whatever may have been the plan proposed to the HFJXP office in order to get the budget 
sanctioned,thefarmersdidnotmean  toimplementtheprojectaccordingtotheplan.0ncetheplan 
was approved and budget sanctioned the Yampalis began to dispute between themselves about 
which canal should be improved and enlarged and the share of water they were to be allocated. 
There were three parties to this dispute: a)  existing irrigators of Baraha Kulo, b) existing irrigators 
of Jaisi Kulo and c) potential irrigators who owned pakho land in the tail end of the Jaisi Kulo 
command area. They disputed before, during and after the project was implemented. While the 
farmers of the existing irrigated fields justified their claims by reference to local law, the owners 
of pakho land and officials of the state agencies gave other reasons to support the claims of the 
pakho land owners. After protracted negotiation, mediated by government officials,they were 
able to reach a compromise which secured water rights for the pakho fanners of Jaisi Kulo while 
at the same time protected the prior rights of the existing rights holders. 
Dispute before Implementation of the Project 
The fanners of laisi Kulo demanded that most of the canal improvement work should be carried 
out in their canal and that they be allocated a larger share of water than Baraha Kulo. They argued 
that Jaisi Kulo can service both khet and pakho land. Pakho land could be converted to khet after 
the canal was improved and extended. Further, Jaisi Kulo could easily imgate fields in Baraha 
Phant, located directly below the command area of Jaisi Kulo. The fanners of Baraha Kulo argued 
that they should be alloted more water than Jaisi Kulo because they have a larger command area. 
They demanded that water should be allocated according to size of the command area. Moreover, 
traditionally irrigated khefs (sabik khef)  have higher priority for irrigation than pakho land. The 
owners of pakho land in Jaisi Phant demanded water from Jaisi Kulo to irrigate their monsoon rice 
116 crop (i.e., after they had converted their pakho fields to khet). They argued that they have rights 
to water from the (improved) canal because had their fields not been included in the project plan 
(to increase the command area) the project would not have been sanctioned. 
The three disputing parties could not come to an agreement and the owners of pakho land filed 
complaints with the Chief District Office, the Agriculture Development Office, the District 
Panchayat Office andtheHFIP office. Officials from these offices VisitedYampaPhant and, after 
surveying the area, suggested that irrigation should he provided to the pakho fields. The District 
Panchayat (now called District Development Comittee) instructed the Village Panchayat (now 
called Village Development Committee) by letter to ensure that the pakho land received irrigation 
and that at the same time the traditionally irrigated fields did not receive less water than they had 
been receiving. The rhetoric used here is not that of rights hut  appeal to the hroadernational policy 
of increasing irrigated land. Part of the letter reads, "  His Majesty's Government has a policy of 
providing irrigation facilities to pakho land to grow irrigated crops and increase nationel income." 
The Pradhan Pancha (chairman of the village council) was given the task of mediating in this 
dispute. 
In a meeting attended by 56  fanners  of Yampa Phant and the Pradhan Pancha, Ward member and 










Cash and labour ro  be conrribured by the  farmers for the improvemenr of borh Jaisi and Baraha 
Kulos would be made on the basis of the size of land which was registered as khet (sabik khet) in 
1933 and later. 
Water is ro  be distributed  from the same locarion in rhe river as has been done rradirionally. 
Regarding warer allocarion,  waterdischarge should bemeasured ar rheplace ofdisrriburion.  Since 
the Baraha kulo has  1argersenGce area, 3parrs of warerwould be allocated to Baraha Kulo and 
2 parts to the Jaisi Kulo from the intake poinr at rhe river. 
Equalprioriry is given  for the improvemenr of borh Jaisi and Baraha Kulos toprevenr warer loss 
rhrough kakagesfrom the canal. 
Required irrigarion  is  10  be provided ro rhe exisringpakho land (sabikpakhoj  for growing winrer 
crops such as wheal, musrard, and vegetables. "he main objective is lo provide irrigation lo rhe 
pakho land lo increase crop yields by urilizing minimum warer. 
Irrigation will beprovidedfrom 1st Aswin 10  15th Chairra (15rh Ocrober 10  30th April, ie. winrer 
season) to grow winrer crops in the Pakho land (sabikpakko). 
Irrigation will be provided from Jaisi Kulo for rhe  esrablishmenr of  vegerable nursery and 
rransplanration of vegetables in rhe pakho land bur ifmore irrigation is needed, warer  will be 
providedfrom borh Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Kulo. 
Whenpakho  land receives irrigarionfrom Baraha Kulo, the kherJields  of Jaisi Kulo shouldnot be 
im'gatedfrom  rhis warer. 
lrrigarion will beprovidedto rhepakho landforrhe required rime from  a suitableplace in rhe canal. 
118 10.  Regarding cash contributionfrom the farmers as depositfor the HFIPproject, cash should be 
collectedat the Mte ofRs. 2Oper ropani (0.05 haJfrompakho  land since irrigation is essentialfor 
growing winter crops there and Rs 90 per ropani  from Kherfields. 
Distribution of water at thefield level is to be done by the Thekedar (water  monitor) on the basis 
ofBhijuwa Palo (waterdistribution  fromthe head to the tail, eachfieldgertine asmuch wateras 
is required) as per the allocated share of water (between different sectors). 
11. 
One copy each of the above agreement was distributed to the concerned Village Panchayat office, 
Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Kulo farmers. 
The terms of the agreement accorded priority to the existing rights holders and at the same time 
recongized the (junior)  rights of the the newcomers, who would be allocated water only for winter 
crops. The agreement favoured the users of Baraha Kulo: not only were equal priority accorded 
to both the canal for improvement work, Baraha Kulo would receive more water than Jaisi Kulo, 
which had to be shared with the new imgators. The pakho land farmers were given rights to water 
from the irrigation system due to the intervention of government officials.  And Baraha Kulo 
fanners were  able to extract favourable  terms  because the Pradhan  Pancha  of  the  Village 
Panchayat owned land in Baraha Kulo command area and was able to manoever the terms in their 
favour. The users of Jaisi Kulo were not too happy with the terms of the agreement, as can be seen 
from the disputes which occured later. They agreed to the terms only to begin the rehabilitation 
work. 
Disputes during  Implementation of the Project 
Thedecisions takenin themeeting temporarily resolveddisputesbetween thedifferentstakeholders 
of these irrigation systems. When the construction work was nearly completed, there was another 
dispute between the owners of existing khet land and the newly pakho land (who had converted 
their land to khet) over water distribution. The pakho khet farmers again appealed to the officials 
to secure water for their fields. Another meeting was held between the fanners of Yampa Phant, 
theCDO, officialsfromtheRegional  DirectorofAgricultureDevelopment.  theCoordinatorofthe 
Hill Food Irrigation Project, the Pradhan Pancha and ward members. The following resolutions 
were passed in the meeting: 
The improvemenr work of the project is almost complete and now there is dispute between (the 
owners on pakho  land and kher land over using waterfrom the canal. Do not dispute about uring 
waterfrom the cml.  The water available in the canal can irrigate maximum land area and 
increase crop yields and the national income. All of us should think about the development of the 
country. Irrigation water will be provided to pakho land without affecting water supply to the 
existing khetfields. 
The District Panchayat has authorized the Village Panchayat to  form a Water Users ' Committee 
(WUC).  This committee will be formed by the beneficiary  farmers with the help of the concerned 
Agriculture Development Officer and technicians  from the  project. The main objective of the WUC 
is to manage irrigation properly for  the pakho land. The pakho land is to be gradually converted 
into khet to increase crop production. 
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the chairmanship of Mr. Ram Kumar Shrestha, Pradhan Pancha and chairman of the construction 
committee. 
The resolutions passed in the meeting, as in the earlier decisions, legitimised the claims of the 
newcomers (pakho land owners) to water without specifying their share of water from the system. 
Again, the rights of the existing irrigators were protected (to the extent of their traditional share 
of water) while insisting that the new irrigators should he allocated water from the improved 
system. The basis for allocating water was that there was sufficient water and that the national goal 
was to increase irrigated agriculture. 
Disputes after Completion of the Project 
After  the construction  work was completed, the construction committee was dissolved  in a 
meeting held in 1989.  The meeting was attended by the Acting Agriculture Development Officer, 
Manager of Agriculture  Development Bank (ADBNepal), the overseer of  HFIP, four ward 
members of Bandipur Village Panchayat and 42 farmers. The following decisions were made in 
this meeting: 
The improvement works in Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Kulo have been completed under the assistance 
of the Hill Food Irrigation Projecr. Warer is to be delivered to Baraha Kulo  from the main canal 
of Jaisi Kulo 918 meters downsrreamfrom its intake. 
Water is to be disrributed on rotational basis, 12 hours each  for  Baraha Kulo and Jaisi Kulo; OUI 
of 12hoursforJaisiKulo. 8hoursforexisringkher land(s0sikKhel)ofJaisi Kuloand4hoursfor 
pakho land to irrigate rice crops. 
The decision taken in this meeting not only legitimised the claims of the pakho land owners to 
water rights in the system, it also allocated water to them from the share allocated to Jaisi Kulo. 
The pakho sector was allocated 4 hours of water (one-sixth). The pakho land owners were able to 
establish their rights so securely that latter when the farmers of Jaisi and Baraha canals disputed 
over water allocation, the pakho sector was still assigned 4 hours of water. 
The Jaisi Kulo fanners, however, were not happy with the share of water alloted to them and they 
later demanded more water. In 1993 after protracted negotiation, equal shares of water (10 hours 
each every day) were allocated to the traditionally irrigated fields in Jaisi Kulo and Baraha Kulo 
and four hours to the pakho fields. The next year, the users of Baraha Kulo demanded that they 
be alloted 12 hours of water per day, as agreed upon during the meeting, arguing that before the 
unification of the two canals they had received equal share of water and, moreover, 10 hours of 
water was not sufficient for them because they had more land to irrigate than Jaisi Kulo. The Jaisi 
Kulo users were not willing to share water equally so the users of Baraha Kulo were unable to 
receive more water than allocated to them. And it was not possible for the users of Baraha Kulo 
to forcefully acquire more water because water was conveyed to Baraha Kulo from Jaisi Kulo, and 
the users of Jaisi Kulo could always control how much water flowed to Baraha Kulo. 
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in equity terms. The farmers of Baraha Kulodemandedmoreshare ofwaterclaiming thatthey had 
more rice fields and moreover according to traditional (customary) law, old rice fields have 
priority over new rice fields in water allocation. In other words, they argued for more water on the 
grounds of land size and of customary law. The Jaisi farmers were not willing to allocate more 
water because they were upstream and reserved the right to deliver as much water as  they wanted. 
Thepakholandownersdemandedrightstoashareofwateronthegroundstheir  land wasincluded 
as part of the command area in the project plan. They could no longer be excluded from sharing 
water because the HFIP project was funded by the government. To put it  differently, they argued 
in effect that with the intervention of the government by means of grants (and the fact that they 
too hadcontributedcash and labour fortherehabilitationand enlargement ofthe system), property 
relations and rights, and thus water rights, had changed. They too had rights to be included in the 
property relations and to acquire water from the system. 
The government officials who mediated  in these disputes  had  to draw a fine line  between 
upholdingcustomarylaw andrightsand insisting onnewrights. Wearenotsure whetherthey were 
concerned with the question of equity. They did not argue that since this was a government funded 
project, the government had a right to decide on who had legitimate rights to water, rather they 
pointed out that with the improvement of the canal, there was sufficient water for all the fields, 
including the pakho fields. And they appealed to nationalistic feelings: to increase food production 
and thereby national income by  irrigating more land. They also stressed the fact that it was 
government policy to bring more fields under irrigation. At the same time, they recommended that 
the share of water allocated to the previously irrigated fields not be reduced; in other words, they 
upheld the state and local law of the senior rights of prior appropriators. 
Strong intervention by the state in this case helped the tailend fanners (pakho land owners) of Jaisi 
Kulo gain legitimate rights and actual access to water which they otherwise may have been denied. 
Tallo Chappleti Kulo and Other Irrigation Systems 
Sikharpur and Bandigaon are neighbouring VDCs in Sindhupalchowk District. Bagmara Khola, 
which separates these two VDCs. is a spring fed tributary of the Irrawati river and the source of 
water for many irrigation systems in these two VDCs.The irrigation systems in the Sikharpwside 
of Bagmara service fields in the hamlet known as  Bangaon whereas the systems on the other side 
of the river service fields in Dundegaon. (See Map I1  and Table I). 
By most accounts the three canals servicing fields in Dundegaon are older than the canals in 
Bangaon. except for the uppermost canal (Malhillo Chapleti  Kulo). The other canals in  the 
Bangaon side of Bagmara were constructed by the farmers over the past 30 years. The discharge 
of water in Bagmara is not sufficient to irrigate all the fields in Dundegaon, especially at the tail 
end of the three command areas. Constructing new irrigating systems which tapped water from 
Bagmarawould considerably decrease water supply to the older canals. It is only natural to expect 
that there would be conflicts between these two villages, especially since the intakes of the new 
systems are located very close to the intakes of the older canals. 
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Bahadur Rijal and his relatives who owned large tracts of cultivated but unirrigated fields. In the 
early 1960s, Dhan Bahadur retired from the Indian Army, returned to his village and involved 
himself  in local politics.  He built  connections with  local  administrators  and  national  level 
politicians.  Using his connections, influence and organising skills he initiated work, first in 
extending Thakuri Kulo and then on the construction of two new canals. As he himself admitted 
he was one of the main beneficiaries of these irrigation systems. 
The Dundegaon villagers who opposed the constructions of these canals were led by the Katwals, 
high caste Hindus, who owned land in the head and middle sectors of the command areas of all 
three canals in Dundegaon. They were not as well connected or active as Dhan Bahadur and were 
not very effective in preventing Dhan Bahadur from constructing new canals which decreased 
water supply to their canals. 
TABLE I:  IRRIGATION SYSTEMS WHICH ACQUIRE WATER FROM BAGMARA 
KHOLA 
I  Name of the canal  I  Location  I  Date Constructed/extended/irnproved 
Mathillo Chapleti 






Dunde,  >100years 
Bandieaon 
Registered in 1895 A.D.;>100 years 
Registered in 1695; extension in 1968 
Completed in 1974  I 
Chapleti,  I  Sikhamur 
Ghattera  I  Bari' 
Tallo @ 
Chapleti 
Tallo Gain Kulo 
> 100 years  I 
Dunde,  I  Bandieaon 
Muhane'  I 
Bangaon. 
Sikharpur  1988 with IIMVWECS grant 
Dunde,  1994 
Bandigaon 
Completed in 1980 rehabilitated in 
Gain  I 
Dunde.  > 100 years  I  Bandieaon 
Thado Sim*  Bangaon,  I  1994  I  Fuchar Kulo  Sikharpur 
Note:  * denotes the system taps water from spring(s) too: 
@ denotes the system taps water from Rakshya Khola (a seasonal stream) 
Tallo Chapleti benefits 110 households and irrigates 26.25 ha  khef  and 25.70 ha of ban' land. 
Ange, Muhane and Gain canals benefit 64 households and irrigate 15 ha of khet and 10 ha of bari. 
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Bagmara go back at least 30 years. There have a been series of conflicts and disputes on different 
sites and in different arenas (forums) concerning different intake points and canals. The state has 
intervened several times in these systems, mostly to mediate conflicts over water rights, to support 
one of the disputing parties or rehabilitate and extend the systems. Intervention by  the state and 
donor agencies, including IIMllWECS helped the fanners of Bangaon claim and acquire rights to 
tap water from Bagmara. The farmers from Dundegaon were forced to accept, de  facto, as it were, 
their claims even at the cost of reduction of water supply to their system. 
These conflicts are interesting from the perspective of our study for they are concerned directly 
with water rights (who bas rights to water and the basis for these rights), mechanisms for conflict 
resolution,  the process of negotiation between disputing parties to arrive at a settlement, the 
consequences of state interventions, and equity issues. 
Moves and Countermoves 
The Dispute over the Extension of Thakuri Kulo 
Our story begins in 1968 when Bangaon farmers, under the leadership of Dhan Bahadur Rijal, 
extend Thakuri Kulo, located below Mathillo Chapleti and above Ange Kulo, to irrigate fields in 
Bangaon. They did not inform, much less consult Dundegaon farmers about their plans. The 
Dundegaon farmers, worried that the supply of water to Ange Kulo would be drastically reduced, 
destroyed the extended portion of Thakuri Kulo. They were willing to allow the existing irrigated 
land to be irrigated but not new areas. Dhan Bahadur then approached the Chief District Officer 
(CDO) for help and the CDO ordered the police to protect them while they constructed the canal. 
They were able to complete construction of the canal under police protection. They were able to 
operate the full length of the canal only for a few years then they could operate only the head reach 
of the canal because of insufficient water supply, frequent landslides in the tail end and recurrent 
conflicts with the Dundegaon farmers. 
The Dispute over the Construction of Ghattera Ban' Kulo 
A few years later, Bangaon farmers, again under the leadership of Dhan Bahadur, built Ghattera 
Bari Kulo (also known as Tall0 Chapleti Majh Kulo) downstream of Thakuri Kulo. The intake 
point ofthis  canal is  located 15 meters above that ofMuhane Kuloandjust below two springs. They 
hoped to tap water from Bagmara as well as the springs which were already tapped by Muhane 
Kulo. Dhan Bahadur would be one of the main beneficiaries of the canal. 
The Dundegaon farmers, having learnt from their earlier mistake, did not destroy this canal but 
instead filed a petition with the district Land Revenue Office requesting the office to restrain 
Bangaon fanners fromirrigatingthenew  command area. TheLandRevenueOffice  took two years 
to decide the case, or rather to suggest to the petitioners that they file a case in the court because 
the Office did not have the authority to hear the case. Strangely, although the Dundegaon farmers 
did not file a case in the court, both parties agree that the Land Revenue Office decided in favour 
of the Dundegaon farmers. The decision was interpreted to mean that the Bangaon farmers were 
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constructing and operating the canal which affected water supply to existing irrigation systems. 
After operating the full length of the canal for about six years, they gave up using the head and 
middle sectors of the canal, as in the Thakuri Kulo case, due to frequent landslides and conflicts 
with Dundegaon farmers. The tail end could be operated because it taps water from a spring, 
known as Jyapu Sim. 
The Disputes over Telia Kulo 
In 1980, Dhan Bahadur again initiated work on another canal, the Tallo Chapleti Kulo, to irrigate 
fields in Bangaon. This canal was constructed as part of the Food for Work Program, for which 
thefarmersreceived 17  quintalsofwheat which was sold to pay localcontractors. The Dundegaon 
farmers did not object to the construction of this canal for several reasons. First, Dhan Bahadur 
had by then developed good social and political relations with the elites of Dundegaon and was 
able to negotiate with them about the construction ofthecanal. Second, the intake of this canal was 
to he located below that of  Gain Kulo, the most downstream of of  the three canals serving 
Dundegaon. Third,Gairi Kulo  had not been functioningforthepasttwo years (anddid not function 
for further three years). Fourth, the Dundegaon farmers did not believe that Tallo Chapleti Kulo 
would operate successful due to geographical reasons (difficult terrain, frequent landslides, etc.). 
And in fact, the canal did not function well until it was rehabilitated in 1987. 
Tallo Chapleti Kulo was selected as one of the irrigation systems to be rehabilitated and extended 
as part of the IIMn  WECS action  research  project. The canal  was actually selected  by  an 
engineering consulting firm which had carried out a Rapid Rural Appraisal survey of numerous 
systems. The rehabilitation  and extension work included construction  of a gabion diversion 
structure (to tap more water), widening the canal at places, construction of culverts, laying hume 
pipes and increasing the length of the canal. The imgation system was capable of conveying more 
water and of irrigating a larger command area than before the project. However, the discharge of 
water at the point where the diversion structure was constructed was not sufficient to meet the 
water demand in the command area. The only way the Bangaon farmers could convey more water 
in Tallo Chapleti was by blocking off the intake point of Gairi Kulo to divert water to their system. 
The Dundegaon farmers were not informed, much less consulted, about the plans to rehabilitate 
and extend Tallo Chapleti. They later came to know that the project was to be implemented but 
they had not expected the gabion diversion stucture to be constructed only a few feet below the 
intakeofGairi Kulo. TheDundegaon farmersrightly fearedthat theBangaonfarmers woulddivert 
water from Bagmara to Tallo Chapleti at their cost because it was easy to block off the intake of 
Gain Kulo. They also feared that the Bangaon farmers would claim equal rights to tap water from 
this source and that their claim would by supported by state agencies and officials (CDO, police, 
Department of Irrigation, etc.) 
This incident occurred during the Panchayat regime. It was a period, as  an informant from another 
site  remarked, “  when you could he arrested as anti-national (and anti-development) if you critised 
any ‘development’ work, even if it went against your interest”. The Dundegaon farmers were 
afraid to complain to the authorities about the construction, especially since it was a government 
supported  project.  Moreover,  Bangaon  was  (and  still  is) part  of  a  powerful  politician  ‘s 
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and important supporter. Dundegaon is part of another constituency, which elected a rival of the 
politician to the parliament (Rastriya Panchayat). 
Given the political and administrative powers ‘arrayed‘ against them, the Dundegaon farmers felt 
that  they  had  no  option  but  to destroy  the  newly  constructed  gabion  diversion  structure. 
Unfortunately this desperate act to protect their water source backfired because they destroyed 
‘government property’. (The diversion structure was built with aid money.)’The  destruction of 
government property gave the residents of Bangaon the opportunity they were seeking. They, as 
well as  the department of irrigation officials Concerned with the construction of the canal, filed 
separate cases with the CDO claiming that a part of the canal was damaged and furthrer that they 
were stoned by the Dundegaon fanners. They thus cleverly converted a dispute over water rights 
to a law and order problem. 
The CDO called representatives of both VDCs to a meeting six months later. He probably had 
someone investigate the dispute because he rightly understood that the conflict was over water. 
However, since he was more concerned with law and order problem and the completion of the 
project than water rights issues, he ‘suggested’ verbally (which was understood to be his ding) 
that the two villages share water equally because the stream bordered both villages. He also 
ordered the chairmen of both villages councils to meet at the police station to discuss this dispute. 
In accordance with his order, the chairmen and other fanners of both villages met at the police 
station to negotiate sharing of water from Bagmara. 
Dhan Bahadur, representing the Bangaon farmers, negotiated with the elites of Dundegaon with 
whom he had good relations. They agreed that the intake of Tallo Chapleti would be located below 
that of Gairi Kulo anduse water nottapped by it. They also agreed that water from Bagmara would 
be fully diverted to Tallo Chapleti after the 25th of Asad (June/July) by which date the command 
area of Gain Kulo would have been fully irrigated for the monsoon rice transplantation. Many 
farmers from Bangaon as well as Dundegaon were unaware of this agreement. A few farmers 
denied that such an agreement, especially the part about diverting all the water after a certain date, 
had been made. However, some Dundegaon farmers do recall such an agreement. One of them 
said, ‘I Why waste water? So we let them use water left over, or which seeps or spills over.” 
The compromise they reached acknowledged the prior and senior rights of Gairi Kulo irrigators 
to water from Bagmara as well as the (junior) rights of the Tallo Chapleti Kulo irrigators. They 
shared water from Bagmara as per the agreement for a few years hut then they began to dispute 
again about sharing water, especially during periods of water shortage. Dundegaon farmers said 
that the Bangaon farmers had agreed to use only the left over water but later they began to use the 
water even before they (the Dundegaon farmers) could irrigate their fields. This is why they tried 
to prevent the Bangaon farmers from using the water all together. 
The Bangaon farmers began to demand more water than they had agreed because, unlike the 
Dundegaon farmers, they were organised and had powerful political and administrative connec- 
tions. Further, theCDO’s administrative ruling (adesh),  though illegal because hedidnot have the 
authority to grant the Tallo Chapleti Kulo irrigators equal rights to water, ‘authorised’ them to 
divert half the share of water from Bagmara and claim equal rights. The CDO’s ruling was illegal 
because the older canal would be receiving less water than they traditionally tapped. But he could 
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and order problem and for damaging government property. 
So confident were the Bangaon fanners of state support that they later shifted the intake of Tallo 
Chapleti Kulo directly opposite, or a few feet above, the intake point of Gairi Kulo, thereby 
claiming equal water rights. The Dundegaon fanners did not accept the claims of the Bangaon 
fanners to equal water rights but they did not take this dispute to court or other dispute resolution 
forums or destroy the intake structure. They did not appeal to higher authorities or go to court 
probably because they did not have the right connections and powerful local leader to encourage 
them. Further, they were not willing to spend time and money going to court. Court cases are time 
consuming, expensive and problematic. The villagers helieve(d), not without some validity, that 
political and economic resources are required to ensure decisions in one's favour. And they dared 
not destroy the intake stucture  because they hadearliercommitted acriminal offence by destroying 
government property. 
Currently, though the farmers of Bangaon and Dundegaon still dispute over sharing water from 
Bagmara, they have come to an unofficial understanding such that both irrigation systems tap 
water  from  Bagmara. When  there  is  sufficient  water  in  the  river  both  systems  tap  water 
simultaneously and there are no, or very few, conflicts between them. During periods of water 
shortage, they acquire water following a queue system based on first come, first served rule. This 
system of water acquisition does not seem to work too well because one or the other party diverts 
water out of turn or demands half the water and leads to disputes. 
How do the disputants justify their claims to water rights from Bagmara? The Bangaon fanners 
offer three justifications. One of the rhetoric they use is  that of equity. They argue that it is  not fair 
that Dundegaon fanners refuse to share water with them because they too have rights to grow and 
eat rice just like the Dundegaon farmers. As Dhan Bahadur so well expressed this justification, '' 
They want us to eat only millet (a low status food) while they eat rice. But we say, 'let us both eat 
rice' ". 
Another rhetoric used is that of state support to their claims. Theirjustification is that theCDO had 
granted them rights to acquire water from Bagmara. Here the Bangaon fanners seem to be arguing 
that the state, or rather state officials, have the authority to bestow water rights to them from 
sources already in use. This justification is not defensible in court because the CDO did not have 
the authority to grant them such rights but, nevertheless, it can he used, and has been, to acquire 
water from a disputed source. 
The third rhetoric used is that of property. Many Bangaon farmers argue that the Bagmara river 
is a common property owned jointly and equally by Bangaon and Dundegaon because it lies at the 
boundry ofthe two villages therefore they haveequal rights toextract water from the strea. In other 
words, the Bangaon fanners are claiming rights to acquire water from Bagmara on the basis of 
riparian  principle  even  though  local  as  well  as  state  law  is  based  primarily  on  the  prior 
appropriation rule. Going strictly according to the prior appropriation rule, latecomers, even if 
theirlandbordersastream,maynottapwaterfromitifthiswillreducewatersupplytopre-existing 
irrigation systems.  If  the riparian principle, as intrepreted by the Bangaon  fanners, is  to be 
followed,thenvillages whichadjoins astream (orariver) have rights to water from thestrea, equal 
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from this source. 
The Dundegaon villagers offer other justifications for claiming virtually exclusive rights to water 
from Bagmara. Their main  argument is that they  are prior appropriators and, as such, new 
imgation systems may not be constructed which will affect water supply to their systems. They 
further reason that their fields were registered as khet (irrigated rice land) at least hundred years 
ago whereas  the fields in  Bangaon  were registered as bari. In  accordance  with local  law, 
traditionally irrigated fields have priority over unirrigated fields for water distribution. And lastly, 
to counter the argument that Bagmara is common property of both villages, they argue that they 
(the Dundegaon fanners) own the stream because the sources of the stream (springs) are located 
in their village. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the disputants use justifications which best suit their 
claims and actions. Dundegaon fanners, as prior appropriators, have first rights to water from 
Bagmara so they base their justifications on prevailing customary and statutory laws. Bangaon 
fanners, as newcomers, cannot base their claims to water rights on the prior appropriation rule. 
They thereforeuseotherrhetoric. suchasequity, riparianrights, andsupport(sanction) by thestate 
or state officials for their claims. Though the justifications offered by Dundegaon fanners are in 
accordance with prevailing law, they are not confident of retaining their almost exclusive rights 
to water from Bagmara because the Bangaon fanners are organised, supported by the state and 
have been operating Tallo Chapleti for over a decade. Bangaon fanners can later claim that they 
have rights to acquire water from the disputed location based on the fact that they have been doing 
so for some time. In other words, they could convert their (illegal) acquisition of water to (legal) 
rights to do so. 
In all the cases of conflicts  between Bangaon and Dundegaon fanners described above, the 
Bangaon fanners attempted to acquire water from a source already used by others, in most cases 
without prior negotiation with existing users and in violation of existing local and state laws. The 
most important law in this context is that existing users have first priority to water and new users 
cannot construct systems which will diminish supply of water to existing users. The Bangaon 
farmersextendedthelengthoftheThakuri  Kulo, overtheobjectionsofDundegaon farmers whose 
fields would received less water as a result of  the extension. Similarly, the Bangaon fanners 
constructedanewimgationsystemabovetheexistingtwoimgation  systemsin Dundegaon, again 
clearly inviolationoftheexistinglaws  because watersupply tothesetwosystemswould have been 
reduced. Tallo Chaplelti was constructedin accordance with the law because its intake was located 
below the existing imgation systems hut later, taking advantage of the rehabilitation project, they 
shifted the intake upstream, on the same level as the intake of Gain Kulo, again in violation of the 
existing law. In these cases, the state, either directly or indirectly, and with  or without the 
knowledge of its officials, supported the Bangaon fanners even when they violated the law. 
It is clear now that the state helped the Bangmn fanners violate both local and state law of prior 
appropriation.  It could be argued that Clause 3 of the Canal, Electricity and Related  Water 
Resources Act, 1967 had empowered the state to rehabilitate existing systems or construct new 
ones even at the cost of other existing systems. The users of the existing irrigation systems had to 
get a  licence from the government if  any  “irrigation project of  His Majesty’s  Government 
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the future” would be adversely affected by using the same water resources (even if they are prior 
appropriators). As far as we know, this clause was not cited by  the Department of Irrigation or 
others to support the claims of the Bangaon fanners for water rights. 
The strategy of the Bangaon farmers seemed to have been to see how far they could get away with 
acquiring WaterfromBagmara, using theirconnections toprotectthem,andthenovertime  toclaim 
rights to tap water. Once they had begun acquiring water from a source, they could claim after a 
few years that they had traditionally acquired water from this source. If this claim was upheld, they 
would acquire rights to tap water. Tallo Chapleti Kulo irrigators are in the process of acquiring 
such rights. 
The important point to note here is that water rights had been restructured to the disadvantage of 
the existing rights holders due to state intervention and the clever use of the state by the Bangaon 
farmers. One consequence of  this  is  regular  conflicts  between  the two villagcs  over water 
acquisition and distribution especially during peak water demand periods. Another consequence 
is that the Dundegaon fanners have not invested much in repair and maintenance of their canals 
due to which the tail end farmers in Dundegaon, mostly small farmers, do not receive sufficient 
water to irrigate their crops. It should be obvious that ‘robbing’ Ram to hclp Hari may not always 
be equitable”. 
CONCLUSION 
State  interventions  in  fanner managed  irrigation  systems have  had  several  consequences. 
Command areas and agriculture production have increased and many newcomers have been able 
to acquire rights and access to water which they  had  been denied earlier. However, not all 
stakeholders benefitted equally. It is usually the dominant groups, the powerful fanners, who 
benefit most from interventions. The targeted beneficiaries of the interventions (for enlargement 
of the systems) do not always benefit, especially if they are small, poor, unorganized farmers and 
own land in the tail end of the command area. Sometimes the targeted beneficiaries benefit at the 
cost of existing rights holders, especially if  they belong to different irrigation systems. 
In all the cases discussed above, state intervention restructured water rights relations between the 
stakeholders. The existing rights holders were compelled to accept the claims of the ‘newcomers’ 
to rights to water from their irrigation system or water source. However, though the claims of the 
newcomers to water  rights were accepted,  at least in  theory, this does not mean  that they 
automatically and actually have access to water. In  most cases, the existing rights holders are 
reluctant to share water with newcomers, even if the systems were enlarged to benefit the non- 
rights holders. In some  cases the newcomers are unable to acquire water to which they have rights 
(Satrasaya Phant Kulo, Dumtar fanners) while in other cases, they receive less water than believe 
they have rights to (Aaruhote Kulo). In both cases, the state did not intervene to ensure that the 
proposed share of water was delivered to the newcomers, who owned land in the tail end of the 
command area and are poor, socially weak and unorganized. In another case (Jaisi Kulo) active 
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probably would not havereceived. Inall excepttheTalloChapleti case, theexisting rights holders 
were able to  protect their rights and retain priority in water allocation anddistribution even if such 
rights were contested by those who did not have @rior) water rights in the systems. One important 
conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that state intervention can help newcomers acquire 
waterrights and actual supply of water while at the same time protecting the existing rights (share 
of water and priority) of the existing rights holders (cf. Durga and R. Pradhan; M. Pradhan and R. 
Pradhan, this volume). 
In the Tallo Chapleti Kulo case, Bangaon farmers did not succeed in their previous efforts to 
acquire water rights from Bagmara  Khola, or did  not  succeed for long, until  WECSUIMI 
intervened to rehabilitate the system. These farmers used WECS as a weapon to seize “rights” to 
water in the stream to which they had been denied access, at least for new systems. The state 
agencies were responsible, directly or indirectly, for helping the users of Tallo Chapleti Kulo 
acquire water at the cost of existing systems. This case study illustrates the important point that 
state intervention may adversely affect the existing water rights of the traditional rights holders 
which may lead, among other things, to the reluctance of  the farmers to invest in improving their 
irrigation systems (Cf. Martin 1986; U. Pradhan 1984). 
Rights to water (or other rights) are legitimized or justified by  law. However, in legal plural 
situations such as in Nepal, the stakeholders often contest which law and which particular rule or 
interpretation of the law is to be accepted as legitimizing or justifying water rights in a specific 
situation.Itisoften thecasethatexistingrights  holdersjustify theirrightsby referencetolocallaw 
or the Chapter on Land Reclamation  in the National Code which  accords priority  to prior 
appropriatorsandupperriaprians whereas thenewcomersjustify theirclaims by reference toother 
laworjustifications,suchasthefactthatthesystem  wasenlargedtobenefitthem(thenewcomers) 
or that water should be shared. The government officials usually do not justify their action (for 
example, insistingthat newcomes begiven water), by reference to waterrelatedlaws(seeKhadga, 
this volume), but by reference to other laws or policies, such as law and order problem, national 
policy  of  expanding irrigated agriculture and national development.  As the cases illustrate, 
government officials, in their zeal to expand imgated agriculture, may violate local law, or even, 
national law. 
These cases raise the question of equity but how are we to address this difficult question’!  Are we 
toemphasizeonlytheprincipleofeminentdomain  and focuson widerpublic benefitby increasing 
command areas and agriculture production? Are we to ignore customary laws and local rights and 
go strictly by state laws? Or are we to uphold customary laws and local rights even if the existing 
rights holdersmonopolizeallormostofthe water?Howdo westrike abalancebetweenrespecting 
therightsofexistingrights  holdersandtheclaimsofthose whoareexcluded?And whoistodecide 
these issues? 
If we consider the examples of  direct state interventions in the cases discussed above and other 
cases, as well as  indirect interventions by the various laws (Acts, Regulations) enacted, it appears 
as though the state reserves for itself the responsibility and right to decide how water should be 
utilised and shared. While the earlier interventions and laws (Muliki Ain) supported, to a great 
extent, customary laws and local rights, latter interventions, especially in projects involving 
international finance, seem todisregardlocallawsandrights. The WaterResources Act 1992vests 
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water is to be  utilised and allocated. This way of utilising water may be more efficient and 
productive  than the  old ways but is it more equitable?  When  we speak of democracy and 
decentralization, surely we must  also speak of respecting local law and rights. 
Yoder, Martin, Barker and Steenhuis (1987:4) identify four issues concerning equity from a 
community perspective, very similar to  the three elements suggested by Martin (1986: 21) earlier. 





These authors ignore three  important  issues regarding  equity. First they  do not discuss the 
differences between different stakeholders in their definitions of equity. They assume that all 
members of a community agree on a common definition of equity. But different stakeholders may 
perceive these elements differently and the perspectives of the dominant fanners group and the 
intervening agency may  differ. Secondly, they do not discuss the question of equity between 
different systems sharing water from the  same source. Which systems have or do not have 
legitimate access to water from the same source and the basis for the access or lack of access are 
important equity (and water rights) issue. And finally, they have not concerned themselves with 
the consequences of state interventions in FMIS for equity. State intervention often opens up a 
pandora box ofconflicting claims to  property relations and water rights and the basis for equitable 
allocation of water rights and obligations. 
The rights that the users have to water are not always equal. Water rights are generally related to 
the past and presentinvestment orcontributions to the system; the userscontributingmoreusually 
have more rights and (sometimes) higher priority than those contributing less. Further, the users 
differentiate between ‘original’ rights holders and ‘latecomers’; original contributors usually have 
more rights or higher priority to water than latecomers (Ambler  1990). In many cases, water 
allocation is based on these factors (share of investment; original investors or latecomers) rather 
than on the size of irrigated land (cf. Martin 1986). 
It is clear then that leaving the decision to the local communities do not always ensure that water 
rights are equitable (cf. F. And K. Von Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz, this volume). Local law can 
be very unjust and unequitable: the existing rights holders, usually the local elite, often deny 
irrigation to new areas even when water is abundant. Further, the stakeholders  do not always agree 
on the criteria to he used to define equity. 
State interventions in fanner managed irrigation systems have many implications and ramifica- 
tions. In this paper we discussed issues related to law, rights, and equity, to indicate some of the 
problems faced by local communities when the state intervenes in their irrigation systems. At this 
stage wearereluctanttosuggestrecommendations because this topicrequiresfunher researchand 
moreover, as  pointed out in the Introduction to this volume, some of these issues require political, 
more than purely research, solutions. 
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Do fanners within the systems receive water to which they are entitled? 
Do fanners at the head of the system receive more water than those at the tail? 
Is there a relationship between the share of benefits received by individual fanners and the 
proportion of the costs of operation and maintenance assumed? 
Do all fanners have rights to access water? NOTES 
1.  Thispaperisarevisedversionofthepaper  presentedatthe workshopon“WaterRights.Conflict 
andPolicy”,January 22-24,1996,  heldin Kathmandu. We aregrateful to the discussantsandFranz 
von Benda-Beckmann for incisive comments. 
Consultant, IIMVNepal. Acting Head, IIMVNepal, and Program Officer, Ford Foundation, New 
Delhi. respectively. 
Intervention by the state in existing irrigation systems may be either direct or indirect. The state 
intervenes directly  a)  hyrehabilitating.extending  andimprovingthe systemeitherthrough  its own 
implementing staff or by the farmers under  their supervision, b)  by  making  changes in the 
organisation and institutions as well as water management activities of the irrigators, and c) by 
administrative support to one of the disputing parties. It intervenes indirectly by changing laws, 
policies, regulations, etc. relating to irrigation (cf. U. Pradhan 1990). 
IIMn WECS (1989); WECSUIMI (1990);  RTDBUlMI (1995). Also Martin Edward and Robert 
Yoder’sthesises; U.Pradhanete1. eds. (1992);UjjwalF’radhan’s andFanesh Shivakoti’s thesises 
the laner supported by IIMI from Ford Foundation grants. 
5  ltneedstnbementionedthat  waterrightsissues havenotbeen ignored.Thefirstmajorwaterrights 
study was carried out for the Ministry of Law by APROSC in 1985  (Srudy on Water Rights Law 
-Nepal);  another study entitled ‘I Water Use Conflicts and Their Resolutions in Selected Irrigation 
SystemsofNepal”, was conductedby IrrigationManagemen1 Center (IMC), Pokhara; 1990. These 
areinadditiontothepublicationsby  Martinand Yoder(  )* ,Yoder,Martin,BarkerandSteenhuis 
(1987). See also Martin (1986): U.Pradhan (1990; 1995). 
For example, in the  1990 publication  by  WECS and IIMI,  Assisrance ro  Farmer-Managed 
Irrigation Systems, based on their action research project. the lessons learnt and recommendation 
deal mainly with ways to reduce the cost of assistance to farmer managed irrigation systems, to 
increase maximum production of food and to enhance farmer-management capability foroperation 
andmaintenance (ibid 12). This small report doesmention water rightsissueinseveral places hut 
does not give it the importance it deserves. For example, one  of the lessons learnt from the action 
research is: “Farmer participation results in: cost savings, mobilisation of farmer resources, sense 
of ownership. and improved ability to manage”  (ibid: 5). And one of the recommendations 
suggested is: “The users’ organisation must agree on water-allocation and resource-mobilization 
rules and procedures before physical improvement begin” (ihid: 39). No mention is made of the 
social dynamics between the farmers and the farmers and the state which determine to a large  extent 
how water is allocated and resource mobilised. 
Similarly, in the 1995 RTDB\ IIMI publication, Improving Supporr Services ro FarmerManaged 
Irrigarion Systems inNepal,  many of the papers discuss theconsequences ofintervention (support) 
inFMIS in terms ofincreaseincommandarea, production,andcroppingintensity,decreaseincost 
of rehabilitation due to farmer participation, improvement in system management by the users, 
institutional  development. etc. Only passing remarks are made on water rights, equity and conflicts 
(by Shivakoti and Pradhan; B.B. Gutung; and Tuladhar). 
7  TheissueofwaterrightsinNepalhavebeendiscussedmainlybyU.Pradhan(1984,1990,1995) 
from a property perspective. Martin (1986) addresses this issue in his thesis. P.Pradhan (1989) 
mentions this issue without any serious discussion. 
This paper is basedonfieldworkcaniedout  for thejointlIMVFREEDEALresearch  project titled, 
“Water Rights in Nepal” which was funded by the Ford Foundation. The study attempted  to 
document and analyze the dynamics of water rights, the relations between customary and state 
laws, and between state and locality in farmer managed irrigation systems in three districts of 
Nepal. Field studies of water management activities as well as water related conflicts and conflict 
management  processes were done (Papers  by Khatri-Chhetri  and  Pradhan.  M.Pradhan  and 






132 were collected and analysed (Khadga, Khanal and Khetri-Chhetri, this volume.) A quick survey 
of40famer  managed irrigation systems was also conducted (Malla and Khadga, this volume). As 
part of the study, IIMI also first conducted fieldwork and then sub-conuacted research on inter- 
sectoral water use and conflicts in the Upper Bagmati Basin (Dixit, this volume). 
The farmers of irrigation systems downstream of Telia Kulo in Dang too destroyed a part of the 
permanent diversion structure constructed by the Department of Irrigation with foreign grant to 
protect their water rights. The leaders were arrested for a day and then released on the condition 
that they presented themselves at the zonal commissioner’s office to present their case (see M. 
Pradhan and R. Pradhan, this volume). 
The RRA  repoR as well as subsequent reports by IlMnWECS did not discuss these conflicts  or 
raise thequestion ofwaterrights  betweensystems.  Thisis quitesulprisingconsidering the fact that 
key IIMWNepal personnel had already written about water rights and conflicts between systems 
over such issues. These issues were probably not discussed precisely because the state (and donor 
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134 Improvement and Enlargement of a Farmer 
Managed Irrigation System in Tanahu: Changing 
Rights to Water and Conflict Resolution' 
Durga K.C. and Rajendra Pradhan ' 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout Nepal, irrigation has been subject to considerable change. Changes in the physical 
structure or in operation and management (which often, hut not always, go hand in hand) have 
oftenresultedinchangesinvariousrightsoverwater.  Thisisnotanewdevelopment buttherecent 
irrigation projects, launched by the government and often financed by international donors, have 
increased the pace and extent of change. Project planners and implementors have not always been 
sensitive to the fact that changes in the physical structure, in distribution and allocation of water, 
and in operation and mangagement have a strong impact on existing rights to water and have often 
been  a  source of  considerable conflict  (U.Pradhan  1994, R.Pradhan  and  U.Pradhan  1996, 
R.Pradhan, A. Haq and U.Pradhan, this volume, and M.Pradhan and R.Pradhan this volume). This 
raises the question of the impact of  such changes on existing rights and obligations. Three 




What happens with existing rights to water if a physical structure (canal, weir) is altered or 
built? 
What happens with existing rights to water if operational or management organization is 
changed? 
What conflicts arise from such changes; how are disputes prevented; and how (if at all) are 
they resolved? 
135 
h  20130 We will discuss these questions with an example of the Satrasaya Phant irrigation system in 
Tanahu, which over the years has undergone a number of important changes. Some changes have 
been initiated and implemented by  local people and others by  the government. In 1989 the 
government launched a project, financed by the World Bank, to improve and enlarge the system. 
This irrigation system is therefore a good example to study the effects of changes. The changes 
involve the three main types of irrigation management activities as described by  Uphoff et el. 
(198%  i.e. (i) physical system activities, such as maintenance, operation and construction; (ii) 
water use activities, such as acquisition, allocation and distribution of  water; and (iii) other 
organizational activities, such as resource mobilization, decision making and conflict manage- 
ment. We will describe how with each change the rights to water were affected, whether and if so, 
what new operation and management structure, enforcing agency and sanctions were introduced. 
In particular it will be discussed how and to what extent physical structures can be used to reduce 
orprevent conflicts fromarising.Thegovernmenten1argementproject  of 1989gaverise  toseveral 
disputes, showing the tensions, shifting relations and negotiations between old and new users. In 
the second part of the paper we will discuss some of the disputes that arose in this system and see 
how they were dealt with and what the outcome was. 
CHANGING RIGHTS TO WATER 
A wide range of rights and obligations exist concerning water use, distribution and allocation, 
operation and management of  irrigation systems. These include (priority) use rights, ownership 
to both land and water, access rights, rights to turns in rotation, rights to converrpah (upland) 
into khet (low land), full rights to use water, rights during monsoon or winter only, rights for way 
(for a canal), rights of compensation (for a physical structure), rights and obligations to contribute 
labour (especially for tenants who do not have ownership rights), and so on. 
Rules and regulations facilitate mobilization of resources for operation, maintenance, improve- 
ment and construction of irrigation systems, and help actualize water rights. Rights are held by 
individual fanners or one or more groups of fanners to allocate and distribute water. Allocation 
and distribution of  water are usually based on resource contribution by the users for original 
construction or current maintenance of the irrigation system. 
From a water rights perspective, the three sets of irrigation mangagement activities mentioned 
above may be  seen  as different means to actualize and protect water rights. For example, 
proportioningstructures (which aremeansofwaterdistribution) are“mechanismforrealizingand 
verifying water rights” (Ambler 1990 38) and water rights are related to past and present 
contributions to the construction and\ or maintenance of the system (ibid: 47). Similarly, Coward 
(1990 83)  argues  that  the rules  for allocating water  “are  useful  in  structuring the  broad 
relationships among the various groups and individuals with a claim to water and between them 
and those without such claims.” This means that everytime one of these three kinds of activities 
undergo changes, rights and obligations related to water change accordingly. 
Most of the fanner managed irrigation systems in Nepal have developed their own written or 
unwritten rules and regulations. These local rules and regulations are altered in response to the 
136 changes mentioned above. However, the state is becoming increasingly involved in irrigation and 
is imposing its own notions on rights and obligations related to water, which may or may not 
correspond with local law. When government projects are introduced, new sets of regulations are 
introduced as well, causing much tension and conflict among old and new users of the upgraded 
system. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS 
Unless laws areeffectively implemented orenforced, there is noassurancerights will beprotected. 
Enforcement of laws helps better operation and maintenance of irrigation systems, prevention of 
conflicts and protection and actualization of water rights. There are mainly four factors  crucial for 
implementation or enforcement of laws. 
Acceptable Rules 
The fanners of local communities must agree that rules are adequate and acceptable. This factor 
is very important for farmer managed irrigation systems because rules are often negotiated 
between the users and between them and non-users. Lack of agreement often leads to ‘water 
stealing’ and disputes. 
Enforcing Agency 
Rules are implemented or enforced by formal or informal organisations. Strong organizations can 
effectively contol water allocation and distribution, mobilize resources for operation and main- 
tenance, and prevent of resolve conflicts. Earlier, in many irrigation systems, the leading farmers 
in the command areaenforced the rules, often made by them. A government appointed revenue 
collecter, such as Jimmawal, assisted by another lower level functionary, such as Kotwal, also 
often enforced rules. Other farmer managed irrigation systems had managing committees. Over 
the past few decades, more and more irrigation systems have formal and registered irrigation 
management committees which are responsible  for enforcingrules. Many imgation management 
committees, as in Satrasaya Pbant Kulo, are assisted by  water contractors or moniters, variously 
called puni thekdar (water contractor) or puni  chowkidor (water guard). These moniters or 
contractors are employed to deliver water in the main and branch canals, patrol the system and 
carry out minor repairs. Many systems have found water moniters to be effective in lessening 
conflicts between fanners over water acquisition and delivery (cf. Shivakoti and Pradhan 1995). 
Sanctions for Violation of Laws 
Sanctions are tools for protecting and upholding water rights. In irrigation systems, violation of 
laws take place when farmers disregard local laws or state laws or both, such as taking water out 
of turn, stealing water, not contributing resources, and damaging the canal. Those who violate 
rules are usually fined or prevented from acquiring water, especially if they are not organized and 
powerful. 
137 Physical Structures 
Physical structures, such as diversion weirs and proportioning weirs and distribution outlets, are 
rneansofallocatinganddistributing  water.Tnroughthem waterdistributionmay becontrolledand 
conflict over water distribution may be prevented. Physical structures may make equitable 
distribution possible, but they do not always do so, nor are they always equally suitable to do so. 
And not all physical structures are equally suitable to prevent conflicts from arising. 
ISSUES OF CONFLICTS 
Conflicts and disputes between fanners over water rights related issues are very common in 
irrigation systems. Some of the conflicts are between individuals, others between groups (e.g., 
head and tail end; existing and new users) within an irrigation system. Conflicts between fanners 
of different systems are not uncommon. There are three major issues of  conflicts. 
Water Allocation and Distribution 
Conflicts often occur over hierarchy and priority in water rights between senior and junior rights 
holders. Conflict usually arises over water allocation and distribution between owners of irrigated 
rice land (khet) and unirrigated land (burr), between head reach and tailend farmers, between 
downstream and upstream irrigation systems, and between prior right holders and new right 
holders (often through government intervention). 
Water Stealing and Acquisition (within and Between Systems) 
During peaks periods of water scarcity, ‘stealing’  is frequently resorted to. Conflicts usually occur 
within systems when a farmer steals water to irrigate his fields during another person’s turn; or 
when non-rights holders steal water from a system. Non-rights holders usually try toacquire water 
rights through stealing. Conflict between irrigation systems usually occur over acquisition of 
water from water source shared by the systems. 
Resource Contribution 
Farmers need to constantly mobilize resources for operation and maintenance, improvement and 
development and effective operation of their irrigation systems. Conflicts occur between new and 
old irrigators over the basis of contribution of resources towards the improvement of irrigation 
systems, with aid from the government or  donor agencies, and  from whom  and how much 
contribution is to be mobilized. Old irrigators want to contribute less resources than the new 
irrigators, reasoning that they are prior holders of rights to water and have contributed resources 
regularly, whereas the new irrigators want to use the government or donor agency aided system 
on an equitable basis. They refer to state law because local rules do not give them rights of access 
to water, if prior users refuse to do so, or only under unfavourable conditions. 
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Since conflicts between fanners are endemic to irrigation systems, conflict management is an 
important water management activity. Conflicts within irrigation systems, especially between 
individuals of between individuals and the management committee are usually resolved locally, 
often by the management committee. And if the management committee is strong, it may also 
resolve conflicts between groups, for example, between head and tail end fanners over water 
distribution or resource contribution. Negotiation, compromise, threat to use sanctions (fine, 
temporary suspension of water rights, etc.) are common means of settling disputes between 
fanners within systems. Disputes between groups of farmers, especially between existing rights 
holders and new claimants as well as between farmers of different irrigation systems are difficult 
to resolve by negotiation or accomodation and are often played out in quasi-judicial or adminis- 
trative offices, such as  Village Panchayat or Village Development Committee offices or the Chief 
District Office. Disputes are also taken to courts. Conflicts and disputes are not always resolved 
or resolved only temporarily. 
HISTORY OF SATRASAYA PHANT KULO 
lherehavebeenmanychangesintheSatrasayPhantKuloimgationsystemsinceitsconsturction 
over 150yearsago.  In this section wedescibechangesinthephysical  structure andcommandarea, 
operation and management, water allocation and distribution and resource mobilisation. We will 
discuss these changes for three phases, namely, (i) original construction and immediately after; 
(ii)fromthisperiodtill therehabilitationandenlargementproject (roughly 1850 to 1989);  and (iii) 
after the completion of the project (1989 to the present). 
Original Construction and Immediately After 
Satrasaya Phant lies on the right bank of Andhi Khola in Ward no. 1 of the Anbu Khaireni Village 
Development Committee (VDC) in Tanahu District. Satrasaya Phant was once a dense forest and 
was cleared for cultivation by Markande Upadhyaya Adhikari about two hundred years ago. Later 
Markande's son as well as four other fanners (who too had cleared the forest for cultivation) 
construted a canal to irrigate their fields in Satrasay Phant. The main source of water of this canal 
was (and is) Thulo Andhi Khola, a tributary of Andhi Khola. Thulo Andhi Khola is fed by Andhi 
Mul, aperennial spring, located some three kilometers from the command area of SatrasayaPhant 
Kulo. The intake of the canal is located about two and a half kilometers from the command area. 
Initially, the canal irrigated 8.99 ha (719mro  mun) of rice fields, divided into five plots. Each 
plot was owned by one farmer and named according to its size, measured in a unit known as~fo 
muri (80 mafo  muri = 1 ha).  Later, it is not know exactly when, the farmers irrigated additional 
6.07 ha of land which they bad converted to rice fields, below their original fields. The original 
fields were and are still known as Upallo (upper) Chhabise, Upallo Sathimure, Upallo Chalise, 
Upallo Satbise and Upallo Barabise and the new, lower fields as Tallo (lower) Chhabise, Tallo 
Sathimure and so on (see Table I). 
139 Table 1: Original and Expanded Irrigated Land in  Satrasaya Phant Kulo 
Before the Rehabilitation and Expansion. 
Original Imgated Fields  Expanded Irrigated land  Total 
Upper Area (Updo)  Lower Area (Tallo)  Irrigated land 
~~ 
Name of the Plot  Area  Name of the Plot  Area 
@a)  (ha) 
~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~ 
Uppallo Chhabise  1.50  Tallo Chhabise  0.62  2.12 
Upallo Sathimure  0.75  Tallo Sathimure  0.75  1.50 
Upallo Chalise  2.25  Tallo Chalise  2.00  4.25 
Upallo Satbise  1.75  Tallo Satbise  1.50  3.25 
Upallo Barabise  2.74  Tallo Barabise  1.20  3.94 
Total  8.99  Total  6.07  15.06 
The five farmers managed and operated the irrigation system. Soon after completion of the canal, 
water was apportioned into five parts for the five original canal-builders, based on the share of 
investment in the construction of the canal. The share of investment was in turn based on the size 
oflandtobeimgated.  Inotherwords,  waterallocation was basedonthesizeoflandtobeirrigated. 
After the enlargement of the command area, water allocation and labour contribution for repair 
and maintenance were done, as earlier, in proportion to the size of  land to be irrigated. 
Between the Original Construction and 1989 
During this phase, operation and management functionaries changed twice. First, Jimmawals 
(revenue collectors also responsible for irrigation management) were appointed by  the state and 
aftertheabolitionofthis post acanalcommitteewasformed.Additional1.66haofricefields  were 
irrigated and there were some changes in water allocation and distribution. 
Changes in Operation and Management Functionaries 
We do not know when a Jimmawal was first appointed for Satrasay Phant but it was probably 
around mid-ninteenth century. Jimmawals were non-official functionary who collected taxes on 
irrigated rice fields (kkef)  in the hills. He was responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
irrigation systems within his jurisdiction.  He was responsible for mobilizing labour and cash for 
operationofthecanal,  and for allocatinganddistributing watertothe farmers. He also adjudicated 
disputes relating to land and water. 
140 Jimmawals were assisted by a village functionary known as Katuwal. Katuwal functioned as  the 
village policeman and messenger. The main responsibilities of  the Katuwal were to inform the 
villagers about irrigation activities, social activities, marriages and rituals; to to collect land tax 
(rnalpot);  and to carry out irrigation activities as directed by the Jimmawal. 
Jimmuwals ceased functioning after 1978. In Satrasay Phant, the functions of  Jimmuwals as 
regards irrigation activities were performed by water contractors and the canal committee. Water 
contractor is the literal translation of the Nepali term ‘bani  rhekdnr”.  His main responsibilities are 
to distribute water according to a schedule agreed upon by the farmers and to carry out minor 
repairs. He also patrols the canal to prevent diversion of water out of tum. A water contractor was 
first employed in 1977 on a trial basis to prevent disputes which arose between farmers due to 
diversion of water from the canal out of turn or for longer time than alloted. The water contractor 
was able to decrease such activities and consequently he has been hired on an annual basis since 
then. 
The farmers with rights to water from the canal formed a seven member canal committee in 1979, 
with the former Jimmawal as the chairman, to oversee the operation and management of the canal. 
The committee was empowered to take decisions on behalf of the farmers. It appointed the water 
contractor, supervised his work, mobilized cash and labour for repair and maintenance, collected 
fines from farmers who did not contribute labourers or diverted water out of turn. It also mediated 
in water related disputes between the farmers of Satrasaya Phant. 
Water Allocation and Distribution 
Two types of  water distribution methods were used for the monsoon rice irrigation during the 
period of the Jimmawal and until the ILC project: i) continuous supply of water, known asziplo 
(withoutturn), andii)rotationmethod(thokuwa~o)  which couldbeeitbera)duipalo(two  turns) 
orb) charpulo (four turns). 
The nipah  method was used when there was abundant water in the canal and fields (due to good 
rains). In this method of water distribution, water is available continuously throughout the whole 
canalandthe  farmers themselvesopenedtheoutletstotbeirfields  wheneverand foraslongas they 
wanted. The commond area was not divided into sectors, as in other water distribution methods. 
In therhokuwupalomethod, waterwasdistributed by turn todifferent sectorsofthecommandarea 
for a fixed duration, depending on the volume of water in the system. As soon as  the allotted time 
was up another area received water even if all the fields bad not been irrigated. Such unimgated 
fields, however, were given first priority in the next turn. In tbedui palo (two turns) distribution 
method, the command area was divided into upper and lower sectors which correspond to the 
Upallo (8.99 ha) and Tallo fields (6.07 ha) mentioned earlier. Each sector received water for 12 
hours by turn, beginning with the upper area. This method of water distribution was used after 
transplantation of rice and if water was not sufficient, they used thecharpalo (four turns) method 
which was also used for monsoon rice transplantation when there was drought. 
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canal committee. In this method, as in the two turns method, the command area was divided into 
two sectors. head and tail but these two sectors did not correspond to the upper (Upallo) and lower 
(Tallo) fields. Further, the size of the sectors varied for different turns. Within each sector, water 
is distributed sequentially from head to tail, from one field to another, the lower field is irrigated 
only after the upper field has been covered with water. All the fields receive irrigation in each turn. 
This method of  water distribution was used to irrigate the fields after rice had been transplanted 
in the whole command area. 
In the charpalo method, the command area was divided into 4 sectors and each sector received 
water for 24 hours in each turn. Each sector received another water turn after96 hours. Sometimes 
two sectors combined to form one sector and received water for 48 hours. The four sectors were 
as follows: 
1st sector:  Upallo and Tallo Chabise  [3.62 ha] 
Upallo and Tallo Sathimure 
2nd sector:  Upallo and Tallo Chalise  [4.25 ha] 
3rd sector  Upallo and Tallo Satbise  [3.25 ha] 
4th sector:  Upallo and Tallo Barabise  [3.94 ha] 
Intheory,allthefields wereallotedequalsharesofwaterfromthecanal,measuredinunitsoftime. 
This may have been the case when the original five investors in the construction of the canal 
operatedandmanagedthesystem.  But in practice, somesectors and fields wereallotedmore water 
than others. For example, Upallo and Tallo Satbise with 3.25 haof rice fields were allocated water 
for the same duration as Upallo and Tallo Chhalise with 4.25 ha. Fields which did not retain water 
easily were alloted more water than those which did. Similarly fields owned by the Jimmawal and 
his  relatives  were alloted  more  water  than  fields owned  by  others.  Jimmuwals alloted  to 
themselves more water than others for the same unit of land. 
In addition to the fields in the command area, fields in Simle, Dungadi and Kundare were also 
irrigated from Salrasaya Phant Kulo but only if there was drought during monsoon. Farmers from 
these locations requested the farmers of SatrasayaPhant for water anddiverted water to their fields 
‘licitly’ if permission was given and  ‘illicitly’ (i.e.,  ‘stole’ water) if  they  were not  granted 
permission. 
Resource Mobilisation 
Operation and maintenance of irrigation systems require resources. In farmer managed irrigation 
systems, the users of the system contribute cash, labour or grains depending on the requirement. 
Construction and maintenance work are often done by the farmers either by themselves or hired 
labourers. Cash or grain contributions are collected to pay contractors or guards. 
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June in preparation for the monsoon rice crop and once in November for the winter crop. The 
irrigation system was also repaired during monsoon due to damages caused by heavy rains. 
The users of the canal contributed a total of 128 labour days for the pre-monsoon and pre-winter 
repair work. Depending on the type of work to be done and the urgency, either eight persons 
worked daily for sixteen days or sixteen persons worked daily for eight days. For this, the 
command area was divided into eight sections. Uppalo Chhabise and Uppalo Sathimure formed 
one section and Tallo Cbbabise and Tallo Sathimure another unit, the other six plots formed 
individual sections. Every section contributed one labourer in the eightkhetala (agricultural 
labourer) system and two labourers in the sixteenkhetah system. 
In theory, the fanners contributed labourer according to the size of land irrigated but in practice 
thefarmerscontributedthesamenumberoflabourersfordifferentlandsizeserviced.Forexample, 
Upallo Chalise with 2.25 haof irrigated land, Upallo Satbise with 1.75 ha and Tallo Barabise with 
1.20  haall contributedone lahourereach. Some fannerscontributedmorelabourerperunitofland 
imgated  because  their  fields,  which  were  sandy, required  more  water  and  other  fanners 
contributed less labourer because they were powerful. The Jimmawal, for example, contributed 
less labourer per unit of irrigated land than others. 
If repair work was not completed within the stipulated date then all beneficiary households 
contributed one labourer daily until the work is accomplished. This type of labour contribution is 
known as sithe and was often done for emergency work during monsoon. 
With the abolition of the Jimmawal system, it was difficult to mobilize labourers for repair and 
maintenance. The fanners then opted to contribute cash instead of  labourers. The cash was used 
to pay either acontractor (not the water contractor) or daily wage labourers, whoever was cheaper, 
to repair the canal. The fanners contributed cash on the basis of the area of land irrigated. The rate 
varied between Rs.  1 to Rs. 10 per 0.25 ha, depending on the total amount to he collected for 
expenses. 
The fanners contributed grains (paddy), based on size of land irrigated, to pay for the services of 
the water contractor. 
The fanners of Side,  Dungadi and Kundare had to help repair the canal if it was damaged during 
monsoon hut they werenotallowedtocontributelabourorcashforregularrepairandmaintenance 
for fear that they would later claim rights to water from the system. 
From 1989 to the Present 
During this phase there were major changes in the physical struture and command area of the 
irrigation system, the operation and management functionaries, water allocation and distribution 
and resource mobilisation. 
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In 1989 the fanners received a grant assistence from the District Irrigation Office (DIO), as part 
of the World Bank funded Irrigation Line of Credit (ILC) program, to rehabilitate and enlarge the 
irrigation system. Under the grant, the intake point was improved with gabion, the canal was 
widened and lined, crossings and culverts were constructed in various parts of the canal, and the 
length of the canal was increased at the the tail end of the system. These modifications resulted 
in better supply of water in the canal and irrigation of additional fields. 
After the completion of the project, the command area (or more specifically the service area) 
increasedfrom 16.72hato25.13  ha.Theadditional8.41  haofirrigatedfieldsarelocatedin Andhi 
Khola at the headend and in Dumtar, Kundarc, Simlc and Dungadi at the tail end of the command 
area. The beneficiary households increased from 45 to 73 14 households converted 1.86 ha of 
pakho land to khet in the newly extended command area sectors. 
Operation and Management Functionaries 
The  canal committee was not recognized as a legal entity by the state because it was not registered 
with the Central District Office (CDO). So, when the ILC project was to be implemented, the 
farmers formed and registered a water users’s association (WUA) and selected members of the 
managing committee, as required by  the project. 
The responsibilities of the managing committee are similar to those of the canal committee which 
it replaced. They carry out decisions made hy the association members during the annual general 
meeting which  is  held just  bcforc monsoon.  During  the meeting the members  review the 
performance  of  the  water  contractor(s),  renew  contract, select  members  of  the  managing 
committee, prepare work plan for canal maintenance, and approve the annual budget proposal. 
Water Allocation and Distribution 
After the implementation of the project, water is allocated to additional areas, namely, Andhi 
Khola at the head end and Simle, Dungadi, Kundarc and Dumtar at the tail end of the expanded 
command area. The old command area receives priority in water distribution and receives more 
water than the new sections of the command area. 
As before the project, water is distributed either continuously eipalo)  or by rotation from head 
to tail, depending on the availability of water, the type or crop and the phase of  the crop cycle. 
Water Distribution During Monsoon 
For the monsoon rice crop, the fields are irrigated at least three times: first for transplanting rice, 
second, the day after transplantation (known asmaadpani) and third, a few weeks later (known 
as chara paani). For the first two irrigation, the command area is not divided into scctors; the 
fanners irrigate their fields, as much as required, generally starting at the head end. 
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command area. The farmers have to inform the water contractor thekdar) one week in advance 
to get water for rice transplantation. The farmers have to arrange their rice planting schedule 
according to the availability of water because the first priority of  water is for those who have 
already transplanted their rice and need to flood their fields. 
The day after transplanting, the rice fields are flooded with water (known asmaadpuni). This 
flooding is  very important because otherwise the fields may dry and crack resulting in poor 
harvest. If necessary, transplanting activities are stopped to allow the transplanted rice fields to be 
irrigated. While the maad pani is distributed from night to 11 a.m. in the morning, water for 
transplantation is provided after 1  I a.m. (The labourers come to work in the fields at 11 a.m.). 
Maadpani irrigation is followed by chara pani irrigation a few weeks later, during the growth 
period. Bijuwa palo method of water distribution is used for this irrigation. The command area is 
divided into three sectors, and not two as it was before the ILC project: i) Uppalo Chabise to Tallo 
Satbise, ii) Tallo Chabise to Dumtar, iii) Simle, Kundare and Dungadi. 
While the IL.C project was being implemented, the water users managing committee decided that 
for the monsoon rice irrigation Simle, Kundare and Dungadi would receive one  turn of  water after 
the old command area had received 5 turns. However, after the project was completed, they 
received water only twice a month for chara pani and only if there was drought. Later, they 
received water for 12 hours after the old command area received water for two turns.  After 
prolonged negotiation between the farmers of the old and new sections of the command area, from 
1994,  the firsttwosectorsreceive  water for 24 hourseach by turn during monsoon and for 36 hours 
immediately after monsoon whereas Simle, Dungadi and Kundara receive water for 2A hours 
every Tuesday, irrespective of the season. Dumtar receives water for 2 hours out of the 24 hours 
alloted to the second sector. 
Water Distribution in Other Seasons 
Thedemandforwaterinthewinterandpre-monsoonseasonsis  not as highasduringthemonsoon 
season because the crops grown during these seasons require much less water than monsoon rice 
crops. In these seasons too, fields in theoldcommandarea have firstpriority to WaterfromSatrasay 
Phant Kulo. Fields in the old command area receive water first, as much as required, and without 
any fixed system as to turns or time. Farmers in the new command area may deliver water to their 
fields after the fields in the oldcommand area have been irrigated. The fields in the new command 
area usually receive as much water as they want in winter but supply is limited once spring rice 
is planted in the old command area. 
Resource Mobilisation After the ILC Project 
After the ILC project, the irrigators have stopped using contractors or daily wage labourers for 
repair and maintenance prefering to do this task themselves. There are several reasons for this 
change in resource contribution from cash to labour. First, the canal requires less repair and 
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Second the number of households which benefit from the canal and thus contribute resources 
increased from 45 to 73. And third, the big farmers, who control the managing committee, were 
able to change the basis of labour contribution from the size of  land irrigated to household. 
Such system of labour contribution whereby every beneficiary household was to contribute one 
adult male labourer for repair and maintenance is known assithe. The sithe system of  labour 
contribution is not new; it was used for emergency repair work during monsoon. However, it is 
now used for normal repair and maintenance. This system of labour contribution benefits the big 
farmers because they have to contribute less labourers per unit of land than the small farmers. That 
this is recognized as unfair is reflected in the fact that less that1 one third of the households turn 
up for repair and maintenance work despite threats of  fine being imposed on those who do not 
contribute labourers. 
As earlier, the farmers of the old command area who imgate their monsoon rice crops from the 
canal pay the water contractors in grains instead of cash.  However, the farmers from Simle, 
Dungadi, Kundari and Side  do not pay the water contractors because they do not deliver water 
to their fields. 
CONFLICT CASES 
Conflicts between farmers over water for irrigation are common in all irrigation systems. Many 
of these conflicts are minor disputes about diverting water out of turn or using more water then 
alloted,  especially during monsoon irrigation when in the heat of the moment words and blows 
may be exchanged. These disputes are usually resolved quickly by the farmers themselves, often 
mediated by neighbours or the operation and management functionaries, only to occur again next 
year. In Satrasay Phant water contractors have helped to decrease such conflicts because they 
deliver water and patrol the canal and their contract is renewed if they perform well. But such 
disputes still occur. 
Other conflicts occur, not so much annually, almost as part of  the irrigation cycle, but when 
changes are introduced, in management, water allocation, resource mobilisation or the physical 
structure. 
In the following section we describe two cases of conflicts between farmers with existing rights 
to water from Satmsaya Phant Kulo and new claimants to such rights which occurred when the 
World Bank funded Irrigation Line of Credit project was initiated to rehabilitate and enlarge the 
irrigation system. There were a series of disputes before, during and after the implementation of 
the project between the disputants. The disputes between these farmers were over three issues, 
namely, a) resourcecontribution, b) who had rights to water from the system and the basis of these 
rights and c) priority and hierarchy of rights. 
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The World Bank funded a project known as Irrigation Line of  Credit (ILO), implemented by the 
Department of Irrigation, in the mid-eighties to expand irrigation in the hilly areas of Nepal. 
Tanahu District was one of the project areas and Satrasaya Phant Kulo was selected as  a potential 
irrigation system to be rehabilitated. The initial plan was to rehabilitate the system to benefit the 
existing irrigators but the command area was too small to meet the technical and economic 
conditions of the program. So  as suggested by  the overseer from the District Irrigation Office 
(DIO), who had canied out the survey, the farmers with existing rights to water from Satrasaya 
Phant Kulo agreed to extend the canal and increase the command area to include Andhi Khola, 
Simle, Dungadi, Kundare and Dumtar. 
Once the technical and economic aspect of the system was approved, the farmers had to fulfill two 
conditions before the project would  be implemented: First, the farmers had to  form a duly 
registered Water Users’ Association and second, they had to deposit cash in an approved bank as 
security money. The fanners also had to contribute labour for the construction work. They would 
forfeit the deposit if they did not meet their labour contribution requirements. The District 
Irrigation Office was responsible for ensuring that the project was completed. 
The farmers held several meetings to discuss issues concerning expansion of the command area, 
allocationofwaterandcontributionofcash. They finally agreedthatSimle,Dungadi andKundare, 
at tail end of one branch of the canal, and Dumtar at the tail end of the other branch would included 
in the proposed extension of the command area of  Satrasaya Phant Kulo $ee Map). The farmers 
of  the proposed extension areas also agreed to the conditions stipulated by the fanners of the old 
command area. The four major conditions were as follows: 
(i)  Theexistingcanal structure would berehabilitatedfirst and it would be enlarged toirrigate 
new fields only if there was money left after the rehabilitation. 
The traditionally irrigated rice fields kabik kher) in the old command area would have the 
first priority in water distribution; the extension areas would receive water after thesabik 
khers were irrigated. 
Pakho (upland) fields in Dumtar, Simle, Dungadi and Kundare would receive water only 
after the khers (traditional as well as new) were irrigated. 
The fanners from the different sectors would contribute cash for the deposit in varying 
proportion, depending on whether their fields were traditionally irrigated by Satrasaya 
Phant Kulo, or are part of  the new command area, and whether the fields werekhet (rice 




The rate andamount agreedupon changedoverdifferentmeetings. They first agreed tocollectRs. 
20 per 0.05 ha from the fanners of Satrasaya Phant, Rs. 50 from the farmers of Simle, Dungadi 
and Kundare (all kher land) and Rs.  80 from the farmers of Dumtarpakho land. This was later 
revised to Rs. 45,75 and 100 respectively because the old rate was insufficient to cover the total 
amount required for the security deposit. 
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SATRASAYA  PHANT The agreement between the fanners reflected the status of  the farmers of the old command area 
as the original holders of rights to water from the system and the (proposed) change in property 
relationsduetogovernmentintervention(investment). Thecommandarea would beenlargedonly 
if the old rights holders agreed but they had to agree to increase the command area if they wanted 
the ILC project to rehabilitate their irrigation system. The farmers of the new command areas 
would not be denied access to water but their rights would be secondary to the existing rights 
holders. The new rights holders could irrigate their fields only after the old imgaters had irrigated 
theirs. Further, the existing rights holders were to contribute less amount for the deposit than the 
new irrigators. The new irrigators had to contribute over one and a half times (Simle, Dungadi and 
Kundare) or twice (Dumtar) the rate to be contributed by  the existing irrigators. 
The farmers with existing rights to water in Satrasaya Phant Kulo were not really keen to share 
water with other farmers and had agreed to enlarge the command area only to meet the conditions 
of the ILC project. This becomes clear from their disputes with the fanners of Simle, Dungadi and 
Kundare over water allocation and distribution, with the farmers of Dumtar over extension of the 
canal and with the fanners of Andhi Khola over access to water from the canal. 
In all these cases the new irrigators demanded rights to use the improved and extended canal to 
irrigate their fields on two grounds. First, the improvement and extension work were done with 
government grant. Second, they had contributed cash for the security deposit, i.e., they invested 
in the irrigation system. In other words, they acquired property rights to the system and rights to 
use water by public (ie., government investment) and private (i.e., their own) investment. The old 
irrigators, although formally acknowledging rights of the new irrigators, did not grant them rights 
to use water easily. The farmers at the head reach were able to actualise their claims because they 
were organised and threatened to use violence. Moreover, they could always breach the canal to 
divert water to their fields located at the headreach. The small farmers in Dumtar, at the tail end 
of the command area, were not able to enforce their claims to their water rights from the canal 
because they were not strong enough to do so. They neither complained to the authorities, nor 
threatened to use violence. 
We will begin with the dispute between the farmers of  Andhi Khola and other farmers first 
Dispute between Satrasaya Phant and Andhi Khola Irrigators 
The fields in the Andhi Khola area were shown as part of the proposed enlargement of the 
command area but the farmers who owned land there were neither called for the meetings nor 
asked for contributions by the farmers of the old command area and the proposed extension at the 
tail end. The farmers of Andhi Khola were under the impression that their fields would he irrigated 
by Satrasaya Phant Kulo so they did not protest until the rehabilitation work was well under way 
and they realized that they would not be provided an outlet for their fields. Then nine farmers filed 
a complaint in the District Irrigation Office (DIO) against the Water Users’ Association (WAU) 
construction committee members. In their complaint they argued that they should be provided 
water from the canal because it  was  being rehabilitated and  enlarged by  the government. 
Moreover,Andhi Kholaarea was shown apartoftheexpandedcommandareain  the survey report. 
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in Andhi Khola. The WUA committee members agreed to do so but only on the condition that the 
Andhi Khola farmers contributed Rs. 500 per 0.05 ha of land to be irrigated. This condition was 
not acceptable to the Andhi Khola farmers who then threatened the committee members with 
sticks. They argued that they would not contribute more than the fanners of the tailend who had 
contributed between Rs. 45 to 100 per 0.05 ha of land to be irrigated. They further accused the 
committee members of discriminating against them by  not informing them when money was 
collected from other farmers for the security deposit before the project was initiated. They then 
threatened to prevent work on the canal unless an outlet was provided to their fields and they did 
not have to contribute more than others. The committee members finally agreed to grant them 
rights to water from the canal upon payment of  Rs. 100 per 0.05 ha of land to be  irrigated as 
contribution for the deposit and an outlet was provided for them. 
The  threat of violence by the Andhi Khola farmers, the location of their fields at the head reach 
of the canal, andpossibly, the instructions by the DIO, compelled the committee members to grant 
them water rights upon payment of the deposit money. If they were not allocated water they could 
easily divert water to their fields unless the other farmers guarded this area day and night. One of 
the reasons why the old irrigators were reluctant to grant them water rights was precisely because 
theirfieldsarelocatedupstreamandit would bedifficult toregulateandcontrol theshareofwater 
they diverted. This is borne out by the case of one farmer in Andhi Khola who refused to pay the 
his share of the security deposit and illicitly diverts water to his fields even though the outlet to 
his fields  is blocked off  time and again and downstream farmers as well as the management 
committee members threaten him. 
Despite opposition from the existing rights holders, the Andhi Khola farmers acquired, or 
appropriated, water rights. In effect, they could now legitimately divert water to their fields, 
instead of doing it illicitly. Government grant and their cash contribution as well as their threat 
changed property relations and water rights in their favour. 
Dispute between Farmers of Satrasaya Phant and Dumtar 
In the case discussed below, a few small farmers of Dumtar have been denied access to water even 
though they have ‘acquired’  waterrights because they are neither organised nor powerful. Further, 
their fields are located at the tail end of the official command area and the canal does not reach their 
fields, so they are unable to steal water. The conflict here is not only between Satrasaya Phant (old 
command area) and Dumtar fanners but also between big and small fanners in Dumtar. Farmers 
whose fields are located at the tail end of the canal do not allow the canal to be extended through 
their fields (i.e., give right of way) to irrigate the fields of the small farmers. These disputes 
remained unresloved during our fieldwork. 
In the meetings held before the project was implemented, the fanners had agreed that Dumtar 
would be included as part of the extended command area and the fanners of Dumtar contributed 
Rs. 100 per 0.05 ha of land to be irrigated as part of their share of the security deposit. While the 
construction work was going on they were under the impression that the canal would be extended 
to their fields after the old canal was rehabilitated and improved. They had  no reason to be 
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Office and the WUA construction committee and further, many of the farmers owned fields both 
in Dumtar and in the old command area. However, the canal was not extended to  Dumtar. 
The small farmers of Dumtar were dismayed and angry. They did not have land elsewhere and 
depended on their fields in Dumtar for their livelihood. They complained to the District Irrigation 
Office overseer and the constucrion committee members only to he informed that the canal would 
not be extended to their fields because all the project money had been spent. 
After the completion of the project, the construction committee was dissolved and emanagement 
commitee was formed. The small farmers who have not received irrigation complainedfrequently 
to the Water Users’ Association Management Committee members. These members acknowl- 
edged the rights of the fanners of Dumtar to water from Satrasaya Phant Kulo because they had 
contributed cash and the project was implemented with government grant. But they claimed that 
they are unable to convince the other fanners to give right of way to construct the canal. These 
farmers own land both in Dumtar, where they grow lentils (and have recently begun growing rice), 
and in the old command area where they grow rice. They oppose the construction of the canal 
through their fields in Dumtar not only because they would lose soil in their land due to irrigation 
hut also because they may face water shortage in their rice fields in the old command area if 
additional fields were irrigated, They were, in a way, reserving water for future drought periods. 
Sailo Sarki had requested the WUA committee members to resolve the question of right of way. 
ThecommitteecalledameetingoftheDumtarfarmers  to try toresolve theconflict. Thecommittee 
requested Mrs. Adhikari to provide land for the canal and she replied that she would be willing tc 
do so if other farmers also provided equal area of land. She complained that Sailo Sarki took 
advantageofher because she never said anything when hedug  the temporary canal without asking 
for her permission. She added,  ‘I I haveWlet land in Satrasaya Phant to grow enough paddy to eat 
rice.InDumtarIonlyhavepaWtoland  whichissufficient togrow blacklentils toeatdal. Honestly, 
I do not want to convert mypakho land in Dumtar to khet to grow paddy.”  She added that the 
farmers were taking advantage of her because she was weak. She was a widow and her sons were 
living in Kathmandu. 
The committee members then requested another farmer to provide land for the canal. He agreed 
to provide land which was uneven hut refused to allow the canal to pass through hiskher fields. 
But this was not acceptable to Sailo. Some of the committee members then  requested other 
fanners, two of  who are committee members, to provide land for the canal. One of them had 
converted hispakho land tokherat the head reach of Dumtar which is irrigated by water from the 
canal. Like others, he too is not willing to give up a small portion of this land for the canal. This 
person, who is the current secretary of the WUA Committee, is reported to have told the farmers, 
“  use power and force, if you can, lo plant rice [i.e., to deliver water to the rice fields]”. None of 
the farmers were willing to give up part of their fields for the canal as a result of which the small 
farmers are unable to plant rice. Sailo  Sarki, apoor, low caste farmer, had to revert hack to growing 
lentils instead of rice. 
15 I The rich farmers were protecting their interests (land as well as water for their fields in Satrasaya 
Phantproper)atthecostofthesesmallfarmersandbydoingso,theyviolatedalocal  lawpertaining 
to rights of way. In other sections of the command area the farmers gave up portions of their fields 
along the canal alignment without compensation since they would benefit and, as one informant 
claimed, in the interest of the whole community.  Elsewhere in the same village, farmers gave 
rights of way for another canal which irrigated fields donated to the village school even though 
they did not benefit directly. And in a neighbouring village, farmcrs gave right of way for a canal 
whichdidnotirrigatetheirfields;they  couldrequest and begiven waterin timesofseveredrought 
but they had no rights to the water. In all these cases, compensation was not sought or paid for the 
land given up although according to the National Code (Muliki Ain) they could claim compen- 
sation either in cash or land. 
Why didthe  big farmers violate the local law concerningright of way? Laws are usually negotiated 
for each instance of its actualization. The relative strengths and interests of the negotiators as well 
as other stakeholders on the one hand, and the degree of effective social control and community 
feeling on the other, determine how the law will be actualised, put into practice. In this case the 
small farmers of Dumtar were not powerful enough to insist on right of way for the canal. The big 
farmers did not want the canal to be extended to Dumtar because once it was done, the farmers 
would insist on  acquiring water and the would affect water supply to their fields in times of 
drought. Another reason was that farmers from other sections of the command area, e.g.,  Simle 
and Dungadi, were demanding that they be allocated more water than they had been allocated so 
far. Distributing water to Dumtar would have reduced water supply to their fields. These fanners, 
who are more organised and powerful than the small farmers of Dumtar, have managed to increase 
water allocation totheir fields for themonsoon paddy crop fromtwice to fourtimesamonth.  These 
farmers were not supportive of  the small farmers of Dumtar because their interests clashed. 
The Water Users Association, and especially the Management Committee, are responsible for 
assuring that the rights holders do  receive irrigation but they have not done this. The old irrigators, 
the elites of Satrasaya Phant, continue to exercise control over water allocation, reserving first 
priority to themselves. Farmers of Simle, Dungadi and Kundare, not only receive water but over 
the past two years they have been receiveing water more frequently (from two times a month to 
once a week), after prolonged negotiations. While the big farmers of Dumtar do receive water 
regularly, the small farmers have not received irrigation yet though they have rights to water from 
the canal.  Sailo Sarki along with other farmers have been demanding  that the money  they 
contributed for the deposit be returned to them if the canal was not extended to their fields but they 
have not yet received it most of the Satrasaya Phant farmers were not willing to return the money. 
In both thesedisputes wecanclearlyseethatallthepartiesacknowledgethefactthatstatefinancial 
intervention changed existingproperty relations and water rights. While prior rights of the existing 
rights holders are  recognized, for example, in the agreement that they would have first priority for 
water, the *new’  rights of those without previous rights to water from the canal are also accepted, 
but as secondary rights. The existing rights holders do not dcny the rights of the ‘newcomers’ to 
water from Satrasaya Phant Kulo because the rehabilitation project was implemented with state 
funds on the condition that their fields are included in the command area and moreover, they had 
contributed cash for the deposit. The newcomers do not demand equal rights because they accept 
(or are forced to accept) the local law that prior appropriators and existing rights holders have first 
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the existingrights  holders who hadpreviously investedinthe system andexistingricelandowners 
contributed less than upland (pakho) land owners. The terms the farmers agreed to took into 
account the rights of the old as well as new rights holders. 
CONCLUSION 
Changes in the physical structure, command area and operation and management organisation 
often result in changes in water rights of existing rights holders and those who did not have rights 
to water in the irrigation system. Water rights are reflected in water allocation and distribution 
(which include share of water and priority in distribution) as well as resource contributions made 
for original contruction and annual repair and maintenance. 
We have seen how with the change of  management functionary from the original five canal- 
builders to the Jimmawal, water allocation and distribution were altered. The Jimrnawal’s fields 
received more water than the fields owned by  other farmers and similarly, he contributed less 
labourersperunit of land irrigated thanother farmers. When Jimmawals ceasedfunctioning, water 
contractors were employed to ensure that water was distributed and delivered according to agreed 
method and schedule. 
With the initiation of the ILC project, there was a change in management organization. All the 
users of the irrigation system were members of the water users’s association which met annually 
to select the managing committee members and discuss rules and regulations. But the major 
decisions were actually made by the leading farmers of Satrasay Phant, many of who were elected 
as committee members. The rules and regulations passed in the meetings often benefitted the big 
farmers more than  the small farmers.  This is  clear in the case of  the rule regarding labour 
contribution for regular repair and maintenance which previously  was based on size of land 
irrigated and currently is one person per beneficiary household. However, this rule may not be as 
unfairasitlooksatfirstsightifontakesintoaccountpreviouscontributionsoftheoldbeneficiaries 
to maintain the system. 
Without the cooperation of the big farmers, the managing committee is not able to function 
effectively. This is illustrated by thecase of thesmall farmers in Dumtar who areunable toimgate 
their fields for their mansoon crops because the committee was unable to convince fanners to give 
right of way to extend the canal to their fields. 
Changes in the physical structure affect water rights. When canals are improved and enlargement 
water supply is usually increased. More water can he supplied to traditionally irrigated fields or 
new fields can he irrigated. The existing rights holders, especially if they are powerful control, to 
a great extent, how the increased supply of water is allocated and distributed, even when the state 
intervenes. 
In the two cases discussed earlier, physical  structures were used  as means of allocating and 
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phase of the project and this was done by not constructing outlets in the lined canal. Later when 
the fanners protested, they outlets were made to enable them to acquire water. The farmers of 
Dumtar werealloted water inprinciple but they could not acquire water because thecanal was not 
extend to their fields. Whether water is distributed by rotation or simultaneously, the size of the 
outlets determine the volume of water the fields receive. The smaller the outlet, the less the water 
discharged into the branch or field canals for the same period of time. 
When the government  is involved in enlarging existing  fanner managed  irrigation  systems, 
fanners without rights to water from the systems claim rights and often are able to acquire rights, 
even if secondary to the existing rights holders. But, and this point is often ignored by government 
officials, enlarging irrigation systems do not always ensure that the targeted beneficiaries have 
access to water from the system; they may have no access at all (as in the case of the Dumtar 
fanners) or have less access than targetted (as in the case of the fanners of Simle, Dungade and 
Kundare who received less water than agreed upon. In other words, some targeted beneficiaries 
may acquire rights to water from a system but may not have access to water. 
The study illustrates  the importance of  understanding social relations between stakeholders, 
particularly between existing tights holders and those without rights. As we have seen existing 
rights holders are usually big farmers who are reluctant to share water with others. Small farmers 
find it difficult to gain access to water unless they are organized or strategically located at the head 
end of the command area. Farmers who are in a position to negotiate and negotiate hard are often 
able to acquire more water than they have been receiving as is illustrated by the case of the farmers 
from Simle, Dungadi and Kundare who were able to demand and be given water every Tuesday 
instead of twice a month. 
Conflicts and disputes over water are endemic in imgation communities. They occur between 
individuals and between groups over water allocation and distribution, taking water out of turn, 
‘water stealing’, resource contribution and so on. 
There are ways to lessen, if not prevent, the Occurence of conflicts. We have seen how better and 
more effective management such as water users’ committee and rule enforcing agencies such as 
water contractors canlessen conflicts. Conflicts are lessened when rules are framed andacceptahle 
tomost oftheusers. Similarly, suitable physical structurescan lessen conflicts ifthey aredesigned 
and operated in a manner which allows distribution of water as agreed upon 
These mechanisms, however, are not effective in preventing conflicts between existing rights 
holders and those who do not have rights in an  irrigation system, especially when the system is to 
be enlarged by donor or government grant. In  such cases, the relations between the existing rights 
holders and the new claimants as well as the extent of state involvement determine how disputes 
are resolved, or whether  they  are resolved at all. If  disputes are not resolved, the intended 
beneficiaries of extension and enlargement projects, especially if they are at the tail end of the 
command area, do not have access to water from the system (see Pradhan, Haq and Pradhan, this 
volume). Lack of  access to water defeats the objective of projects to enlarge irrigation systems. 
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1.  This paper is a revised version of the paper presented at the conference titled “Water  rights, conflict 
and policy” held in Kathmandu, Jan 23-26, 1996. We are grateful to Keebet Benda-Beckmann for 
extensive comments on this paper. This paper is based  on fieldwork carried out by  IIMI and 
FREEDEAL as part of the research project on “  Water Rights in Nepal”. 
2.  Durga K.C.  worked for IlMU Nepal as research officer. Currently he is working on the process 
document research  in Nepal  for Mountain  Resources Management Group.  a local NGO. R. 
hadhan was formerly consultant to IIMI/Nepal for the research project on water rights in Nepal. 
Cumntly he is directing research on the second phase of the water rights in Nepal project for 
FREEDEAL, a Nepalese research organization. 
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156 Disputing, Negotiating and Accom  ,&IS  Means 
to Acquire and Protect Water‘fiights: 
A Case Study of Conflicts in Dangl 
Mahesh C. Pradhan and Rajendra Pradhan2 
INTRODUCTION 
There are many ways of acquiring and protecting water rights in farmer managed irrigation 
systems. Water rights are acquired principally by  investment in original construction, rehabilita- 
tion, or extension of a system, and by inheritance or purchase of  irrigated land (U. Pradhan 1990). 
Itis  oftenlhecasethatthefannerswhohave  waterrightsarenot willing tosharewater withfanners 
who do  not have such rights in their irrigation system or water source. These farmers try to acquire 
rights to use water from the imgation system or water source by  means of state intervention, 
negotiation ordisputing. The existing  rights holders use similar  means to protect their water rights. 
The means used to acquire or protect water rights depend on specific situation, relations between 
stakeholders and the options available to them. Ifrelationsare cordial, new claimantsmay acquire 
rights  by  contributing for the  rehabilitation  or maintenance  of  the system; if  relations  are 
problematic,  new claimants may  acquire rights by  seeking help of the state or by  disputing. 
Powerful local elites may use threats or violence or ask for help from state agencies to acquire or 
protect their rights and small fmers  may take recource to the courts or administrative bodies or 
‘steal water’ to acquire or protect their rights. Changes in political situation and power relations 
may compel the disputing parties to negotiate and accomodate instead of taking a conflictuous 
stand. 
The  means used  to acquire or protect  rights are thus different  strategies employed by  the 
stakeholders. Strategies include the forum to which the disputes are taken, such as the courts, local 
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# 1-0\31 bodies and the streets, the type of claims being made (of ownership, use rights, senior and junioi 
rights) and the justifications offered for the claims. 
Claims  to  water  rights  (of  ownership  or  use)  are justified  by  reference  to  law.  Different 
communities have different local laws which legitimize claims and different ways of acquiring 
rights. The state has its own laws which may or may not recognize such local laws. In most 
communities  in Nepal  it is often  difficult  (or rather  was  difficult) to distinguish  between 
‘customary’ law and ‘state’ law, unless they contradict each other, because the everyday practices 
of water rights do not always distinguish between the two. It is mostly when disputes occur and 
are taken to judicial or quasi- judicial bodies, or when the state is involved, that such distinctions 
are most relevant. For the purpose of this paper we will explicitly refer to customary or state law 
mainly if the distinction is relevant which may be the case if local or supra-local actors apparantly 
orient themselves at the one or other. or at a specific combination of the two. Otherwise we will 
just speak of local rules or local law. 
There are different levels and kinds of rights to water: property rights; use rights; senior or first 
rights and junior or secondary rights; rights for specific season and so on (cf. U. Pradhan 1994; 
Wiber 1992).  Prior appropriation of water from a source by constructing an irrigation system (thus 
by investment) usually gives the investors senior rights to water from the source. Investors who 
later construct another canal using the same source of water acquire rights junior to the rights of 
the prior appropriators. Upper riparian users may have senior rights to lower users. Some users 
may acquire rights to use water from a source by virtue of long use even though they do not own 
the water source. 
This paperdiscusses themeansused to acquireorprotect water rightsinfarmermanagedirrigation 
systems. It will he argued that the specific means used by the stakeholders depend on which 
strategy they consider most suitable in the existing situation. social relations between them and 
the options available. It will also he argued that the law which is used tojustify claims are not only 
fixed ‘customary law’ or ‘state law’ but local rules or local law, generated by the local people. The 
paperdescribesthreeconflictcasesinTeliaKulo(Guhar KholaIrrigation Project)toillustrate how 
conflicts arise and disputing and negotiation are used to acquire or protect water rights as well as 
how and what rules are generated by the stakeholders. It will be argued that disputing is one of the 
options available to the stakeholders and is used either when other means fail or better alternatives 
are not available. Similarly, the stakeholders take their disputes to the forums which they believe 
best suit their interests (Benda-Beckmann 1984). 
! 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TELIA KlJLO 
Before describing the conflict cases, it will be useful to give a brief history of Telia Kulo. Telia 
Kulo is located in Bijauri Village Development Committee (VDC), formerly known as Bijauri 
Village Panchayat, in the nothern section of Dang Valley, at the foothills of the Mahabharat hills. 
Bijauri VDC comprises of several villages such as Kharkhare, Hadime and Doghare. Dang Valley 
is a part of Dang District in the southern part of Nepal, known as Terai. The Terai is the northern 
part of the Gangetic plain and is flat land except for some areas such as Dang Valley. Dang Valley 
158 is surrounded by the Chum and Mahahharat range of hills 
Dang Valley was at first populated solely by Tharus, who are indigenous to the Terai. From the 
14th century onwords they were ruled by  kings from outside the area. Until the middle of this 
century Dang was part of petty kingdoms and relatively independent from the center. The kings 
of this kingdom donated huge tracts of tax free land to their Brahmin priests. These priests were 
sometimesgranted wholevillagesasgifts.  Forexample,an ancestorofthe present day Majhgainyas 
received the village Majhgaon as a gift from a king. According to one estimate, the Majhgainyas 
received over 2040 ha of land as gifts in Dang District. The Majhgainyas, like other landlords, 
constructed irrigation systems to irrigate their fields. 
Telia Kulo was constructed between 150 to 200 years ago by Majhgainyas to imgate  their mustard 
crops in Hadime and Doghare. Later it was also used lo imgate rice crops. The canal was later 
extended to service other villages such as Pakare and Mairawa. And as described below, it was 
again extended in 1982, this time by  the government, to service villages such as Hemantapur, 
Bankatta and Nimuwa. Currently, the main crops during monsoon is rice and corn and during 
winter wheat and mustard. 
The Majhgainyas. known as Jamindars (landlords),  were the most powerful families in the 
command area of Telia Kulo. Though they are not as powerful as they were formerly, they are still 
influential in village politics. The traditional rivals of the Majhgainyas in Telia Kulo command 
area are the Regmis, another Brahmin family. They own land in the head sector of the command 
areaand claim that their ancestors first constructed the irrigation system. Whatever may have been 
the case,  the Majhgainyas controlled  the management  of  Telia Kulo. The actual  operation, 
maintenance, and water distribution activities were carried out by the Tharus, their servants and 
tenants,  under the  supervision  of  a Tharu Sardaruwa  (leader)  who  was  appointed  by  the 
Majhgainyas. The Majhgainyas, however, made all the decisions relating to the management of 
Telia Kulo. 
The main source of water of Telia Kulo is Guhar Khola, a perrenial river which begins from the 
hills and flows from the north to thesouth. Guhar Kholaisalso themain sourceof water forseveral 
other irrigation systems such as Malware Kulo, Manpure Kulo and Duruwa Kulo, all of which are 
located below (south of) the intake point of Talia Kulo. In accordance with the local law, which 
seems to he accepted by most of the fanners in the locality, Telia Kulo, as the most upstream of 
all these irrigation systems, has first priority (seniorrights) in acquiring water from the river. Telia 
Kulofarmersmay withdrawasmuch waterasthey wantfromtherivereventotheextentofleaving 
no water in the river for the downstream irrigation systems. This means that more intensive 
irrigation or extension of the existing command area of Telia Kulo would lessen water supply to 
the downstream irrigation systems. 
We are  not  aware of  any conflicts or disputes between  the fanners of  Telia  Kulo and the 
downstream irrigation systems over sharing water from the river. Presumably, as long as they 
received sufficient water, the fanners of these downstream irrigation systems accepted, or were 
made to  'accept',  the local law of  first  priority  to the upstream  canal. The fanners of the 
downstream canals were not totally deprived of water from Guhar Khola for three reasons. First, 
the diversion weir of Telia Kulo was constructed of brushwood which allowed water to seep 
159 through. Second, the farmers of Telia Kulo did not  expand their command area or allow the 
conversion of non-rice fields to rice fields (khef)  which would have increased demand for water. 
Third, some of the leading families in Telia Kulo had fields or relatives in villages served by the 
downstream canals. 
The alignment of Telia Kulo canal parallels Guhar Khola for a few kilometers then snakes east 
towards Lama Khola. Several villages such as Hemantapur, Bankatti and Nimuwa lie to the east 
oftheoldcommandareaofTeliaKulo, beyondLamaKhola.Thesevillageshavetheirownsources 
of water such as Sakram Khola, Dude Gajari and Lama Khola, which, however are (and were) not 
sufficient to meet their irrigation needs for winter crops. The elite fanners from these villages had 
made variousattempts foraboutacentury toacquire water from Guhar Kholatoimgatetheir fields. 
They did not succeed because it was difficult and expensive to construct a new canal, which would 
have to be at least 13  km long, on the hilly terrain between Guhar Khola and their villages. Another 
option, cheaper and more feasible, was to link their canal to the tailend of Telia Kulo. But they had 
togetpennissionfromthe farmersofTeliaKulo. However, theTeliaKulofarmers werenot willing 
to cooperate because the increased demand for water would have reduced supply to the irrigation 
systems which tapped water below the intake point of their canal. 
We are not sure whether the farmers from Hemantapur and other neighbouring villages negotiated 
with the Telia Kulo farmers (especially the Majhgainyas). It seems more likely that they used other 
means to try to acquire water from Guhar Khola and Telia Kulo. For example, in 1907 one person 
sought and received  permission from the Land Revenue Office (Ma1 Kachhari) in Dang to 
construct a canal from Guhar Khola to irrigate his fields located in the present day new command 
area of Telia Kulo. He was unable to complete the construction of the canal due to the difficult hill 
terrain. Some sixty years later, landlords of Hemantapur constructed Mani Kulo which diverted 
water first from Dude Gajari and Lami Khola and later from Chammi Sota and Jhari Bharne, all 
located close to the tail end of Telia Kulo. Some fanners from Telia Kulo allege that the real 
intention of constructing Mani Kulo was to acquire water from Telia Kulo. All they had to do was 
to dig a ditch which would link these two canals. This allegation may be true because in  1975 
leading fanners from several villages served by Mani Kulo petitioned the Zonal Commissionarand 
at his insistence, they  were able to buy water from Telia Kulo to irrigate their winter crops. 
However, after a few years they  were unable to buy water from Telia Kulo due to a violent 
confrontation over the timing of water distribution to these villages. 
Finally the leading farmers of Hemantapur and other neighbouring villages appealed for help from 
the Dean of the Sanskrit Institute to which they had donated large tracts of land. The Sanskrit 
Institute is located in Baljhundi, near Hemantapur. The dean, who lived in a house owned by one 
of these farmers, had close links with the royal family. During the king’s visit to Dang, the dean 
petitioned the king for an irrigation system which would irrigatefields in Hemantapur and several 
other villages. The king then directed the concerned ministry to implement such a project, which 
is known as Guhar Khola Irrigation Project. 
Prior to the implementation of Guhar Khola Irrigation Project (GIP), Telia Kulo was 6 km long, 
with a gross command area of 450 ha and actual irrigated area of 260 ha (I77 ha of khet and 88 of 
bari). It benefitted  340 households  in  wards six, eight and nine  of  Bijauri VDC.  After  the 
completion of the project the canal is 13  km long, with a gross command area of 700 ha and actual 
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six, eight and nine of Bijauir VDC and ward 7 of Manpur VDC. 
The irrigation systems downstream of the intake of Telia Kulo service a gross command area of 
3984 ha  in Bijauri,  Halwar,  Manpur  and  Daruwa  VDCs  and  benefit  approximately  2900 
households. 
CONFLICT CASES IN TELIA KULO/(GIP) 
We will now discuss three cases of water rights related conflicts in Dang District. The first case 
describes the conflict between fanners  of irrigation systems downstream of Telia Kulo irrigation 
system and the Department of Irrigation, more specifically the Guhar Khola Irrigation Project 
(GIP), over the rehabilitation and extension of Telia Kulo which would affect water supply to the 
downstream irrigation systems. The second case is between the existing water rights holders of 
the old command area of GIP and the claimants in the newly expanded command area. The third 
case is between existing rights holders and new claimants (owners of bhil land) within the old 
command area of GIP3. 
In the first case, the existing rights holders used political and administrative means to protect their 
water rights whereas in the second case they used the court. In the third case, the existing rights 
holders first used their power to prevent new claimants  from acquiringrights butlateraccomodated 
their claims. The new claimants in all three cases used political and administrative means to try 
to acquire water rights. Inall three cases, the new claimants were able to acquire water if not water 
rights to some extent by state intervention in the first case, negotiation and accomodation in the 
second case and accomodation in the third case. 
The Conflict Over Guhar Khola Irrigation Project 
As per the royal directive, a project was sanctioned to irrigate fields in Hemantapur, Bankatti, 
Bankatta, Nimuwa and several other villages, all east of Lama Khola, with water from Guhar 
Khola (See Map I). The project, known as Guhar Khola Irrigation Project (GIP), was initiated in 
1978. It was financed by  the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and implemented by the 
Department of Irrigation. Like many projects implemented during this period, both the donor as 
well as the implementing agencies did not take into consideration the existing water rights of the 
local communities and, as elsewhere, this led to conflicts and disputes (cf. U. Pradhan 1990). 
Many ofthe  farmer  softhe  oldcommandareaofTeliaKuloandthedownstreamirrigationsystems 
claimed that the feasibility study for the project was done in secret and that they were never 
informed  about the project, much less consulted. The farmers of  the downstream  irrigation 
systems had not objected tothe project whenafew sectionsofTeliawasrehabilitated  because they 
were ignorant about the proposed project plan. But once the construction work in the headworks 
hadbegun, afewofthemsomehowmanaged togetinfomation abouttheactual planofthe project. 
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ihsr Khols Irrigation Project Map I The original plan of the GIP was to construct a permanent concrete diversion weir at the intake 
pointofTeliaKulo, andtorehabilitateandextend thecanal.Thecommandarea wasto beincreased 
by 525  ha, east of Lama Khola, to benefit villages such as Hemantapur, Bankatti and Nimuwa. 
Land owned by the Sanskrit Institute would also benefit. None of the villagers served by irrigation 
systems downstream of the intake of Telia Kulo would benefit from the project; on the contrary, 
they would be deprived of their existing water rights. 
Traditionally Telia Kulo fanners constructedtemporary brush wood diversion weir which allowed 
sufficient water to seep through to the canals downstream of the intake point. The permanent 
diversion wier was designed such that all or most of the water could be diverted from the river, 
leaving noorvery little waterintheriverbelow it. And there wasaverystrongpossibility thatmost 
of the water would be diverted to Telia Kulo (GIP) to irrigate the newly extended command area 
because GIP was a government project funded by ILO and the irrigation system, renamed GIP by 
the government, was to be managed by the Department of Irrigation. This would considerably 
reduce water supply to the downstream irrigation systems such as Malware Kulo, Manpure Kulo 
and Duruwa Kulo whose intakes were located below the weir. The farmers of these downstream 
irrigation systems would be deprived of their traditional share of water from Guhar Khola. They 
thus protested and disputed very vigorously to protect and assert their water rights. 
In this case the major conflict of interest over water rights in Guhar Khola (and Telia Kulol GIP) 
was between the farmers of the proposed new command area and the downstream irrigation 
systems. But they do not seem to have negotiated or disputed with each other directly. The water 
rights of the downstream farmers would not have been threatened had the GIP project not been 
implemented. As we have seen earlier, all the attempts of  the fanners of the proposed  new 
command area to acquire water from Guhar Khola had failed. The fanners of the downstream 
irrigation systems therefore disputed directly with the GIP project office because it was the 
implementing agency of the project. The farmers of the old command area of Telia Kulo were not 
involved in the dispute but apparantly supported the farmers of the downstream irrigation systems 
behind the scene. According to some fanners from the old command area of Telia Kulo, they did 
not join in the dispute because they would benefit from the project (the permanent diversion weir 
and rehabilitation of the canal would reduce labour and maintenance requirement considerably) 
and they were afraid that the government may cancel the project if they protested about it. 
The fanners of the downstream irrigation systems first petitioned and protested with the project 
officials. The project officials were unable or unwilling to alter the project plan for two reasons. 
First, the project was apparantly approved by the king himself and second during this period the 
state did not tolerate any protest against 'development'  work, especially, foreign funded projects. 
Seeing no other immediate alternative, about 500 farmers of the downstream irrigation systems, 
led by local landlords destroyed part of the diversion weir. A few of the leaders were arrested for 
a day and then released on bail. The leaders then organised protests and demonstrations and sent 
petition letters to different offices and officials such as the GIP office, the Chief District Officer, 
the Zonal Commissioner Office. These officials too could or would not help them so they took the 
help of a Member of Parliament of Dang District to petition several offices in Kathmandu again 
in without success. Finally, again with the help of their Member of Parliament, they petitioned the 
cabinet to protect their water rights. 
163 The cabinet did not take a hasty decision but instead sent a high level commission to Dang to 
investigate. After the commission had submitted its report, the cabinet met to discuss what to be 
done. The cabinet had to take several factors into consideration while making its decision. The 
project could not be stopped because, as mentioned above, it was approved by the king and funded 
by ILO, and also because most of the construction work had already becn completed. At the same 
timc,  the project  would  have adversely  affected about 2900 households of the downstream 
irrigation systems and benefitted only about 855 households in the proposed new command area. 
Further, the project had created a law and order problem and needed to be.  defused. The cabinet 
finally decided to change  the plan of the project and directed the concerned ministry to do  so. The 
ministry, more specifically, the Department of Irrigation. Hydrology and Meterology, instructed 
the Guhar Khola Irrigation Project office (i) to reduce the proposed new command area from 525 
ha to 250 ha ii) to allocate water to the farmers of the new command area only for monsoon crops 
iii) not to allocate more water to the old command area than it had traditionally used and iv) to 
constructthesluicegatesoftheheadworksinsucha  way thatthe supply of waterto thedownstream 
irrigation systems would not be less than it had traditionally (sabrk)  received. 
The cabinet’s decision protected water rights of the existing rights holders (the fanners of the old 
command area of  Telia Kulo as well as the farmers of the downstream  irrigation irrigation 
systems). Most of the targetted beneficiaries of the project (730 households) were unable to 
acquirerights to water in GIP (and Guhar Khola) because the the new command area was not 
expanded as originally proposed.  Other fanners (125 households) acquired rights to water from 
the system but only for monsoon crops when they really wanted water for winter crops. 
The  farmers of the downstream irrigation systems were able to protect their water rights by means 
of  protests,  petitions  and use  of  administrative  and  political  connections.  The  fanners of 
downstream irrigation systems used these modes and forums of disputing instead of going to court 
for several reasons. The three most important reasons cited by informants are: i) The judicial 
process takes a long time and is expensive and troublesome; ii) they believed that the courts would 
decide in favour of the government (the Department of Irrigation) because it  had invested heavily 
in  the project and, moveover, the courts usually  favoured the government,  and iii) they had 
connections in Kathmandu and believed that it would be better for them and quicker if they used 
administrative and political channels instead of the judicial process. They had to resolve their 
dispute as  quickly as possible because it would he very difficult to alter the plans once the project 
had been completed. 
The cabinet’s decisions werc accepted by  all the stakeholders for the moment. The conflict 
however remained and later there were other disputes over water rights in Telia Kulol GIP. These 
disputes had been simmering for a long time and came to boiling point after the completion of the 
GIP project. We will describe two such disputes, the first between the farmers of the old and new 
command area and the second between the existing rights holders and the ‘new’ claimants in the 
old command area of  Telia Kulo. The farmers of the downsmeam irrigation  systems were not 
involved in any of these disputes. The Dispute Between the Farmers of the Old and New Command Area of GIP 
As discussed earlier, the fanners of Hemantapur and Bankatti. in the new command area of GIP, 
had made several attempts to acquire water from Telia Kulo for their winter crops because their 
water sources supplied sufficient water during monsoon but not during winter. After the Guhar 
Khola Irrigation Project was implemented, they acquired rights to water from the canal hut only 
for the monsoon crops, as per the cabinet’s decision. A few years later, they asserted claims to 
water rights for their winter crops by petitioning the Bijauri Village Panchayat (now known as 
Bijauri Village Development Committee) for help in securing their rights. 
The chairman of Bijauri Village Panchayat was an old rival of the Majhgainyas, the elites of the 
old command area, and (as politics go) a friend of the elites of the new command area of theG1P. 
The chairman was very willing to help the petitioners especially because his father had lost a court 
case some forty odd years ago in a dispute over water rights issue with the Majghainyas. 
The chairman of Bijauri Village Panchayat in collaboration with other Village Panchayat officials 
and the petitioners formed a water users’ sub-committee and alloted water to the new command 
area for winter irrigation from Telia Kulo/ GIP. The fanners of the old command area were not 
consulted about water allocation from Talia Kulo but simply informed by a letter sent by  the 
Village Panchayat office.These officials  justified their actions on the grounds that the GIP was no 
longer a ‘private’ but a government irrigation system (sarkari kulo) and, therefore, the Village 
Panchayat had jurisdiction to allocate the water. 
The farmers of the old command area were not willing to share water with the fanners of the new 
command area for winter irrigation. They believed that Telia Kulo was their irrigation system and 
had the right to decide whether and to whom they would allot water. To assert and protect their 
right, some of the farmers of the old command area, lead by the Majhgainyas. filed a case in the 
Zonal Court against a few farmers of the new command area, the water users sub-association, the 
Chairman of the Bijauri VDC, and the Bijauri VDC.  In their petition they requested the court to 
issue an injunction ordering the defendants not to acquire water from Telia Kulo. They suspected 
that thedefendants were trying toacquire water illegally fromTeliaKulo and thusinfringeon their 
traditional water rights. They argued that Telia Kulo was constructed by their ancestors and that 
they, the petitioners, have been lawfully using it for a long time. It is their property. However, the 
government rehabilitated and extended Telia Kulo and renamed it Guhar Khola Irrigation Project. 
The decision of His Majesty’s Government (of 1983) clearly states that the farmers of the new 
command area have rights to water only for monsoon crops and not winter crops. The court 
dismissed the case on procedural ground, namely that cases pertaining to property, of establishing 
ownership, should first he filed in the District Court and not directly in the Zonal Court. 
The petitioners filed an appeal against the decision of the Zonal Court with the Regional Court of 
Appeal hut they did not persue this case in the court. They gave two main reasons for this. First, 
it was expensive and time consuming to visit the court in Nepalganj. Second, they settled the 
dispute out of court for ’political’ reasons. During this period there was a nation wide movement 
to overthrow the Panchayat regime and restore democracy in Nepal. Many of the litigants were 
actively involved in this political movement and found themselves on the same side. They were 
able to discuss the dispute and reach a compromise. The chairman of the Village Panchayat and 
theVillagePanchayat were notinvolvedin thediscussion orthecompromise. Theagreement they 
165 reachedwasthatthenewcommandareawouldbeallocated  waterforupto20daysayeartoirrigate 
mustard but not wheat crops. They would get water only after the old command area had been fully 
irrigated. In exchange, the fanners of the new command area would contribute labour for repair 
and maintenance of the canal. 
In this case when other means (use of Village Panchayat by one party and of thecourt by the other) 
failed, the fanners of the new command area acquired secondary rights to water in Telia Kulo for 
their winter irrigation and the fanners of the old command area were able to protect their senior 
rights by negotiation, accommodation and compromise instead of further disputing. 
The Dispute Between Bhitwals and Other Farmers in the Old Command Area 
Telia Kulo is in the Terai, the stretch of flat land, stretching from east to West, in the southern part 
of Nepal. In Terai, land is classified either as bhir or dhanhar which is similar to thepakhokhet 
classification in the hills. Fields which are levelled and bunded and are suitable for rice cultivation 
are called khet or dhanhar. Fields which have not been levelled and bunded and in which crops 
whichdonotrequireirrigationbutdependonrain  suchascornandmilletarecultivatedareknown 
as pakho or bhit. Bhit fields may be irrigated but only for winter crops. 
In the old command area of Telia Kulo, bhit fields are located mainly between Raniyapur and 
Bansgadi and in Kashipur and Kharkhare (see Map II), i.e, between the head and middle sectors 
ofthecommandarea.Mostoftheownersofthesefieldsaresmall  fanners,mainlyrecentmigrants 
from the hills. They bought these small plots of land from the landlords, some of whom, including 
Majhgainyas, continue to own bhit fields, especially in  Kharbare and Kashipur. The farmers, 
especially the small fanners who did not own rice fields, slowly started to convert their bhit fields 
to khet, especially the fields which adjoined the canal, and to grow rice. However they were not 
alloted water by the fanners who managed Telia Kulo. 
As mentioned earlier, the Majhgainyas, the biggest landlords in the Telia Kulo command area, 
managed the irrigation system, assisted by other fanners. Water allotment in the tail end of the old 
command area of Telia Kulo, where the Majhgainyas live, was based on labour contribution for 
repair and maintenance of the canal (which in turn was based on the size of the land irrigated). 
Water was not alloted to new fields without the consent of the Majhgainyas. The Majhgainyas 
were reluctant to allow conversion of bhit fields to khet because additional land under rice 
cultivation increases demand for irrigation, especially if the monsoon is late or poor. Fanners 
depend on irrigation for flooding their fields during and just after rice transplantation. 
The bhitwals. as the owners of bhit fields are called, were not alloted water but they would 'steal' 
water to irrigate their monsoon rice crop by  breaching the canal banks adjoining their fields. 
According to the tail end fanners, the bhitwals did not close the holes they had made which led 
to loss of water and reduction in water supply to the fields in the tail end of the command area. The 
powerful landlords forcefully seized livestock or household items as fine (khara) to punish the 
fanners who were caught stealing water and the local authorities did not intervene when these 
small fanners complained against the Majhgainyas. They and the Majhgainyas believed that the 
owners of bhit land did not have rights to water from Telia Kulo. 
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(CASE IU: THE  DISPUT 
OTHER  FARMERS  IN THE  OLD  COMMAND 
AREA  OF  TELIA  KULO) 
LEGEND 
EXISTING  KHET  OF  TELIA KULO  a  KHET  CONVERTED MOM  WIT 
a VILLAGE While theMajhgainyas were still very powerful, thevillagersdidnotdareopenly convertbhitland 
to khet but they began to do so when the Majhgainyas began to show less interest in irrigation 
management and their power and influence declined. In the beginning bhit fields were converted 
by the bigger landlords, especially the rivals of the Majhgainyas. Encouraged by these examples 
and supported by a few liberal landlords and Bijauri Village Panchayat officials. other villagers, 
mainly small farmers and low castes, converted their bhit land to khet, especially after 1979 when 
the construction work for the rehabilitation and extension of Telia Kulo was initiated. 
At first the Majhgainyas tried to deter the bhitwals, especially the small fanners, from irrigating 
their newly converted khet fields by forecefully seizing livestock or household items as fine and 
by patrolling the canal.  The Majhgainyas lost interest in preventing them from diverting water 
after their authority was undermined by the Village Panchayat which intervened several times on 
behalf of the bhitwals. The bbitwals began to ‘steal water’ more openly. 
A document in our possession (presented below) supports the contention of the Majhgainyas that 
the Village Pancbayat office intervened on behalf of the bhitwals. The document was signed by 
thevillagers who hadappealed totheBijauri Village Panchayat to help them recover livestockand 
household items seized by the Majhgainyas as punishment for “stealing” water. They recovered 
the seized items with the help of the Village Panchayat and then signed this document in  1985. 
The document is an agreement (rnajuranama)  and a confession signed in 1985 by seven persons, 
four from Bansgadhi and three from Raniypur, that they bad diverted water from the canal to their 
fields4 .  They agreed to  divert water to  their fields once in five days and only for that year. They 
would not take or demand more water. They also agreed to abide by the decision of the GIP office 
regarding water allocation. They agreed to pay the fine as per traditional practice if they diverted 
more water to their fields than agreed upon. 
When (branch) canals of  Telia Kulo were being  constructed by the Guhar Khola 
IrrigafionProjectand  we convertedourprivate landfodhanhar(ricefie1ds).  The  owners 
oflandbelow us complained that theirfields in  Bansgadhi, Thangaon. andBijauri which 
traditionally received irrigation (sabik pati aayeka jagga), did nor  receive sufficient 
water and were in danger of drying up (sukha parti jan sthithi). We (the undersigned 
persons),  therefore, agree that once His Majesty’s Government completes the irrigation 
project, we will to do whatever it decides as regards water allocation (howsoever and 
to whosoever it decides to give wafer:  je  jaslai je  jasto kisimle pani dela so bamojim 
garne) and until then agree that bhit land will remin  as bhit and dhanhar as dhahnar. 
Further, we agree to divert waferforone  day everyfive days under the supervision of the 
Sardaruwa of  Telia Kulo (andincrease  thejlow of wafer  to the canalfrom Guhar Khola) 
fo see through this  year’s harvest. We will nor ask or fake  more water than this. Until the 
Irrigation Project makes another arrangement. we will not say anything andcontinue fo 
maintain bhit land as bhif.  Ifwe do nor do  as stated above and take more water, we will 
pay khara (fine)  as  per fradifionalpractice. 
In effect, the persons who signed the document seem to have been forced to accept the “customary 
rule” that the traditionally irrigated fields (sabikpati  aayeko  jaggga) had first rights to water from 
1  b8 Telia Kulo but at the same time, as the document in shows, they subtly hinted that they too could 
have rights to water from the canal, renamed Guhar Khola Irrigation, if the state (or the Project 
officials) so decided.  Similar views,  with  additional justifications, were  expressed by  the 
‘bhitwals’ during interviews with them. Informants from the tail end of the command area stated 
that these were the reasons given by the ‘bhitwals’ for diverting water to their fields. 
According to the tail end irrigators, the bhitwals justify their action by arguing that Telia Kulo is 
no longer a private canal but a public or government canal because it was rehabilitated  and 
extended by the government. Everyone with land in the command area has rights to use water from 
the government canal. As if to emphasize this point, they call the canal ‘sarkarikulo’  (government 
canal) or ‘sinchi  kulo’  (irrigation canal) instead of Telia Kulo. They further argued that if the 
farmers in the new command area have rights to the water from the canal, they too should have 
rights because they own land in the (old) command area. Moreover, since the canal passed through 
their fields, they should have rights to use water from the canal. 
Over the past few years, the tailenders have more or less accepted the fact that the bhitwalas will 
divert water to their fields, licitly or illicitly. So rather than ignore them, an attempt is being made 
to coopt them within the system. The recently converted kbet land in Kashipur are not allocated 
water officially. However, the bhitwalas are allowed to deliver water to their fields unofficially 
for fixed periods. Initially, they neither contributed nor were allowed to contribute labour for 
repairs and maintenance because the old irrigators feared that if they contributed labour, they may 
claim water rights in the future. Later they contributed labour for emergency repair of the canal. 
At first their labour contribution was not recorded but the Sardaruwa now keeps a record of their 
contribution and even demands that they contribute labour. The claims of these bhitwals to rights 
to water from Telia Kulo is gradually being accepted by the existing rights holders. The fact that 
some of these bbitwalas (i.e., the bigger farmers) are maternal relatives of  the Majhgainyas 
probably helped them secure ‘unofficial’ water rights. 
The claims of the bbitwals from Kharkhare are also being accepted, however reluctantly. The 
recently converted fields of a big landlord was allocated water first since be is an influential 
Majbgainya and had migrated to Kharkhare from the tail  end of  the command area to take 
advantage of the new section of the canal. The small landholders, recent migrants, were also 
alloted water by the water users’ committee since 1994 for three to three and a half hours per day 
to dissuade them from diverting water whenever they wanted. These bhitwals however do not 
contribute labour for system maintenance. They are thus accepted ‘freeriders’. 
Over the years the bhitwals have been able to acquire water to irrigate their rice crops, if not water 
rights. If in the beginning they ‘stole’ water and were punished for it, later they were supported 
by the Village Panchayat Office and some landlords in acquiring water. The implementation of 
the Guhar Khola Irrigation Project changed property relations, or rather perceptions of property 
relations of the bbitwals and other farmers, in that Telia Kulo was considered by them as a public 
or government canal and not a private one. The Majhgainyas were less powerful and could no 
longer enforce their rules. They and other farmers in the tail end of Telia Kulo were forced to be 
more accomodating and less contlictuous. 
169 CONCLUSION 
In the cases described above, the fanners used different means to acquire or protect water rights. 
In all three cases, fanners sought to acquire water rights not by  investment, or negotiation or 
litigation in the courts but by  political manoevering because it was the best means available to 
them. The existing rights holders were not willing to share water with other farmers. The rights 
of the prior appropriators were accepted by most of the farmers, even if there were disputes as to 
who the prior appropriators were. And the courts in most cases upheld the rights of  the prior 
appropriators. 
Another means used to justify claims to water rights, if not to acquire rights, was to subvert the 
justification for exclusive use of water by existing rights holders by insisting that property relations 
hadchanged. Thenew  claimantsarguedthatwiththeinititionoftheGuhar  Kholalrrigationproject 
by theDepartmentofIrrigation,  TeliaKulo was notaprivatecanal hutapublic orgovernment one. 
Therefore,everyone who ownedland withinthecommandareahadrightsto waterfromthe system 
and the Village Panchayat could intervene. 
In the first case, farmers from Hemantapur and neighbouring villages (the new command area of 
Telia Kulo/ GIP) sought the help of a person close to the king to sanction a project which would 
deliver watertotheir fields. Earlierefforts toacquire water fromTelia Kulo had failed butaproject 
sanctioned hy the king and implemented by the government would be difficult to oppose. In the 
second case, the farmers of the new command area asked for help from the Village Panchayat 
officials who were rivals of the Majhgainyas, the main persons who opposed sharing water with 
them for winter crops. The Panchayat officials alloted water to them for winter crops which they 
justified on the ground that Telia Kulo was no longer Telia Kulo, a private canal, but Guhar Khola 
Irrigation Project, a government canal. The bhit land owners similarly used the village Panchayat 
officialsandtbeGuhar Kholalmgation Projecttolegitimizetheircl~msto  water fromTeliaKulo. 
Another tactic they employed was to use the strategic location of their fields next to the canal and 
above the tail end of the old command area to divert water on a regular basis, especially at night 
when it was difficult to patrol the canal. 
The existing rights holders used three means to protect their water rights. In the first case, the 
fanners from irrigation systems downstream of the diversion weir of Telia Kulo/ GIP took to the 
streets, protested, petitioned, and used political and administrative channels to alter the plan of the 
GIP project. They felt that this was a better strategy than using the judicial process. Although the 
conflict of interest over water was between the fanners of downstream irrigation systems and 
farmers in the proposed extension of the GIP command area, one party could get water only at the 
cost of the other. they did not confront each other directly but used the GIP as a medium to try to 
acquire rights or protect rights. The protests, petitions and political manoeuvering by the fanners 
of downstream irrigation systems were actually directed to the farmers of the proposed new 
command area and not the Department of Irrigation. They were able to protect their existing water 
rights, thanks tothe cabinet decision. The farmers ofthe new commandarea acquired some rights, 
hut secondary to the existing rights holders. 
In the second case, the fanners of the old command area of Telia Kulo resorted to the COUR to 
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irrigation. Faced with claims that Telia Kulo was not their irrigation system but a public or state 
property, they had to establish that the irrigation system was indeed their property. Once this was 
established by the court, and thus ’legally’ accepted, they could prevent others, including the 
Village Panchayat office, from acquiring water from their system. It is unfortunate that the court 
did not give its judgement as to who ‘owns’ the irrigation system because the issue is still not 
settled. With changes in the political circumstances, they negotiated a compromise and agreed 
grant limited or secondary water rights for the farmers of the uew command area. 
In the third case, theMajhgainyas were able touse theirposition as powerful local elites toenforce 
the dominant local rules concerning water acquisition (bhit owners did not have rights to water for 
rice crops). When their power declined and the village Panchayat office intervened, they changed 
their strategy and became more accomodating. The strategy they then used was to allocate water 
or ‘allow’ the bhitwals to acquire water without officially accepting their claims to water rights 
in Telia Kulo. 
Claims to water rights have to be established and justified by reference to law. In this paper we 
have tried to show that the law that is used to  justify claims is plural, multiplex and dynamic. Law 
as understood here is  not one law, customary or state, but often a combination of both types of law 
and other normative repertoires. State law does become relevant when the actors go to court or the 
state is involved but state law is only one of the nonnative repertoires available to the actors in a 
semi-autonomous social field and sub-fields. As Moore (1978) has argued, actors in a semi- 
autonomous social field generate rules which draw upon several normative repertoires and the 
rules are not static but change over time. In the case of Telia Kulol GIP irrigation context, actors 
draw upon repertoires of perceptions of state law (and state power), of tradition (customary law), 
patronage and power, normatives ideas derived from perceptions of  cropping constraints and 
opportunities, and perceptions of property relations. Different actors generate different rules or 
use different repertoires to justify their claims, depending on which they believe best suit their 
interests. 
NOTES 
1  This paper is a revised version of the paper read at the workshop titled,  ** Water Rights, Conflict and 
Policy, “  held in Kathmandu. Jan 23-26,1966. Fieldwork for the paper was done in Dang as part of 
the Ford Foundation funded IIMW  FREEDEAL study on water rights in Nepal. We  are grateful to 
loep Spiertz for detailed comments on the paper. The paper is based on fieldwork carried out jointly 
by IIMI and FREEDEAL for the research project on ‘‘ Water Rights in Nepal”. 
Mahesh C. Pradhan was formerly Research Associate in IIMVNepal for the research project on 
“WaterRights inNepal” and is currently attached with FREEDEALon thesecond phaseofthe  study. 
Rajendra Pradhan was consulting anthropologist to IIMVNepal and is currently directing research 
on water rights in Nepal for FREEDEAL. 
Thesecases havebeen discussedelsewherefmmadifferentperspective  (R. Pradhan andU. Pradhan 
1996). The first case has also been discussed in this book by Pradhan, Haq and Pradhan. 




171 photocopied the document from Mr. JanardanPokhrel, a Majhgainya. and former leader of the Telia 
Kulo management committee. The document, dated 042/5/3  B.S., i.e. 1985 A.D., is a copy of the 
original document. According to MI. Pokhrel. this agreement was  submitted to Bijauri Village 
Panchayat Office. The seven persons who signed the agreement are all bhitwals. Presumably there 
was a complaint against them. 
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172 Dynamics in Water Rights and Arbitration on 
Water Right Conflicts: Cases of Farmer Managed 
Irrigation Systems from East Chitwan' 
A. Shukla, N. R. Joshi, G. Shivakoti, R. Poudel and N. Shrestha' 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the dynamism in water rights from the perspective of property creating 
process and its regulation and use and the mechanisms of arbitration when conflicts arise in the 
process. In  conceptualizing irrigation development as property, the paper draws  upon the  property 
framework  of  Coward (1983). The development and subsequent management  of  irrigation 
systems involve investment of resources of some form, whether capital, labor, material or know- 
how. The mobilization and investment of resources may occur in private, community or state 
management regimes. Those who make the investment develop claims on the water supply that 
is acquired and the physical structures that are  created for acquisition, conveyance, regulation and 
distribution of available supply of water. Even in the case of the state management, the investment 
of resources for imgation development has a targeted area and users to serve. 
Within the system each individual who has invested in the development and management of 
irrigation system has claim on the portion of available water supply. The collective claim on 
acquired  supply of water  is  therefore apportioned into individual's  claim.  In defining  the 
individual's claim the imgators come to a set of  agreements that creates a social contract for 
173 irrigators to realize their claims and acknowledge the claims of others. These agreements are 
apparent in the forms of rules, roles and sanctions to define, constrain and enforce individual’s 
claims (Pradhan 1987).While in some irrigation systems the set ofagreements are well articulated, 
in others there may  be little codification. The water right is therefore realized  by  both, the 
mechanismsofaccess andacquisition ofwater and also by themechanismsofits’ distribution and 
use (Ambler 1989). 
The set of agreements that the irrigators develop to define the collective and individual claims are 
often equated with the flow regimes at the source and within the system. Available supply at the 
source and that acquired in the system are temporally fluctuating, so a uniform set of agreements 
may not be adequate for variable flow regimes. The irrigators therefore develop and enforce 
differential set of agreements to define the collective and individual claims depending upon the 
flow regimes at the source and within the system. 
The claims that the irrigators develop collectively or individually have definite objective of 
directing and ensuring the benefits attainable from irrigation. The irrigators therefore make every 
effort to maximize the benefits of irrigation. Conflicts arise if moderation or alteration occur on 
thecollectiveorindividualclaimseithertolimitortoexpand  theseclaims. Often thecausesofsuch 
conflicts are man made both within the system or result from external intervention. However, they 
may also originatefromecologicalforces  working bothatthemacroandmicro1evels.Degradation 
ofcatchment may reduce dependable supply in the streams and therefore increase the constraints 
on acquisitionof supply in theirrigationsystems. Anotherexampleisdamagecaused  totheintake 
and the canal alignment due to increased flood frequency and sedimentation in the streams. Since 
changes resulting from such ecological forces have bearings on original claims of the irrigators, 
these become potential sources of conflict. 
Several informal mechanisms exist for conflict resolution. The irrigators seek assistance of formal 
legal and quasi-legal institutions when the informal institutions fail in arbitrating the conflicts 
adequately. The informal mechanisms are therefore as important as  formal institutions for conflict 
resolution. 
This paper uses two set of cases of Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) from eastern part 
of Chitwan Valley to illustrate dynamism in water rights. The conflicts arising from water right 
issues in the irrigation systems and the roles of formal and informal institutions for arbitration on 
conflicts have been discussed. While one set of cases of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa Irrigation 
Systems presents the situation in water deficit irrigation systems, another set of cases of Badgaon, 
Jivanpur and Surtana Irrigation Systems typically presents situation in water adequate irrigation 
systems. Thus the two sets of cases provide opportunity to compare the nature and dynamics of 
water rights in water adequate and water deficit irrigation systems. 
Study of available records and participants’ interview are the two techniques used in this study for 
information gathering. While participants’ interview helped understand the decision making 
174 process, the study of available records helped analyze time series of events and processes at work 
for dynamics in water rights. 
IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT IN EAST CHITWAN:  THE 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
Chitwan District is located at the south-western part of the country between longitudes 83’ 35’  to 
85’55’E and latitudes 27’ 21’ to 27045”.  About three fourth of the area of Chitwan District is 
valley with flat to almost flat land havinghigh agricultural potentials. The valley plains are located 
between Mahahharat range of mountains in the North and Churia hills in the south. The valley is 
divided between eastern and western parts by Khageri river, popularly known as eastern and 
western Chitwan. The area south of Rapti river is called Madi Valley (Fig. 1). 
Rapti river is the major water resource ofeast Chitwan. It flows fiom  north-east to south-west and 
ultimately joins theNarayani river system. Perennial rivers like Lotharand Manahari flow along 
eastern boundary while Khageri flows along western boundary. Dhongre Khola’ and Budhi Rapti 
are perennial streams which flow east to west parallel to Rapti river. Several streams flow into the 
valley from Mahabharat hills which are seasonal in character. These include Kair Khola, Pampa 
Khola, Tanhi Khola. Chatra Khola and Marta1 Khola. 
In 1993,anirrigationresourceinventoryofeastChitwan  wascompletedhy IrrigationManagemen1 
Systems Study Group (IMSSG)4 at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS), 
Rampur. The team could document the characteristics and performance of 88 fanner managed 
irrigation systems in the area. The total area under command of these irrigation systems was 
estimated to be 10,704  ha of which 6,626 ha was perennially irrigated while 4,076  ha was irrigated 
only during monsoon (Shuklaet al. 1994). In addition there are two government built irrigation 
systems in east Chitwan: Pithuwa Irrigation Scheme (600 ha) and Panchakanya Irrigation Scheme 
(600ha).  Both thesesystemsarenowmanagedhy  theusersthroughtheirwaterusers’organization. 
East Rapti Irrigation Project (ERIP)’,  a public sector irrigation development program, is being 
implemented in east Chitwan under credit assistance of Asian Development Bank. One major 
componentof the project is  to provide rehabilitation support toexistingfarmermanagedirrigation 
systems in the project area. 
Chitwan Valley is one of the recently settled areas in the country. Until 1953,  there were scattered 
settlements of Tharus and Darais who are indigenous inhabitants of the area. The valley was then 
known as “malaria hell” due lo rampant malaria epidemic. In 1953,  the government initiated 
planned resettlement program  in Chitwan under the Rapti Valley Development Project. The 
project started forest clearing and malaria eradication. In the same year floods and landslides 
175 washed hundreds of villages in the adjoining hill districts. The government therefore decided to 
encourage the flood victims to settle in the valley and clear and cultivate the land, of which they 
eventually became the owner. During 1958-59, people from all parts of the country migrated into 
the valley; however, the major influx was from adjoining Lamjung, Tanhun, Gorkha, Baglung, 
Dhading, Nuwakot and Kaski districts. 
The pattern of irrigation development in east Chitwan correlates with the settlement program in 
the valley. Of the 88 farmer managed irrigation systems inventoried in east Chitwan, 41 were 
foundtobedevelopedbefore 1953and47  wereconstructedafter 1953.Ofthe41  irrigationsystems 
constructed before 1953, 35 of the systems were initiated by Tharus and Darais while 6 of them 
were initiated by migrant communities. Contrarily, of the 47 irrigation systems constructed after 
1953,34  were found to be initiated by migrant communities while only 11 of them were initiated 
by the original settlers (Shukla et al. 1994). 
The migration into Chitwan Valley was also found to have resulted in changes in the management 
regime of the fanner managed irrigation systems in the area. The migrants took over the primary 
management responsibilitiesof many irrigation systems that were initiated by  the Tharus and 
Darais. On the basis of management responsibility, among the 88 irrigation systems inventoried 
in the area, 20 were found to be managed by  original settlers, 45 by  migrants and 23 of them 
managed collectively by original settlers and migrant communities (Shukla el al. 1994). 
TheTharus andDarais, theoriginal settlersofthearea, were thepioneer  sofirrigation development 
in the valley. Many of the irrigation systems initiated by Tharus before 1953  had their origin under 
theParganasystem ofgovernancestartedduringthe Ranaregime'.  Parganawasagroupofseveral 
maujas (village) forming an administrative jurisdiction. Each paragana was headed by apargana 
chaudhary while the mauja was headed by aZamindar. Zamindars were responsible for collection 
of land revenue from the tenants within the maujas. while the pargana chaudhary was responsible 
for collection of revenue from the Zamindars. The headquarter of Chitwan that time was Upartang 
Gadhi, now in Dahakhani VDC7. The revenue collected from each pargana was brought to the 
headquarter by the parganachaudhary. During the period of difficult transport and communication 
this governance mechanism facilitated the state in revenue collection. Eastern Chitwan that time 
wasdividedin threeparganans while western Chitwan and Madi valley had oneparganaeach.  The 
pargana chaudhary of each pargana played an important role in the development of the irrigation 
systems. They used to summon all the tenants in the pargana if labor force of a mauja was 
inadequate toconstruct acanal. Jharahi was the formofcompulsory labormobilization from each 
household, which existed among the Tharu inhabitants as customary institution. 
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The Case of Water Adequate FMIS 
The case of  Surtana, Jivanpur and Badgaon Irrigation Systems illustrate the situation in water 
adequate regime. While Surtana and Jivanpur Irrigation Systems have only one source, Badgaon 
Irrigation System has two different sources. The settings of the three irrigation systems is shown 
in  Fig.3. Other characteristics of  the irrigation  systems arc presented  in Table  I. The three 
irrigation  systems were initiated  hy  the Tharu Zamindars at diffcrent  periods.  Among them 
Surtana is the oldest while Jivanpur Irrigation System is if relatively more recent origin. 
Table 1:Physical and Socio-Economic  Characteristics of Badgaon, Jivanpur and Surtana 
Irrigation Systems. 
Badeaon  .livanour  Surtana 
Source  Budhi Rapti+Dhongre  Budhi Rapti  Dhongre Khola 
Khola 
Type of Source  Perennial  Perennial  Perennial 
Year of initial  Budhi Rapti->100 years  1958 A.D.  >lo0  years 
construction  Dhongre Khola-  1922 A.D. 
Community responsible  Tharu 
for initiation 
Tharu  Tharu 
Nature of intake  Budhi Rapti-Brushwood  Brushwood  Gabion 
structure  Dongre Khola-Gabion 
Service area  225 bigha  60  bigha  258 bigha 
No. of household  167 
beneficiaries 
40  200 
Average landholding size  0.5 bigha  0.4 bigha  1.25 bigha 
Year of major  1987 
rehabilitation  (FIWUD) 
I988  1979and 1987 
(FIWUD)  (DDC+FIWUD) 
179 surtnna  Wgation System 
Jiwanpur Jrrigatioo System 
Fig. 3.  ?he Setting of  Badgaon, Surt~na  and Jivanpur Irrigation Systems Surtana versus Badgaon Irrigation System 
Surtana Irrigation  System had  been  obtaining  water  supply  from Dhongre Khola from  the 
beginning. Badgaon had originally built the system with intake in Budhi Rapti which was later 
abandoned due to deepening of the stream at the point of obstruction. Badgaon at that time was 
asmallvillageandtheserviceareaofthesystem wasbetween 33 to40ha.Thelaborforceavailable 
was not adequate to operate the canal withthe intake in Budhi Rapti. In 1992  Badgaon users started 
digging another canal to access the irrigation supply from Dhongre Khola. They built a brushwood 
type diversion structure upstream of the intake of Surtana. The area that time was under dense 
forest and the Badgaon users dug the canal day and night through the forest. The people at Surtana 
could not figure out what was being dme  until the digging of Badgaon canal was completed and 
a diversion structure was built. 
In 1947,  Surtana users decided to shift the intake upstream of the intake of Badgaon in Dhongre 
Khola. In aflood in 1954,  Dhongre Kholachangedits  courseand entered the maincanal of Surtana. 
As a result of this event the intake point of Surtana had to be  shifted to about 600  m downstream 
of the original intake point. Once again the intake of Badgaon got to be upstream of the intake of 
Surtana. 
In yet another major flood in the area in 1970  the flood control dike in Lothar river got broken, as 
a result, a course of Lotharriverentered Dhongre Khola. The intake of Surtana and Badgaon were 
heavily damaged and it became impossible for Surtana (0 operate the canal from the same intake. 
The people of Surtana decided to shift the intake upstream near Shanti Bazar. Since the land near 
Shanti Barn  belonged to the users of Majhui Irrigation System which had its intake upstream of 
Surtana, the people of Surtana had to face resistance of Majhui users in obtaining the access to the 
new intake. For three years from 1970  to 1973  the Surtana canal could not be operated and the 
farmers could not grow paddy. Surtana users filed a case with the then Zonal Commissioner of 
Narayani Zone'.  Later with the intervention of Mr. Him Prasad Upreti, a prominent local leader 
and the then member of District Council of Chitwan, the dispute was settled and in 1973  Surtana 
could obtain access by purchasing land adjacent to the intake. This resulted  in the shifting of 
Surtana intake upstream of Badgaon. 
In  1979 the  District  Development Committee (DDC)9 of  Chitwan provided  a grant of  Rs. 
70,000.00  for the construction of a gahion diversion structure at the intake of Surtana. While the 
work  was  being  planned,  the  users  of  Badgaon  filed  a  written  petition  with  the  District 
Development Committee complaining that construction of gabion diversion structure in Surtana 
would reduce the quantity of supply at the intake of Badgaon. Another issue of conflict resulted 
from the location of intake points of Badgaon and Surtana as shown in the cadastral map of the 
area prepared in 1969.  Since the area was surveyed and mapped before Surtana shifted its intake 
upstream of Badgaon in 1973,  this became alegal document for Badgaon to justify its position. 
The issue was settled with the intervention of the Districl Development Committee (DDC). The 
agreement between  Surtana and Badgaon was written down and signed. The main provision of 
the agreement was that Surtana would allow one-sixth of the flow in Dhongre Khola at the intake to pass downstream to be used in Badgaon.  When the authors discussed with the farmers of 
Badgaon their rationale for agreeing on one-sixth  of the flow in Dhongre Khola, they expressed 
the following view: 
“Dhongre  Kholaissuchasourcerhatifyouobstructthestreamatanypointalmost 
the same quantity of  water reappears a few hundred meters downstream.  We 
objected to the  construction of the gabion diversion structure  in Sultana, not 
because this wouldconstrainoursuppl~but  to legitimize ourclaim  on thefwater) 
supply in Dhongre Khola”. 
Badgaon versus Jivanpur Irrigation System 
After the Budhi Rapti source of Badgaon was abandoned, the farmers of Fapeni village near the 
intake filled out the canal alignment and started cultivating. The farmers of Pipra village, which 
belonged to the Zamindar of Surtana, did not have access to irrigation and therefore they could not 
cultivate rice. In the absence of irrigation the tenants did not have incentive to settle in the village. 
The Zamindar of Sunana had matrimonial relations with the Zamindar of Kathar village. Kathar 
village had it’sownimgationsystem withintakeinDhongreKholaupstreamofMajhui  Irrigation 
System. The excess water from the irrigated areas of Kathar drained into Budhi Rapti near the 
abandoned intake of Badgaon. The Zamindar of Kathar was willing to provide drainage water to 
Piprabuttherewereonlyfew tenantsin Piprawho wereinaposition tomobilizetherequiredlabor 
to dig a canal to access this water. The possibility for them was to negotiate with Badgaon to use 
theoldcanalalignmentdugforBudhiRaptiintake.  In 1965  theZamindarsofSurtanaandBadgaon 
came to an agreement to allow Pipra to use the old canal to access drainage water of Kathar. The 
agreement was facilitated by the Zamindar of Kathar and the then Chairman of Kathar VDC, Mr. 
Him Prasad Upreti. Upon this agreement Pipra started obtaining drainage water from Kathar and 
Badgaon Irrigation System was renamed as Badgaon-Pipra Irrigation System. In the mean time 
Jivanpur Irrigation System wasconstructedin 1958  withintake in Budhi Rapti near the abandoned 
intake of Badgaon. 
After the flood damage to the Dhongre Khola intake in 1970, the Badgaon users needed an 
alternative source of water supply. Though they had access to drainage water of Kathar, it was not 
adequate to meet their demand. The  Zamindar of Jivanpur, MI. Chuda Mani Chaudhary, was also 
the chairman of Kathar  VDC. The users of  Badgaon decided to approach Mr. Chuda Mani 
Chaudhary to obtain access to Budhi Rapti source. Considering the sufferings of the farmers of 
Badgaon and Pipra.  Mr. Chaudhary granted them access to Budhi Rapti on the ground that 
Badgaon-Pipra would allow the drainage water of Kathar to augment the supply of Budhi Rapti. 
Upon getting access to Budhi Rapti, Badgaon-Pipra started using both, the drainage water of 
Kathar as well as water from Budhi Rapti source. Further, the Badgaon-Pipra canal at the intake 
waspassingthroughlowland whileJivanpurcanal waspassingthroughupland. Dueto topographical 
disadvantage water in Jivanpur canal would enter only after impounding of water and sufficient 
rise of water head at the intake. As a result more water was flowing towards Badgaon-Pipra canal. 
Jivanpur users were unhappy with this situation and they wanted Badgaon-Pipra to use only one 
source. They filed a written complaint with the Kathar VDC to settle the dispute. The dispute was 
I82 settled with the intervention of Mr. Chuda Mani Chaudhary. Badgaon-Pipra was allowed to use 
one-fourth of the water in Budhi Rapti and the drainage water of Kathar. A written agreement was 
reached between Badgaon-Pipra and Jivanpur to this effect in 1972. 
Despite the agreement that had put restriction on the access of Badgaon-Pipra to Budhi Rapti 
source, theactual supply in thesystem wasmorethan toJivanpurduetotheaIignmentofthecana1. 
In 1987, the Farm Irrigation and Water Utilization Division (FIWUD)"  provided assistance to 
Kathar Irrigation System for system rehabilitation, The fanners ofFapeni, whodid not have access 
toimgation,joinedtheusers ofKatharin resourcemobilization. Upon the intervention ofFIWUD 
the drainage water of Kathar, which was earlier recycled for irrigation in Badgaon-Pipra, was 
diverted10 irrigateareasofFapenivillageandsomeuplandareasofKatharthatdidnot  haveaccess 
to irrigation.  When  the  farmers of  Badgaon-Pipra  objected  to  this intervention,  they  were 
convinced by the FIWUD engineer that FIWUD would provide assistance to Badgaon-Pipra in 
rehabilitation of their system. 
In the mean time users of Badgaon-Pipra increased the cross-section of the canal to access more 
water from Budhi Rapti. In 1992 the users of Jivanpur decided to put a hume pipe culvert at the 
intake of Badgaon-Pipra to limit their access to Budhi Rapti water. This was unacceptable to the 
users of Badgaon-Pipra so they broke the pipe culvert at the intake. This raised a serious dispute 
between Jivanpur and Badgaon-Pipra. The users of Jivanpur filed  a written petition with the 
Kathar VDC. The dispute was settled with the intervention of  Mr. Shyam Upreti, who was 
chairman of Kathar VDC. A written agreement  was reached between Badgaon-Pipra and Jivanpur 
statingthat (i) Jivanpur wouldget two-third andBadgaon-Pipraone-thirdofthe water at theintake 
inBudhi Rapti, (ii)all theresources for the subsequent repair andmaintenanceof theintake would 
be jointly mobilized by the users of both the systems, and (iii) that if government agencies decide 
to provide  support for the construction  of permanent intake the required resource  would be 
mobilized by both the systems proportional to the area under irrigation. 
FIWUD provided support to Badgaon-Pipra in rehabilitation of the system in 1987. A grant of Rs. 
60,000 was provided by FIWUD and resources equivalent of Rs. 15,000  in terms of cash and labor 
were mobilized by the users, which was utilized in the construction of a gabion intake at Dhongre 
Khola and in the improvement of water distribution structures. Since Dhongre Khola intake of 
Badgaon-Pipra was functional. the users agreed to one-third of the water of Budhi Rapti while 
negotiating with Jivanpur in 1992. 
In a major flood in the Rapti river in 1993 the  joint intake of Jivanpur and Badgaon was washed 
away and a course of Budhi Rapti entered Dhongre Khola from this point. After the flood, interim 
support was provided by ERIP for the rehabilitation of irrigation systems in the area. Badgaon- 
Pipra and Jivanpur could temporarily rehabilitate the system for operation. Once again the dispute 
for water share at the intake in Budhi Rapti arose. Both the systems have been identified for 
rehabilitation  support under ERIP but  due to  the dispute  of  water  share  at the  intake,  the 
rehabilitation works could not be started. Badgaon-Pipra had been claiming more water at the 
intake on theground thatthereismoreareaunder  irrigationin Badgaon-Piprathan Jivanpur. While 
Jivanpur had been stating its position as per the written agreement of 1992 that had granted them 
access to two-third of the water in Budhi Rapti. 
I83 In December 1995, ERIP issued a written notice to both Badgaon-Pipra and Jivanpur to settle their 
dispute of water share at Budhi Rapti intake or else the proposed rehabilitation support would be 
cancelled. Both the systems have come to an agreement with the intervention of Kathar VDC on 
the following clauses: (i) that Jivanpur and Badgaon would agree to share half of the water each 
at the intake provided a permanent diversion structure be built at the intake, (ii) the resources 
requiredm be mobilized internallyfor the construction of permanent intake would be proportional 
to service area of both the systems, and (iii) that for subsequent repair and maintenance of the 
intake the resources would be mobilized equally by both the systems. 
Though the dispute between Badgaon-Pipra and Jivanpur is settled some disagreements still 
persist. One of the issues concerns the nature of the permanent intake. Both the systems have been 
demanding cement-concrete diversion structure while the engineers ofERIPhave been proposing 
a gabion box type overflow weir. ERIP has adopted the policy of not supporting the construction 
of cement-concrete diversion structure as it could reduce the available supply to the downstream 
system and become a source of potential conflict. 
The Case of Water Deficit FMIS 
To illustrate the situation in water deficit regime, a case study of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa 
irrigation systems is presented. The source of supply of the three systems is Pampa Khola which 
is a seasonal stream. The people in the area reported that the dry season flow in Pampa Khola has 
been decreasing. During flash flood, the stream brings massive amount of coarse sediments 
including sand, boulders and pebbles, as a result of this the bed level of Pampa Khola has been 
rising. This fact as well as deforestation and uncontrolled land clearing in the catchment area have 
resulted in changes in the hydrology of this stream. The locations of the three irrigation systems 
includedin thiscasestudy areshown inFig. 4.  Among the threesystems, Pampais the oldest. Other 
characteristics of the three systems are presented in Table 2. 
The areas of the three systems are among the recently settled areas in Chitwan Valley. In 1961 ex- 
armymen who wereearliersettledacross theRaptiriver were brought tosettlein thisarea, because 
the land of their earlier settlement was acquired by the Royal Chitwan National Park. During tbat 
time the forest in this area was being cleared by the Timber Corporation. During the Royal visit 
of the king to Bharatpur, theex-armymen requestedbim to grant them permission to use tree roots 
and other leftover timbers. They were granted Royal permission to utilize the leftover forest 
productsin 1067  haofland. They soldfirewoodandotherforestproductsfrom  thisareaandraised 
a fund of  Rs. 1.5 million. They utilized this money to support development work in the area 
including construction of roads, schools, drinking water supply schemes and irrigation systems. 
Initial funding for the construction of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa Irrigation Systems came from 
this ex-armymen fund. 
184 Table 11: Physical and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa 
Irrigation Systems. 
Pampa  Chipleti  Chympa 
Source  Pampa Khola  Pampa Khola  Pampa Khola 
Type of source  Seasonal  Seasonal  Seasonal 
Year of initial construction  1967  1971  1969 
Community responsible  Migrant  Migrant  Migrant 
for initiation 
Nature of intake  Permanent  Brushwood  Brushwood+ 
(Gabion bos)  Gabion 
Service area  105 bighas  217 bighas  135 bighas 
No. of household  96  20 I  55 
beneficiaries 
Year of  major rehabilitation  1991  1981  None 
(CSIP/ADB-N) 
Origin of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa Irrigation Systems 
Budi Kuloi'. Pakakdibas Kulo and Badara Kulo were developed by the Tharus and existed in the 
area prior to the initiation of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa Irrigation Systems. In  1967 the ex- 
armymen fund provided Rs. 40,000forthe construction of Pampahigation System. Thegrant was 
utilized  in contracting out the work of canal construction  in the difficult portions  and in the 
construction of intake. And all the ex-armymen settled in the area provided free labor in digging 
the canal. In  1969 a brushwood diversion  structure was  built  in Pampa  Khola, about 50 m 
downstream of present intake and water supply was obtained to irrigate 20 ha of land. In 1970  the 
intake was shifted upstream of the original intake but it was again washed away in  a flood. In 1976 
the users decided to dig a tunnel through hard rocks and they shifted the intake further upstream. 
The next year the users of the system were successful in obtaining a grant from the Community 
Surface Irrigation Program (CSIP)'* of the Agricultural Development Bank (ADBN)  which was 
utilized in the construction of permanent intake and in lining a portion of the main canal. The total 
cost was Rs. 246,000 of which 60 percent was the grant of the government, 30% was provided by 
ADBN as credit and 10 percent equivalent of  labor was mobilized by  the beneficiaries. The 
service area of the system increased to 70 ha after the improvement under the CSIP program. 
185 Chipleti Irrigation System was initiated in 1971 with the intake in Pampa Khola, upstream of the 
earlier intake of Pampa Irrigation System but the system could not be operated for three years. In 
1973 a new intake was built in Kali Khola to augment the water supply. Free labor was mobilized 
by  the users of the system and a grant of Rs. 90,000 from the ex-armymen fund was utilized in 
contracting out the work of digging the canal in difficult portions. These two attempts were not 
very successful and the system remained defunct from 1973 to 198 1. The fanners  in Chipleti were 
growing maize and millet while in the fanners in the adjoining Pampa Irrigation System were 
growing rice which was amatter of humiliation for the users of Chipleti. In 1981 an ex-annyman, 
MI. Chuda Bahadur Pandey, who had training in the engineering division of the Indian Army, re- 
initiated the construction of the system. It took 44 days for 86 men to reconstruct the system. The 
system could be operated to bring 48 ha of land under irrigation. Three years later the District 
Development Committee the provided a grant of Rs. 12,000  and 11 units of gabion boxes for the 
rehabilitation of the system. 
After the construction of the permanent intake of the Pampa Irrigation System the supply of water 
at the Chipleti intake was reduced. Though Chipleti had another intake in Kali Khola, the available 
supply was not adequate to meet the demand for water. 
A few Chepang households were irrigating about 5 ha of land from a small canal called liudi Kulo 
with intake in Jethar Khola, upstream of Pampa and Chipleti Irrigation Systems. The drainage of 
this system was utilized by Chipleti for irrigation. To improve the canal and intake in Jethar Khola, 
the  Chepang  households  obtained  a  credit  support  of  Rs.  9,000 from  the  Small  Farmers 
DevelopmentProject(SFDP)  of ADB/N. In themean timeanunderground water tank for drinking 
watersupply scheme was builton thebankofJetharKholawhichreducedtheflowinJetharKhola. 
The Chepang households decided to move their intake upstream in Pampa Khola in 1978.,As  a 
result of this change the water supply in Jiudi canal increased tremendously. 
From  1985 onwards, the users of  Chipleti  Irrigation  System obtained water  for dry  season 
irrigation  upon  request  to the Chepang  households.  The users of  Chipleti  had  realized  the 
importance of this water because it was valuable for their wheat irrigation. In 1990 an agreement 
was reached between the users of Chipleti and the Chepang households that resulted in regular 
access of Chipleti to Jiudi Kulo. In turn the users of Chipleti paid Rs. 20,000 to the Chepang 
households which they utilized topay backthe loan from SFDP. After this agreement the Chepang 
households became regular users of the combined Jiudi-Chipleti Irrigation System. 
Cyampa Irrigation System was initiated in 1969. During the construction of the Pampa Irrigation 
System in 1967 the users of Cyampa had also contributed cash and labor hut upon completion of 
theconstruction, they were deniedaccess to irrigation. ShantaBahadurThapa, aprominent fanner 
from the area, decided to invest his own money to construct Cyampa Irrigation System. In 1969 
heinvested a sumofRs. 12,000and theusersofCyampacontributedfree labor fortheconstruction 
of the canal. It took nearly one month for 45 men to dig the canal and construct an intake in Pampa 
Khola. Water supply was obtained for irrigation of 53 ha of land in the command area of the 
Cyampa Irrigation System. In 1970  the ex-annymen fund provided a grant of Rs.  6,000  which was 
187 utilized to partlay reimburse theexpenses ofMr. Thapa.Thesystem waslaterexpandedtoirrigate 
90 ha of land. 
Pampa versus Chipleti Irrigation System 
In 1971 when the initial construction of Chipleti Irrigation System took place. its intake was 
upstream of Pampa Irrigation System. Pampa moved its intake upstream in search of relatively 
more stable intake point. In  1991 when ADB/N provided rehabilitation support to Pampa, the 
major portion of resources was spent in the construction of the intake structure. The objective was 
to divert maximum possible amount of water horn Pampa Khola. 
Though Chipleti  had two intake points in Pampa and Kali  Khola the available supply was 
inadequate to meet the demand. The users of Chipleti negotiated with Jiudi Kulo of Chepangs to 
access more assured water supply. 
On the day of  July 7, 1992 when the new intake of Pampa Irrigation System was inaugurated, the 
usersofPampaorganizedafeastattheintake.  Duringthefeast IheusersofPampadecidedtobreak 
the upstream intake of Jiudi-Chipleti system. The position of Pampa was that with the access of 
Chipleti in Jiudi Kulo the demand of water would increase which would reduce the supply at the 
intake of Pampa Irrigation System. 
When the intake of Jiudi-Chipleti was damaged, the users of  this system were transplanting 
monsoon rice. As the water supply in the canal ceased, the users went to the intake and found the 
intake broken. The users committee of the Jiudi- Chipleti sent a written message to the users 
committee of Pampa to enquire into the matter. When they got no response a written complaint 
was filed in the Birendranagar VDC asking for compensation of Rs. 52,820 for four days of delay 
in transplanting ricedue to thedestruction ofthe intake. TheVDC functionariescouldnot arbitrate 
in the matter and referred the case to the District Administration Office at Bbaratpur. The District 
Administration Office organized several hearings from both the parties. While the case was still 
pending at the District Administration Office, the users of Pampa filed a petition at the District 
Court of Chitwan on  the grounds that the construction of  Jiudi  Kulo was initiated after the 
construction of Pampa and therefore it would reduce the prior rights of Pampa Irrigation System 
in Pampa Khola. 
On June 17, 1994 the District Court gave the verdict in favor of Pampa Irrigation System. The 
verdict of the court stated that until 1978 the intake of Jiudi Kulo was from Jethar Khola and that 
it was moved to Pampa Kholaonly after 1978. Sincethis changc was made after the construction 
of intake of Pampa Irrigation System, it may reduce the supply available for Pampa Irrigation 
System in Pampa Khola. 
The users of Jiudi-Chipleti Irrigation System challenged the verdict of the District Court in the 
AppellateCourtinHetaudawheretheverdict  WasinfavorofJiudi-Chipleti IrrigationSystem. The 
188 new verdict stated that the existing intake ofJiudi Kulo is 1.5 !un upstream of the intake of Pampa, 
sotheissueraisedby Pampathatit wouldreducethesupplyinPampaKholaat  theintakeofPampa 
Irrigation System is not justifiable. The case has been appealed in the Supreme Court, 
Pampa versus Cyampa Irrigation System 
During the initial construction of Pampa Irrigation System in 1967, the present users of Cyampa 
Irrigation System had also contributed cash and labor hut they were denied access to irrigation 
from this system. They then began to construct Cyampa Irrigation System, locating its intake 
downstream of Pampa Irrigation System. 
The conflict between Pampa and Cyampa irrigation systems arose when the construction of a 
permanent intake structure was initiated in Pampa Irrigation System in 1991 under ADB/”s 
support. Until that time Pampa Irrigation System had brushwood diversion structure at the intake. 
While the construction  of the new intake was going on, the users of Cyampa filed a written 
complaint with the Birendranagar VDC and District Administration Office in Bharatpur. When 
the authors enquired into the rationale of their complaint, they stated 
“We  saw cerneniconcrete diversion structure being built with almost6feetdeep  foundation. 
A siructure of  this nature was sure ro reduce our share of water in  Pampa Khola ’I. 
The Birendranagar VDC involved the officials of ADB/”s  Small Farmers Development Project 
in Birendranagarin thearhitration. Anagreement, which was writtendown, was reachedonMarch 
10, 1992. As per the agreement, gabion boxes would be used instead of concrete to construct the 
diversion structure at the intake and Pampa Imgation System would provide water to Cyampa to 
irrigate wheat crops. Since then if  water is needed in the Cyampa Irrigation System, the users’ 
commitee apply in writing to Pampa, stating the area to be irrigated and the actual imgation time 
required. The users’  committee of  Pampa  validate  the  request  of  Cyampa through  actual 
inspection. If the request is found genuine, Cyampa is given water for irrigation. When the users 
of Cyampa were enquired about this arrangement they stated that the supply made available by 
Pampa was never adequate. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper started with  a brief conceptual framework of  irrigation development as property 
creating process, the process of defining and realizing claims on  irrigation and therefore the 
emergence of water rights. The later part of the paper dealt with a historical account of irrigation 
development in east Chitwan that laid the context for initiation of FMIS in the area. To  illustrate 
the dynamism of water rights and conflict resolution mechanisms, two sets of case studies of 
FMIS, representing water deficit and water surplus conditions, were used. The two sets of cases 
189 illustrated the processes of negotiation, re-negotiation, claims and conflicts in  acquisition and 
sharing of water that occur as a result of changes, whether internally induced or resulting from 
external forces. The external forces in  the context of the study area were Occurrence of flood, 
change in the flow regimes of  the streams and structural changes in the nature of  diversion 
structurescaused by external intervention. The internal forces we.reincreasein population and area 
under cultivation which increased demand for irrigation. From the two sets of cases, conflicts 
emerging from the claims on irrigation as well as the hierarchy of institutions and mechanisms 
existing for arbitration on conflicts were identified. 
The resettlement program in the area was initiated in 1953 under the Rapti Valley Development 
Project. As the population increased the demand for irrigated agriculture also increased. People 
started building new irrigation systems to exploit the existing water resources. At the same time, 
the need  for expansion  of  irrigated  area  of  existing systems  also increased.  This  induced 
constraints on existing water resources as well as on water supply within the system. When the 
magnitude of constraints increased such that the benefits the users were enjoying were adversely 
affected, they started making efforts to define, establish and protecttheirrights. Whileestablishing 
their rights, several kinds of differentiation and amalgamation took place. The magnitude of 
constraints were further enlarged by the occurrence of floods and reduction in dependable flow 
regime in the streams.  In  attempts to ease the constraints, changes were brought in the physical and 
structural characteristics of irrigation systems. Traditional brushwood diversion structures were 
replaced  by  gabion  box  intake  structures.  Such changes further resulted  in changes  in  the 
relationship between upstream and downstream irrigation systems as regards access to water. 
Conflicts emerged when the attempts to protect rights in one system were found to put limits on 
the benefits realized by others. This is apparent form the case of Pampa, Chipleti and Cyampa 
irrigation systems where construction of permanent intake structure in Pampa irrigation system 
became a source of conflict. The conflict between Badgaon and Jivanpur and that between Pampa 
and Chipleti was due to the attempts made to expand access to the water source. Attempts to gain 
access to upstream intakes were also made through negotiation with the upstream systems. The 
amalgamation of Jiudi withchipleti Kulo was aresult of the attempt to expand access to  upstream 
system. 
The two sets ofcasesofFMIS alsoillustrated the hierarchy ofmechanismsthatexist  for arbitration 
and mediation of conflicts. There are multiple levels of informal mechanisms before people seek 
the intervention of formal  legal andquasi-legal institutions. The initial attemptsfor arbitration was 
found to take place among the users. As apparent from the case of Pampa and Chipleti irrigation 
systems, the users of Chipleti attempted to seek explanation from Pampa when their intake was 
damaged. The second  stage of mediation  was  found to take place with  the involvemenl of 
prominent individuals in the community, who may be either village elders or leaders of local 
political units. The role of local feudal like Zamindars who initiated the FMIS  have also been 
important. The conflict between Surtana and Majhui irrigation systems and that between Badgaon 
and Jivanpur were settled with the help of such individuals. 
190 People seek the intervention of legal and quasi-legal institutions only when the informal conflict 
resolution mechanisms fail. The role of the Village Development Committee (VDC) has been 
important as a quasi-legal institution in resolution of irrigation related conflicts. The VDC Act of 
1991 has empowered the VDC to look into the matters of irrigation development and resolution 
of irrigation related conflicts. The  VDC has authority to mediate between conflicting parties and 
impose fines and penalties in case of defaults. 
In case of conflicts not getting settled at the VDC level, they were found to be referred to the 
District Administration Office. This was observed in case of Pampa and Jiudi-Chipleti irrigation 
systems where the Birendranagar VDC referred the case to the District Administration Office in 
Chitwan when the conflict could not be resolved at the VDC level. The intervention of court in 
conflict resolution was sought as a last resort. The conflict of Jiudi-Chipleti and Pampa irrigation 
systems was brought to the court only because other mechanisms for conflictresolution. including 
the VDC and the District Administration Office, failed to resolve the conflict adequately. 
The two set of cases presented in this paper limited the explanation to dynamics in the water rights 
only at  the source  and ignored the issues resulting from individuals’ claims within the system. The 
authors plan toextend thestudy furtheranddocumentthe processes ofrealizing waterrights  within 
the system. 
IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY ISSUES 
One of the important inference drawn from the two sets of cases is that water right is a continuous 
flux changing over time because of continuous processes at work. There are multiple dimensions 
to water rights. Even drainage water from the upstream system could be the potential source of 
supply for the downstream systems. This has implication for the development and management 
ofinigation resources. Therelationshipamong theirrigation systems in terms oftheir rights at the 
source, if ignored during external intervention, may result in conflicts. Thus, while planning 
intervention in the irrigation systems, existing access to different sources and the inter-system 
watertransfermust  be accounted forand thepossibleeffects ofintervention on existingrightsmust 
be assessed in advance. 
Another issue relates to the ecological forces responsible for water right dynamism at a macro 
level. Particular to the cases described in this paper, occurrence of floods and changes in the 
dependable flow regimes of the streams have influence on the existing water rights. The causes 
of these forces and therefore the means of their control, lie outside the boundary of the imigation 
systems, hence multi-sectoral approach in catchment protection, forest conservation, erosion 
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The authors are Faculty and Members of Irrigation Management Systems Study Group at the 
Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS). Rampur, Chitwan. Nepal. 
Khola in Nepali means river or stream. 
Irrigation Management Systems Study Group (IMSSG) is a professional group of faculties at the 
Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science (IAAS) involved in the study of issues related to 
irrigation development and management. 
East Rapti Irrigation  Project (ERIP) is a public sector irrigation development program. being 
implemented in east Chitwan under credit assistance of Asian Development Bank. The objectives 
of the project are: i) rehabilitation of farmer managed irrigation systems in the project area. ii) 
construction floodcontroldikeandrivertraininginRapti  river,iii)constructionofapproximately 
60 kmof village and link roads and iv) promotion of shallow tube well program in the areas where 
surface irrigation is not available. 
Rana regime was established by Prime Minister Jang Bahadur in 1846 A.D. The Rana families 
ruled Nepal during most of 19th and first half of  20th century. 
Village Development Committee (VDC) is an elected body at the village level. 
Nepal is divided into 14 Zones and 75 Districts; each district forms one administrative boundary. 
District Development Committee (DDC) is an elected body at the District level. 
The Farm Irrigation  and Water  Utilization Division (FIWUD) was started in  1973 under the 
Department of  Agriculture to take up construction of irrigation schemes less than 500 ha in Terai 
and less than 50 ha in the hills. In 1987 FWUD  was merged with the Department of Irrigation. 
Kulo in Nepali means irrigation canal or irrigation system. 
The Community Surface Irrigation Program  (CSIP)  is the credit  and subsidy  based  surface 
irrigation development program of the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN).  Of the 
total cost of an  irrigation project, 60% subsidy in the capital cost is provided by the government, 
30% is provided by ADBN as credit and 10%  equivalent is home by the beneficiaries through 
compulsory labor mobilization. 
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193 Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation: 
A Case Study in Upper Bagmati Basin' 
Ajayu Dixi? 
INTRODUCTION 
The use, allocation and management of water in the Bagmati Basin occur under the influence of 
natural,  societal  and  other factors.  Population  growth,  expanding  urbanization,  growth  of 
polluting industries, rising land prices, ineffective governmental policies, overlapping and often 
contradictory  legislation  and  policies  and  declining  motivation  for  collective actions have 
exacerbated the stress on water use and alloction. Competition among water uses is rising and 
conflicts have started to emerge, particularly during the dry season. Domestic and industrial 
wastes are rarely treated; instead they are discharged raw into water bodies. Untreated wastes 
greatly lower the quality ofriver  water andjeopardize the  health of populations living downstream 
orclose to the source ofdischarge. Thecost ofwaterpollution totheenvironment and to thesociety 
is high, with rising cases of water brone diseases. One major consequence is increased stress on 
the social fabric, including conflicts over the allocation of safe water. 
The exact nature of the competition and of the stress that will emerge, however, is not adequately 
understood. Also the impact cannot be predicted with accuracy as the institutional processes are 
in different stages of  evolution. Generally, the quality and quantity of water supply are on the 
decline both at local and regional levels. Though the effects are harsher for those at social and 
economic margins, the impacts pervade across the social spectrum. This situation is an outcome 
of the complex interplay between the physical nature of the resources, the role of the formal state 
agencies, government departments and informal fanners and community groups,  including the 
increasing litany of acts and regulations. Though several initiatives on policy formulation have 
been made, in the current socio-political milieu, they have not been translated into action and have 
failed to show results. The outcome has been further rising competition over use of water, lack of 
effective formal management, encroachment of customary norms and the degradation  of the 
quality of water. 
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k 20133 An understanding of the processes by  which water is allocated to meet various needs is important 
if improvements are to be made and a decent level of service is to be delivered regularly. The 
problem of deficient services does not, however, stem from the fact that the quantity of water is 
lacking or that the technology for tapping water is not available. Rather, the problem is rooted in 
the absence of a social and institutional framework to ensure that services are delivered. In many 
cases, the rate of deterioration is fast, and the challenges of improving the services appear to be 
even more intractable. A solution will come from an approach aimed at setting institutional 
processes on track rather than one honing purely technological tools. 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary  objective of  this paper  is to obtain insight  into the society-water interface in 
Kathmandu Valley which is synonymous with the Upper Bagmati Basin, and to offer some 
explanations of the nature of the emerging competition for water. More specifically the paper will 
attempt to provide some insights into the issues governing inter-sectoral allocation of water with 
respect to a) different water uses, b) the nature of both formal and customary water rights, and c) 





the status of different water uses; 
the nature of the relationship between customary and statutory water rights; 
the nature of the competition for, and conflicts over, access to and use of water; and 
the role of institutions in water management; 
The study is based on field study of two sites in the Upper Bagmati Basin, Mahankalphant and 
JorpatiCokarna region northeast of Kathmandu city. a review of “gray literat~re”~  and on an 
analysis of secondary information. The study of Mahankalphant aimed to understand how the 
economic and political strength of  the capital city is leading to encroachment of the customary 
rights of the population in terms of access to water. In Jorpati. the other case study site, efforts were 
made  to  explore interface of  customary practices  with  state-led and commercial  initiatives. 
Because decisions about management occur within a complex social context, discussion are made 
keeping the largerframeworkin the background. Ethno-ecological methods were used in both case 
studies. It must be mentioned that sources are disparate and data inconsistent. In this report, the 
area occupied by  Kathmandu Valley will be referred to as the Bagmati basin and the case study 
region as the sub-basin.  The GokamafJorpati region will be referred to as Jorpati. 
This paper first describes the case study sites and the nature of the water resources base. It then 
dwells on the types of institutions both in the formal and informal sectors that manage water. The 
analysis of the drinking water sector is done in greater detail because of its increasing dominance. 
The Acts, Rules and Regulations are dicussed next. The description of the nature of the sectoral 
uses is followed by analysis of the changes and impacts in relation to the case studies. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn. It is hoped that the finding will assist in the identification of options for 
the management of the inter-sectoral allocation of  water. 
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I96 This paperisonepartofan on-goingstudy ofthechanges thatareoccurringin Kathmandu.Itaims 
at some understanding of the complex social, physical and historical/political factors that are at 
work shaping water use and availability in the Valley. It is not about comprehensive literature 
review, elaborate field investigation or exhaustive scientific modeling. If it stimulates funher 
questions to refine the knowledge of the complexity, this effort will have been amply rewarded. 
THE RESEARCH AREA 
The region analyzed in this research is the Upper Bagmati Basin northeast of Kathmandu city 
including Mahankalphant and Jorpati villages. This region was selected for study because of its 
long history of state-led interventions and the current competition between at least four water use 
sectors: agriculture (irrigation), hydropower, drinking water for urban and rural communities as 
well as industry (carpet factories).  The major water use elements analyzed are the Sundarijal 
Hydropower  Plant;  a  farmer managed  irrigation  system  at Mahankalphant  in  Sundarijal; 
Kathmandu’s drinking water production system in the sub-basin: surface water and groundwater 
systems;anagency developedimgation systemandcarpetfactoriesinJorpati.  Referencesarealso 
made to the rural drinking watersupply systems in the sub-basin and to riparian uses. The Bagmati 
basin and sub-hasin, the case study areas and the systems elements which were studied are shown 
in Figure l(a) and I (b). Water use elements are shown schematically in Figure 2. 
In Sundarijal, a hydropower plant has been built and water from its tail race feeds Kathmandu’s 
water supply system. A small patch of  irrigated land called Mahankalphant is situated on the 
eastern bank of the Bagmati, opposite the power plant in Sundarijal. The land supports about 50 
families of diverse ethnic composition, though the majority are Tamangs. Mahankalphant is a 
typical rural community though it is located in the Valley. The other site analyzed in this study is 
lorpati, which is closer to Kathmandu and therefore, more influenced by the creeping urbaniza- 
tion. The Jorpati suburban region has registered gradual changes in its land-use pattern as new 
settlements, particularly along the road corridor have developed. A number of carpet factories, 
which use the municipal as well as groundwater sources, have been built in the area. 
The Jorpati region is served by  the imgation barrage at Gokama. The barrage, built by  the 
Department oflrrigation(Do1). imgatesfmlandon  the westandeastbanksoftheBagmati River. 
The total command area was 152 ha, 55 ha of which is on the eastern side. The eastern canal is 
managed by the farmers and operates intermittently, while the western one is  no longer functional. 
The western canal is filled with liquid and solid wastes in several places and has been encroached 
upon by the road and factories. Besides the eastern canal, other smaller, temporary diversions also 
extract water from the river and use it for irrigation. The irrigation canal at Jorpati  was also used 
for other purpose. Water powered, cereal grinding mills, known as gkuttas, were installed  in 
places where the gradient of the canal changed suddenly. In the 1950s there were I0 or 12  ghattus 
in the canal at lorpati. With the increasing availability of electricity and ground cereal in the 
market, the operation of these ghuttus declined, and has long ceased to operate. 
197 SCHEMATIC  OF  WATER  USERS  IN  UPPER  BAGMATI  BASIN 
Bignuti Dam 1930% L 
I  I 
and" (1960s) 
Mg  Water to D~chi  and 
Bbrdrnbsr 1970s (DWSS) 
Gokarna Iniptioo 
Bnmp 1960s @Or) 
Figure 2. Schematic Drawing ot  Water Use Elements The Resource Base 
The Bagmati River originates in the south-eastern flanks of Shivapuri Hills which form the part 
of Mahabharat Hills. Fed by rainfall and  base-flow, the river drains a total area of 3710 km2 in 
Nepal, and then joins the Ganga river in India.  Its upper basin, where Kathmandu Valley is 
situated, occupies an area of 662 km2 until the river flows out of the valley at Chovar. The valley 
and its inhabitants are dependent on the nvers of the monsoon-fed basin for meeting all their water 
needs.  Rain falls in the basin during the pre-monsoon months of  April and May, during the 
monsoonmonths(hetween1une  toSeptember), andin  winter. Almost IOpercent oftheannual rain 
which falls in the Bagmati Basin occurs during the monsoon months. In a year, Kathmandu Valley 
receives amean  rainfall of about 1 Wmm,  but this figures varies between 1  100  and  2500  mm from 
year to year. 
TheflowoftheBagmatiRiverisdirectlyinfluenced  by therainfallpattem, andit isduring the four 
months of the monsoon that almost 80 percent of all run-off occurs. At Chovar, the mean annual 
flow of the Bagmati is about 15.5 m3/s.  Run-off is governed by the volume, duration and intensity 
of rainfall, and evaporation. Even during the monsoon, fluctuations are high and the flow does not 
show a direct correlation with rainfall. In  the dry season, the minimum average flow at Chovar is 
0.51 m3/s.  The flow at Chovar does not, however, measure actual discharge; upstream extraction 
takeaway someoftheflow.  Interceptionofreturnflowfromthetributariesand  themainriverand 
reuseofthatflow  is frequent and widespread.Thevolumeofwaterthususeddependsonhowmuch 
land can be irrigated and the availability of water. The latter is particularly limiting in the dry 
months when use exceeds availability. Assessment of actual use of return flow and consequently 
obtain the estimate of the natural flow is, therefore, c mplex  Because the volume used is not 
monitored, and water tax records are not maintained,  it IS almost impossible to quantify the 
amount of water used by the irrigation sector. 
The floor of the valley has resulted in a geo-hydrological formation with both shallow and dee 
aquifers. The three deep groundwater aquifer districts are the northern, central and southern. 
Because only the northern aquifer is hydraulically connected to the surface sources, it exhibits 
some natural recharge characteristics. The sub-basin investigated inthis  report includespart of the 
northern aquifer. In the southem and the central aquifers, which are both overlain by a thick layer 
of clay, natural recharge is low.  The occurrence of shallow groundwater is widespread, but the 
quality of groundwater fluctuates seasonally and varies by  location. In many cases, shallow 
groundwater is unsuitable for consumption.  Since the 1980s, groundwater, from both deep and 
shallow aquifers has played an important role in fulfilling water requirements  in the Bagmati 
basin. 




INSTITUTIONS MANAGING WATER 
The formal institution present in the sub-basin is His Majesty's Government of Nepal whose 
policies and programs are executed through departments and para-statals. The four departments 
which are directly related to the use of the water resources come under the Ministry of Water 
Resources: the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS), the Department of Irrigation 
201 (DoI), the Groundwater Resources Development Board (GWRDB), which monitors groundwater 
investigation andexploitation, and theDepmment of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM), which 
is in charge of the collection of hydrological and climatological data. 
Another organization is the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA),  a para-statal chaired by the 
Minister of  Water Resources  and  responsible for hydro-power  development  and  electricity 
supply. NEA owns and operates the hydropower plant at Sundarijal. Though in principle, the Do1 
is responsible for all irrigation activities within the valley, only a few schemes were built by the 
department. In practice, most irrigation schemes are built and managed by farmers with little or 
no linkage with the DoI. These farmer-built systems have existed for centuries and generally did 
not find salience in formal discourse till the early 1980s. 
Theagency that hasthemajorroleintheuseandmanagementofwaterofthesub-basinistheNepal 
Water Supply Corporation (NWSC). It is a para-statal established under the Ministry of Housing 
and Physical Planning (MHPP) by the Nepal Water Supply Corporation Act of 1989.  The previous 
incarnations of this corporation were the Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation (WSSC), and 
the Water Supply and Sewerage Board (WSSB) and the Pani Goswara. which was the entity 
establishedbytheRanas when thefirstpiped watersystemswasbuiltuntil the WorldBankentered 
the scene in 1974 and created the WSSB, then the WSSC. At present, the corporation supplies 
water to 13 municipalities of  the country including Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur in the 
valley. As a para-statal, NWSC has the advantage of having some autonomy over its income but 
it has problems collecting revenue and devolving management. It has shown a penchant for 
procupg  and disbursing funds through investment in infrastructure rather than water manage- 
ment.  The  water treatment  facility at Sundarijal and  the groundwater  wells are under  the 
ownership of NWSC. 
The Department of Water Supply and Sanitation (DWSS) has the most extensive mandate and 
handles watersupply inruralareasas wellasinanumberofmajorurbancenters.Theresponsihility 
for supplying drinking water to the and to rural villages in the sub-basin out side of NWSC lies 
withtheDWSS. Inthekn  yearperiodfrom 198Oto 1990,it wasorientedtowards theconstruction 
of drinking water projects. Before 1980 DWSS was responsible for providing water supplies to 
all rural communities in the hills and mountains with population in excess of 1500  people, and to 
develop shallow groundwater potential within the Terai belt.1° The creation of the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board in  1996 has emerged as a competitor of the 
DWSS. The boardevolvedJakapas, aWorld-Bankfundedpilot  initiative, to support water supply 
to settlements with less than 500  residents. 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the Ministry for Land Reform will have more prominent 
roles to play as demographic changes continue in the valley, and competition between urban and 
rural interests in the use of land and water resources increase. At present, however, there are no 
links between agricultural development, land zoning and classification, and water management. 
The Ministry of Local Development (MLD) deals withlocal development activities including the 
administration and coordination of local bodies. District, municipal. and Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) function under the umbrella of the MLD. These committees are empowered 
by their legislative mandate to develop and manage water supplies and other amenities at the local 
level. Other agencies active in the Bagmati basin are the municipalities of Kathmandu, Lalitpur 
and Bhaktapur, which provide urban services at the local level.  The study region falls under the 
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II jurisdiction ofvillage Development Committees and the municipality has no legal presence here. 
Informal fanner’s groups and community organizations exist both  in Mahankalphant and  in 
Jorpati.  But while a healthy collective spirit is maintained at Mahankalphant, particularly  in 
irrigation water application, at Jorpati this spirit is on the verge of becoming extinct. A recent 
development in the study region is the emergence of registered non-governmental groups. Most 
of the groups give themselves a broad mandate to support environmental activities and social 
services rather than just to focus on water management issues. 
Formal organizations have not been effective in addressing the question ofrising  competition, nor 
in resolving the conflicting demands resulting from the limited supply and diminishing quality of 
water. The functions of the formal and informal institutios overlap, as there is no dividing line 
where thedutyofoneends,andthatoftheotherstans.Theoutcomeisclear:  inabilitytoadjudicate 
the inter-sectoral allocation of water in the face of rising scarcity due to increasing requirements, 
changing use and deteriorating quality. Efforts at maintaining water supply have, in fact, led to 
more stress. 
EXPANDING REGULATIONS 
The intervention of the state has also occurred indierctly by means of promulgation of laws and 
policies.  The entry of the state through its various organs has been associated with concomitant 
promulgation ofdifferent acts, lawsandregulations that support and seek tojustify the roleofstate 
organizations thus established for harnessing and management of water. Collectively the effect of 
these laws has been encroachment on customary practices of water management, degeneration of 
the resource and theresultant accentuation of the dichotomy between the capital city and the rural 
areas. The state has encroached on customa?;(local)  rights and rules which are also articulated 
in the country’s National Code (Mulki  Ain).  These codes include mechanisms for upholding 
customary norms and for indirectly governing water management. particularly irrigation systems. 
Since the  early nineteenth century, when  the country embarked upon modern  development, 
private land ownership has increased and land tenurial relations have changed, which have also 
affected the practices of water management and allocation. 
A major legislative initiative was the Canal, Electricity, and Related Water Resource Act of 1967. 
The promulgation of this Act can be explained as an attempt by  the state to introduce specific 
legislation governing utilization of the country’s water resources. The Act articulated a new role 
for the state by  initiating the creation of infrastructure in pursuance of the stated development 
goals. Development activities were undertaken by government departments and bodies such as  the 
Development Boards established under the Act. Though the Act of  1967 recognized the right of 
individuals and groups to construct irrigation schemes, the right of eminent domain was manifest. 
The Act stipulated that authority to control irrigation facilities rested with the state once it had 
investedin the creation ofsuchfacilities. The paramountpower ofthestateover existing irrigation 
systems if they “hindered” government actions was evident in the Act, which also incorporated 
the concepts of licensing, payment of irrigation service fees, and so on. As a result, the customary 
rights of the users had meaning only as long as they were legitimized by the state. 
203 This Act, which was never really implemented, was amendment and finally replaced for several 
reasons: the proliferation of development activities, the emergence of compe.tition for the use of 
water, the availability of new technological option for water extraction, and conflicts over uses. 
Three new legislations were introduced in  1990s: the Water Resources Act 1992 (WRA), the 
Electricity  Act  1992 (EA) and the Water  Resources  Regulation of  1993. The WRA which 
attempted to cover all aspects of water resource development replaced the Canal, Electricity and 
Related Water Resources Act of 1967. The WRA aimed to address the rights involved in the 
hierarchy  of  water use, privatization,  and public  interest, and to ensure optimal  use of the 
resources. The WRA also includes groundwater as one of its components. 
A flagship act of the Ministly of Water Resources, WRA was the first act in Nepal to stipulate that 
ownership of all water resources within the kingdom of Nepal is vested with the state. It requires 
that licenses must he acquired to use water. The Act ensures water right and provides for the 
prescription of a pollution tolerance limit as well for systems for monitoring pollution.  It also 
allows for water user’s groups to be formally registered under it. While the Act is filled with 
appropriate words, it is actually in conflict with other acts because it duplicates their mandate. 
There is also a gap in legal coverage particularly because the formal registration of community 
users’ groups is done under the Society Registration Act and not the WRA. The thousands of 
fanners groups have not found it worthwhile lo bring themselves under the umbrella of the Act, 
as it would mean curtailment of their autonomy. 
Under the Act, the allocation of water resources is decided as seen fit by the ministry. Allocation 
takes  the  form  of permission  to  make  new  interventions  for development and of  right  of 
expropriation of water to agencies, communities. the private sector and individuals. Right to use 
water is provided through licensing, though free access of water for certain uses “granted”. In the 
case of facilities regulated hy  public agencies or private developers, the individuals rights are 
subservient to the terms and conditions imposed by the state through the concerned agencies. Since 
the right of “ownership” is treated as the paramount right of the state and other rights, such as 
usufructuary  rights,  and transfer rights,  as derivative or secondary  to ownership rights,  the 
differen  e  between “people’s  rights”  and “states  rights”  have become  more apparent than 
before. 
The WRA also stipulates the principle of beneficial use of water hy prioritizing uses, presumably 
according to a hierarchy of needs. The need for drinking water precedes all other needs. The Act 
also authorizes the government to utilize or develop water resources on its own and stipulates that 
for purpose of extensive public uses, the state can develop and acquire water resources, land, 
buildings equipment, and related structures to be utilized under the Act. It makes provisions for 
conflict resolution; arbitration is to he achieved through a prescribed committee. However, the 
procedure for appointing the committee and the definition of its mandate are vague. The nature 
ofprescribedright remainsunclear. Althoughtheresponsibility fordischarging the Actlies within 
its jurisdiction, the Ministry of Water Resources has not yet followed its mandate as stipulated in 
the Act. The act is enforceable when a gazetted notice “specifies” the area where the provisions 
of the act is to be implemented, but no such area have been specified or licence issued. 
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History 
Water wasoneof themainelementsoftheLichhavi and Mdla  civilizations in KathmanduValley. 
For itsdomestic watersupply, theurbancore haddhungeydharos, stone spouts built in adepressed 
rectilinear pit with an ingenious system of water filter and supply hydraulics. Wells were dug and 
natural springs exploited. These water supply systems were locally managed.  For irrigation, 
stream water was diverted by  constructing temporary dams to divert water into earthen canal, and 
then into fields. The  canals were managed using traditional systems with a history ofcultural and 
religious continuity. The operation  and management of many irrigation canals received state 
sanction and support; these canal were called raj  kulos (state canals). Fertile soil and fresh water 
from the numerous streams and wells made it possible to farm intensively in the valley floor and 
the surrounding hills. 
With the start of Rana rule in  1840 AD. the compact urban  form of  the earlier era and water 
management institutions gradually came under stress. Rana rulers occupied  agricultural  land 
outside the urban core where they constructed Victorian style stucco palaces. The  domestication 
of  water for private use, as opposed to the prevailing communal use, acompanied other changes 
that started 4Oyearsafterthe Ranascame topower. Duringthereign ofBirSumsher,the thirdRana 
Prime Minister, water sources in the northern Sivapuri hill were tapped and transmitted by pipe 
networks to the capital. The water system was built primarily to provide water to the Prime 
Minister’s palace but was also available to the ruling elite.  When  the  Rana oligarchy  was 
overthrown in 1951, new lifestyles were disseminated more rapidly among the local inhabitants 
which resulted in the increased use of  piped water for private household activities and other uses. 
The deliberate policy of the Ranas to restrict migration into the valley and its inaccessibility had 
deterred large-scale  migration  into the  valley. After  1950, these restrictions  began to ease. 
Kathmandu became more accessible to other parts ofNepal when the Tribhuvan Highway, which 
connected Kathmandu Valley to Hetauda in the south,  was completed. The completion of other 
highways linking Kathmandu  with other parts of Nepal further improved accessibility  to the 
valley.  Improvements  in accessibility  have resulted  in  the concentration  of  administrative, 
commercial, industrial and educational activities in the valley.  People from all over the country 
began to move to the valley leading to arapid increase in its population. This, in turn. has induced 
apositive  feedback resultingin the mushroomin  of settlements, garment and carpet factories and 
other manufacturing enterprises in the capital. 
The nature, scale and pace of urban expansion since the 1950s generally, but more specifically 
since the 1980s, have accelerated the breakdown of the religious-cultural milieu of the valley. At 
the same time, the existing infrastructure facililties have not been able to cope with the changes 
and have deteriorated. For example, the water supply distribution system in urban Kathmandu is 
inadequate; it requires major repairs and, in many cases, replacements. The volume of water lost 
from the system is increasing. Despite substantial resources spent on improving the services, the 
decline in services has continued. 
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In KathmanduValley. water isusedformany  purposes. Theseare (i) irrigation, (ii)drinking water, 
(iii) hydropower, and (iv) industrial use, (v) house construction and (vi) religion. The Bagmati and 
its tributaries are important for a variety of both seasonal and perennial religious rituals, ranging 
from feasting and bathing at auspicious occasions (Kushe Auncee) to cremation of the dead and 
death rituals involving ablution. In this paper we will discuss only the first four uses of  water. 
In the Upper Bagmati Basin  the  state has intervened on  several occasions  by  constructing 
hydropower plants, irrigation barrages, expanding drinking water system and so on (See Table I). 
Table I:  Sequence of Interventions 
Year of Intervention 
1936  Hydropower plant 
1960s 
Nature of Intervention 
Drinking water system expansion through tapping of 
tailrace from hydro-plant diversion of the Bagmati 
River 
Irrigation barrages at Gokarna and Pashupatinath 
Drinking water systems upgrading (World Bank project) 
1960 
1970 
1980  Groundwater wells development 
1994  Wet season Bagmati flow brought to Mahankalchaur 
(JIC project) 
Hydropower Development 
The first state-led intervention in the Bagmati sub-basin was the construction of the 640 kW 
hydropower plant in the 1930s.  The  plant diverted water from the Bagmati to generate power.  A 
dam was built in the Bagmati River upstream from its confluence with the Nagmati Rivcr above 
Sundarijal. The dam created a small reservoir from which water was channeled through a pen- 
stock pipe to the power house below the reservoir located on the downstream bank of the river. 
After power was generated the water was released into the Bagmati River via the tail-race of the 
plant. 
Though the power plant made non-consumptive use of water, diversion of the river flow soon 
started to have a negative impact at the local level. Water flow during the lean season for irrigation 
at Mahankalphant was reduced. The plant did release the diverted water back into the Bagmati 
river, but at apoint lower than the irrigation intake. Consequently, flow into the intake decreased. 
Residual flow from the main dam and the flow from Nagmati. a tributary of Bagmati provided a 
water supply in excess of the requirements of the farmers except during droughts when irrigation 
needs weren’t always met. The flow from the tail-race of the plant, later was divereted to meet 
drinking water needs of Kathmandu. 
206 Irrigation 
Prior to the 1950s the flood-plain along the Bagmati river was used exclusively for agriculture. 
Irrigated agriculture was the dominant institution to use and manage water. In terms of volume, 
even today irrigation is thegreatest water user. The locally built irrigation systems consist ofsyarrli 
(brushwood) dams to divert water. After diversion, water is conveyed through an earthen kulo 
(canal) and supplied to a series of terraced fields with diverse ownership. These temporary dams 
are made of stones, hushes and logs. Generally clay is used to provide a seal. Re-erecting the dam 
requires that  the farmers benefiting from the system come together to perform  the  needed 
restorations. 
The processes and activities related to the diversion of water and its provision to multiple users 
are governed  by  traditional management  practices  and communal  understanding.  Water for 
irrigation is distributed from the head to the end of the canal. The flow from one terrace fin  s Its 
way into the next. and the next, and finally to the main river where water is used again.  The 
plantation of rice, the major crop, is completed in less than two weeks. lrrigation is required mostly 
for supplemental applications which serves the interests of  all the farmers. These processes in 
general describe the procedure of water allocation in a fanners managed irrigation systems, which 
was also evident at Mahankalphant, Only in the dry season when the water flow was naturally 
lower and in the season of rice seedlings transplantation did the situation tend to become stressful 
both at Jorpati and Mahankalphant. 
The state-led initiative to develop irrigation in the sub-region began in the early 1960’s, when two 
irrigation barrages were constructed replacing the temporary structures. One was built at Gokarna 
and the other at Tilganga close to the temple of Pasupatinath. After the barrage at Gokarna was 
completed, the existing farmer built canal was rehabilitated and extended to Boudha. which is 
currently Ward No.7  of Kathmandumunicipality  .  The  barrage at Tilganga irrigated land along the 
eastern and western banks of the Bagmati river along the track lying south of the present bridge 
over the Bagmati river near Gaushala at the Ring Road. However, this barrage has no irrigation 
function presently 
The Department of  Irrigation (DoI) organized a formal mechanism for the maintenance of the 
bmage by appointing caretakers (“dhalpn”). The dhalpas operated the barrage gates, ensured a 
constant supply of water in the canals, and supervised maintenance. Until 1984, farmers were 
active  in canal  maintenance,  even though the responsibility rested  with  the  Department of 
Irrigation. Departmental involvement in canal maintenance gradually declined, and fueled by the 
increasing challenges of maintenance, the interest of the farmers alsodeclined. The  entry of carpet 
factories into the area propelled land speculation and for many land owners, it has become more 
profitable to sell or lease land than to maintain its agricultural use. The dhalpa arrangement for 
maintainance was dismantled in 1990 when the new Irrigation Policy came into effect. 
Drinking Water 
Urban Use 
Piped drinking water was introduced in Kathmandu as early as the 1880s. when the Bit Dhara 
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systemwasbu~lt.ThesystemtappedtheheadwatersoftheBishunumati  riverin theShivapuri hills. 
207 Later, in the 1930s the Tri-Bhim Dhara system, which utilized the spring water source in Balaju, 
was built. The third major intervention for improving drinking water systems in the capital, but 
only the second intervention in the Bagmati sub-basin, was made in the mid-1960s. Water from 
the  tail-race of  the Sundarijal  Hydropower  Plant  was tapped  in  order to supply  water  to 
Kathmandu. Raw water from the tail-race was treated in Sundarijal and then  transmitted to a 
reservoir in Mahankalchaur north of Kathmandu city. Almost all  of the lean season flow of the 
Bagmati River upstream of Sundarijal was tapped. Still later, Nagmati and Syalmati, the two 
tributaries of the Bagmati in the sub-basins, were also tapped. 
The early drinking water supply systems served a small percentage of Kathmandu’s population, 
mostly  those living in the central core. By 1990, however the reticulation system had expanded 
into a network that served the population living in an area of 50 km2 mostly within the Ring Road. 
At present seven water production systems serve seven major sectors in the distribution area. 
Though for the purpose of analysis, the supply network may be divided into identifiable sectors, 
the reticulation is  actually a complicated system of mains and distribution pipes that overlap and 
intermix among the sectors. Pipes that were laid a hundred year ago also constitute part of the 
reticulation system. 
The rapid urban expansion over the last few decades has resulted in  haphazard growth and the 
xpansion ofdrinking water reticulation system has not matched the growth of new settlements. 
e7  As result, water supply connection to new households are mainly from one major distribution 
18  mains. The result is the widespread incidence of manifold supplies called spaghetti connections. 
Old pipes and spaghetti connections are some of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses of 
water that is supplied. Because of high losses in the transmission lines, distribution systems as well 
as wasteful use, only of 40-60  percent of the supply fed into the system is actual1  available for 
consumption. The estimates of unaccounted for water is uncertain and also vary,  because bulk 
water use metering is not done. 
In the sub basin, second major intervention to improve the drinking water system was initiated in 
1974. Its objective was to  provide safe and uninterrupted supply of drinking water to the residents 
of Kathmandu.  The initiative came under the program funded by a World Bank loan. All earlier 
supply systems had used surface sources, which were considered to be inadequate, and rather 
unreliable for industrial use, particularly during the dry seasons. The  exploitation of groundwater 
started in the early 1980s,  again under the third loan package from the World Bank. From virtually 
nothing, the contribution of  groundwater to Kathmandu’s drinking water supply had reached 
between 40 and 50 percent of the total dry season supply by  1995. 
Inthedecade between 1980and 1990privatepumpsinlargenumbers  have beeninstalled athotels, 
commercial establishments, industries, government offices and international agencies. Private 
wells were also installed in the Jorpati region by factory owners. Nayapati, in Gokama VDC, has 
five deep pumps which feed water to the Mahankalchaur reservoir. The groundwater extraction 
rate far surpasses the rate of natural recharge. Thus the resource is mined from the acquifer lenses 
rather than harvested. Also, the groundwater has a highconcentration of ammonia, manganese and 
iron. Since 1995, the NWSC has started to use groundwater only in the dry season when surface 





208 In 1994,  a project was undertaken with Japanese assistance to improve the quality of groundwater. 
The project constructed a treatment facility at Mahankalchaur. A new transmission line parallel 
to the one existing from Sundarijal to Mahankalchaur was also laid. The purpose of the new line 
was to tap the wet season flow of the Bagmati River. The new transmission line transfers raw water 
from the river to  Mahankalchaur, where it is treated and supplied to Kathmandu. The new system 
makes further encroachment on the traditional water rights of the users there. 
Despite these efforts and initiatives, the drinking water supply service is deficient both in terms 
of quality and quantity. Supply is intermittent, available only for 3 hours each in the morning and 
evening on the average. In several parts of the destribution area, there is no supply for days. The 
fluctuating flow hasresultedin asituationin whichcontaminated water is sucked intopipesduring 
periods when the supply under pressure is not maintained. This problem is particularly serious in 
the inner city where drinking water supply pipes and sewer lines are laid almost parallel to one 
another, but also in the sub-urban regions. Initiatives on maintaining the systems have been 
delayed, and existing proposals have been bogged down by delays in negotiation of the terms of 
the loan and other details. 
Rural Use 
The rural population in the sub-basin also use the Bagmati River and its tributaries as its source 
of drinking water. The population in Danchi, Thali, Bhadrabas and Nayapati use the Bagmati as 
their source. The water system at Danchi takes water from the Mahankalphant irrigation kulo 
diversion. Its construction was sanctioned by HMG  in the early 1980s. When asked why they 
allowed this water source to the used by  others, the farmers of Mahankalphant responded that 
drinking water is more crucial than irrigation and therefore, it has to he shared. Water in the rural 
areas is supplied by community tapstands, and the per-capita water demand is rated at 45 liters 
daily. The actual figure of consumption of water is not very easy to estimate because large number 
of those living in these villages move daily to Kathmandu to perform wage labour, do marketing 
or work in government offices where they work. As part of the floating population they also draw 
on the municipal services there. 
Industrial Use 
Theuseoffloodplainsalong thebanksofBagmati anditstributaryriversin theKathmanduhegan 
to change away from agricultural use at a fast rate in the late 1970s. The changes have been more 
evident as growth of ribbon settlement along the roads in general. The situation was not much 
different in the Jorpati region in the sub-basin, which saw increasing growth of settlements. 
Particularly in Jorpati area, carpet factories began to appear around the mid  1980s. The carpet 
industry was taken up on a large scale and was to become the major foreign exchange earner of 
the country. Most of the factories are located along the road, while many others are located along 
the western canal that is fed hy the Gokarna irrigation barrage. 
There are several  reasons why carpet establishments are concentrated in the Jorpati region. One 
reason was the presence of a Tibetan community who possessed carpet making skills.  Other 
reasonsarevehicularaccess and areliable  watersupply dueto theproximityofthe trunkmain from 
Sundarijal to Mahankalchaur as well as more stable groundwater aquifers. The suburb of Jorpati 
isin the center ofthe northern groundwaterdistnct of the valley. As carpetmanufacturing requires 
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23 significant water, it was natural for entrepreneurs to seek a region which ensured a good water 
supply and thus posed fewer risks to business. 
The transmission main that brings treated water from Sundarijal to Mahankalchaur provided a 
reliable source of water supply. Even those factories located close to the Gokarna canal, further 
away from the transmission main, used it as their water source. Supply was obtained by tapping 
directly intothemains  indirect violation oftheexistingregulationofone connectionsperpremise. 
Some factories were able to obtain between two to five conncctions. The factories had access to 
continuous water supply, 24 hours a day even when services in the city became deficient. Many 
of these connections were freely provided, and larger size pipes than usually installed for  domestic 
supply were used. 
Factories are located  within compounds, and include a work area and living quarters for the 
25 
employees. In Jorpati area, however, factories generally perform weaving, dyeing and washing. 
The population of workers in the factories ranges betwee  50 to 500. It was reported that, in the 
1960s the region had 1300  households and 1700 voters.2SIn the decade from 1980 to 1990, the 
population increased almost by ten fold. The expansion of carpet making activities is another 
reason for the floating population of migrants in the valley which has further increased pressure 




The continued use of upstream sources for fulfilling drinking water needs of Kathmandu has 
reduced availability of water in the Bagmati river. Declining flow has meant that water was not 
sufficeint for irrigation, and consequently interest of the farmers at Jorpati for agriculture is on the 
decline. Availability  of  a continuous and comparatively  reliable water supply at Jorpati - 
groundwater and piped  supply, including  some residual flow in Bagmati -  has led to the 
establishment of several carpet factories there. Establishment of factories in turn brought migrants 
looking for employment opportunities. which in turn  impacted the irrigation systems whose 
operation had been affected by the declining river flow. Factoriy buildings and new construction 
activities have made further encroachment on the irrigation canal, particularly on the western side. 
Not only did the construction directly interfered with the canal, solid and liquid wastes from the 
factories were also dumped there, which blocked the canal flow. As a result, the Gokarna barrage 
irrigates only the eastern bank of the Bagmati River west of Gokarna forest. 
Blocked canal and pollution have deterred the farmers from irrigation management and cultiva- 
tion. In the short run, therefore, selling land is  seen to be more profitable than cultivation. As the 
price of land in this area has risen steeply: in Jorpati one ropani (0.05 ha) is reported to fetch 
between five hundred thousand and one million rupees depending upon location of the plot, 
speculation is high. Many fanners  reason that they can support themselves better by selling their 
land than by farming. To paraphrase the question posed by farmers, “Who would give up 500,000 
rupees per ropani  of land which produced meager agricultural harvests?”. For those fanners who 
do have the capacity to sustain production, competition from cheaper goods imported from the 
Tarai has reduced the viability of vegetable farming as an occupation. The agricultural outputs 
210 from the resultant small holdings can not support a family year round. Selling or leasing land has 
thus become more attractive, and the motivation for collective actions and irrigation management 
is on the wane. 
Speculation on land is also high due to the nature of land ownership. Division of land among 
inheritors also leads to land fragmentation, and selling. The land in Gokarna phant of the Jorpati 
region belongs to a guthi (trust) of the Pasupatinath temple. Because of the common property 
characteristics of the gurhi land, encroachment is on the rise. Consequently, new houses and 
settlements are mushrooming not just in the Jorpati region, but also on the suburban regions of 
Kathmandu. Theoutcome is similiar generally. Agricultural lands in the flood plains have changed 
into settlements. The most dramatic changes is evident at Tilganga. The barrage there no longer 
serves its original function because its command area is now a compact settlement. Because, these 
settelements expand without adequate sanitation and water supply provision, there is  net negative 
effects on water resources: deterioration of quality and quantity. 
Sand Mining: Low River Bed 
One outcome of the growth of settlements in Kathmandu has been an unprecedented demand for 
sand. Since the 1970s. sand has been mined from stretches  along the Bagmati at a much greater 
rate than it is naturally replenished. Whileclearly changing the physical character of the river, sand 
mining alsohasan impact onlocal irrigation. Sandextractionaffectsirrigation two ways. Intensive 
sand quarrying, has lowered the river bed by between 1 and 2 meters in several sections. Because 
this has resulted iualower water level, less watercanenter thecanals. Due tosandmining theriver 
bed is lower than the irrigable land so the brushwood dams have to be located further upstream. 
However, since water from further upstream reaches different land parcels, the management of 
water for agriculture has thus become more intractable. 
Pollution and Waste 
Pollution of surface water is mostly through biological waste, and is on the rise. Factories which 
are located along the roads and canals, where workers live, dispose waste directly into rivers, 
irrigation canals and land parcels. The reduced residual flow resulting from increasing upstream 
extraction means rivers are less able to assimilate and flush away untreated liquid wastes. The 
degradation of rivers in Kathmandu is the combined effects of, reduced residual flow due to 
upstream water extraction. mining of sand and disposal of untreated waste in water bodies. 
The extent of biological pollution of groundwater is less pronounced. Deep aquifers, are not yet 
polluted because groundwater recharge occurs in the northern aquifer which is of good quality. 
Surface water quality hereis comparitively better, but deteriorating. Though biological quality of 
deep groundwater is not really an issue at present, it will be soon if the trend of pollution of the 
upper reaches of the Bagmati in the sub-basin continues. In general shallow groundwater is so 
polluted that it can not be used for drinking, but the situation varies according the location of the 
aquifers and sub-soil seepage from household septic tanks. Pollution is likely to continue as it is 
easier and cheaper for industries to dump waste in  rivers than to treat it. Lack of standards on 
housing, water and waste water will lead to further deteriorations. Even if standard are made, 
21 1 because enforcement is weak, the situation will  not change. Pollution  mitigative  initiatives, 
therefore, must be more holistic and make a begining from where waste is generated. 
COMPETITION, CONFLICT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Increase in population, urbanization, changing pattern of land-use, river bed mining for sand and 
increasing pollution are altering the conventional uses of water. Water traditionally  used for 
irrigation, is  now allocated for other uses, mostly drinking. The result is that almost all of the flow 
of  the Bagmati River has been diverted and that the amount of water for downstream uses has 
become inadequate. Since 1994 expropriation of the wet flow as well as the dry reduced water 
availability even during the wet season. Tapping of the wet season flow was based on the logic 
that more surface water is available during the monsoon season. Now water is deficient the whole 
year, whereas in the past, water was short only in the dry season. The declining flow and limited 
supply of water has led to more frequent disputes among farmers. In some  extreme cases, scuffles 
even took place, thus heightening tensions in what had been amicable social relationships. 
Pollution  has also exacerbated local level conflicts. Farmers in the Jorpati  area believe  the 
discharge of effluents from neighbouring carpet factories was the primary reason for damage to 
crops and reduced crop yields. Waste discharged into imgated fields is reported to have reduced 
yields between 2 and 5 times. Fanners reported that instead of rice, the produce was “bhus” (husk 
with no rice kernel inside) or ruined crops: the rice paddy did not mature properly, turned yellow, 
and died. The effects on both grain and vegetable crops irrigated with contaminated water are 
reported to be similar. Pollution from one particular factory in Jorpati was the cause of a dispute 
between farmers and factory owners (see below). 
In one case, the VDC filed a case with the district court against the building of some houses in the 
Jorpati region. The court ruled that VgCs have no authority to prevent construction activities 
within their administrative jurisdiction.  Their failure at getting the state to adjudicate has led the 
farmers to seek alternative forms of conflict resolution. Users seem to prefer non-formal forms of 
settlement. Industries too seem reluctant to trust the state apparatus for adjudication. This was 
evidentin theconflictbetween factories and farmers atJorpatiin whichcase,thepresenceofathird 
party-alocalNG0,  wasinstrumental in bringinginsettlementbetweentheaffectedfarmersand 
the polluting carpet factory. The negotiation bro  ght compensation to the farmers. and in the 
process, the NGO also secured benefit for itself. 
There is no statutory mechanism for adjudication either between the departments and the users or 
among different users. In Jorpati it led to a situation of impasse. Several complaints about the 
damages in the canal made by farmers to  the District Irrigation Office(DI0) went unheeded. Later 
in consultation with a local club, samples of the polluted soil and water were presented to the DIO 
andofficialsfromDIOinspectedtbearea.However,noaction  wastaken.TheDIO,infact,refused 
toenter into any formofarbitration.  The fanners were told by theDistrictImgation Office, “There 
isnoprocedure  fordirectaction,” in cases ofpollution.Thefarmers also approached the Gokarna 




212 The formal sector, including VDCs and departments,  have  not  only been  unable to resolve 
conflicts, but have also failed to respond to the situation of water stress at local levels. In response, 
farmers have devised ways that bypass official procedures. The need to compete has also been 
exacerbated by the hydropower plant. During the dry season, the same water used by the plant, 
though in limited quantities, is claimed by the Mahankalphant users for transplanting rice. Since 
local water rights are not respected, there is no official practice of releasing water from the plant 
for limited local use. The particular needs, however, are met by working on the local loayalties 
overriding the statutory provisions. Fanners approach the operators with their request and the 
operator in turn releasing the water for aperiod of  2 to 3 hours during  the plantation. 
Due to the poor level of  coordination  and the lack of  interaction among the state agencies, 
departments and para-statals, the extent of competition is likely to be exacerbated during the non- 
monsoon months. Following the promulgation of the Water Resources Act, the state is now the 
primeadjudicatorinresolving waterrelated disputes, hut hashistorically tended to ignorethe non- 
state. In several cases, the state has failed to adjudicate  justly. Thus at one level state intervention 
is expanding. By assuming control over the customary practices of water management, it has 
exercisedresolutionofauthority.Atanotherleve1,  however, thestateisalsoweak.Therearemany 
instances in which state agencies have succumbed to collective assertions and bargains. When the 
collective bargaining strength of a local community is strong, such as when farmers organize 
themselves in a group, state agencies are forced to res  ond even if  it means that the water use 
priority accorded by Act has to be contradicted upon. 
In a situation of conflict, particularly when the questions of ownership and rights of surface water 
between the departments, para-statals  and informal groups of  farmers, the issue of equitable 
allocation remains unresolved.  Such conflict  may  hinder  in meeting drinkinghdustrial and 
irrigation water needs. During peak irrigation seasons the same water source may he claimed by 
farmers asserting prior utilization rights. If left unresolved, transmission lines may be broken and 
water  used  for rice  transplanting.  While  affecting  the drinking water  supply  to the  target 
community, issue of unresolved ownership is likely to exacerbate the conflict over equitable 
allocation of water. 
8 
ENCROACHMENT OF CUSTOMARY RIGHTS 
At Mahankalphant, in the study region, it was reported that those erecting the brushwood dam had 
first right to irrigation, and those cleaning the canals had second priority. This practice conforms 
to customary law: those who erect diversions for irrigation have top priority over the use of the 
water source. Farmers at the head end of the canal were first to use the water, while those at the 
tailendlast.Thecustomary law isnotrecognizedby the 1992WaterResources  Act, which accords 
priority to drinking water use of a domestic user or group of users who could claim right over 
existing use. 
The Act accords absolute recognition of the state’s ownership and control of water resources. It 
empowers the government with the authority to issue licenses for water allocation and to resolve 
conflicts over water use, if and when they arise. Although the Act requires all users to claim their 
213 rights lo the water sources they are  using, no such claims have been expressed either by the state 
agencies or para-statal organizations that already use water sources. The stipulations of the Act 
and the customary practices in many case as evident from the case study are likely to lead to a 
situation of conflict. The relevance of the  1992 Water Resources Act vis-his the customary 
parctices and practical operational  requirements need review. 
The right of the state to own of water resources which is stipulated in WRA, may not affect the 
daily activities of fanners using an irrigation system. Also absence of departmental programmes 
as well as budgetary constraints may limit the role that state agencies have in the management 
systems. However, the promulgation of each legislation necessitates a reconciling of customary 
laws and practices with conventional concepts of wa er development and modem legal system. 
Theresult is thatcustomarymlesaregraduallyeroded.  Nowthatthe balanceofpowerhasshifted 
in favour of the state, there is a risk that the state’s prowess will prevail over the “right” of a 
community, user or group of users. The chance of eminent domain being exercised is increasing 
in the face of rising competition, conflict and adjudication over access to water. 
In theIrrigationPolicy of 1992, referenceisfrequentlymade  to thelegal recognitionofwater users 
groups as autonomous entities, to the respective rights and duties of the users and the irrigation 
agency, toplacing systems under collectiveownership of the users, to handing overfull ownership 
of systems built by agencies to users, to having and the related structures be kept at water users’ 
associations  registered by the government, and to give the responsibility  for operation  and 
maintenance activities as  well as for defining of ownership. However, nowhere in the policy is the 
question of water rights considered or the rights and including other operational concerns of 
owners acknowledged.  Under the provisions of  the policy, HMGN does not envisage that 
irrigation development in Nepal will remain exclusively under government ownership, which 
contradicts the stipulation of the WRA which places all water sources within the jurisdiction of 
the state. 
Thus,right to waterseeems tobeassured tothose whoalready haveaccess toservices asprescribed 
by the new Acts. To those who are yet to be provided with the services, the obligatoin of the state 
has not been made clear and is a question that remains to be addressed. For example, the existing 
rights to irrigation water at Mahankalphant was continously encroached upon to meet drinking 
water requirements of the capital city. There has been no efforts to prescribe the waterright of the 
comminity there to ashare of the river. Though the 1990 Water Resources Act requires thatrights 
for use of water have to be claimed, none has been done by the NWSC or NEA both of which use 
the Bagmati river’s water. 
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CONCLUSION 
The water allocation and management problems in the Upper Bagmati Basin are a result of a 
complex combination of factors that include not only the availability of waterresources and their 
vulnerability, but also demographic, legal, administrative, commercial, political and behavioral 
issues. In the past problems were expected to go away when more water was made available. This 
has not been the case and, in fact, the level of service continues to deteriorate. The deficiencies 
214 result from institutional weaknesses and a lack of clarity about how water use and rights are to be 
allocated both formally and informally. Segmental operation of government departments and 
agencies have led to deterioration of the level of services. 
Customary  water  rights are being  encroached  upon  by  a configuration  of forces which are 
dominantly urban in character and commercial in orientation. While the current policies mention 
managing water through decentralized initiatives, the respect for local water rights needed to 
sustain such astrategy is lukewarm at best. The importance of decentralized management of water 
resources has not yet been ideologically internalized by mainstream socio-political  processes. The 
usurpation of resources and lack of decentralization initiatives have important implications in the 
pursuance of the goal of achieving national well-being through providing water for improved 
health, food, security and energy. 
Since  water  resources  themselves  are  decentralized  their  management  should  also have  a 
decentralized framework instead of the centralized bureaucaratic approach currently in vogue. 
Decisions about resource allocation have to be made as close to the source of consumption as 
possible. At no level, either in local village governments or central departments, has the mandate 
to issue permits for use and to adjudicate allocations of water been made clear. Who should 
supervise allocation  and using what mechanism to preserve the tolerance limit of water are 
unanswered issues. In the current decision making structure, the question to answer is: How will 
thechanges toensure the equitable allocation andmanagement of wateroccur, and who will bring 
about these changes? 
It is unlikely changes will come from the pyramidal departments which constitutes only one sub- 
setofthesocialenvironrnent  involved in themanagement ofwater. Adepanmentis maneuverable 
by  political pressures and itself does not possesses an inborn vision to institute change or to 
consider the broader implications of its activities. Because water utilities have to sustain the 
purpose for which they have been created, they show inclinations towards rejecting arguments that 
question their style of functioning. This hostility stems more from the fear of loosing legitimacy 
than from the injustice of the criticisms. 
The results are clear. In spite of the huge sums of money spent on delivering water, the supply in 
Kathmandu isdeficient and allocation is unsustainahle. Thereason has lesstodo with watersupply 
projects or technical solutions themselves, than with the model ofdevelopment that has flourished 
in the capital city. When the size and growth of Kathmandu are juxtaposed with the limit of its in- 
valley water sources it isclear thatexpansionofthecity is unsustainable. Whilecontinuoussupply 
servicesbyinterbasintransferofsnow fedriverwou!daddtothequantumofwater,thepopulation 
served in Greater Kathmandu is expected to be close to 3 million in 2015 AD, when the project 
would be completed. One can only guess at the impact of this population in a city in which the 
social limits on population havealready been reached. Limited investigations in Kathmandushow 
that the social costs are high, especially to the uneducated, those living at the social margins, 
women, children and, from a broad perspective, the next generation. 
In summary, the preceding analysis provides following lessons. The competition among different 
water use sectors is on the rise, but the understanding of the nature of  the competition is rather 
inadequate to allow equitable allocations. The expanding framework of Rules, Acts and Regula- 
tionsgradually encroachon thecustomary pratices and rights to waterofthelocalcommunity.The 
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32 role of  the state,  through creation of  more legislations  and Acts,  is increasingly becoming 
dominant in relation to decision on how water resources will be used and allocated. The tendency 
of  the governmental  agencies to centralize is concomitantly associated with  organisational 
conservatism, inflexibility and inefficiency. These attributes, at the level of individual organiza- 
tions, continue to reinforce behaviour that perpetuates propensity towards traditions, caution and 
protectionism.  In  managing  inter-sectoral allocation  of  water between  the various sectoral 
agencies, adhocism thus pervades without reconciliation  of  the strategic mission of equitable 
management of water allocation with organizational culture. An unintended consequence of this 
apparent impasse is creation of social space that the communities have used to stake claim and 














This is arevised version of the paper readat the Workshopon “WaterRights, Conflicts andPolicy”, 
Kathmandu, January 22.24.1996. Research for this paper was doneunder contract with IIMLPJepal. 
The author wishes to thank Rajendra Pradhan, Dipak Gyawali and Sudhirendra Sharma for their 
comments on the paper at different stages. 
Ajaya Dixit is water resource engineer. Heis editor of the journal Wafer  Nepal  and  chairman of 
Nepal Water Conservation Foundation. 
Unpublished project reports and documents are referred to as “gray literature”. 
The(VDC)VillageDevelopmentComitteeis the basic politicalunitofvillageadministration.  VDCs 
consistofmemberselectedbyeachoftheninewardsinavillage.Thecommittee  hasachairmanand 
vice-chairman elected by  the VDC constituencies. In the VDC, activity plans and  budgets are 
prepared and later approved by  the DDC. A District Development Committee (DDC) is composed 
of  representatives indirectly elected by  the committee members, chairman and vice-chairman of 
VDC. The DDC includes Chief District Officer (CDO) appointed by the Home Ministry and local 
Development Ofticer (LDO) appointed by  the Ministry of Local Development. 
BBWMS 1994. 
Till 1977, farmers in lorpati area paid Rs 3 as panipor (water tax), they no longer do so. lfpanipot 
were still collected and the record had been maintained, the area under irrigation could be worked 
out as could the amount of water used. 
JICA 1990. 
Estimates oftherechargeraterangefrom30to40Million LitredDay (MLD), buteven 27 MLDlDay 
is suggested as a plausible rate. See Binnie 1989. In 1987, HMG commission had questioned the 
provision of using groundwater on an assumed higher recharge as earlier studies had mentioned 
rather low recharge rate of 4 MLDiDay. See Pokharel Commission 1987. 
For discussions on the availability and quality of shallow groundwater see Karmacharya and Rao 
1990. 
In a review undertaken for UNDP, Gyawali and Dixit  1994 analyzed institutional shortcomings 
related to the management of water in urban towns of Nepal under the NWSC. Many  of  these 
recommendations for the decentralization of management to local bodies remain to be implemented. 
Also see IDA I993 and Pokharel Commission 1987. 
MWR  1981. 
Each municipality is an elected body  constituted under the Municipality Act of 2048 (1991) and 










governed by a municipal board comprised of elected ward chairmen. The municipality is presided 
over by a mayor and assisted by a deputy mayor, both of whom are elected. The functions of a 
municipality are loosely organized, generally along sectoral lines sucbas tax and revenuecollection, 
issuance of building conslruction permits, planning and engineering, sanitation and solid waste 
management. administration and accounts, litigation. and inspection. 
ThecustomarylawasenshrinedintheMulkiAin has beenineffectsince 1853 (Regmi 1976).  Under 
this provision. the state specifically recognises those who have priority in the use of irrigation water 
by implying that gains should accrue to those who had, through collective labour mobilisation, 
invested in the irrigation development first.  See Pradhan  1993 for discussions on the nature of 
property rights in Nepal. 
Pradhan 1993. 
In migration has resulted in a population growth rate within the valley far in excess of the national 
growth rate of 2.5  percent. In 1991, the valley had a population  of 1 million, while that of urban 
Kathmandu wascloseto6hundredthousand. SeeBBWMS 1994formoredetails. The fact that large 
portion of the rural population comes to Kathmandu each day and returns to their villages in the 
evening demonstrate that the rural-urban communities are a continuum rather than distinct entities. 
See INFRAS  1993 for discussions. 
In some unusual caw  waste water from households is diverted for irrigation. 
Once the Irrigation Policy was promulgated  the Department of  Irrigation (Dol) introduced the 
concept ofjoint management by users' committees (upuboktusumiti) and thedepartment. This policy 
which was formulated following pilot tests in several regions. was undertaken to offset the financial 
burden of the cost of operation and maintenance to the government and to facilitate the role af the 
private sector in the development of irrigation. Under the provision of this policy HMGIN d6es not 
envisage irrigation development in Nepal to remain exclusively under government ownership. 
Drinking water is suppliedtoanestimatedfive hundred andeighty thousandusers viaprivateas well 
as  public tap stands by the NWCS. This estimate, however, does not include the large floating 
population in Kathmandu, which also seems to draw on the same supply of wafer. Only 80% of the 
consumers of NWSC are estimated have access to its services. Also, 80% was for domestic  purposes 
(Binnie 1989). Another study by JICA (1990) estimated  81% consumption  was for domestic 
purposes, 12% commercial for use and 5 % for industrial use. 
Spaghetti connectionsare multiplicity ofdomestic supply lines from a single distributary. and areone 
of the causes of high losses of water. 
Theestimates ofunaccountedfor water isuncertain and also vary. Studies by Binnie (1989)estimated 
that the loss was 65% In  another study CES (1991)  estimated theloss lo be between40% to 50% while 
another study (JICA 19W)  indicated that losses were perhaps only 30% of the daily production. The 
uncertainty remains. Officially 40 percent is accepted, but appears to rather a be politically correct 
figure. SeeDixit A. 1992. A recentlymmpleted leakdetection study concludes similarly about high 
leak in the system, see IDA 1995. 
The World Bank-supported first Water Supply Project was staried in 1974. In 1978 the second loan 
package was approved, and the third package followed in 1984. See Pokharel  Commission 1987. 
BPC 1995. 
Presently the World Bank and the NWSC are engaged in an institutional debate over the approval of 
a 60 million dollar package loan for the rehabilitation of the Kathmandu's drinking water system. 
Recommendations for decentralization  have not been taken up, but proposals of inter-basin bulk 











tributary of the Indrawati basin north of Kathmandu. in order to augment water supply ofthe valley. 
Bringing Tibetans to the area was deliberate, according to the ex Pradhan Pancha of lorpati VDC 
who said, “I  tried to bring institutionolestabl;shmenfs, imporrantpeople,  factories,  etc. romakethis 
place important. I also settled the Tibetan refugees here.” 
Allowingindustries freeconnectionsfromthetransmission  mains have affected thesupply to the city 
area by reducing the flow. A5 it is an unsound practice in drinking water supply operations, tapping 
into transmission mains is not recommended in the management of utilities. Only one connection per 
premise is allowed these days. 
Itisdifficu1testimatethenumberoffactoriesasthearescattered.Dueto  slumpinthemarket,carpet 
making activities are in recession. 
Personal communication with Mani Ram Chalise. 
Effluent discharged from one factory damaged crops  for two years jn a row. 
Personal communication with the chairman of lorpati VDC. 
Compensation for farmers whose crops were affected  by effluent  from  the carpet  factory was 
negotiated by the Chahari Yuba Club. Twenty percent of the settled amount was contributed to the 
club to build its premises. 
An example of such conflict is seen at Phaqing in southern Kathmandu during the dry season. The 
NWSC has had to guarantee a minimum supply of water to farmers to transplant rice. Farmers at 
Pharping claim prior use of the water source  sthat  long precedes promulgation ofthe  Water Resources 
Act although this claim contradicts priority accorded to drinking water in the Act. The Nepal Water 
Supply Corporation issues public notices in national  dailies asking urban  consumers in certain 
sections of the supply region to cope with the reduced water supply during the period. 
Inlegalparlance,itisimpliedthatasnewacts  areenacted, IheprovisionsrnadejntheMulkiAin  will 
be repealed  (Pradhan 1993) 
INFRAS 1993 
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219 Local Law and Customary Practices in the Study of 
Water Rights’ 
E von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda-Beckmann, 
H.L.J. Spier&’ 
“Science  and her generalized statements cannot remove individual responsibil- 
ity  by replacing  belief; subjectivity, struggle and  guilt.  Science can only 
broaden and clarify the conscience ofthose engaged in practice, their appre- 
ciation  for the consequences of their actions and of the meaning of what they 
are doing” (Baumgarten 1973:xxxv, rephrasing Max Weber 1917). 
The quotation from the work of the famous sociologist Max Weber points at the potential tension 
between scientific research and analysis and their value for pragmatic action. Scientific state- 
ments, Weber warns us, will rarely lead directly to a certain course of action; it can only be one 
of the fundaments of  knowledge upon which political actors - whether they are legislators, NGO 
activists, consultants or common people - can draw in their attempts to choose a particular course 
of action. Such choices are inevitable, Weber says, and should not be hidden behind or masked 
as scientific statements. This tension also colours the studies on water rights in Nepal and India 
which are presented in the various contributions in this volume. Most of  these studies are strongly 
motivated by some form of activism which aims at changing the current conditions of water rights 
and water management practices. While differently phrased, the ultimate objectives are shared: 
aconcem for amoreefficient usemadeof water, with amorejust,  equitable, distribution of access 
to  water, as well as for sustainable water use practices. These objectives  are based  on the 
observation that the current conditions are lacking in these respects, and that something bas to be 
done about that. The strong future orientation of action research in which the descriptive and 
teleological orientation dominate brings with it the danger that theexplanatory objectives of the 
research remain under-exposed. Research focused on water rights and water management should 
not stop atmaking an inventory ofcurrentlegalrules,ofstateandcnstomary  laws and the practices 
of water allocation and distribution; it also needs to analyze the significance of these rules in the 
processes of  social and economic change leading up to the current conditions. 
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4  30l3$- As experiences in other parts of the world has shown, if such questions are not addressed, the 
starting point for action may be a somewhat distorted conception of  the situation one wants to 
change, and an equally distorted construction of the causes of that perceived situation. In the logic 
of development intervention, whether from above or from below, policy goals often come first, 
and the conception of reality is constructed as its negative condition that has to be changed. 
Hitchcock‘s remark that “[pleople rely on their goals to guide their thinking about what already 
exists. In such circumstances, planners re-invent the traditional as a negative stereotype; they 
derive it from their goals, rather than the other way round” (Hitchcock 19801),  aptly characterizes 
mainstream development intervention planning, with its legal engineering centred perspective. 
In the case of bottom-up activist research, we find almost the opposite position, the negative 
stereotype being that of the state and state law; the positive, unquestioned one that of ‘community’ 
and their customary laws. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of these issues and show what a legal anthropological 
perspective may contribute to the understanding of the water problems the studies in this volume 
are concerned with. We shall relate our ideas as closely as possible to what we think are thebasic 
assumptions which usually are behind action oriented research and which also largely underlie the 
research presented in this volume and shall refer to cases in this volume to illustrate some of  our 
points. Adopting a legal anthropological perspective means giving primary attention to descrip- 
tionandanalysisofthecument legal situationand trying tounderstand the significanceofthat  legal 
situation for the actual forms and practices which water rights and water management assume. It 
means asking ahout the interrelations between law and social practice, rather than engaging in 
conventionaldoctrinal legal science, stating what thecorrect interpretationsofthelawareand how 
decision making in courts should proceed according to the law. 
We shall start our paper by a discussion of the concept of water rights and the laws through which 
water rights are defined. We then discuss what law means in a context of legal pluralism which 
weencounter in Nepal and India where we are not simply confronted with a single, unitary legal 
system but with a complex co-existence of normative systems. Special attention will be given to 
notions of “customary law” and “customary practices” which play such an important role in 
ongoing research  on water rights. This will  bring us to a more general consideration  of the 
relationships between legal complexity and social practices, in which conflicts and disputes, and 
procedures of dispute management have an important place. Then follows a discussion of  the 
implications of our considerations for water management policies that aim at improving equity, 
effectivity and sustainability in water management. Finally, we shall venture some  ideas about the 
implications of our analysis for the pragmatics of future policy making. 
3 
WATER RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 
Water has many fundamental functions in human life and social organization: It is both essential 
as drinking water and as an ingredient for food processing. It is also an important means of 
production in a variety of enterprises: for irrigation agriculture, for industry, for the generation of 
hydro-electric power. Water can also be primarily relevant as the habitat of other resources (fish, 
marine resources) or as a means of transportation. Besides, its many ecological functions are more 
222 andmore  becomingasuhject ofscientific and politicalconcern. Insituations wherewater is scarce 
or over-abundant or if its flow is not properly controlled, it almost inevitably becomes subject of 
conflicts and disputes. Conflicts due to water shortage tend to bring violent, short term action 
because water problems often require immediate action. Because of its importance and to limit the 
numberandscopeofconflicls, localcommunitiesas  wellasgovernments haveenactedregulations 
which establish rights to water, i.e. legitimate ways of control, administration, appropriation, use 
andtransfer.  Thevarious kindsofregulationarenot always congruent; stateregulationsmaydiffer 
from regulations of  local communities. As the examples of  this volume show, regulations 
canceming irrigation water are subject to frequent change in Nepal (Shukla et al. in this volume; 
K.von Benda-Beckmann, Spiertz and F. von Benda-Beckmann 1996).  Whenever new canals are 
built, when existing infrastructure has been destroyed by floods, when new crops are introduced, 
and when existing systems are rehabilitated and enlarged, new rights are established and new 
regulations have to be made to accommodate the new situation. These are periods of intense 
negotiation  among the interested  parties,  situations in  which the government may envisage 
different regulation from the rules proposed by local authorities, and where at least some of the 
users feel squeezed out of their legitimate interest. The resulting changed allocation, distribution, 
operation and maintenance systems distribute the burdens and profits in very different ways. 
Rehabilitation projects in particular are often felt to be imposed upon local communities, in which 
users do  have not a voice, and in which they feel their interests and rights are not being fully taken 
into account. This is a complaint that is heard in particular from the old users. As the Dang case 
shows (see M. and R. Pradhan in this volume), new users may profit from the projects and from 
the fact that it is made by the government, because that gives them a legitimation for their use of 
the system which they did not have previously. 
The Physical, Social and Legal Status of Water 
Water confronts us in different manifestations, in different functions, beneficial uses as well as 
nuisances, or even as calamity. To a large extent these can be captured in physical categories that 
distinguish water according to physical criteriaoraccording to its actual social and economic uses. 
Thus we can distinguish water in more or less natural states - as water flowing in streams, as 
surface- or ground water - from water in man-made technological artifacts - water in irrigation 
canals, in dug or bore-wells, or in artificial lakes. According to its uses, we can distinguish drinking 
water, irrigation water, hydroelectric watersources, etc. However, when talking about the uses and 
functions of water, we are confronted with a possible distinction between theuctual uses which 
people make of water, and thenormativelydefined functions, which give specific water resources 
a specific destination: to be used as drinking water or irrigation water, or for industrial production. 
These mative  definitions invest such water with a specific legal status. The legal statuses given 
to water may pertain to the totality of  *one  water complex’, such as a lake, a river, a well, water 
in irrigation canals, but it can refe  also to a specific volume or a proportion of such totality. Water 
‘rights’ often relate to such legally defined categoria of water, and not to the natural resource 
water as such. 
223 Water and its Environment 
AnMher important aspect in the construction of water rights is the relationship of water and the 
physical and social environment of which it is part, and of rights pertaining to other elements of 
that environment. Land, and the water on or under it, may be constructed as one comprehensive 
category of property rights, or rights to water may be derived from the right to land on which it 
is, or vice versa. From the cases of irrigation water and drinking water in this volume, it is obvious 
that the land on which the water stands, or along which it flows, or where the water source is 
located, is an integral part of peoples’ constructions of water rights. Because such rights may vary 
with the different relations of water to particular plots of land and/or technological artifacts, we 
will have to ask also questions like: to what extent are water rights conceived of as isolates or 
related torightspertainingto its environment;  towellsand thelandon which the wellsare; torivers 
or rivulet beds, or to drainage and seeping trajects or, of  course, irrigation canals, weirs, division 
blocks, tubes etc. (see also U. Pradhan 1994).  There appears to be great variety in the construction 
of water rights. Such differences in legal constructions of water or land rights influence the ways 
in which conflicts are conceptualized and disputes are framed. 
The Range of Water Rights 
Given themany different forms andfunctionsofwater it isobvious that theconceptofwaterrights 
can never he more than an “umbrella concept”, which includes quite a variety of different rights 
todifferent kindsofwater. Thereis a widerangeofdifferenttypesofrights to water, whichembody 
sanctioned social, economic and political powers of different scope and intensity. Legal systems 
define these different types of rights and lay down the conditions under which a social entity can 
or must become a right holder. These conditions may tie rights to a specific legal status such as 
being a “citizen”, a member of  a village community or  an  association like a Water Users 
Association. They may also tie the acquisition and continuation of such right to the fulfilment of 
specific obligations. This is particularly so in most irrigation systems where rights and participa- 
tion in  labour and monetary contributions to  the maintenance and repair of the system are 
intimately linked. The ‘bundle of rights’ metaphor is a useful tool for analyzing the different 
elements summarized by such an umbrella concept (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1995 with further 
references). Looking at thetotal rangeof water rights, in all societies there is somedifferentiation 
between rights to control, regulate, supervise, represent in outside relations, and regulate and 
allocate water on the one hand, and rights to use and exploit it economically on the other (see also 
Schlager and Ostrom 1992, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1995). 
Public and Private Rights 
Socio-political control rights are usually vested in institutions and positions of  socio-political 
authority which, according to peoples’ constitutional theories, represent the community. In state 
organized societies, it  is also embedded in  the  notion of  sovereignty (Beitz  1991: 243). In 
contemporary states and state legal systems, these dimensions are distinguished and systematized 
intermsofpublicandprivatelaw.Thisdistinctionis,ofcourse,  anormativeone whichnotalways 
corresponds to a clear-cut and mutually exclusive division of property rules and rights into public 
or private ones. In fact, most rights have both public and private aspects. In societies with less 
hierarchical political organizations than our state organization, there may not be such a sharp 
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and exploitation, however, usually are distinguished:‘ In many societies, these rights may also be 
construed in a layered or  tiered fashion, with supreme but largely residual rights vested in the 
highest political  authority  (the  state,  the  Crown,  the  King, the chief, the  village  republic 
government) and provisional rights derived from the residual right and delegated to public 
authorities at lower levels of political and administrative organization. ‘Communal’ or ‘common’ 
(supra4ndividual)property rights in third world societies. to varying extent, have both private and 
public aspects. 
Internal and External Water Rights 
Where groups are the holders of water rights, one will always have to look at external and internal 
water rights. External water rights specify the range of  rights of the group (the state, the village 
community, the family, the Water Users Association) in relation to individuals and groups which 
are not group-members. Internal water rights specify the rights of the group members vis-84s 
each other and the group or group representative. In the private law sphere, the external unity of 
water rights - water rights as oommon or communal property of groups ~  was translated as group 
(family) or common ownership, and the group members’ rights to the property were constructed 
in terms of European legal concepts ofjoint or co-ownership. The interpretation of local property 
rights as communal, implicitly on the basis of European legal notions of ownership obscured 
individual rights in local societies (Clammer 1973, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979, Snyder 1981, 
K. von Benda-Beckmano 1985, Wiber 1991). 
The distinctions between public and private, external and internal property relationships are 
helpful for our understandhgof individual andsupra-individual forms of property rights. Failure 
to make these distinctions has regularly led to grave misunderstandings of property rights in 
academic comparison, but aiso in theapplication of  ‘customary  law’ in the coloniesorindependent 
states in the third world. 
Rules and Principles 
Water law and waterrights are usually seen as being established by legal rules. However, the legal 
provisions that indicate the conditions under which individuals or villages have access to wxtr 
sources are rarely clear-cut rules with which one could determine whether or not such rights exist 
or must be given. Normative concepts such as “a field closer to the source has a prior right over 
the fields further away”, “first users have priority over newcomers” or “a new intake may not be 
builtinsuchawaythatitlessens  the waterintakeofexistingsystems;itmustbebuiltatasuffcient 
distance from a downstream intake” rather have the character of principles. These principles 
provide a repertoire of  accepted justifications and options for possible arrangements. But the 
principles  do not  lead  unequivocally to  specific solutions, because they  may  be  mutually 
exclusive. It is not always certain which principle has priority over another; in fact this is usually 
subject to contention and negotiation. In  the agreements and settlements that are reached in 
negotiations it is established which of  the principles are followed and in which hierarchy. In other 
words, legal principles require concretisation in terms of decision making processes aswater 
rights in relation to the concrete ecological and socio-political situation. 
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Whenspeakingabout waterrights, anotherdistinction thus has to be made. Weneed todistinguish 
the legal constructions of water rights from the actual social relationships that connect concrete 
right holding individuals, groups or associations with concrete and demarcated resources. Water 
rightsand thelegallydefinedconditionsunderwhichcertainsocial  entitiescanacquiresuchrights 
are part of water law; the actual constellation of  social relationships between concrete social 
entities and concrete water resources on the other hand are quite different social phenomena. This 
distinction isimportant.  If it is notmade, there is noroom for looking at interrelationships between 
legal  forms or types  of  property  relationships  and  the concrete  manifestations  of  property 
relationships in social and economic life. Questions concerning the relationship between types of 
water rights and their distribution cannot be dealt with systematically. For instance, whether 
certain types of property rights are likely to lead to concentration and accumulation of property 
by  a few (see Berry 1988, Bruce 1988, Sugarman 1983), whether they have stronger or lesser 
functions for social and economic security (Chambers and Leach 1989, F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1990, van de Ven 1994), or are likely to lead to more or less sustainable resource use cannot be 
answered. 
Water Rights Relationships and Other Social Relationships 
Waterrightsin thenarrowsenseofthe wordusually areintimatelyrelated withother rightsas well 
as withother social relationships. They are related to land rights, to“citizenship”rights, rights that 
establish who is an original settler and who is a newcomer, kinship, etc. Law thus embodies power 
positions and power relationships. Merely concentrating on water rights in the narrow senseis not 
sufficient to understand how water management operates: It is more useful to look  at all the rights 
and social relationships that pertain to water. In other words, an important aspect of water rights 
is the extent to which they are differentiated from other legal as well as social, political and 
economic relationships, or to which they are one aspect. 
Legal Pluralism 
Another complicating factor in the perception of water rights is the condition of “legal pluralism”, 
the situation in which in the samesocio-political units there is aplurality of normative orderind 
In a plural legal situation, constructions of water rights may be duplicatory with respect to all 
components of water rights. What water “is”, and what kind (drinking water, irrigation water) can 
be defined differently for legal purposes. Land, groundwater, irrigation water and irrigation 
infrastructure may be treated as separate property objects in one legal system, and at the same time 
as one in another. There is also variation in the construction of property holding units, of the legal 
capacity of individual persons, associations and groups. Of course, there are also differences in 
the  relations, in the types, substantive content and bundling of different rights. In many third world 
countries,  local  legal  systems in  themselves  may  be  plural.  Older  and  newer  versions  of 
“traditional”  or “customary”  property  relations  may  co-exist, and local  village  versions  of 
customary property  law may  co-exist with customary law creations of  state courts or legal 
science!  In a plural legal system there may he more than one construction of “customary law”. 
Local people are not the only category of actors which thus classify and label rules as belonging 
to a legal system. “Customary  law” in most legal systems is also a category of  which the 
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anthropological literature, therefore, it has become common to distinguish “people’s customary 
law” from “lawyers’ customary law” (see Clammer 1973; Snyder 1981; Woodman 1987). 
CUSTOMARY LAW, LOCAL LAW, AND PRACTICES 
Within the context of legal pluralism and water management, the notion of customary law is a 
problematic one because of three interrelated assumptions. First, many researchers start from the 
assumption that in every society or ethnic group there exists a coherent set of norms that can be 
labelled customary or traditional law. These ‘deeply ingrained‘ legal systems are supposed to 
govern local peoples’ hehaviour as  well as their response to outside intervention. Second, all law 
which is not enacted and applied by state institutions usually is conceived of being “customary” 
law, that is based upon customary behaviour patterns that find their origin and legitimation in 
history. Third, in the notion of customary law, law and behaviour or practices ate considered to 
be more or less identical. The terms customary law and customary practices are often used 
interchangeably. As some of the studies presented in this volume show, these assumptions are not 
warranted, and therefore provide a unproductive guide for devising research as well as policy. 
Local Law 
From the studies carried out by  the IIMI-FREEDEAL team it has become apparent that all 
researchers were confronted with the problem that in real life, even in the most isolated villages, 
different kinds of rules co-exist. Customary or traditional rules of behaviour, of allocating and 
distributing water rights are, and probably always have been, intermingled with norms emanating 
from other sources of  power and authority, generated outside local communities, such as  the state 
and government agencies, or religious teachings at various levels. If welook at the totality of rules 
andnormsinruralcommunities,  weseethatsomenormsarecustomary,inthesenseofbeing  based 
upon long-standing and hardly changed traditions. Others have only recently come into existence 
and are not customary in this sense but also accepted as valid. They may be adaptations of earlier 
state or customary rules, or new forms of self regulation. Yet other norms are derived from the law 
of the state or government agencies. The same holds true for the institutions involved in water 
management. Some are based in traditional leadership positions and councils, others, like Water 
Users Associations, are quite recent institutional developments in which state administrative 
regulation with more traditional ideas over decision making powers are amalgamated. We suggest 
that this totality of  legal regulation in specific local settings be called ‘kcal law”. 
This local ‘mix’ of legal rules usually does not form a uniform and consistent system. There may 
be different interpretations of local law and of state law used at the same time. Much of the law 
consists of very general and abstract principles which allows many different interpretations when 
applied to a concrete situation. Moreover, original settlersmay have different interpretations from 
newcomers; persons from lower classes have different interpretations than higher classes; full 
time farmers may have different notions than villagers who work in government service. And 
some persons expect more protection from the law of the state, however distorted their knowledge 
ofstatelawmaybe,thantheyexpectfromcustomarylaw.Theywill  trytoplayoffstatelawagainst 
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M. and R. Pradhan (in this volume). Villagers who did not have access to irrigation water before 
the rehabilitation of the system took place claim that the customary first rights of other villagers 
were extinguished because the authority over the canal was transferred to the Government. They 
reason that, since the rehabilitation of the canal was a government project, the canal no longer is 
the property of  the existing right holders but of the State. Therefore they should now be given 
access to the canal according to state law, an access which was denied to them under customary 
law. Whether or not this was acorrect interpretation of state law is not relevant here. In fact, with 
the help of Panchayat officials, and perhaps some other advisors in the local irrigation offices and 
other local experts, they appear to have thought up an entirely new legal device, which they 
attributed to the state legal system, alegal device which, if accepted, becomes part of the repertoire 
of local law. 
Many of researchers have been struck by  the ease and frequency with which people move from 
one kind of law to another and by the fact that different persons give different interpretations of 
local or customary rights, depending on their social position and the situation at hand. The whole 
constellation of norms, that are expressed and used at the local level, appears to be far more 
complex and dynamic than was originally expected. 
Customary Law 
This emphasis on the existence of local law does not mean, of course, that the notion of customary 
law could be replaced by the notion of local law, or that customary law would play no role of 
significance in rural communities. But customary law can be, and often is used in two meanings: 
The first meaning is  a descriptivecharacterization of rules: One speaks of customary rules because 
these rules have been accepted and used for a long time. In the second sense, customary law refers 
to a system of legal rules so named. The use of customary law, without further qualificalion, thus 
can be very confusing  because not all customary rules  in the first sense need to be part of 
“customary law”; while not all rules said to be part of “customary law” need to be customary. 
Moreover, as we have mentioned before, there may exist different ideas about “customary law” 
in villages and court settings (see Spiertz and De Jong 1992). 
Thus when we look at the relationship between customary and local law, we can be faced with 
different situations. Many elements of local law may be customary in the first sense, based upon 
an (assumed) continuity of local legal tradition. Such rules and principles may, but need not be 
incorporated into the systemic category of “customary law”. Generally speaking, “customary 
law”, or differentconstructions ofcustomary law, is part of the legal pluralism which provides the 
ingredients from which local law is shaped. 
Customary Law and Customary Practices 
Another source of possible confusion comes forth from the assumption that customary law and 
customary practices are identical. The terms are often used synonymously. This can mean two 
different things. 
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customary law and the type of behaviour to which the rules and principles refer, that is customary 
behaviour patterns which are in conformity with customary law. Whether or not this is the case 
can only be determined by empirical research. Such research will have to answer the following 
questions:(l) whatare therelevantbehavioursin thefieldweareinterestedin?(2)isthisbehaviour 
customary, inthe  sense of continuing historically earlierbehavioral patterns?, (3) is this behaviour 
in conformity with rules and principles that are held to be part of customary law and, moreover, 
whose customary law? It should be stressed that one certainly  cannot simply assume such 
congruence, and many cases reported in the contributions to this volume show this clearly. 
Secondly it can mean that within normative constructions, for instance in court decision making 
or academic writings, no distinction is made between customary law and practices. This can be 
the case, as  for instance in the case of Yampa Phant - Satrasay Phant case as reported by IIMI/Free 
Deal in theirpreliminaryreport, thecourt actually says that adisputeshould be solved by reference 
to “previous practices”. Here practicepatrerns  are given legal relevance; whether or not these 
patterns coincide with legal rules or principles is not in debate. This normative statement is a fact 
by  itself; whether  such normative statement reflects a corresponding actual congruence is a 
different question which again can only be answered by empirical research. 
LAW, BEHAVIOUR AND DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 
The mereexistence  oflegal  rules andprinciples, whether originating fromgovernment legislation, 
tradition or contemporary local law making, do  not justify to draw direct conclusions with respect 
to the behaviour of people. They only become significant when people - farmers, government 
officials, project managers - orient their behaviour towards these rules when this orientation thus 
becomes one of the factors which influences their behaviour in matters of water management or 
indecisionmakingprocesses.  Thisoften is thecase whenpeoplequiteconsciously follow the ideas 
embodied  in  legal  rules.  However,  the plural  legal  situation  complicates  matters,  because 
following one rule, state law, often means contravening another, local or customary law. In plural 
legal contexts we therefore are always confronted with the question oftherelarivesignificance of 
one type of legal rules in relation to others, apart from the question which other, non-legal factors, 
play a role. 
Legal rules and principles do not only become significant in water management if people behave 
according to the rules. Even when people’s practices deviate from legal rules, they may function 
asasourceofpositiveornegativemotivation. Andlegalrules are usedtolegitimateclaims to water 
or land when water rights are problematic or contested, and when people negotiate water rights 
or submit their contradictory claims to an institution with decision making authority. In ordinary 
lifeandactivities,ordinarypeopleusuallydonotreflectmuchonthelegalbasisoftheirright.They 
do not specify whether they think they have a right to water according to state law, to customary 
law or even to religious law and there usually is no need for doing so. But this is different when 
rights become seriously contested in disputing processes. Claims have to be justified, and this 
usually has to be done by reference to legal rules and principles. People may do  so directly on the 
basis of their own knowledge of the rules involved, but they may also refer to experts or their 
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of ordinary people. This is commonly recognized in relation to state law, which is primarily the 
domain of lawyers and administrators. But for customary law there are also many different kinds 
of self-proclaimed or recognized experts, among them local wise-men, priests, researchers, 
administratorsor lawyers. Some basetheirexpertiseonanintimateknowledgeoflocalconditions, 
others on sacred texts, yet others on academic or administrative status. In arena’s like courts, the 
government administration, and parliament, hut also in irrigation projects, these authoritative 
expert versions of cdstomary law often become a powerful means of promoting or defending 
specific interests and constructing rights, quite irrespective of the local law on the ground. 
Disputes 
Such negotiations often develop into conflicts and lead to disputing. Researchers therefore quite 
rightly paid much attention to disputes. For a number of reasons, it is an important field of study. 
First, because disputing may occur frequently in the management and use of water management. 
Moreover, in disputes legal arguments, rights and obligations become discursive and are most 
clearly articulated by the contending parties, as well as by a decision making authority. Thirdly, 
the processofnegotiating anddecisionmaking shows us whichare therelevantdisputeprocessing 
institutions, which of the often contradictory versions of law are selected as being valid and in 
which way  abstract rules and principles are concretized in a specific problematic situation? 
Finally, the study of disputes and dispute processing are a rich source of information ahout the 
significance of law within and outside the court context. This last point can he illustrated with the 
case Lilinath Acharya and Ramhari Archaya vs Durga Prasad Acharya (Civil registration 341184 
2048/9/23 - 2050/5/9).8 
Two years before thedisputecame tocourt, thedefendant. who hadinheritedland, started 
to cultivatericeon his inherited property. Plaintiffs, also relatives of the deceased person, 
claimed that as a result they had too little water to irrigate their land, and that their crops 
were damaged as  aconsequence. They also claimed that their irrigation water came form 
a reserve that was built upon the land of the deceased person, and accused the defendant 
of  having destroyed the reserve and blocked a rivulet that allegedly conducted water to 
their fields. They also accused the defendant of  illegally turning un-irrigated upland 
@akho)into irrigated lowland (kket) and starting to grow rice, and by  doing so taking 
away water from the neighhours downstream, who then no longer could grow rice. 
Whathecomesclearinthecaseisthat whatusedtobetwodifferentfields, withorwithout 
a rivulet in between, was later registered as one field. This was a useful way of including 
the rivulet into the field and that in turn made it possible for the defendant to claim that 
he legitimately used water because it sprang from his own field. It looks very much like 
an evasion of water rules which say that you are not allowed to take water upstream if that 
hinders prior users downstream, and which forbids un-irrigated up-land to he converted 
into irrigated low-land if there is not enough water for the already existing irrigated low- 
land. By registering the two plots as  one, the water was redefined as water from the own 
field. This was perhaps not entirely without reason, because on tke field were several 
springs, at least some of the water was from the field itself. 
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the role of  law in disputes. They concern the way in which legally relevant facts are constructed, 
the transformation processes which disputes undergo when various institutions deal with them, the 
options  available  forums  of  dispute management, and  the implementation  of  authoritative 
decisions. 
Construction of Legally Relevant Facts 
Most disagreements in legal disputes (in whatever country) are about matters of evidence, and 
about questions of whether certain behaviour is or is not in accordance with a specific norm (K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1984). The validity of the general content of a rule or principle as such is 
much less frequently contested. As the Lilinath case shows, all persons involved, parties as well 
as witnesses, use otherwise uncontested norms to emphasize why certain behaviour is or is not 
justified. 
In this case, disagreement is not so much ahout the validity of  a general rule, but about 
the question whether certain behaviour or Occurrences fall under the working of a rule. 
Nobody denies thatpahko cannot be turned intokhet if downstreamkhet will not receive 
sufficient water as a consequence. The question is whether turning a particular field into 
Met does reduce the water of downsveamkhet-fields. And whether levelling out a field 
means in fact destruction of  a reserve and blocking a rivulet, or whether levelling is 
standard behaviour of a farmer who inherited a piece of  land and starts cultivation. And 
whether water used to come from the disputed land onto the land of the plaintiffs. Some 
witnesses in support of the defendant deny this to be the case, others say that sometimes 
some waterdoes flowover, but that ismerely surplus waterreleasedfromthedefendant’s 
land, suggesting that it is not water that was always used by the plaintiffs to irrigate their 
land, but merely to get rid of the superfluous water himself. 
Studying the claims and defenses of parties and the testimonies of witnesses thus may reveal a lot 
about  customary  norms  and  about  the  way  ordinary  people  use  these  norms  to  evaluate 
occurrences or actions for their legal relevance, and in order to  justify certain behaviour. Law is 
away toconstruct legallyrelevantfacts, a way of ‘imaginingthereal’.  asClifford Geertz hasnoted 
(1983). It is also a legitimating device, to be used and manipulated in different settings, whether 
in courts, before government agencies, or village institutions, whether by civil servants, ordinary 
farmers, village leaders, or waterofficials. This is one way in which legal rules obtain significance 
in the dispute processes. However, theclaims, counter arguments, testimonies andjudgements tell 
us little about whether and how these norms motivated actual behaviour that is now underscrutiny. 
Why it is that the two fields were registered as one, or why claimants went to court, cannot be 
deduced from these rules. 
The Transformation of Social Conflicts 
The subject matter which is openly disputed in processes of  negotiations and decision making, 
however, is not necessarily theconflict whichmakes therelationship between parties problematic. 
In this case it seems that behind the water dispute another dispute is lurking. 
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of the defendant had been accused by the plaintiffs of theft of jewelry, but it could not 
be proven. The  defendant, a farmer, feels himself and his family harassed by the plaintiff 
and his wife whohaveapositionascivil servants. Oneofthe witnesses, a ‘servant’,even 
qualified the same behaviour as a ‘conspiracy’, again using a different idiom. 
What looks like a mere water dispute, may also be a dispute about social relations and standing 
amongstrelatives, about inheritance, orvillagepolitics,  and perhaps muchmore which theofficial 
court material does not reveal. In general it can be said, and Nepal is no exception, that what 
appears to  be the main issue in court is not necessarily the most important point, and may turn out 
to be only marginally relevant in the village setting. 
Such transformation of the underlying social conflict may be due to the way the courts operates. 
The court may disregard the underlying social conflict and reduce it to its ‘legally relevant’ 
aspects. Case material collected in-court usually gives only one part of the whole story and further 
field research, difficult as it may he, is needed to reveal the full scope of the conflict (Felstiner, 
Abel, Sarat 1980; K. vonBenda-Beckmann 1984).  Butatransfonnationofthedisputemay bealso 
due to the strategies of the parties who willingly or inadvertedly mispresent the underlying social 
conflict in court (see Cohn 1967).  Thus, a conflict between neighbours may turn into a disputc 
about theft, brought before the police, a dispute about water stealing, brought before a group of 
village elders, and perhaps later before the civil court. Conflicts over land rights may be presented 
as water rights disputes, and vice versa. 
Disputes do not always lead to authoritative decisions. Many are resolved through negotiations, 
ending in compromises between the involved parties. Negotiation and decision making processes 
over water rights inevitably  become involved in wider networks of power relationships  and 
become strongly affected by the relationshipbetween thedifferentpowerholders. As appears from 
many case studies in this book, ‘good’ relationships between zamindars in different systems or 
villages, if strengthened by relations of common descent or affinity, may facilitate easy negotia- 
tions of intricate problems. ‘Bad’ relationships may make the settlement oftrivial disagreements 
impossible. Water disputes - ‘inter system disputes’ thus can turn to become disputes between 
‘rightist’ and ‘leftist’ villages. The stability of compromises therefore is largely determined by the 
stability of the power network in which negotiations were carried out. Changes in the network, 
shifts in  power  balances  between jurisdictions and changes  in  their personal  composition, 
tendentially  favour  attempts  to negate  on earlier  decisions.  The changes in  ecological  and 
agricultural developments regularly provide occasions that can be readily taken up by the person 
intending to change earlier decisions anyway (see Shukla et al. in this volume, K. von Benda- 
Beckmann, J. Spiertz and F. von Benda-Beckmann 1996). 
Choice of Forums for Dispute Settlement 
The way disputes are being treated, the forum in which they are processed, and their outcome 
depends, of course, on the kind of rules that are applied by the institution of dispute management. 
But is also depends on the type of relationships disputants, witnesses, mediators or adjudicators 
have in other social settings. For example, one of the witnesses of the Lilinath case, who was 
equallyclosely relatedto bothparties, remainedvery vaguein histestimony, while theothers were 
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cousins, neighbours, and members ofa  waterusers’ organisation, tend to keep theirdisputes within 
the village setting and do not easily go to court (Yngvesson 1985, Nader and Todd 1978, K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1981). People having more simplex social relations, tend to go to external 
institutions more easily. Also differences in political and economic power are crucial for our 
understanding of  the questions whether, by  whom and with which success decision making 
authorities, functionaries of village institutions or state courts, can be mobilized, and what this 
means for %distribution  of water rights. From other legal anthropological research it is known 
that the powerless have far more difficulty in mobilize law and legal institutions, whether state 
institutions or other, to defend their interests than for the powerful. The wealthy and powerful are 
better equipped to bring their disputes before the institution that applies the kind of rules that 
support their position best. It certainly is not unusual that poor peasants successfully invoke the 
law of the state against the interests of the powerful landowners, as happened in the Dang case (M. 
andR. Pradhan inthisvolume). Butthat doesnotmean thatthey manage toimplementafavourable 
decision (Silliman 1981-1982; Turk 1978; Galanter 1974; Nader and Todd 1978). 
The Implementation of  Court Decisions 
It is generally assumed that court decisions are implemented in the way the court, or another 
institution authorized to make decisions, has ruled. However, research bas shown that many 
decisions are not implemented at all or in a very different manner (see  for Indonesia, for instance, 
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1985).  In order to assess the real impact of courts and other institutions, 
it is not enough to look at how frequently people turn to a court, it is also necessary to study the 
‘post-decision  stage’ of  a case. Such a study reveals that courts and other institutions, though they 
make a decision, may not be very successful in settling a dispute. Court decisions may not  be 
carried out at all and many years after the court has made a decision, a dispute may flare up again, 
because some of the central actors have come to a powerful position and think they can turn the 
balance in their favour. 
IMPLICATIONS: HOW DOES PLANNING BENEFIT FROM 
RESEARCH ? 
Where do these insights leave us when we try to suggest how improvements of  the existing 
situations could be made, and by which means? In contemporary development policy it is seen as 
important to involve local people in the process of change and development intervention as well 
as take their customary institutions and laws seriously into account. Most of the research projects 
share this development philosophy. and, generally speaking, so do we. However, the above 
considerations show us that we move in a complex field of problems and dilemmas where no easy 
general answers can be expected. The expression “to take customary rules and practices into 
account” is itself ambivalent. In one sense, which we call thenormative sense, it means that such 
rules and practices should be recognized asdeserving vdidiv, as valuable elements in the overall 
context of water management organization. But to take into account can also mean: seeing them 
as  relevant factors in the multitude of factorsthat togetherconstitute present reality, independent 
of any normative or moral evaluation. Obviously, both evaluations must be interrelated, because 
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based upon an evaluation of its substantive content as well as its social functions. In the following 
we want to spell out some of the implications of our analysis. 
Taking Customary Law into Account in the Normative Sense 
When one talks about taking customary law and practices into account in the normative sense, one 
usuallydoes soout oftheconvictionthat thesenorms areanexpressionofthepeople’sownvalues, 
and that intervention andlegislation have to avoidmeasures that would weaken or contradict them. 
This normative assumption, we think, underlies many of the research and policy objectives of the 
water rights projects (such as the IIMn FREEDEAL project) which are reported in this volume. 
Customary law is often taken to be inherently democratic, egalitarian, equitable and therefore to 
deserve to be supported, while state law or government regulations are not. Yet there is ample 
evidence from all research projects that unequal power relationships greatly affect the ways in 
which water is distributed and managed and the extent to which norms are being followed. All 
researchers have come across examples of powerful figures who took water before their turn, who 
chasedaway poorer people, although they hadaright todraw water, whodid not participate in the 
maintenance, who dug a channel without permission or blocked an intake or a rivulet, and who 
even successfully tried to change the distribution rules in their favour. In some instances, this may 
an arbitrary (ab)use of power by individuals or groups, breaches of local andor  customary law by 
powerful people. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that local law establishes and legitimizes 
many differences in political power and rights over land and water resources. Unequal access to 
watermay bearesultof ‘legal’unequallanddistribution,  whichin turn isaresultofrulesofkinship 
and inheritance and local forms of social stratification. Since such differences often have a basis 
in religious rules and categories (such as caste), these legal elements are often not seen as forming 
part of customary law, and therefore are easily neglected. Yet they are very customary, and they 
are very significant at local level. 
Thus questions that seem not immediately relevant for the study of waterrights come into focus 
such as: Are ‘the people’, or ‘the farmers’ a homogeneous category? Is there social stratification? 
How are powerpositions supported by customary law?  Who are the social, economic and political 
elites? This then leads to questions concerning waterrights proper, such as: Are rights to water 
different for different social classes? Different  for men  and women?  Different for original 
occupants and newcomers? Different for people of different caste? And, very important, who 
profits from the existing arrangements? Almost all research projects have shown that there is a 
fundamental difference between original occupants, settlers, water users, and latecomers. Some- 
times latecomers have obtained a strong political position, as research by IAAS has shown for 
some parts of the Terai, and have thus also obtained better water rights than in parts where 
latecomers belong to the lower classes (see Shukla el al. in this volume). The IIMUFREEDEAL 
project has also shown that women usually do not have rights to irrigation water on their own 
account. Widows and divorced women have difficulties obtaining, or keeping access to water. For 
example, widows or divorced women are discriminated against in rotational distribution systems 
of water allocation. They may get a turn to water, but only at night. Low1 gender inequality is 
further enhanced by the fact that maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, intimately related to 
access rights, is very much a maleconcern. And the research has shown that there may be conflicts 
between rights to  drinking water - female domain - and rights to irrigation water - a male domain. 
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Moreover, in disputes andcontacts with outside agencies, women are usually in a weaker position 
because men tend to function as the main intermediaries and brokers in the communication and 
interaction channels to these agencies (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1990/91). These differences in 
political  and economic power also play an important role with respect to access to dispute 
management institutions. Local law thus may not be democratic at all, though it may be more 
flexible and adjustable than stale law. This does not mean that local law is less equitable than the 
laws of the state or vice versa. In some respects local regulations may be more equitable and in 
others state regulation. The point is that only a careful examination of both state law and local law 
as used and applied in actual practice brings out the relative strengths and weaknesses of each kind 
of law. 
What is to be Recognized: Customary Law or Local Law ? 
The normative validation of customary rules, rights and principles is problematic also in another 
respect. When state legislators, judges, or sympathetic researchers are open to give more official 
recognition and sanction to  non-state law, they tend to think of  non-state law only  in legal 
categories such as “customary law” or “ancient or previous practices”. Such constructions of 
customary law and customary rights are dogmatic constructions, usually only validated under the 
condition that they can be considered to be the historically grown rights at local level, free from 
interference of outside agencies such as the administrative agencies and if it is sustained by actual 
practiceP At the same time these constructions are often framed in such language that they can be 
accommodatedin theconceptual framework ofthe statelegal system. Inmany contextsofruleand 
decision making of !he  state apparatus, it is these dogmatic constructions which count, and not the 
norms and values described in ordinarypeople’s own terms. Government legislators orjudges may 
have little use for some ‘local’ law, certainly if social practices are not in accordance with these 
rules. This is nothing they wish to give validity to in the dominant legal framework they are 
operating in. But even if they wanted to, they may find it almost impossible to take it into account: 
As we have seen, there may be no generally accepted local law and what there is may not go back 
to ancient tradition. 
This poses a dilemma upon researchers and legal advisors, who sympathize with local law, and 
who often are the persons who have, and want to produce the necessary evidence on customary 
law. lfthey want tomakelocallawrelevant  inthecourtandpolicycontexts, they may have toadapt 
and thus change and distort their findings. framing them in a language which will be more readily 
accepted by policy makers. If not, they may risk that policy makers and judges will not find their 
researchevidence relevant in their own frameworkof ‘customary  law’ relevance!OThe researcher 
is thus easily attempted to change roles from academic scholar to an advocate for customary law, 
and risks becoming a bad  scholar; or he remains a research scholar and risks becoming an 
unsuccessful advocate. The decision will usually be a pragmatic and political one; social science 
cannot help making this choice. 
Customary or Local Law as Significant Factors 
But whatever choice one makes in this dilemma, and however one may value local law and 
practices, they have to be taken into account as part of the elements which constitute reality. In 
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explanatory factors. Caste differences as normative principles, in combination with differences in 
economic wealth and political power, still largely determine access to water and the distribution 
of water and maintenance activities. Differences in land ownership determine differences in 
access to water. We may all wish these factors were irrelevant and we may not want to take them 
into account in the sense of accepting or legitimating their normative validity. Yet it is a factor not 
likely to disappear if 'not recognized', a factor that very likely will influence the consequences of 
whatever intervention is proposed." 
This leads us back to re-examine what the reality to be changed is in our conceptualization of the 
problems and questions of research, and how local or customary law is seen as a factor influencing 
this reality. Do research questions aim at explanation in addition to description? For instance, the 
overall goal of the IIMIlFree Deal project is 'enhancing local management ... and bring ahout 
equitable and productive development of water resource use'. It also assumes that 'customary 
practices must he taken account in legislation; otherwisepractical problems will arise'. This seems 
to imply that, if local management is enhanced, equitable and productive development of water 
resources will be possible. Or that, if  laws were formulated with the proper understanding of 
customary practices,  less  practical  problems  will  arise.  Implicit  in  these  statements is the 
assumption that most problems are aresull  of government intervention that did not follow existing 
regulations. While government regulation undoubtedly can be blamed for alotof problems, it does 
not seem entirely warranted to put all the blame there. What thenis the assumed influence of 
customary rights and practices on local conditions? A positive one under which water manage- 
ment is more equitable and efficient? Or a negative one, causing the conditions to be changed? 
How have local laws changed, and why? 
It seems to us that these questions must be answered before policy options are envisaged. Even 
where research is action and future oriented, historical and explanatory research must be carried 
out. For only such insights make it possible to work out feasible future scenarios. The  explanatory 
questions become especially important when we look at the policy objectives which we all share, 
a concern for a just, sustainable and efficient management and use of  water. Thinking through 
realistic possibilities for future developments, we need an understanding of what the role of local 
law and practices has been in these respects. A somewhat romantic picture of local affairs - if only 
left in peace to unfold their creative possibilities - on closer examination may turn out to be 
unrealistic as far as the nature and functioning of customary law with respect to these objectives 
is concerned. To be sure, such an attitude may not he entirely without ground. The researches 
carried out by IAAS researchers and their colleagues from Indiana University have shown, for 
example, that in general farmer managed irrigation systems function  technically better than 
government operated systems (Lam, Lee and Ostrom 1994). This seems to suggest that customary 
law in this realm deserves support. But the research that has been done gives us also ground for 
doubt, for it does not mean that farmer managed systems are good in equal distribution. Could it 
be that these systems function better than agency managed systems, precisely  because of the 
political and economic power differences shaped by local, or customary law? In the heat of the 
defense of suppressed people, it is easily forgotten that they may he as much suppressed by their 
own elites as by government agencies, and that efficiency does not necessarily imply equity. 
This poses another dilemma which can only be solved by a political choice and for which social 
sciences do not provide a solution. Are we primarily interested in sustainable management of 
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contradictory concerns forequily, sustainahility, and national economicgrowth?  Wishing to attain 
all three objectives in a well-balanced way will not remove the actual constraints. Depending on 
the choice we make, the kind of intervention would be different. The equity issue is particularly 
difficult because rights to water, as we have seen, are so intimately related to wider sociopolitical 
organization. If, therefore, to bring about equity would require farmore fundamental changes than 
seemsfeasible, a further choice has to bemade, leading into thedirection ofkedistribution of water, 
and, given the close connection of water rights with land rights, probably also of land. But we may 
take the local social-political constellation and the ways a local community is embedded in wider 
social and political networks for granted and make improvements within these margins. Even if 
the actual improvements wouldperhapsremainrather  marginal, they could still bevery significant 
if we would base our goals and expectations  on arealistic analysis of the local situations, including 
the complexity of the interrelations between law and practices. 
CONCLUSION 
The complexity that emerges from research, and in particular from the research in this volume, 
cannot he directly applied or fully incorporated into restatements or changes of the law by policy 
makers or, in individual cases, by judges. But such research does provide a more adequate picture 
of local reality and provide some valuable explanatory insight into the reasons and causes which 
have led to the current situation. It will also provide some indications about the probable course 
of events in the future if no specific intervention would take place. And it will help forming a 
realistic assessment of the most likely outcomes of newly planned interventionist measures. All 
these are important preconditions for responsible policy making. While research does not contain 
clear directives for policy, and while it cannot provide guarantees for success, it allows for a 
realistic consideration of policy alternatives and their probable intended and unintended conse- 
quences. These considerations may he pretty pessimistic ones, for they may point to necessary 
changes that are politically  nearly impossible to achieve. But this is pessimistic only if one 
compares a more realistic assessment withroo optimistic expectations of social scienceandpolicy 
making. Thus, at the end, we come back again to Weber’s warning mentioned in the beginning of 
the introduction to this volume: Science is in the position to show what people could reasonably 
wish todo, and what wereasonahlycanexpectto be theconsequences oftheiractions. Butitcannot 
tell them, what  they have to wish and to do. Decision and action is left to (individual) choice and 
decision making (Baumgarten 1973:xxxv, rephrasing Max Weber 1917).  But in order to be able 
to make such choices, it is necessary that planning and research are continuing, and mutually 
dependent activities. It cannot be that research is a one time activity, after which one knows 
customary or local law for ever. Local law is dynamic and so are the interrelationships between 
law and social practices. Every time new policies are beingproposed, new research is needed. This 












This paper is a revised  version  of  the  one presented  at the IIMI-FREEDEAL-WAU-EUR- 
workshop on Water Rights. Conflict and Policy, Kathmandu, January 22-24, 1996. 
F. vonBenda-Beckmannisprofessoroflaw  indevelopingcountriesattheDepartmentof  Agrarian 
Law of the Agricultural University Wageningen, The Netherlands. J. Spiertz also teaches law in 
developing countries in  the same department. K.  von  Benda-Beckmann  is  senior lecturer  in 
anthropology of law at the Sanders Institute, Facultyof Law. ofErasmus University Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands. 
Hitchcock says this to characterize the Botswana grazing land policy. but it has a farmore general 
validity, see also Dove 1986 with respect to Indonesia's agricultural policy. Bowen 1986 speaks of 
'motivated misrecognition'. 
SeeF.  vonBenda-Beckmann 1979:43,Thisdistinctionisnotnew,  andmost anthropologists report 
empirical manifestations  in the  societies they study. For further references  see F. von Benda- 
Beckmann 1995. 
There is a multitude of literature, both empirically andor conceptually and analytically oriented. 
See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979.1992. For systematic treatments of the conceptual questions. see 
Vanderlinden  1971.1989. Griffiths 1986, Merry 1988. 
See K. van Benda-Beckmann 1984, Woodman 1987. 
This is the main reason why decision making processes in disputes have become an important 
subject in the (legal anthropological) study of unwritten local laws; unwritten law even was defined 
as those rules and principles that could be observed as 'showing their teeth' in decision making. We 
should add, though. that lawyers and anthropologists interested in law tended to overemphasize the 
importance of  disputes, neglecting  the significance  of  legal mles and  principles  in  other.  not 
conflictive contexts. It is therefore certainly one of the virtues of the research projects that come 
together here, that they all includebothdisputesandordinary social lifein theirresearch (seeHoebel 
1954. Pospisil1971;Epstein 1967.  For critiques of the trouble-less approach see Holleman 1973;  F. 
von Benda-Beckmann  1979; K. van Benda-Beckmann 1984, with further references. 
This case was collected and translated for us by our colleagues from the Free DeaUllMl project. 
In UttarPradesh. the problem is morecomplicatedbecauseofthesettlementsthatweredocumented 
inthelate 19thcentury.Today, theseareconsideredtobe'the'customarylaw,  although, asthe DCAP 
project has shown, they have litlle to do with presently valid local norms and values. The Nepal 
situation seems tobedifferent. since thereare nosettlements. In Nepal the term "ancient orprevious 
practices" seems to be used by state agencies. However, in both concepts references to the past are 
crucial. 
The anthropologist Ken Maddock has discussed this dilemma in a very vivid manner with respect 
to the land-rights question of Australian Aborigines (Maddock 1986). 
The sketched dilemma also suggests that researchers should be careful to frame their findings in 
such a way that chances are as small as possible that their own work will be used  as a kind of 
settlement. This has happened in various parts of the world. Anthropologists such as lsaak Shapira 
and Hans Holleman who worked in southem Africa noted to their surprise that their book was used 
in court as a standard description of customary law as if it were a law book, instead of a book about 
law. This cannot be avoided, of course. Once a book is out, there is no way  that its use can be 
controlled, fortunately not. But it does mean that one has to be extremely careful in pointing out that 
the report refers to one place and one time and that local law changes all the time. 
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242 ANNEXURE I 
Programme  Schedule 
Workshopon 
Water Rights, Conflict and Policy 
January 22-24, 1996, Kathmandu. 
DAY I:  JANUARY 22 
9:15  - 1O:OO  Registration 
1000  - 1030  OPENING CEREMONY 






1030  - 11:OO  TEA BREAK 
THEME I: 
11:OO  - 1:oo  SESSION I:  Law, Policy, Rights 
Chairperson: 
Discussant: 
Welcome Address by Ajaya Dixit, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation 
Objectives of the Workshop by Dr. K. A. Haq, Acting Head, IIMJ/Nepal 
Speech by the Chief Guest Mr. Ratneshwor Lal Kayastha, Joint Secretary, MOWR 
Speech by Dr. Ujjwal Pradhan, Program Officer, Ford Foundation 
Vote of Thanks by  Dr. Rajendra Pradhan, Consultant, IIMUNepal 
WATER RIGHTS:  STATE, LAW AND POLICY 
Surya Nath Upadhaya, Secretary, (M E & P) 
Rajendra Kishore Khatri, Under Secretary, Ministry of  Water Resources 
*  Water Use and Water Rights in Nepal: Legal Perspective 
Shantam S.  Khadka (FREEDEAL) 
*  Water Rights 
Bharath Iairaj (CEL WWF -India) 
Floor Discussion 
l:oo - 230  LUNCH BREAK 
243 230  - 500  SESSION Il:  State, Policy and Rights 
Chairperson:  Dr. Binayak Bhadra (CEDA) 
Discussant: 
* 
Dr. Ujjwal Pradhan (Ford Foundation) 
Inter-Sectoral Water Allocation and Competition: Nature of Emerging Stress in the 
Upper Bagmati Basin. 
Ajaya Dixit (Nepal Water Conservation Foundation) 
*  Delhi’s Groundwater: Rights and Policy 
Bharath Jairaj (CEL WWF - India) 
3:30 - 345  TEA BREAK 
Discussant:  Nasiruddin Ansari, Deputy Team Leader, ILC 
*  Laws,  Rights  and  Equity:  Implications of  State Intervention in  Farmer  Managed 
Irrigation Systems. 
RajendraPradhan (IIMI), K. Azharul Haq (IIMI) and Ujjwal Pradhan (Ford Foundation) 
Floor Discussion 
DAY 2:  JANUARY 23 
9:30 - 12:OO  SESSION 111:  Customary Laws and Rights 
Chairperson:  Mr. Govinda Das Shrestha 
Discussant:  Prof. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, De[t. of Agrarian Law (WAU) 
*  Customary Water Rights in Current Water Resources Administration in Kumaon and 
Garhwal, Uttar Pradesh. 
M.S. Vani, DCAP, India 
*  Customary Water Law of Lianghai Naga in West District of Manipur. 
Liangsi Niurnai, New Delhi 
10  30  ~  10: 45 
Discussant: 
TEA BREAK 
Dr. K. Azharul Haq (IIMI) 
*  Local Law and Customary Practices in the Study of Water Rights 
Prof. Franz von Benda-Beckmann (WUA), Dr. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (EUR), 
Dr. Joep Spiertz (WUA) 
244 Floor Discussion 
12: 00  - 1:30 
THEME II:  WATER  RIGHTS:  CONFLICT  AND  CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 




M. M. Shrestha (DDG, DOI) 
Dr. Khem Raj Sharma, (Chief, RTDB, DOI) 
*  Water Management, Conflict and Conflict Management: Water Rights in a Farmer- 
Managed Irrigation System in Tanahu 
Durga K.C. and Rajendra Pradhan (IIMI) 
*  Conflict as a Means of Acquiring and Protecting Water Rights: Case Study of Conflicts 
in Dang. 
Mahesh Pradhan and Rajendra Pradhan (IIMI) 
Floor Discussion 
3:15 - 3:30  TEA BREAK 





Hon’ble Justice Om Subedi, Appellate Court 
Ganesh Raj Sharma, Senior Advocate 
The Court System in Nepal 
Ram Chandra Bhattarai (FREEDEAL) 
*  Water Related Cases in the Supreme Court (1980-1990) 
Bishal Khanal (FREEDEAL) 
Judicial Trends in Water Law: A Case Study 




245 DAY 3 :  JANUARY 24 
9:30 - 12:OO  SESSION VI:  Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
Chairperson: 
Discussant:  Dr. Jagdish Pokharel (CADR) 
Prof. Kailash Nath Pyakuryal (T.U.) 
*  Fanners Managed Irrigation Systems and Dispute Resolution Practices in Nepal 
Gehendra Malla and Shantam S. Khadka (FREEDEAL) 
Formal and Informal Institutions for Arbitration on Water Right Issues: Cases from East 
Chitwan 
A. Shukla, G.  Shivakoti, N.R. Joshi (IAAS, Rampur) 
* 
10: 30 - 10: 45 
Discussant  Dr. Jagdish Pokhrel 
246s 
TEA BREAK 
Conflict Resolution in Natural Resources Management 
Ruchi Pant, New Delhi 
Floor Discussion 
1230  - 1:30  LUNCH  BREAK 












3:30 - 345  TEA Break 
3:45 - 415  Closing Remarks: 
Dr. Ujjwal Pradhao (Ford Foundation) & Dr K. A. Haq (IIMIWepal) 
Vote of  Thanks: Kanak Bikram Thapa (FREEDEAL) 
The Significance  of Water Rights Study for Water Resource Management 
Dr. Ujjwal Pradhan, Ford Foundation 
Mr. Chitra Deo Bhatta, National Planning Commission 
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Legal Research and Development Forum (FREEDEAL) 
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Cornell University-Nepal, Study Program 
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CARE/Nepal 
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Butwal Power Company 
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